

ISRAEL VOL 12
(MAR 73 - OCT 73)

2

0 7 1 0
DECLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
14a	memo	Jennings to Kissinger	7/27/73	B
14B	transmittal slip	Glueck to Robertson w/ attachments	2/7/73	B
21	memo	Memorandum For Record	5/19/73	B
31	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
32	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
33	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
35	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/26/73	B
36	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/21/73	B
37	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/23/73	B
41	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/9/73	B
42	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B
43	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B
44	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

610

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
45	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/7/73	B
46	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/6/73	B
48	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/1/73	B
49	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/1/73	B
50	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	9/30/73	B
65	telegram	JCS to USDAO	10/29/73	B D
72	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/24/73	B
74	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/21/73	B
88	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/14/73	B
120	telegram	DIA to State	8/13/73	B
105	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/1/73	B
134	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	6/12/73	B
136	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	6/8/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

610

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
143	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	5/14/73	B
150	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	3/14/73	B
151	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	3/14/73	B
182	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/25/73	B
189	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/10/73	B
193	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/14/73	B
194	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/12/73	B
196	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/9/73	B
199	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/9/73	B
217	telegram	Secstate to Tel Aviv	10/20/73	D
220	telegram	Secstate to Tel Aviv	8/17/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

610

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
14a	MEMO	Jennings to Kissinger 9/82	7/27/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NLNS 02-07/11		
14B	transmittal slip	Glauch to Robertson w/ attachments 12/82	2/17/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NLNS 02-07/12		
21	MEMO	Memorandum For Record	5/19/73	B
31	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
32	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
33	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
35	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/26/73	B
36	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/21/73	B
37	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/23/73	B
41	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/9/73	B
42	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B
43	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B
44	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

1010

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DECLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
45	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/7/73	B
46	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/6/73	B
48	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/1/73	B
49	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/1/73	B
50	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	9/30/73	B
65	telegram	JCS to USDAO	10/29/73	B D
72	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/24/73	B
74	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/21/73	B
88	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/14/73	B
100	telegram	DIA to State	5/13/73	B
105	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/1/73	B
134	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	6/12/73	B
136	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	6/8/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

610

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DECLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
143	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	5/14/73	B
150	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	3/14/73	B
151	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	3/14/73	B
182	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 pgs.	10/25/73	B
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/13		
189	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 pgs.	10/16/73	B
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/14		
193	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 2 pgs.	10/11/73	B
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/15		
194	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 pgs. DOS 2-15-02	10/10/73	B
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/16		
196	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 pgs. DOS 2-15-02	10/9/73	B
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/17		
199	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 2 pgs. 2-15-02	10/9/73	B
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/18		
217	telegram	Secstate to Tel Aviv	10/20/73	D
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/19		
220	telegram	Secstate to Tel Aviv 1 pgs.	8/17/73	B
	MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	NLNS 02-07/19		

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

610

FOLDER TITLE

2

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 5970-X

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

October 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*
SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ismail Fahmi--
Talker

This afternoon before coming back to my office I talked with Secretary Kissinger about his talks with Fahmi today and asked him what he wanted the President to do tomorrow. The attached talker is based on that conversation.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the attached to the President tonight.

XGDS-3
DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.
BYAUTH-Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

BECLASSIFIED

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN. *HK*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEETING WITH ISMAIL FAHMI
SPECIAL EGYPTIAN EMISSARY

Wednesday, October 31, 1973

3:00 p.m. (45 minutes)

The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

I. PURPOSE

To summarize our effort to consolidate the Middle East ceasefire and to persuade Egypt to have confidence in US determination to engage actively in Mid-East peace negotiations and to enter those negotiations without preconditions.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: President Sadat sent Fahmi to Washington for an exchange of views on consolidating the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire and on peace negotiations in order to prepare the way for my talks in Cairo November 6. Fahmi is normally Minister of Tourism but has been Acting Foreign Minister while Foreign Minister Zayyat was at the UN during the war.

Most of my talks with Fahmi have concentrated on a package to consolidate the ceasefire. It would be useful for you to summarize this, and it is detailed in your talking points below. We put this proposal to the Israelis so that Mrs. Meir would have it before her departure.

Beyond summarizing the ceasefire package, I would suggest that you focus on what the US can and cannot do in the peace negotiations.

The problem we face with the Egyptians is the familiar one of persuading them to negotiate seriously on the terms of a peace agreement without insisting that we deliver it in advance of negotiations the total Egyptian package.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

On the other side, a principal Israeli request is to give them a chance to negotiate some of the terms themselves. When you talk with Mrs. Meir, you will want to be in a position to say that we have done nothing to foreclose that opportunity even though we cannot be optimistic that peace can be achieved if they maintain that position.

Given these two positions, it is likely that the peace negotiations will deadlock very quickly. Our strategy will be to try to segment the negotiations so attention can be focussed in the early stages on a first step that--difficult as it may be--might realistically be taken in the next few weeks while terms of a final settlement are still being negotiated.

If we are to succeed in this course, we will have to develop Egyptian confidence without going into too much detail.

One other issue is our desire to have Sadat, once the ceasefire is consolidated, urge Faisal to relax the oil boycott when negotiations begin.

B. Participants: Egyptian Emissary Ismail Fahmi accompanied perhaps by Ambassador Abdallah El Erian (Egyptian ambassador to Paris) and Ahmed Khalil, head of the Egyptian Interests Section in Washington. I will sit in on the US side.

C. Press Plan: Press photo opportunity at the beginning. Press Secretary to brief in very general terms.

III. TALKING POINTS

A. I understand you (Fahmi) and Secretary Kissinger are working on a proposal for consolidating the ceasefire. As I understand it the main points are:

--The UN would assure that only non-military shipments reach the Egyptian Third Army when Israeli troops pull back.

--Israeli troops would move back to the October 22 ceasefire line. Prisoners of war would be released immediately.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET /NODIS (XGDS)

- 3 -

-- The Egyptian naval blockade at the mouth of the Red Sea would be raised.

- B. It is important to consolidate the ceasefire, but it will be even more important to establish momentum in the peace negotiations.
- C. The US will support those negotiations actively. I want you to understand what we can and cannot do.

-- We can help devise a negotiating process that has at least a reasonable chance of succeeding. This may require that the negotiations be broken down into manageable units and steps. Patience will be required.

-- We will use our influence with Israel. The convening of a peace conference will provide a framework. But we will need realistic proposals that have some chance of being agreed.

-- In short, we have promised to engage in a process with good faith. We want the closest possible cooperation with Egypt.

- D. Egypt has an interest in urging the oil producers to relax their boycott. The US will find it difficult to sustain the kind of role that will be required under threat of prolonged boycott.

SECRET /NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

E. JNDENCE PROF

DOC	RECD	G NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
10/30/10	10/30/10	59707	

FROM: Saunders LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
UNCLAS _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS ☒
KISSINGER _____ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____
SCOWCROFT ☒ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ CODEWORD _____
ELIOT _____ S ☒ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Pres Talker re mtg w/ ISMAIL FAHMI - LA

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

SOURCE / CLASS / DL

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			
EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			

ACTION REQUIRED	
MEMO FOR HAK	()
MEMO FOR PRES.	()
REPLY FOR	()
APPROPRIATE ACTION	()
MEMO TO	()
RECOMMENDATIONS	()
JOINT MEMO	()
REFER TO FOR:	()
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	()
CONCURRENCE	()
DUE DATE:	
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN)	CY TO
10/30		Stuart	X	Pres for Talkers (11/05)	
11/1				File	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D _____ BY _____ CYS FOR) SA _____) HP _____ ORIG) WH _____ TO) PA _____) SF _____) NS _____) EP _____ DESTROY) DY _____
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
OR RECORD COMMENT: _____	
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____	
SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____	

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved in T 10/1 '73

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7319350 WH

5816

COMPLETE DISTRIBUTION

MADE IN S/S-1.

Date 10-18-73

Initial E.K.

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 11, 1973

SUBJECT: Assistance to Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Ze'ev Sher, Economic Minister, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Menachem Naveh, Economic Counselor, Embassy
of Israel

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, Under Secretary for Security
Assistance

Mr. William H. Lewis, Special Assistant to Under
Secretary for Security Assistance

Mr. James C. Dean, NEA/IAI

COPIES TO:	S	INR/OD	PM
	D.	WH	
	P	CIA	
	E	DOD	
	T-2	1.EA	
	S/PC	IO	
	S/S	AID	
		Tel Aviv	

Mr. Sher began by saying that he thought it was proper to tell Dr. Tarr in a very general way what the impact of the present war was on the Israeli economy and on Israel's needs for assistance in the future. Sher was not requesting anything specific. However, he did want us to know that each day of the war cost the Israelis approximately \$250 million and it was estimated that the minimum cost for a war was about \$2 billion. It was impossible to calculate the economic costs with any precision, for in addition to the immediate costs of materiel and loss of production, one also had to include the indirect costs such as pensions and medical assistance plus the effects on trade and tourism.

Sher wanted us to know that the GOI's previous forecasts on GNP, foreign exchange reserve levels, and foreign exchange expenditures would, of course, have to be altered in light of the war. He was not in a position to offer any estimates at the present time and it would probably be at least two months

NEA/IAI:JCDean:kha
(Drafting Office and Officer)

FORM DS-1254
2-65

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1979

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

before any approximations could be made. Sher noted that Israel was mobilizing its own resources; a new system of compulsory defense loans had been established for both individuals and corporations in addition to already high taxes and Sher personally expected additional indirect taxation. Sher stated that frankly he didn't know what to ask for. The first and overriding objective of the GOI was to win the war. Everything we were discussing was secondary. Sher said that he did not know if the situation had ever been as grave as it presently is in Israel. Even in the War of Independence the economy had not developed to a high level and there was not as much to lose. It seemed to Sher that a great deal more resources would be needed in the future in order to provide an effective deterrent.

Under Secretary Tarr expressed our sympathy and our concern for the present situation in Israel. He assured Mr. Sher as in the past, any Israeli request for assistance would be given careful consideration.

On his way out Mr. Sher told Mr. Dean that he was holding similar meetings today with officials in the NSC, AID, Treasury and OMB.

Clearance:
NEA - Mr. Atherton
(in draft)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
NO	DA	NO	DA
10	18	10	18
11	11	5816	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ☒ FROM: Pickering ☒ UNCLAS ☐ LOG IN/OUT ONLY ☒

KISSINGER ☒ RICHARDSON ☐ LOU ☐ NO FORN ☐ NODIS ☐

SCOWCROFT ☐ SCHLESINGER ☒ C ☒ EYES ONLY ☐ EXDIS ☐

ELIOT ☐ S ☐ CODEWORD ☐ SENSITIVE ☐

TS

SUBJECT: Memcon of Carter Tarr, William Lewis & James Dean
of State Dept w/ Ze'ev Shai & Menachem Mivneh of Israeli
Embassy re aid to Israel

REFERENCE: S/S 7319350 OTHER NOT RECORDED

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
10/18		Saunders	C	for information	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

OR RECORD COMMENT: _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ☒

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D _____ BY _____

CYS FOR) SA _____

) HP _____

TO) WH _____

28 1973) PA ☒

) SF _____

) NS _____

) EP _____

DESTROY) DY _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

AK has seen
October 17, 1973
20

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: DONALD J. STUKEL *aka*
SUBJECT: Financing Arms for Israel

The DOD proposal (Tab A) prepared as a result of WSAG direction provides:

- \$2.2 billion for grant military assistance for Israel
- \$200 million for grant military assistance for Cambodia
- \$500 million for additional military assistance to other countries

The primary question is whether additional assistance to Israel should be grant or credit.

If the assistance is grant, we will be under tremendous pressure to provide the full \$2.2 billion even if the conflict were to terminate shortly. The \$2.2 billion level assumes a long war in which we provide everything on the Israeli list of requests, which go beyond one for one replacement. A Congressional request of \$2.2 billion for Israel would signal a massive rebuilding of the Israeli military forces well beyond the current crisis.

From our point of view, it is preferable to provide Israel with credits. If financing is the only concern, legislation already exists ("Jackson Amendment") to permit extension of credit to Israel.

Since the outbreak of the war, about \$600 million of supplies and equipment have been delivered or are in the pipeline to Israel. Part of this has been funded under unused credits and the remainder by signing "dependable undertakings" (no payment for 120 days). Israel owes the U.S. about \$1.7 billion on cash and credit purchases (20-30 year repayment periods) made prior to the war. At the present they still have \$300 million in FY 74

FMS credits plus a limited amount of FMS credits from previous years. Their financial picture was very good before the war. If it becomes necessary, debt forgiveness or rescheduling could be addressed later.

As to piggy-backing Cambodian needs and some other shortfalls on an Israeli request, we must recognize that a Conference Committee is currently considering our FY 74 MAP request of \$652 million. Any new request would be referred to the same committees and would be considered in light of our previous request. A case can be made for additional funds for Cambodia in light of the continued fighting but a case for \$500 million additional grant assistance to other countries can not be supported convincingly.

If the DOD proposal were submitted in its current form, I believe we would get the amount requested for Israel but the other requests would be deleted, or if granted, would be offset by cuts from FY 74 request of \$652 million.


Options

1. Go forward with the DOD proposal. [This option is counter-productive in terms of the current crisis and will probably not get us additional resources for Cambodia or other countries.]
2. Do not send a proposal to the Congress, but provide additional credit to Israel under the Jackson Amendment. [This option satisfies all needs arising out of the crisis and does not have adverse side effects with the Israelis, Arabs or Soviets. However, it does nothing for our other MAP funding problems.]
3. Send a proposal to Congress requesting \$500 million in grant assistance for Israel and \$200 million in grant assistance for Cambodia to meet emergency needs arising from the conflicts. The remainder of Israel's needs could be handled by credits under the Jackson Amendment. [This option limits the adverse side effects of the DOD proposal and might provide funds for Cambodia.]

RECOMMENDATION:

- That you reject the DOD proposal at the WSAG meeting.
- That you direct DOD to pursue Option 3 (\$500 million for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia).

Lehman concurs.



Tab A

H. R. _____

A Bill to provide additional foreign assistance authorizations.
be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That this Act may be
cited as the "Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1973."

Sec. 2. In addition to such amounts as may be otherwise authorized
to be appropriated to the President for military assistance for the fiscal
year 1974, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
President for the fiscal year 1974 not to exceed--

- ~~2.2 BILLION~~
- (1) ~~\$3,000,000,000~~ for military assistance for Israel;
 - (2) \$200,000,000 for additional military assistance for Cambodia;
 - and
 - (3) \$500,000,000 for additional military assistance to such other
friendly foreign countries and in such amounts as the
President may determine.

Sec. 3. Military assistance furnished out of funds appropriated
under section 2 of this Act shall be furnished in accordance with all of
purposes and limitations applicable to military assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 424; P.L. 87-195), as amended.

Sec. 4. Israel is hereby released from its contractual liability
to pay for defense articles and defense services purchased under the Foreign
Military Sales Act (82 Stat. 1320; P.L. 90-629), as amended, during the
period beginning October 6, 1973 and ending on the date of enactment of
this Act, and funds appropriated under section 2 of this Act for military
assistance for Israel shall be used to reimburse current applicable

Appropriations, funds, and accounts of the Department of Defense for the value of such defense articles and defense services.

Paragraphs from Prime Minister's Speech

The friendship and support of the United States, of its Government and of its people, have always been very dear to our hearts and this is particularly true at this moment. We have no doubt that the United States views with profound concern the bloody events in the area, a concern that has its roots in the traditional policy of the United States to pursue peace, in America's desire to prevent bloodshed and in the American interest to insure that there are no local centers of conflict which might turn into conflagrations and spread further. I have no doubt that the United States wishes as well that the United States' friendship for the state of Israel is not at the expense of the legitimate interest of other countries, including the Arab countries. We are doing everything to insure that the United States has a full understanding of the roads that we decide to take, of the policy that we adopt and of our needs. This mission is carried out by our Embassy in Washington headed by Ambassador Simcha Dinitz . . . the Foreign Minister of Israel, Abba Eban who is also at present in the United States . . . Needless to say that we at all times deeply appreciate the sympathy and support of American Jewery whose hearts are with us in these difficult days and hours of our struggle.

Secretary of State Professor Henry Kissinger, in a press conference held last Friday (October 11) referred to the problems of the area and the statements that he made merit our appreciation. He pointed out that the United States has a traditional friendship with Israel and has an ongoing military relationship with Israel which the United States will continue to maintain in this crisis. He also explained to the Soviet Union the policy of the United States and did so out of concern for Israel, concern for the other countries in the area, and concern for world peace. Yesterday (October 16), Ambassador McCloskey, speaking on behalf of the Department of State headed by Secretary Kissinger, stated that the United States has begun to resupply Israel and that to an appreciable extent this is designed to prevent the massive airlift by the Soviets from unsettling the military balance in the area. The United States is responding to our vital needs as they arise in the midst of this war.

-2-

In the name of the people of Israel I wish to express our gratitude to the President of the United States and the American people who have acted in accordance with American tradition to help a country that is resisting aggression. In view of the vast flow of arms and military equipment from the Soviet Union to the Arab countries at a constantly increasing pace, the United States is responding to our requests and is doing so in the quantity, the variety, and the speed that are commensurate with the present situation.

We do not wish for anyone to do the fighting for us, but I am confident that the United States will do everything necessary to deter dangerous tendencies in the policy and the actions of the Soviet Union and will extend to Israel all the aid it requires to defend its existence and to repel the aggressors.

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

BUD MC FARLANE *RM*

SUBJECT:

Supply and Contingency Planning

While we do not, at this time, intend to supply large numbers of major items (tanks, aircraft), it is well to keep in mind that should that policy change, there will be an unavoidable delay in response time, particularly for tanks, and other bulk cargo. It would be worthwhile to take advantage of any military shipping bound for the eastern Mediterranean to send the maximum amount of bulk cargo against the contingency that may arrive in the future. Specifically, the amphibious ready group that departs tomorrow could be augmented by two LST's without changing its appearance as a normal deployment. The LST's could be loaded with tanks and/or other hardware that would be available in the area should it become necessary at some point in the days ahead.

The visibility of such an operation would be a key consideration. One option which I believe would minimize the possibility of public awareness would be to take the tanks to the beach at Camp Lejeune and, without ever leaving the base, put them on an LST.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: LOUISE NSC/S
FR: PBB - Peter Burke

I HAVE TAKEN ACTION
5091 ~~OFF~~ AND PUT IT
ON THE PRESS REQUEST
LIST. PLEASE DE-LOG
IT.

DECLASSIFIED

TO: PRESS REQUEST LIST (IRENE)

5091

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

September 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Appointment with JERUSALEM POST
Correspondent

Dan Gottlieb, Washington Correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, has asked for an interview with you.

He has asked whether it would be possible for such an interview to take place in time for the September 27 (New Year) edition of the Post, but he would obviously like to keep his request on the books for an appointment at any later time when you might be granting interviews of this kind.

I simply told him that I would pass along his request so that you might have it on your list. I assume that you are receiving many of these.

RECOMMENDATION: I do not recommend that you do this unless you are going to make some systematic effort over time to see selected foreign newsmen.

Agree: no appointment now _____

Disagree: schedule an appointment now _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
9/11	9/12/11	2091	A

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT ONLY
 KISSINGER RICHARDSON LOU NO FORN NODIS
 SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 ELIOT S CODEWORD SENSITIVE
 SUBJECT: Requests appt w/ HAK for Dan Gottleib of the Jerusalem Post on Sept 27
 REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			X	MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
9/12		HAK	X	Decision (9/17)	
9/25		C		Close per Burke	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH NOTIFY & DATE
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
 OR RECORD COMMENT:
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
 CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG #
 SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
 M/F'D BY
 SEP 27 1973
 ORIG)
 TO)
)
)
)
 DESTROY)

MEMORANDUM

NSC 5435

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GEN. SCOWCROFT
FROM: LEN GARMENT
SUBJECT: ISRAELI DESALINATION PROJECT

I promised Ambassador Dinitz I would take this up with Henry. According to Hal Saunders this project had all but final, and purely technical, approval. The Israelis were therefore justified in believing it would proceed. It is apparently hung up as a result of some reconsideration by OMB of funding of other desalination projects. However, it seems to me that this is likely to be seen, and justifiably, as a renege on a firm agreement. I recommend that we get it unplugged. Hal Saunders generally agrees with my view.

Encl.

07744
DECLASSIFIED

FACT SHEET

Problem: Delay in pro forma executive branch approval of joint venture between the Government of Israel and the United States to construct a prototype desalting plant pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding dated November 1, 1972, between the Government of Israel, AID, OSW, and the Department of State. The Memorandum agreement calls for the use of an Israeli-developed desalting process and a contribution to the venture by the United States of funds appropriated in 1969 by the Congress under § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The Joint Venture: The United States has agreed at the administrative agency level to enter into a joint venture with Israel by which each country would contribute half of the cost of building a prototype desalting plant in Israel which would advance existing desalination technology. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries, subject to formal approval by the President and by the Prime Minister, calls for test evaluation of a first stage pilot plant already constructed in Eilat using an advanced, Israeli-developed desalting technique; the construction and testing in California of a two-effect module of the prototype plant; and, finally, if previous stages so justify, the construction of an 11 million gallon per day prototype in Ashdod, Israel.

Tentative Budget: The participants in negotiations which resulted in the November 1, 1972, agreement operated with a

\$32 million budget in mind, with the United States and Israel each defraying half the total cost.

Sources of Financing: In 1969 the Congress authorized in § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2179, the appropriation of \$20 million as the U.S. contribution to the venture. This sum was appropriated in the 1970 Foreign Aid and Related Agencies' Appropriation Act. This money has been carried from year to year as earmarked and available funds for the project.

The Need for Water: Israel has completely exploited all available water supplies. It has converted supplies of brackish water; it has employed water conservation and cloud seeding techniques; it has established an expansive water distribution system. Nevertheless, the lack of additional fresh water sources presents so urgent a problem that unless new sources are quickly developed, Israel will shortly have to curtail its agricultural and industrial development. Water rationing is already in use in most parts of Israel. It is estimated that by 1980 industrial and agricultural development will be cut back sharply if the only remaining available source of supply--ocean water--is not made available for efficient use.

The Dilemma: Since the Memorandum of Understanding was concluded, no official word concerning the project has emanated from the White House. Unless the project is now approved, the Congressional will expressed in § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act and in the Appropriation Act will be thwarted; technology will not be advanced by means of a prototype plant testing a process which offers large-scale savings in the use of desalted water; the joint venture between the two countries will dissolve; and the timetable for Israel's tapping of new water sources will dangerously be set back. Israel's need for water can no longer wait. Having developed the most promising desalting process of all, and having persuaded the operating agencies of the U.S. Government wholeheartedly to endorse the prototype desalting plan, Israel has now waited eight more anxious months without any word from the White House.

The Desalting Process: Israel Desalination Engineering, Inc., has developed an improved multi-effect distillation process that uses relatively low operating temperatures and inexpensive aluminum tubing. This process has been developed only in Israel and is based upon much experience gained in desalination by Israeli firms using smaller units. This process has been chosen for the prototype plant above all others because of its reliability, economies, and advanced stage of technological development.

Cost of Water: Information prepared by Israel and presented to AID in a Proposal dated February 17, 1971, indicates that using conservative figures Israel can produce water at a price lower than \$.23 per 1,000 gallons using Office of Saline Water criteria for an operating 200 million gallon per day plant utilizing the IDE process. A construction of a prototype plant will demonstrate the feasibility of such operating plants.

History of the Project: From 1969 until November 1, 1972, the Office of Saline Water of the Department of Interior, AID, and the Department of State continuously reviewed the state of the art to determine whether a desalting process was sufficiently advanced to justify the construction of a prototype plant. On the basis of the Israeli Proposal submitted in 1971 outlining and explaining the IDE process, OSW engineers after on-sites visits in Israel and after close examination of the IDE process determined the process to be feasible and determined further that the Israeli projections were reasonable. It was on this basis that on November 1, 1972, the three agencies agreed to recommend to the President of the United States to proceed with the implementation of the project. In the same Memorandum of Understanding the Israeli participants agreed to recommend to the Israeli Government to proceed on the basis of the three-stage outline

- 5 -

of the project contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. Since then, the Government of Israel has approved its participation in the project as outlined. The Department of State has submitted an action memorandum with its own strong endorsement (and that of AID and OSW) to the White House seeking pro forma approval for the project. It had been assumed by the participants in these negotiations that once agreement on an operating level had been secured, White House approval would be forthcoming routinely. Since the Memorandum of Understanding was concluded, no objection to the prompt implementation of the program has been voiced by any U.S. Government agency or, as far as is known, by any individual U.S. Government officer.

Benefits to the United States: All know-how and patents rights resulting from the construction of the prototype and the development of the IDE process will be shared by Israel with the Government of the United States. Economic advantages secured as a result of this project will redound to the benefit of the United States as well as Israel. In addition, the middle stage of the project will take place in the United States, and the aluminum tubing for the plant will be purchased in the United States.

NSC 5435

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Summary and Conclusions Reached
Following Negotiations Held in Washington, D.C.
Between Representatives of the Government of Israel
and Representatives of the Government of the United States

By this memorandum, the participants in negotiations conducted at Washington, D.C., on October 30, 31 and November 1 and 2, 1972, summarize conclusions reached in connection with a proposal for a two-country venture to construct a prototype desalting plant in Israel. By subscribing to this memorandum, the signatories verify the contents thereof and undertake in full good faith to exercise maximum effort to carry out and implement the terms of agreements reached in the course of these negotiations and set forth in this document.

I. Representatives of the Government of Israel and of the United States have agreed to recommend to the decision-making authorities within their respective governments to approve the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement between the two countries obligating both governments to proceed with the prototype construction project contemplated by § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. In this regard, the participants in these negotiations have agreed to the following outline of the project:

DECLASSIFIED

(A) The project shall take the form of a true joint venture between the two Governments in terms of financial contribution in equal proportion by each Government toward the realization of this project in accordance with § 219; the full commitment by each Government to pursue the realization of the central objective of this agreement-- the construction and successful operation of the prototype plant in Israel using the IDE process for the purpose of improving existing, and developing and advancing new, technology; close cooperation between the two Governments at every stage of the project to insure successful transition from one stage to the next; close liaison between representatives of both Governments throughout the duration of this project in order to insure the avoidance of misunderstandings and the constant exercise of good faith and energetic contribution in all aspects affecting the realization of the objectives of this project.

(B) The project as envisioned shall include the following elements:

(1) The design and construction of a 1 MGD demonstration plant in Elat. It is anticipated that this plant, now in construction, will be completed in the latter half of 1973.

(2) A period of operation and data evaluation for results associated with the operation of the plant at Elat.

(3) The development of a conceptual design for an 11 MGD plant which shall include various collateral tests. It is expected that the conceptual design for this prototype will be completed within one year after work has been begun on this effort.

(4) The development of detailed designs for the 11 MGD prototype. It is expected that this effort will require a further six to nine months.

(5) Design, construction, and operation of a two-effect test module in San Diego. It is expected that the time required for the construction of the test module will occupy one year. The purpose of the test module will be to verify the design characteristics for the prototype plant.

(6) The construction of an 11 MGD prototype in Ashdod, Israel. The period of construction is expected to be approximately two years. The plant will thereafter operate for a period of up to five years to determine full operational results.

II. The Government of Israel submitted a draft budget of \$30 million which, subject to subsequent joint examination, was accepted for purposes of the discussions. The \$30 million figure does not, however, include the cost of construction for the test module in San Diego. The construction and operation of the module in California is expected to cost \$2 million by OSW's estimate.

III. The Government of Israel has offered the IDE process, as outlined in the proposal dated February 15, 1971 by the Government of Israel, for use in the construction of the prototype, and AID and OSW have agreed to use this process. It is understood that the use of the IDE process is a precondition to the execution and implementation of the agreement.

IV. The participants agree that a generous but prudent patent and know-how policy would be adopted by the parties in their final agreement. This policy would carry out the intention of § 219 by making information covered by patents and proprietary know-how available to agencies of the United States Government or their designees in United States Government projects and that this information would be made available to other parties on terms to be subsequently agreed upon.

V. The parties to the final agreement will undertake that to the maximum extent practicable the equipment and material for the 11 MGD prototype will be procured in the United States. Exceptions from this rule will be considered on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to AID's approval.

VI. The participants to the negotiations whose names appear below each undertake to support efforts to secure the approval of their respective governments to the

conclusion of an agreement concerning the substance outlined in this memorandum and to the approval of the project as described herein. In this regard, it is anticipated that steps necessary to secure such approval will be taken by the participants in the shortest practicable time; that each participant will recommend to his government that the project be approved as outlined herein; and that an agreement binding upon both Governments, obligating funds necessary to carry out the project, will be concluded in the shortest practicable time. Both before and after the conclusion of any such agreement, each participant agrees to exercise full good faith in order to promote the realization of the objectives of this undertaking and in order to insure that misunderstandings, delays, and obstructions to the smooth operation of the project are avoided.

To this purpose, the participants in the negotiations have this 3rd day of November, 1972, this 26th day of Heshvan, 5733, affixed their signatures.

REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL:

Eliezer Tal

Dr. Eliezer Tal, Director
National Council for
Research and Development
Prime Minister's Office
Head of Delegation

REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES:

Theodore Rustig

Theodore Rustig, Director
Office of Capital
Development
Bureau for Asia

Gideon A. Levite
 Gideon A. Levite, Head
 Technology Division
 National Council for
 Research and Development

Bradshaw Longmaid
 Bradshaw Longmaid, Director
 Office of Near East Affairs
 Bureau for Asia

Menachem Naven
 Menachem Naven
 Economic Counselor
 Embassy, Government of
 Israel

Emory G. Roberts
 Emory G. Roberts
 Assistant Director for
 Operations
 Office of Engineering

Robert Evans
 Robert Evans, Chief
 Thermal Processes Division
 OSW, Department of the
 Interior

James Callahan
 James Callahan
 General Engineer, OSW

Other Non-Signatory Participants in These Negotiations

L. M. Hale, Director, Office of Engineering, AID.

Theodore Thompson, Chief, Water Resources Branch, Office of Engineering, AID.

Leopold Mastrofini, Project Engineer, Office of Engineering, AID.

James E. Stephenson, Deputy Director, Office of Capital Development, Bureau for Asia, AID.

William Underwood, Chief, Special Projects and Reports Division, Office of Capital Development, Bureau for Asia, AID.

William Savage, Assistant Director of Engineering and Development, Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior.

Stephen Stein, Assistant General Counsel for Near East and South Asia, AID.

Thomas D. Brown, Attorney-Adviser, Near East and South Asia, AID.

J. Thomas McAndrew, Country Directorate, Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Department of State.

Nathan Berkman, Managing Director, Israel Desalination Engineering Ltd.

Amnon Zfati, Technical Manager, Israel Desalination Engineering Ltd.

Mattaniah Eytan, Washington legal adviser, Government of Israel.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	OG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
MO DA	MO DA HR	5-135	
7 25	9 26 10		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS *Garment, L* UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER ☒ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT _____ S _____ CODEWORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Garment press on Stated Israeli Resolving projects*
2 on 6 funding problems

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <i>9/28</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
2/22/74	Saunders	NSC/S	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Close this out. We are retaining the original because this issue being considered anew on basis of more recent comments from Garment. Rosemary</i>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____	<p>MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:</p> <p>M/F'D _____ BY _____</p> <p>SA</p> <p>HP</p> <p>WH</p> <p>PA <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>SF</p> <p>NS</p> <p>EP</p> <p>DESTROY) DY</p>
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
OR RECORD COMMENT: _____	
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____	
SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

2/25/74

Profile sheet for Log No. 5435 returned
to Secretariat with notation to Close this out,
with xerox copies of attached with it. These
originals are for use in another package.

730 5435

MICROFILM		DATA
DO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
AUG 12 1974		
ORIG)	REC	
TO	PAF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	WEC	
	SUB	

00000
DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GEN. SCOWCROFT
FROM: LEN GARMENT
SUBJECT: ISRAELI DESALINATION PROJECT

I promised Ambassador Dinitz I would take this up with Henry. According to Hal Saunders this project had all but final, and purely technical, approval. The Israelis were therefore justified in believing it would proceed. It is apparently hung up as a result of some reconsideration by OMB of funding of other desalination projects. However, it seems to me that this is likely to be seen, and justifiably, as a renege on a firm agreement. I recommend that we get it unplugged. Hal Saunders generally agrees with my view.

Encl.

By sent upstair

NSC 5435

DECLASSIFIED

FACT SHEET

Problem: Delay in pro forma executive branch approval of joint venture between the Government of Israel and the United States to construct a prototype desalting plant pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding dated November 1, 1972, between the Government of Israel, AID, OSW, and the Department of State. The Memorandum agreement calls for the use of an Israeli-developed desalting process and a contribution to the venture by the United States of funds appropriated in 1969 by the Congress under § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The Joint Venture: The United States has agreed at the administrative agency level to enter into a joint venture with Israel by which each country would contribute half of the cost of building a prototype desalting plant in Israel which would advance existing desalination technology. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries, subject to formal approval by the President and by the Prime Minister, calls for test evaluation of a first stage pilot plant already constructed in Eilat using an advanced, Israeli-developed desalting technique; the construction and testing in California of a two-effect module of the prototype plant; and, finally, if previous stages so justify, the construction of an 11 million gallon per day prototype in Ashdod, Israel.

Tentative Budget: The participants in negotiations which resulted in the November 1, 1972, agreement operated with a

\$32 million budget in mind, with the United States and Israel each defraying half the total cost.

Sources of Financing: In 1969 the Congress authorized in § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2179, the appropriation of \$20 million as the U.S. contribution to the venture. This sum was appropriated in the 1970 Foreign Aid and Related Agencies' Appropriation Act. This money has been carried from year to year as earmarked and available funds for the project.

The Need for Water: Israel has completely exploited all available water supplies. It has converted supplies of brackish water; it has employed water conservation and cloud seeding techniques; it has established an expansive water distribution system. Nevertheless, the lack of additional fresh water sources presents so urgent a problem that unless new sources are quickly developed, Israel will shortly have to curtail its agricultural and industrial development. Water rationing is already in use in most parts of Israel. It is estimated that by 1980 industrial and agricultural development will be cut back sharply if the only remaining available source of supply--ocean water--is not made available for efficient use.

The Dilemma: Since the Memorandum of Understanding was concluded, no official word concerning the project has emanated from the White House. Unless the project is now approved, the Congressional will expressed in § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act and in the Appropriation Act will be thwarted; technology will not be advanced by means of a prototype plant testing a process which offers large-scale savings in the use of desalted water; the joint venture between the two countries will dissolve; and the timetable for Israel's tapping of new water sources will dangerously be set back. Israel's need for water can no longer wait. Having developed the most promising desalting process of all, and having persuaded the operating agencies of the U.S. Government wholeheartedly to endorse the prototype desalting plan, Israel has now waited eight more anxious months without any word from the White House.

The Desalting Process: Israel Desalination Engineering, Inc., has developed an improved multi-effect distillation process that uses relatively low operating temperatures and inexpensive aluminum tubing. This process has been developed only in Israel and is based upon much experience gained in desalination by Israeli firms using smaller units. This process has been chosen for the prototype plant above all others because of its reliability, economies, and advanced stage of technological development.

Cost of Water: Information prepared by Israel and presented to AID in a Proposal dated February 17, 1971, indicates that using conservative figures Israel can produce water at a price lower than \$.23 per 1,000 gallons using Office of Saline Water criteria for an operating 200 million gallon per day plant utilizing the IDE process. A construction of a prototype plant will demonstrate the feasibility of such operating plants.

History of the Project: From 1969 until November 1, 1972, the Office of Saline Water of the Department of Interior, AID, and the Department of State continuously reviewed the state of the art to determine whether a desalting process was sufficiently advanced to justify the construction of a prototype plant. On the basis of the Israeli Proposal submitted in 1971 outlining and explaining the IDE process, OSW engineers after on-sites visits in Israel and after close examination of the IDE process determined the process to be feasible and determined further that the Israeli projections were reasonable. It was on this basis that on November 1, 1972, the three agencies agreed to recommend to the President of the United States to proceed with the implementation of the project. In the same Memorandum of Understanding the Israeli participants agreed to recommend to the Israeli Government to proceed on the basis of the three-stage outline

of the project contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. Since then, the Government of Israel has approved its participation in the project as outlined. The Department of State has submitted an action memorandum with its own strong endorsement (and that of AID and OSW) to the White House seeking pro forma approval for the project. It had been assumed by the participants in these negotiations that once agreement on an operating level had been secured, White House approval would be forthcoming routinely. Since the Memorandum of Understanding was concluded, no objection to the prompt implementation of the program has been voiced by any U.S. Government agency or, as far as is known, by any individual U.S. Government officer.

Benefits to the United States: All know-how and patents rights resulting from the construction of the prototype and the development of the IDE process will be shared by Israel with the Government of the United States. Economic advantages secured as a result of this project will redound to the benefit of the United States as well as Israel. In addition, the middle stage of the project will take place in the United States, and the aluminum tubing for the plant will be purchased in the United States.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Summary and Conclusions Reached
Following Negotiations Held in Washington, D.C.
Between Representatives of the Government of Israel
and Representatives of the Government of the United States

By this memorandum, the participants in negotiations conducted at Washington, D.C., on October 30, 31 and November 1 and 2, 1972, summarize conclusions reached in connection with a proposal for a two-country venture to construct a prototype desalting plant in Israel. By subscribing to this memorandum, the signatories verify the contents thereof and undertake in full good faith to exercise maximum effort to carry out and implement the terms of agreements reached in the course of these negotiations and set forth in this document.

I. Representatives of the Government of Israel and of the United States have agreed to recommend to the decision-making authorities within their respective governments to approve the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement between the two countries obligating both governments to proceed with the prototype construction project contemplated by § 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. In this regard, the participants in these negotiations have agreed to the following outline of the project:

(A) The project shall take the form of a true joint venture between the two Governments in terms of financial contribution in equal proportion by each Government toward the realization of this project in accordance with § 219; the full commitment by each Government to pursue the realization of the central objective of this agreement-- the construction and successful operation of the prototype plant in Israel using the IDE process for the purpose of improving existing, and developing and advancing new, technology; close cooperation between the two Governments at every stage of the project to insure successful transition from one stage to the next; close liaison between representatives of both Governments throughout the duration of this project in order to insure the avoidance of misunderstandings and the constant exercise of good faith and energetic contribution in all aspects affecting the realization of the objectives of this project.

(B) The project as envisioned shall include the following elements:

(1) The design and construction of a 1 MGD demonstration plant in Elat. It is anticipated that this plant, now in construction, will be completed in the latter half of 1973.

(2) A period of operation and data evaluation for results associated with the operation of the plant at Elat.

(3) The development of a conceptual design for an 11 MGD plant which shall include various collateral tests. It is expected that the conceptual design for this prototype will be completed within one year after work has been begun on this effort.

(4) The development of detailed designs for the 11 MGD prototype. It is expected that this effort will require a further six to nine months.

(5) Design, construction, and operation of a two-effect test module in San Diego. It is expected that the time required for the construction of the test module will occupy one year. The purpose of the test module will be to verify the design characteristics for the prototype plant.

(6) The construction of an 11 MGD prototype in Ashdod, Israel. The period of construction is expected to be approximately two years. The plant will thereafter operate for a period of up to five years to determine full operational results.

II. The Government of Israel submitted a draft budget of \$30 million which, subject to subsequent joint examination, was accepted for purposes of the discussions. The \$30 million figure does not, however, include the cost of construction for the test module in San Diego. The construction and operation of the module in California is expected to cost \$2 million by OSW's estimate.

III. The Government of Israel has offered the IDE process, as outlined in the proposal dated February 15, 1971 by the Government of Israel, for use in the construction of the prototype, and AID and OSW have agreed to use this process. It is understood that the use of the IDE process is a precondition to the execution and implementation of the agreement.

IV. The participants agree that a generous but prudent patent and know-how policy would be adopted by the parties in their final agreement. This policy would carry out the intention of § 219 by making information covered by patents and proprietary know-how available to agencies of the United States Government or their designees in United States Government projects and that this information would be made available to other parties on terms to be subsequently agreed upon.

V. The parties to the final agreement will undertake that to the maximum extent practicable the equipment and material for the 11 MGD prototype will be procured in the United States. Exceptions from this rule will be considered on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to AID's approval.

VI. The participants to the negotiations whose names appear below each undertake to support efforts to secure the approval of their respective governments to the

conclusion of an agreement concerning the substance outlined in this memorandum and to the approval of the project as described herein. In this regard, it is anticipated that steps necessary to secure such approval will be taken by the participants in the shortest practicable time; that each participant will recommend to his government that the project be approved as outlined herein; and that an agreement binding upon both Governments, obligating funds necessary to carry out the project, will be concluded in the shortest practicable time. Both before and after the conclusion of any such agreement, each participant agrees to exercise full good faith in order to promote the realization of the objectives of this undertaking and in order to insure that misunderstandings, delays, and obstructions to the smooth operation of the project are avoided.

To this purpose, the participants in the negotiations have this 3rd day of November, 1972, this 26th day of Heshvan, 5733, affixed their signatures.

REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL:

Eliezer Tal

Dr. Eliezer Tal, Director
National Council for
Research and Development
Prime Minister's Office
Head of Delegation

REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES:

Theodore Lustig

Theodore Lustig, Director
Office of Capital
Development
Bureau for Asia

Gideon A. Levite
Gideon A. Levite, Head
Technology Division
National Council for
Research and Development

Bradshaw Longmaid
Bradshaw Longmaid, Director
Office of Near East Affairs
Bureau for Asia

Menachem Naven
Menachem Naven
Economic Counselor
Embassy, Government of
Israel

Emory G. Roberts
Emory G. Roberts
Assistant Director for
Operations
Office of Engineering

Robert Evans
Robert Evans, Chief
Thermal Processes Division
OSW, Department of the
Interior

James Callanan
James Callanan
General Engineer, OSW

Other Non-Signatory Participants in These Negotiations

L. M. Hale, Director, Office of Engineering, AID.

Theodore Thompson, Chief, Water Resources Branch, Office of Engineering, AID.

Leopold Mastrofini, Project Engineer, Office of Engineering, AID.

James E. Stephenson, Deputy Director, Office of Capital Development, Bureau for Asia, AID.

William Underwood, Chief, Special Projects and Reports Division, Office of Capital Development, Bureau for Asia, AID.

William Savage, Assistant Director of Engineering and Development, Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior.

Stephen Stein, Assistant General Counsel for Near East and South Asia, AID.

Thomas D. Brown, Attorney-Adviser, Near East and South Asia, AID.

J. Thomas McAndrew, Country Directorate, Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Department of State.

Nathan Berkman, Managing Director, Israel Desalination Engineering Ltd.

Amnon Zfati, Technical Manager, Israel Desalination Engineering Ltd.

Mattaniah Eytan, Washington legal adviser, Government of Israel.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

4992

(Supersedes 4918)

OBF

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

September 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *hal*

WILLIAM B. QUANDT *w.b.2.*

SUBJECT:

Israeli Policy Toward the Occupied Territories

This memorandum seeks your decision on whether Acting Secretary Rush should express our concern over Israeli policies toward the occupied areas, as developed most recently in the Labor Party platform. Ambassador Dinitz has asked to see Mr. Rush on Monday, September 10, at 4:30, prior to the Ambassador's departure for Israel the following day for consultation. The State Department asks for your concurrence in having Mr. Rush make clear our reservations about actions in the occupied territories that might be prejudicial to a peaceful settlement and to King Hussein in particular [See Tab A]. The background to this issue is given below.

The Israeli Labor Party has recently adopted a program for dealing with the occupied Arab territories over the next four years. For the moment we cannot expect to influence election year rhetoric, but eventual implementation of this program is yet to be determined. In the past, Israeli leaders have read our silence as acquiescence in the steps Israel has taken toward annexing or settling parts of the occupied areas, and the issue now is whether we want that to happen at this possibly crucial point.

Three elements of the new Israeli program could cause us difficulties if a genuine negotiation were ever to take place. First, the Labor Party is calling for an expansion of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. Second, the policy of restricting private land purchases by Israelis in the occupied territories may be loosened. Third, a sizable Israeli town is planned for the northeastern Sinai, which would effectively cut Gaza off from the Egyptian town of al-Arish.

Ambassador Keating has suggested in a cable to you [tab B] that we should talk to the Israelis to try to persuade them to delay implementation of the new program. He feels that Ambassador Dinitz would be the proper person to discuss this with at the outset, and that he be authorized later to raise the matter officially in Israel before the elections are held.

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

- 2 -

The Jordanians are also asking us to make our views on this issue known.

The only thing that has been said to date is the State Department's reaffirmation on August 23, in response to a question, of a statement made by Ambassador Yost in 1969 [Tab C].

One alternative to having Mr. Rush talk to Ambassador Dinitz about this on Monday would be for you to make the point quietly with Dinitz after his return that any Israeli actions in the occupied territories that make negotiations less likely will not have our support. If this process leads toward disguised annexation, the US and Israel will end up on opposite sides of some of the key issues of a peace settlement.

On balance, it is probably worth having Acting Secretary Rush raise this issue now with Ambassador Dinitz in a low-key way. We will have made a point, and if necessary you can follow up later.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize General Scowcroft to call Acting Secretary Rush to give your concurrence in his mentioning to Ambassador Dinitz briefly and for the record our concern over Israeli policy in the occupied areas.

_____ Approve

_____ I'll talk to Dinitz about this after his return
from Israel.

_____ Other.

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7316345

4992
Tab A

September 6, 1973

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israeli Occupied Territories Policy

The Labor Party's Secretariat has now overwhelmingly approved a platform plank on occupation policy that will give a new and substantial fillip to Israeli settlement and investment in the occupied territories. Approval by the full Party Central Committee and ultimate adoption as Government policy now seem certain. The Acting Secretary and Assistant Secretary Sisco have been considering what action we might take to minimize the damage to our interests from this step and have concluded that the Acting Secretary should make a low-key demarche to Ambassador Dinitz setting out our concern and objections. This would be followed up by Ambassador Keating to Eban in Jerusalem. We believe, if this demarche is to have the desired impact, the Israelis should know that it is done with approval in the White House. This course is consistent with what we have done over the past four years - to indicate our disassociation with Israeli unilateral actions in the occupied territories and Jerusalem, which in our judgment prejudices any ultimate solution.

The Israelis now have 47 settlements in the occupied territories with a population of over 5,000, exclusive of some 15,000 in East Jerusalem. We have in the past taken public issue with this development on the grounds that it is contrary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions proscribing movement by the occupying power of its own population into occupied territory, and is a further obstacle to inducing the Arabs to come to the negotiating table. We believe it is important now that we restate our position to the Israelis. Our silence in the face of this latest development may be construed by them as acquiescence,

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS

DECLASSIFIED


SECRET/EXDIS

-2-

and so encourage the pace of this activity. Our demurrer would give some help to Israeli minimalists who, though badly outnumbered, are speaking out against this platform plank, which was an election compromise made by Meir and Sapir to keep Dayan in the Labor Party fold. For example, some of the doves in Israel have rightly branded this action as creeping annexation.

A demarche at this time would be useful to Dr. Kissinger during his UNGA discussions. We may expect Arab and non-aligned interest here in New York in this matter and what we are doing about it; it will help blunt criticism if we can say we have talked to the Israelis and that our policy continues to be opposed to any such actions prejudicial to a solution.

With your concurrence, the Acting Secretary will express to Ambassador Dinitz our concern at this latest Labor Party action and what it portends for GOI policy, and our objections to such actions which are prejudicial to a peaceful settlement and to King Hussein in particular.


Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

COPY 6 OF 12 COPIES

Tab B Wt 11 B



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

C 301452Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9618

CONTROL: 8464Q

RECD: 31 AUG 73 3AM

BT

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 6846

NODIS

FOR ACTING SECRETARY, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, ASST. SECRETARY ✓
SISCO

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFCR, PCCR, XF

SUBJECT: GOI POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: TEL AVIV 6819

1. WE HAVE REPORTED AND ANALYZED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS AND REFTEL HIGHLIGHTS THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM WILL POSE FOR ANY US POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE AT LEAST THE INITIATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE ONLY TOO AWARE THAT THE REAL DIFFICULTY IS PROPOSING SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS. WE PROPOSE TO USE THIS CHANNEL FOR A DIALOGUE WITH WASHINGTON ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE USG SHOULD DO ABOUT THE ISRAELI LABOR PARTY PROGRAM, HOW AND WHEN. IN THIS RESPECT, WE HAVE REPORTED THAT THIS PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO BE ADOPTED OFFICIALLY BY THE LABOR PARTY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

2. WE ARE UNABLE TO RECONSTRUCT FROM OUR FILES THE HISTORY OF US REPRESENTATION TO THE GOI HERE ON SUBJECT OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT APPEARS LAST AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT WAS MADE BY AMBASSADOR YOST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969, WHICH OUTLINED OUR CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO "ANY ACTION-- IN JERUSALEM OR ELSEWHERE -- THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS PREJUDICING OR PREJUDGING A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE." FOR THE LAST FEW YEARS, WE APPEAR NOT TO HAVE OFFICIALLY PROTESTED TO THE GOI ITS ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; IN THIS RESPECT, WE NOTE THAT ON AUG 23 THE DEPT SPOKESMAN REFERRED TO THE 1969 YOST STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING US ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REPORTED LABOR PARTY PROGRAM. SINCE THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED PUBLICLY ON AUG 23, SEVERAL LEADING US NEWSPAPERS HAVE WRITTEN EDITORIALS WARNING THAT THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS EQUIVALENT TO DE FACTO ISRAELI ANNEXATION, WITH ALL THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS THAT HAS FOR HOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- TEL AVIV 6846, AUG 30

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISRAELIS WERE LISTENING, WE BELIEVE THAT THE AUGUST 23 EXERCISE WAS USEFUL IN THAT AT LEAST IT PUT US ON THE PUBLIC RECORD AS NOT HAVING CHANGED OUR OFFICIAL POLICIES TOWARD THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THIS ACTION IN ITSELF IS GOING TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE LABOR PARTY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM NOR ON SUBSEQUENT LONGER RANGE GOI PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS COMPONENT PARTS.

4. WHAT, AS STATED IN REFTEL, MUCH OF THE PROGRAM IS A CONTINUATION OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF ONGOING GOI PROGRAMS. WE CANNOT EXPECT THE ISRAELIS EITHER TO REPUDIATE PUBLICLY THESE PROGRAMS OR TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY REQUEST FROM US THAT THEY JUST TURN THE WHOLE THING OFF. AND IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT MANY ISRAELIS BELIEVE SINCERELY WITH DAYAN THAT THE ONLY HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA IS TO CONVINCE THE ARABS THAT TIME IS NOT ON THEIR SIDE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS TO US THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF BEING ABLE TO ASSURE THE GOI OF ANY REAL HOPE FOR AT LEAST INITIATING A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, WE SHOULD FOCUS ANY ACTION WE DECIDE TO TAKE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE GOAL OF GETTING THEM TO DELAY IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM WHICH REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT AND HIGHLY VISIBLE NEW DEPARTURES. WE COULD, THEREFORE, EMPHASIZE OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF YAMIT AND ITS ADJACENT NETWORK OF SETTLEMENTS ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, WHILE EXPRESSING GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THRUST OF LABOR PARTY PLATFORM IN CONTEXT OF CONTINUITY OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (SEE REFTEL FOR MORE DETAILS.)

5. HOW AND WHEN. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INITIALLY RAISE SUBJECT WITH GOI IN NEAR FUTURE. FOR OPENERS, WE WOULD SUGGEST AN EARLY CONVERSATION WITH AME DINITZ IN WASHINGTON. EMBASSY, OF COURSE, IN NO POSITION TO GUARANTEE WHAT SUCCESS WE MIGHT HAVE WITH GOI. DEPENDENT IN PART ON RESULT OF SUCH A MEETING, DEPT CAN DETERMINE WHETHER WE SHOULD MAKE DEMARCHE AT OUR END. ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE COMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN IMMINENCE OF ELECTIONS HERE, ON BALANCE I RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THIS MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE ISRAELIS HERE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HOPEFULLY, EXPRESSION OF OUR CONCERNS WOULD HELP MODERATE AT LEAST SOME CAMPAIGN RHETORIC ON SUBJECT AND SHOULD STRENGTHEN HAND OF THOSE IN GOI WHO ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TREND TOWARD ANNEXATION. ALSO, IT WOULD SERVE AS REMINDER TO GOI DECISION MAKERS THAT IN THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC ISRAELI CONSIDERATIONS THEY SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF FACTOR OF US-GOI RELATIONS.

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTION TO THIS MESSAGE.

KEATING
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Q
Tab C. P. C.
UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release USUN-70(69)
July 1, 1969

Statement by Ambassador Charles W. Yost, United States Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, on the situation in Jerusalem, July 1, 1969.

Once again the Council has been summoned to deal with certain actions taken by the Government of Israel in Jerusalem. We have listened carefully to the statements of the Permanent Representative of Jordan and other Arab Ambassadors, as well as the reply of the Representative of Israel.

The discussion thus far has made amply clear that the status of Jerusalem is not an isolated problem, but, rather, an integral part of a whole complex of issues in the current Middle Eastern conflict which must be resolved. This is not a novel conclusion. The Council clearly recognized that fact in Resolution 242, which treats the entire Middle Eastern situation as a package. This resolution remains the basis of our approach to a just and lasting peace in the area. You are all well aware of the strenuous efforts my own Government is making to help Ambassador Jarring promote a peaceful settlement. Progress in these efforts has, admittedly, been slow. This is perhaps not surprising when one reflects on how deep the roots of the conflict go. But the important thing is that some progress is being made. The fact that it has not been crowned with dramatic success should not give grounds for despair. Nor should it be exploited as justification for actions, which will make greater progress even more difficult. This applies to actions in Jerusalem as elsewhere in the area. Indeed, Jerusalem occupies a very special place in all our minds and all our hearts as one of the holiest cities in the entire world. For Jerusalem is a sacred shrine to three of the world's largest and oldest religious faiths: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. By virtue of that fact the United States has always considered that Jerusalem enjoys a unique international standing and that no action should be taken there without full regard to Jerusalem's special history and special place in the world community. Unfortunately there have been acts of many

-more-

...which have broken the peace in Jerusalem. This is a deep concern to my Government and to the international community. Mr. President, we understand the deep emotional concerns which move all parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute on the subject of Jerusalem. We do not believe, however, that any of these concerns are served by what is now taking place in East Jerusalem, whether it be actions by those now exercising authority there or by individuals considering themselves aggrieved and therefore justified in resorting to violence. The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests in the city. The United States considers that the part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Israel in the June war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power. Among the provisions of international law which bind Israel, as they would bind any occupier, are the provisions that the occupier has no right to make changes in laws or in administration other than those which are ^{temporarily} necessitated by his security interest, and that an occupier may not confiscate or destroy private property. The pattern of behavior authorized under the Geneva Convention and international law is clear: the occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by immediate needs of the occupation. I regret to say that the actions of Israel in the occupied portion of Jerusalem present a different picture, one which gives rise to understandable concerns that the eventual disposition of East Jerusalem may be prejudiced and the rights and activities of the population are already being affected and altered.

My Government regrets and deplores this pattern of activity, and it has so informed the Government of Israel on numerous occasions since June 1967. We have consistently refused to recognize these measures as having anything but a provisional character and do not accept them as affecting the ultimate status of Jerusalem.

I have explained in some detail the opposition of the United States to certain measures taken by the Government of Israel in Jerusalem, since this is the precise object of the complaint brought before us by the Government of Jordan. But, as I suggested earlier, we cannot logically and intelligently consider the problem of Jerusalem without putting it in its proper perspective -- the Middle East situation as a whole. In this connection, I would recall that one of the first major policy decisions taken by President Nixon after assuming office this year was that the United States Government should take new initiatives in helping to try to bring peace in the Middle East. For the past several months we have been devoting our best efforts to this task. We shall continue to do so but for these efforts to succeed we will require the goodwill and cooperation of the parties themselves. A just and lasting peace in the Middle East is long and tragically overdue. It will not be found through terror bombings, which inevitably harm innocent

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

YOST

...civilians, any more than through unilateral attempts to alter the status of Jerusalem. It will be found only through the instruments and processes of negotiation, accommodation and agreement. It will come only through the exercise by the parties of the utmost restraint -- not just along the cease-fire lines or in public statements, but also on the ground in Jerusalem itself.

In treating the problem of Jerusalem, since we deal with it in the context of the total situation in the Middle East, my Delegation will subject any proposal for Council action, first of all, to the test of whether that proposal is likely to help or hinder the peaceful settlement process. I hope all members will do likewise. For example, one constructive move the Council might make would be to request the parties to lay aside their recriminations, to desist from any action -- in Jerusalem or elsewhere -- that might be construed as prejudicing or prejudging a final, comprehensive settlement, a just and lasting peace. Thus, our consideration of the situation in Jerusalem could provide a fitting occasion on which to insist once more that the parties to a dispute which keeps the world's Holiest City in turmoil act responsibly to resolve the whole dispute and, until it is resolved, that they take no action anywhere which could further jeopardize its resolution.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
9 06	9 07 09	4792	Launders

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS *Pickering* _____ UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER _____ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

SCOWCROFT ☒ _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS ☒

ELIOT _____ S ☒ _____ CODEWORD _____

TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *US concern re Israeli occupied territories policy and state recom guidance to Amb Dinitz*

REFERENCE: S/S *7316345* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR HAK (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST					REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA					RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP					DUE DATE: <i>(9/12)</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<i>Supersedes 7304918</i>
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>9/7/73</i>	<i>Launders and Guandt</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Decision (9/16)</i>	
<i>9/10</i>			<i>C</i>	<i>OBE per WH</i>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

OR RECORD COMMENT: _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ *7304918NS* JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ☒

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D *BY* BY _____

SEP 12 1973

ORIG _____

TO _____) SA _____

_____) HP _____

_____) PA *X* _____

_____) SF _____

_____) NS _____

_____) EP _____

DESTROY) DY _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4918

ACTION

SECRET (GDS)

September 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Israel's Policy Toward Occupied Territories

As you know, the Israeli Labor Party has developed a program for dealing with the occupied Arab territories over the next four years. There is nothing we can do to affect the adoption of the program, but its eventual implementation is yet to be determined. In the past, Israeli leaders have read our silence as acquiescence in the steps Israel has taken toward annexing or settling parts of the occupied areas. The most explicit statement made on this topic was by Ambassador Yost in 1969 [Tab B], which was reaffirmed by the State Department on August 23.

Three elements of the new Israeli program could cause us difficulties if a genuine negotiation were ever to take place. First, the Labor Party is calling for an expansion of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. Second, the policy of restricting private land purchases by Israelis in the occupied territories may be loosened. Third, a sizable Israeli town is planned for the northeastern Sinai, which would effectively cut Gaza off from the Egyptian town of al-Arish.

Ambassador Keating has suggested in a cable to you [Tab A] that we should talk to the Israelis to try to persuade them to delay implementation of the new program. He feels that Ambassador Dinitz would be the proper person to discuss this with at the outset, and that he be authorized later to raise the matter officially in Israel before the elections are held.

Henry note
Assistant Secretary Sisco has indicated an interest in talking to the Israelis about this when he gets back to Washington this week. Before then, you may want to make the point quietly with Dinitz that any Israeli actions in the occupied territories that make negotiations less likely will not have our support. In addition, if this process leads toward disguised annexation, the US and Israel will end up inevitably on opposite

SECRET (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

sides of some of the key issues of a peace settlement. One purpose of talking to Dinitz yourself is to avoid the appearance of a major public US demarche on the subject.

RECOMMENDATION: That you talk informally with Ambassador Dinitz about our concern with Israel's new policy toward the occupied territories.


_____ Approve

Let Sisco talk to Dinitz about this,
but tell him not to make a public
demarche.

SECRET (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES

WTT 4



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

C 301452Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9618

CONTROL: 84640

RECD: 31 AUG 73 3AM

BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 6846

NODIS

FOR ACTING SECRETARY, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, ASST. SECRETARY
SISCO ✓

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFCR, PBCR, XF

SUBJECT: GOI POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: TEL AVIV 6819

1. WE HAVE REPORTED AND ANALYZED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS AND REFTEL HIGHLIGHTS THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM WILL POSE FOR ANY US POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE AT LEAST THE INITIATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE ONLY TOO AWARE THAT THE REAL DIFFICULTY IS PROPOSING SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS. WE PROPOSE TO USE THIS CHANNEL FOR A DIALOGUE WITH WASHINGTON ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE USG SHOULD DO ABOUT THE ISRAELI LABOR PARTY PROGRAM, HOW AND WHEN. IN THIS RESPECT, WE HAVE REPORTED THAT THIS PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO BE ADOPTED OFFICIALLY BY THE LABOR PARTY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

2. WE ARE UNABLE TO RECONSTRUCT FROM OUR FILES THE HISTORY OF US REPRESENTATION TO THE GOI HERE ON SUBJECT OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT APPEARS LAST AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT WAS MADE BY AMBASSADOR YOST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969, WHICH OUTLINED OUR CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO "ANY ACTION-- IN JERUSALEM OR ELSEWHERE -- THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS PREJUDICING OR PREJUDGING A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE." FOR THE LAST FEW YEARS, WE APPEAR NOT TO HAVE OFFICIALLY PROTESTED TO THE GOI ITS ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; IN THIS RESPECT, WE NOTE THAT ON AUG 23 THE DEPT SPOKESMAN REFERRED TO THE 1969 YOST STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING US ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REPORTED LABOR PARTY PROGRAM. SINCE THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED PUBLICLY ON AUG 23, SEVERAL LEADING US NEWSPAPERS HAVE WRITTEN EDITORIALS WARNING THAT THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS EQUIVALENT TO DE FACTO ISRAELI ANNEXATION, WITH ALL THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS THAT HAS FOR HOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- TEL AVIV 6846, AUG 30

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISRAELIS WERE LISTENING, WE BELIEVE THAT THE AUGUST 23 EXERCISE WAS USEFUL IN THAT AT LEAST IT PUT US ON THE PUBLIC RECORD AS NOT HAVING CHANGED OUR OFFICIAL POLICIES TOWARD THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THIS ACTION IN ITSELF IS GOING TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE LABOR PARTY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM NOR ON SUBSEQUENT LONGER RANGE GOI PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS COMPONENT PARTS.

4. WHAT, AS STATED IN REFTEL, MUCH OF THE PROGRAM IS A CONTINUATION OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF ONGOING GOI PROGRAMS. WE CANNOT EXPECT THE ISRAELIS EITHER TO REPUDIATE PUBLICLY THESE PROGRAMS OR TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY REQUEST FROM US THAT THEY JUST TURN THE WHOLE THING OFF. AND IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT MANY ISRAELIS BELIEVE SINCERELY WITH DAYAN THAT THE ONLY HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA IS TO CONVINCE THE ARABS THAT TIME IS NOT ON THEIR SIDE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS TO US THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF BEING ABLE TO ASSURE THE GOI OF ANY REAL HOPE FOR AT LEAST INITIATING A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, WE SHOULD FOCUS ANY ACTION WE DECIDE TO TAKE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE GOAL OF GETTING THEM TO DELAY IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM WHICH REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT AND HIGHLY VISIBLE NEW DEPARTURES. WE COULD, THEREFORE, EMPHASIZE OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF YAMIT AND ITS ADJACENT NETWORK OF SETTLEMENTS ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, WHILE EXPRESSING GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THRUST OF LABOR PARTY PLATFORM IN CONTEXT OF CONTINUITY OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (SEE REFTEL FOR MORE DETAILS.)

5. HOW AND WHEN. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INITIALLY RAISE SUBJECT WITH GOI IN NEAR FUTURE. FOR OPENERS, WE WOULD SUGGEST AN EARLY CONVERSATION WITH AME DINITZ IN WASHINGTON. EMBASSY, OF COURSE, IN NO POSITION TO GUARANTEE WHAT SUCCESS WE MIGHT HAVE WITH GOI. DEPENDENT IN PART ON RESULT OF SUCH A MEETING, DEPT CAN DETERMINE WHETHER WE SHOULD MAKE DEMARCHE AT OUR END. ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE COMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN IMMINENCE OF ELECTIONS HERE, ON BALANCE I RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THIS MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE ISRAELIS HERE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HOPEFULLY, EXPRESSION OF OUR CONCERNS WOULD HELP MODERATE AT LEAST SOME CAMPAIGN RHETORIC ON SUBJECT AND SHOULD STRENGTHEN HAND OF THOSE IN GOI WHO ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TREND TOWARD ANNEXATION. ALSO, IT WOULD SERVE AS REMINDER TO GOI DECISION MAKERS THAT IN THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC ISRAELI CONSIDERATIONS THEY SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF FACTOR OF US-GOI RELATIONS.

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTION TO THIS MESSAGE.

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

BAD
COPY

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release USUN-70(69)
July 1, 1969

Statement by Ambassador Charles W. Yost, United States Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, on the situation in Jerusalem, July 1, 1969.

Once again the Council has been summoned to deal with certain actions taken by the Government of Israel in Jerusalem. We have listened carefully to the statements of the Permanent Representative of Jordan and other Arab Ambassadors, as well as the reply of the Representative of Israel.

The discussion thus far has made amply clear that the status of Jerusalem is not an isolated problem, but, rather, an integral part of a whole complex of issues in the current Middle Eastern conflict which must be resolved. This is not a novel conclusion. The Council clearly recognized that fact in Resolution 242, which treats the entire Middle Eastern situation as a package. This resolution remains the basis of our approach to a just and lasting peace in the area. You are all well aware of the strenuous efforts my own Government is making to help Ambassador Jarring promote a peaceful settlement. Progress in these efforts has, admittedly, been slow. This is perhaps not surprising when one reflects on how deep the roots of the conflict go. But the important thing is that some progress is being made. The fact that it has not been crowned with dramatic success should not give grounds for despair. Nor should it be exploited as justification for actions, which will make greater progress even more difficult. This applies to actions in Jerusalem as elsewhere in the area. Indeed, Jerusalem occupies a very special place in all our minds and all our hearts as one of the holiest cities in the entire world. For Jerusalem is a sacred shrine to three of the world's largest and oldest religious faiths: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. By virtue of that fact the United States has always considered that Jerusalem enjoys a unique international standing and that no action should be taken there without full regard to Jerusalem's special history and special place in the world community. Unfortunately there have been acts of many

-more-

...which have broken the peace in Jerusalem and which are of deep concern to my Government and to the international community. Mr. President, we understand the deep emotional concerns which move all parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute on the subject of Jerusalem. We do not believe, however, that any of these concerns are served by what is now taking place in East Jerusalem, whether it be actions by those now exercising authority there or by individuals considering themselves aggrieved and therefore justified in resorting to violence. The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests in the city. The United States considers that the part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Israel in the June war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power. Among the provisions of international law which bind Israel, as they would bind any occupier, are the provisions that the occupier has no right to make changes in laws or in administration other than those which are ^{temporarily} necessitated by his security interest, and that an occupier may not confiscate or destroy private property. The pattern of behavior authorized under the Geneva Convention and international law is clear: the occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by immediate needs of the occupation. I regret to say that the actions of Israel in the occupied portion of Jerusalem present a different picture, one which gives rise to understandable concerns that the eventual disposition of East Jerusalem may be prejudiced and the rights and activities of the population are already being affected and altered.

My Government regrets and deplores this pattern of activity, and it has so informed the Government of Israel on numerous occasions since June 1967. We have consistently refused to recognize these measures as having anything but a provisional character and do not accept them as affecting the ultimate status of Jerusalem.

I have explained in some detail the opposition of the United States to certain measures taken by the Government of Israel in Jerusalem, since this is the precise object of the complaint brought before us by the Government of Jordan. But, as I suggested earlier, we cannot logically and intelligently consider the problem of Jerusalem without putting it in its proper perspective -- the Middle East situation as a whole. In this connection, I would recall that one of the first major policy decisions taken by President Nixon after assuming office this year was that the United States Government should take new initiatives in helping to try to bring peace in the Middle East. For the past several months we have been devoting our best efforts to this task. We shall continue to do so but for these efforts to succeed we will require the goodwill and cooperation of the parties themselves. A just and lasting peace in the Middle East is long and tragically overdue. It will not be found through terror bombings, which inevitably harm innocent

YOST

...civilians, any more than through unilateral attempts to alter the status of Jerusalem. It will be found only through the instruments and processes of negotiation, accommodation and agreement. It will come only through the exercise by the parties of the utmost restraint -- not just along the cease-fire lines or in public statements, but also on the ground in Jerusalem itself.

In treating the problem of Jerusalem, since we deal with it in the context of the total situation in the Middle East, my Delegation will subject any proposal for Council action, first of all, to the test of whether that proposal is likely to help or hinder the peaceful settlement process. I hope all members will do likewise. For example, one constructive move the Council might make would be to request the parties to lay aside their recriminations, to desist from any action -- in Jerusalem or elsewhere -- that might be construed as prejudicing or prejudging a final, comprehensive settlement, a just and lasting peace. Thus, our consideration of the situation in Jerusalem could provide a fitting occasion on which to insist once more that the parties to a dispute which keeps the world's Holiest City in turmoil act responsibly to resolve the whole dispute and, until it is resolved, that they take no action anywhere which could further jeopardize its resolution.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
749418	749418	4718	

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

Scumder/Quondt

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

KISSINGER *X* _____ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ CODEWORD _____

ELIOT _____ S *X* _____ SENSITIVE _____

TS _____

SUBJECT: *Israeli Policy towards Occupied Territories*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
9/04		HAK	<i>X</i>	<i>Deuslon (9/10)</i>	
9/10				<i>HAK approved recom</i>	
9/10				<i>See 7304992NS for action</i>	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____

OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ *1304992NS* JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *X*

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/ *257* BY _____

CYS FOR) SA _____

) HP _____

ORIG) WH _____

TO) *SEP 12 1973* ✓

) SF _____

) NS _____

) EP _____

DESTROY) DY _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7314485

4451

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

August 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Assistant Secretary Sisco's Interview
on Israeli Television, August 1, 1973

Mr. Sisco asked that the attached interview on
Israeli television on August 1 be sent to you for
your information. He calls to your attention in
particular the question and answer on pages 9 and 10.

Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco's
Interview with Israeli Television,
August 1, 1973

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOSEPH J. SISCO'S INTERVIEW
WITH ISRAELI TELEVISION AUGUST 1, 1973

Q. Mr. Secretary are you satisfied by the present status quo in the Middle East?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I can't say that we're satisfied with the present status quo in the Middle East. There are both positive and less positive elements in it. Obviously, here we are in August, it will be just a few days and this will be three years of the cease-fire as tenuous as it has been along the Egyptian-Israeli front. Now this is obviously a good thing. Moreover, I believe the situation in Jordan is stable. I'm glad to say that the situation along the Israeli-Lebanese border is reasonably quiet as well as other borders. I think in that sense the present status quo is very good indeed. On the other hand, there's been an obvious lack of progress toward a political solution and as long as the no-war no-peace situation exists in the area instability is there and therefore there are risks. We've just concluded the Summit in Washington a few weeks ago, and certainly the risks of confrontation between ourselves and the Soviet Union have been reduced. I think the key is still to find a way to get a negotiating process started because from the point of view of the

United States what we want is to try to help get such a process started because regardless of the cease-fire the no-war no-peace situation is still too unstable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have new proposals for the Israelis and the Egyptians to get out of this stalemate?

MR. SISCO:

No, we don't. We don't have any new proposals. I met, for example, just yesterday with the Israeli Ambassador. I made no new proposals. We've just completed a round in the UN Security Council. I would hope that in the aftermath of this Council both sides would take a look at their positions to see whether there's anything more that can be done in order to get a negotiating process started. Certainly, if the Secretary General, Mr. Waldheim, decides to come to the area in the foreseeable future this too will afford a new opportunity.

Q. Mr. Sisco, how do you rate the chances of the Dr. Kurt Waldheim visit to the Middle East in view of the fact that Dr. Jarring didn't succeed in the past?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I think as I say, there's a new opportunity but whether one is talking about Ambassador Jarring or Dr. Waldheim or efforts by the United States the fact of

the matter is that each faces basically the same difficulty. There are serious differences with respect to the elements of an overall settlement. President Sadat has said, as you know, not an inch of territory. From the Israeli point of view Israel attaches considerable importance to territorial adjustments in order to meet what it considers to be its crucial security needs and as of right now I would say that the chasm on this particular issue continues to be a very wide one.

Q. You mentioned the Security Council's debate on the Middle East just recently and there the Americans put again the veto on the resolution. How do you regard this veto in view of the fact that there was a lot of criticism in the Arab countries concerning this veto and apparently the United States found itself in some way isolated from traditional allies like Great Britain and others?

MR. SISCO:

Our approach to the Security Council was two-fold. First, we made it very clear that we were prepared and are prepared to support a UN involvement whether it would have been in the form of another Jarring Mission or a mission by the Secretary General. Secondly, we made very clear that we could not support and would actively oppose any propositions, any proposals which would distort or undermine the delicate balance in the November 1967 resolution. It's true, of course, that each side has a different

interpretation of that resolution. But, nevertheless, it still remains the basic framework, in our judgment, within which any political solution has to be achieved. It is still accepted by both sides regardless of the different interpretation each has and therefore while we would quite frankly have preferred an outcome whereby there was a broad consensus in the Council that the Secretary General should get on with his mission based on Security Council Resolution 242, nevertheless we felt that the proposition that was before the Council would have undermined 242 and we feel that our veto, ✓ hopefully, has kept open the doors of diplomacy. We realize that there's been some criticism; we regret the veto in that regard but we felt in these circumstances that the course of statesmanship was to take that very difficult decision, and having done this, it is one reason why we would hope that the parties would look at the situation in the aftermath of the Security Council to see whether in the context of the Secretary General's trip to the area or in other ways some new opportunity can be developed.

Q. Do you feel that Israel should do something to get out of this stalemate in the Middle East?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I would hope that both sides would look at the situation. I think that Israel could look at the situation to see whether there is something more that it could do to be helpful in getting a negotiating process started. I think, equally, the other side has an equal responsibility in this regard. I don't have any precise, specific suggestions to make but all that I'm saying here is that the Middle East has been a history of lost opportunities. I think we may very well have a new opportunity before us, and I hope that each side will avail itself of the opportunity.

Q. I wonder Mr. Secretary if you can enumerate opportunities which were lost because of Israel?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I don't think its particularly beneficial to begin to make value judgments as it related to either side. I think that if you look over the history of the last four or five years, frankly, I think there's enough blame to spread around. I think on occasions Israel might have lost an opportunity, on other occasions I think Egypt might have lost an opportunity but I don't

really think it's very fruitful for me, or for any official really to focus on the difficulties of the past. I think it's better to look ahead.

- Q. Mr. Sisco, from time to time we read in official American policy statements about the Palestinians. How would you define this problem?

MR. SISCO:

Well, you undoubtedly noted that there was reference to the legitimate interests, and here I'm quoting, of the Palestinians in the recent Soviet-American communique. This is intended to express what has been our long-held view that obviously for any durable peace to be achieved in the area it not only has to meet the interests and the aspirations of each of the states, of Israel, of Egypt, of Syria, of Lebanon, of Jordan, but it also has to meet the legitimate interests, the aspirations of the Palestinian people and, it means just that, no more, no less. It doesn't mean that the United States has opted for one form of solution as against another. We think, for example, that this is something for the Arab people themselves to decide and so that, we've not, on the basis of anything that we have ever either said publicly or any substantive ideas that we've ever developed over

the last four or five years, chosen any one solution as against another. But we do think that if you're going to have a peace that really means anything and lasts that it's obviously going to have to meet their concerns as well.

Q. You're probably aware of the controversy among the Israeli leadership on this question --

MR. SISCO:

Oh, yes.

Q. --the Palestinians. Do you think there is room for another Palestinian state between the sea and the desert? ✓

MR. SISCO:

Well, again, as I say we have not adopted any kind of a position as it relates to either the federal type solution which King Hussein talked about about a year ago, or a so-called Palestine entity that some Palestinian leaders talk about, or for that matter, a Palestinian state which has appeared rather frequently in recent public statements of the Egyptian Foreign Minister inside and outside of the UN Security Council. We have no specific substantive position in this regard. What we have said is that the interests of the Palestinian people need to be taken into account in any solution. In what form, I think is something for the Arab people to work out.

Q. I have the feeling that this is one of the subjects that were (sic) not discussed very much between the Israelis and the United States, and there was no serious dialogue between the two countries on this question of the Palestinians. Do you think there is room for such a dialogue?

MR. SISCO:

You mean between the United States and Israel?

A. Yes.

MR. SISCO:

Well, I don't think it is entirely accurate to say that we haven't discussed this. Over the years I think we have had the fullest kind of an exchange, on all the various substantive elements of a possible solution with the Israeli Government. As I say, we have not adopted any substantive position as such, but certainly there have been regular exchanges, and if you go back, for example, to the 1967 resolution there, of course, it only talks in terms that there must be a solution to the so-called refugee question. Obviously, this whole matter has become much more politicized in the last four or five years. But, I don't see any particular advantage to single out this element as against any others. I don't think there is any lack of substantive exchange on any of these questions.

Q. How do you see the future American policy towards the Middle East in the very immediate future?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I think obviously, our efforts are going to continue in the direction of trying to be helpful in getting a negotiating process started. The very fact that you've had a cease-fire continuing, of course, is a helpful element. The very fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States have adopted a non-confrontation policy is helpful. On the other hand, the longer there is no solution, the more difficult it is to try to achieve a solution, and therefore the protracted period in which there has been no serious, practical progress toward an overall settlement makes it more complicated. Moreover, as you well know, while our interests in many respects are parallel to the interests of Israel, they are not synonymous with the State of Israel. The interests of the United States go beyond any one nation in the area. We have important political, economic and strategic interests in the entire area, whether you are talking about the Middle East as well as the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. There is increasing

concern in our country, for example, over the energy question, and I think it is foolhardy to believe that this is not a factor in the situation. It's a factor in the situation as are a good many others, so that in any one action that the United States has to weigh, it has to take all of these variegated interests into account. We have long ago concluded that there's really only one satisfactory answer, and that satisfactory answer is a peace in which both sides have established a vital interest, and I think you can assume that the United States will remain engaged in trying to get a serious diplomatic process started. We feel that whatever influence the United States can exercise, that it should be exercised within the context of ongoing negotiations, not in the abstract.

- Q. You have mentioned naturally the energy crisis and the obvious question is do you think the Arab oil-producing countries will use the oil as a political weapon against the United States in the future, in the 1980's?

MR. SISCO:

Well, of course I'm in no position to be clairvoyant and to predict it. My hope is that the mutual interest that has existed between producer and consumer will continue. There are obvious voices in the Arab world

-11-

~~who~~ are pressing for a linking of oil and politics,
if I can put it this way. I would hope that these
questions can be viewed by all concerned in their own
proper perspective, because as I say, I think there
is a mutual interest between the countries that use
this oil and market this oil and so on, and those
that have it in the ground and produce it.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
8/10/73	80077	7451	Saunders

Pickering =

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

KISSINGER ☒ RICHARDSON _____ LOU ☒ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ CODEWORD _____

ELIOT _____ S _____ SENSITIVE _____

TS _____

SUBJECT: *Most Sec State J. Disco interview Aug 1 on Israeli television*

REFERENCE: S/S *7314485* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <i>(8/13)</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
8/17/73	Saunders	NSC/S	C	HAK informed of attached. No further action. Close out. rosemary for BQuandt	

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____	<p>MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:</p> <p>M/F'D <i>AOC</i> BY _____</p> <p>CYS FOR) SA _____</p> <p>) HP _____</p> <p>ORIG) WH _____</p> <p>TO) PA <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>) SF _____</p> <p>) NS _____</p> <p>) EP _____</p> <p>DESTROY) DY _____</p>
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____	
	OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
	CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____	
SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.	AUG 22 1973	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

4574X

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

August 15, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT *w.B.Q.*
SUBJECT: Minutes of Your Meeting with Ambassador
Keating

Attached for your approval and files are the minutes of your meeting
with Ambassador Keating on August 13, 1973.

HK

XGDS-3
DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.
BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

BECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

August 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Kenneth Keating, Ambassador
to Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security
Affairs Adviser to the President
William B. Quandt, NSC Staff

DATE AND PLACE: 12:10 - 12:45 p.m. Monday, August 13, 1973
in Dr. Kissinger's Office

Keating: Israel runs the risk of getting itself into problems with
activities such as the diversion of the Lebanese plane.

Kissinger: If they had got those four fedayeen leaders though it would
have been quite a coup.

Keating: Yes, but it would have been very hard to justify.

Kissinger: No, no. I agree. It couldn't be justified.

Keating: It would have been good if they had caught them, but it
couldn't be justified.

Kissinger: It's a weird war. The problem for the Israelis is that when
they get hit they have no way of holding any government respon-
sible. Yet whenever they hit back it becomes an international
incident. There is an asymmetry there.

Keating: I was surprised to see that the United States has been blamed
by the Palestinians.

Kissinger: That's standard. It's totally unreasonable. Well, we'll have
to condemn Israel in the vote in the United Nations.

XGDS-3
DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.
BYAUTH- Dr. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

- 2 -

Keating: If the Lebanese don't press the issue, the sanctions won't be in the resolution. How will we vote? What if there are sanctions?

Kissinger: We'll try to split any such resolution into two parts. If the resolution simply calls on the ICAO to do something to prevent future measures of this sort we might vote for it. If the resolution insists on expelling Israel, then we can't vote for it.

Keating: Some action has to be taken though in a case of this sort.

Kissinger: The problem is that the Arabs can hijack a plane and fly it to Abu Dhabi and no one can do anything about it. We need some symmetry. Perhaps sanctions could be brought against the government that allows such a plane to land.

Keating: The Arabs must be very opposed to sanctions against terrorism.

Kissinger: That's right; they're very opposed.

Keating: I want to ask about this other recent incident and how it was handled.

Kissinger: Which, the hijacking?

Keating: No, Sisco's interview on Israeli T.V.. And then when he called in Dinitz.

Kissinger: That's not the White House method for doing things. It's childish. How would we like it for the Israeli Ambassador to get on US television and give us advice? It doesn't help to just urge the Israelis to be flexible in the abstract. We have to know what we want from them. To begin with, the Arab position now is inflexible. If it were to change, we could go to Golda at the right moment and urge flexibility on the Israelis, which is something we do want. But we don't want to hit them with it publicly, particularly in the midst of their own election campaign.

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

I also wouldn't have handled the hijacking the way State Department wanted. I wouldn't have condemned the action on Saturday. I would have held out until Monday to condemn it, and that would have given us a better bargaining position. Instead, by condemning it on Saturday, we move on to the question of sanctions on Monday. Rogers wanted to use this gambit of only stating our position on an "if asked" basis. But that's a bad tactic.

It's insane to stir up the Jewish groups when we have nothing concrete in mind and nothing to work with. If Egypt were to make a proposal, then we could go to the Israelis and urge them to shape up. We're prepared to do this. But if the Egyptians say the entrance price for negotiations is Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and then the Israelis should negotiate with the Palestinians, this is a dream land. No Israeli will accept it. Even if Israel were to make some minor modifications in its position now, it would be of no use. We need to try first to get the Arabs to come up with a reasonable position. Sisco's statement simply doesn't help. He did it for nothing.

Keating: The President has enough problems now without stirring up the Jewish community against him.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Keating: Dinitz talked to me about his discussion with Sisco. He felt we were pressing hard. I think it was all right to explain to the Israelis the problems we faced after casting this veto, but it's important to do it quietly, not in public.

Kissinger: Absolutely. I'm going to get Joe Sisco under control. If you have trouble out there in Israel, you can back-channel me.

Keating: I don't like to do that in principle.

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

- 4 -

Kissinger: Then don't. It's up to you.

Keating: If I need to I will.

Kissinger: We don't want to make this Arab-Israeli conflict a major political problem to the President now, in addition to its being a major international problem.

Keating: You don't want to lose the Jewish community's good will. You may have noticed a recent advertisement in the New York Times supporting the President. Most of the signatories were Jews.

Kissinger: I didn't see that.

Keating: On this issue of a settlement, I guess it's impossible without both sides making some concessions.

Kissinger: There is no question about that. But we need to stop grandstanding and we need to get Sisco to stop. The way he operates, we get caught from both directions. If we move away from Israel now without getting anything in return from the Arabs, it will simply whet their appetite. I am willing to press Israel hard at the right time. In fact, if a settlement comes Israel may want us to press them to accept compromise terms. In the Vietnam situation, people kept telling me that we should squeeze Thieu, but until the right time came and the stakes were important enough I didn't do so. It's the same situation with Israel. What do the Arabs want now? Even if Golda were to come up with some new proposals, it wouldn't help.

Keating: Joe Sisco agrees that there can't be any political concessions from Israel until after the elections.

Kissinger: Of course. Well, it's up to you. You can get in touch with me if you want through the back-channel. I'll protect it.

Keating: It would be helpful if you were to take the initiative and ask me questions through the back-channel to which I could respond.

Kissinger: But you may get some instructions that we don't even see. If I do see the instructions and have problems with them, I'll get in touch with you.

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

BECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

- 5 -

Keating: I thought any important instructions would be cleared here.

Kissinger: That's normally true. Joe Sisco has a free-wheeling tendency. The President, of course, won't allow a major blow-up with Israel without making sure we know about it. But sometimes information from the Israeli embassy about what we are doing is better than what I am told from State. The Israelis eventually tell me, so I do get informed.

Keating: If an ambassador gets definite instructions, and if he doesn't agree...

Kissinger: It's up to you. When I am aware of problems, I'll query you.

Keating: That's the best way. But if I find problems with my instructions, I'll take the bull by the horns. I work for the President after all. Maybe things will get moving after the October elections. We'll need to do some hard work then. If I could, I would like to take a letter from the President with me. I'm leaving on Friday.

Kissinger: We'll get the letter done for you. We'll have it by Thursday. Do you want it sent to New York or to the State Department?

Keating: Send it to 200 Park Avenue, New York City. Mark it for the 52nd floor. It gets to me more rapidly that way. Well, we've covered most of what I wanted to cover.

Kissinger: I talked to Joe Sisco on the category 1 recommendation. I gather it's gone to the administrative types.

Keating: It got bogged down in Curtis Tarr's shop. He's taking over Macomber's duties.

Kissinger: I don't see how the administrative people can disagree with political instructions.

Keating: Tarr is very good, but this is the first time I've ever seen administrators act that way. But that's not a very important issue.

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

- 6 -

Kissinger: You'll have had the unique experience of working with two women prime ministers. Golda can be very tough, but she is a very warm person.

Keating: I'm looking forward to dealing with her.

Kissinger: What kind of residence will you have?

Keating: Not like in India. That was really a grand place. Moynihan is turning it into a guest house, however.

Kissinger: I've been there. It was very nice.

Keating: The facilities in Israel are apparently all right. Barbour never did much entertaining, so he didn't use them the way I will. I'll have to be careful how I use my time in Israel, however, because lots of visitors from the United States will want to see me. Well, that covers everything I had to bring up. If you can get me the letter, I would appreciate that. Please give the President my best wishes.

Kissinger: I will.

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA MO DA HR			
8 15 8 15 11		4574X	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER ☒ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS ☒

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT _____ S ☒ CODEWORD _____ SENSITIVE ☒

SUBJECT: *HAK meeting w/ Amb Kenneth Keating on Aug 13-44*
re terrorism & Arab-Israeli dispute

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
8/15		HAK	X	Outside system (8/20)	
8-16				Filed	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D _____ BY _____
SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
OR RECORD COMMENT: _____	
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____	CYS FOR) SA _____
SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.) HP _____
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____	ORIG) WH _____
	TO) PA _____
) SF _____
) NS _____
) EP _____
	DESTROY) DY _____

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 14a ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 14B ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

PARTICIPANTS:

Max Fisher

Jacob Stein

Richard Maas

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4002

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

July 18, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jewish Leaders, July 19

I assume that one of the topics is your assessment of what we can expect from the Soviets in the wake of the summit. They will be fully aware of Brezhnev's figures and the general pitch he made to the Senators and Congressmen. Brezhnev probably "misspoke" in giving his totals. For your reference, here is where we stand:

Brezhnev

68,000 left before January 1973

61,000 applicants last year

60,200 actually left last year* US estimate - about 31,000

11,400 applicants so far this year

10,100 permitted to leave this year US estimate - about 12,600

*Possibly he meant last two years or to date.

While it is possible to make some sense out of these figures, a key problem is the Soviet claim that 95 percent of those that applied were permitted to leave. This is widely disputed, and is probably phony. Moreover, there is the problem of those who are deterred from applying by fear of retaliation -- some claim this figure would be in the hundreds of thousands.

Thus, it would be prudent not to get very involved in whether Brezhnev's figures are correct. Rather, you might want to make the following points:

-- the exit tax is removed; this is in itself a rather major accomplishment. It is very unlikely that it would have occurred without the political

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

improvements in our relations resulting from the President's policy. No Soviet leader could have justified such a retreat to the Politburo unless he could point to a general trend in US-Soviet relations;

-- the fact remains that emigration continues at about the same level as for 1972; by the end of the year if this continues, the totals will be about 85,000 for three years.

Special Cases

There are a growing number of cases where special interest groups here and abroad have organized to publicize the plight of one person: i. e., an economist, or a scientist, or a ballet dancer, etc. In some instances this pressure may be helpful -- the Soviets have, for example, let some well known dissidents leave, never to return. But there is also the basic injustice to all those faceless people who do not command well placed friends in the West. In any case, the White House cannot become a court of special pleading, taking up every person who has the backing of a group. The Soviets are well aware of the more infamous cases. We have some hope that they will make a gesture.

MFN-Jackson

If you decide to discuss this, there are some points you might want to bring out:

-- While the Jackson amendment is directed against the USSR, its practical effect will be far more sweeping. Technically it will have to apply to all communist countries plus Yugoslavia; if we were to apply it to the letter, all credits, government sponsored insurance for investors, and MFN treatment should be cancelled or suspended for Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, etc., and also for China.

-- We could not claim in good conscience that only Russia denies free emigration.

-- Thus, the entire structure of what we have been trying to do is undermined.

-- The President must have some discretion to carry out a realistic foreign policy. It would be madness to cut off Yugoslavia when it faces

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

the uncertainties of the post-Tito period. It would be crippling to cut off all prospects of economic relations with China at this stage in our relations.

In short, the Jackson amendment as it is now written risks a major damage to US policy in return for which we can only expect that the Soviets will no longer have any incentive to let the current rate of emigration continue.

At Tab A is a current State compilation of the emigration rate.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 17, 1973

SECRET-NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet MFN and Jewish Emigration

Jewish Emigration in 1973. Monthly arrivals of Soviet Jews in Israel this year are at roughly the level of the first six months of 1972:

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u> (rounded figures)
January	2,300	2,700
February	2,000	2,400
March	2,800	2,600
April	2,000	2,700
May	2,700	2,200
June	3,300	1,900
	<u>15,100</u>	<u>14,500</u> (approximate six-month figures)
July	2,000	1,000 (first 15 days only)

The Israeli Embassy tentatively regards the drop-off in emigration in June 1973 as coincidental and believes that the total for 1973 will be roughly the same as that for 1972. There has been little progress in the hardship or prominent emigration cases or in reported harassment of applicants for emigration.

Brezhnev Visit and MFN. Our soundings on the Hill indicate that Brezhnev's meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not materially improve the chances for passage of the MFN aspect of the Trade Reform Act without undesirable conditions. Brezhnev's claim that there is no "so-called Jewish question" in the USSR and the figures he addressed were not convincing to members of Congress. In short, at the moment prospects do not appear bright for Congressional authorization of MFN for the Soviet Union without onerous restrictions related to Soviet Jewish emigration.

SECRET-NODIS--GDS

7313163


4002

BECLASSIFIED

SECRET-NODIS

-2-

Timing for formal Congressional consideration of the Trade Reform Act and the amendments is still uncertain. If formal consideration of the Act is delayed, Jackson-Vanik amendment supporters may seek some earlier opportunity to restrict MFN and credits.


Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

SECRET-NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF :

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	7 002	J feldt

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER ☒ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS ☒

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT ☒ S ☒ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Jewish Immigration & arrivals in Israel & status of Soviet MEN passage in Congress

REFERENCE: S/S 7313163 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE (_____)
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: (7/22)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
7/18		HAK	X	Talked (7/19/73)	
7/20			C	Noted by HAK	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____

OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ☒

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D AOC BY _____

CYS FOR) SA _____

) HP _____

ORIG) WH _____

TO) PA ☒

) SF _____

) NS _____

) EP _____

DESTROY) DY _____

JUL 23 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Henry-

I had this typed up
in case you wished
to send it to the
President.

Bunt

No
HK

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Message from Prime Minister
Golda Meir

I thought you would be interested in reading Prime Minister Golda Meir's response to your message of condolence on the death of the Israeli Assistant Military Attache.

"Dear Mr. President:

"On behalf of the people of Israel I wish to express to you my sincere thanks for your moving message of condolence on the murder of Colonel Yosef Alon. It is tragic that this young and brave man should have fallen victim to such a senseless dastardly act of violence.

"My Government and I deeply appreciate your determination to devote all available resources to investigate this brutal act and to bring the perpetrators to justice.

"I recall, Mr. President, the sad day in Washington when your diplomats were being held in the Capital of Sudan and then murdered. I remember your firm stand at the time. When we face tragic events of that kind I often think of your reaction in a moment of trial and draw encouragement from it.

Sincerely,

's' Golda Meir"

DECLASSIFIED

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****S COPY

OP IMMED
ESA051A0A730
DE RUESAD #5240 1841540
O 031522Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 8962

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 5240

E O 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, IS, US
SUBJECT: PRIMIN'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ON DEATH OF
YOSEF ALON

1. EMB RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM EVRON OF FONMIN
FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT NIXON. GOI INTENDS TO
RELEASE TO PRESS AT 11 PM ISRAEL TIME JULY 3, I.E. 5 PM
WASHINGTON TIME.

2. " DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
" ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY
SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR MOVING MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE ON THE
MURDER OF COLONEL YOSEF ALON. IT IS TRAGIC THAT THIS YOUNG
AND BRAVE MAN SHOULD HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO SUCH A SENSELESS
DASTARDLY ACT OF VIOLENCE.
" MY GOVERNMENT AND I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR DETERMINATION TO
DEVOTE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO INVESTIGATE THIS BRUTAL
ACT AND TO BRING THE PERPERTRATORS TO JUSTICE.
" I RECALL, MR PRESIDENT, THE SAD DAY IN WASHINGTON WHEN YOUR
DIPLOMATS WERE BEING HELD IN THE CAPITAL OF SUDAN AND THEN
MURDERED. I REMEMBER YOUR FIRM STAND AT THE TIME. WHEN WE
FACE TRAGIC EVENTS OF THAT KIND I OFTEN THINK OF YOUR REACTION
IN A MOMENT OF TRIAL AND DRAW ENCOURAGEMENT FROM IT.
SINCERELY,
GOLDA MEIR".
ZURHELLEN
BT

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

KENNEDY, MCFARLANE, SAUNDERS, DAVIS

PSN:027807 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:184/16:09Z DTG:031522Z JUL 73

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****S COPY

DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMCENTER USE ONLY

DAC _____ GPS _____

LDX 520 PAGES 1

TTY _____ CITE _____

DTG

03 1746 Z

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

TO: CAMPBELL FOR MR. KISSINGER

INFO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
RON ZIEGLER

RELEASED BY: RL

TOR: _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: TOHAK 289

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE.
WASHINGTON

Mr President

On your behalf
I have approved
a C-135 To return
The body.

[Signature]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*
SUBJECT: Death of Israeli Attache

Colonel Yosef Alon, Assistant Armed Forces Attache, Israeli Embassy, was shot several times outside his home in Bethesda, Maryland, upon returning home from a private party. He was declared dead on arrival at Suburban Hospital at 0130 (Washington time) of multiple gunshot wounds in the chest. A car was seen departing the scene of the shooting, but no suspects have been apprehended.

An Israeli military spokesman in Tel Aviv declared the shooting could have been the work of Arab terrorists. He speculated the shooting could have been in retaliation for the death of a suspected Arab guerrilla in Paris on Thursday. No money or other valuables were taken from the body, leading officials to discount robbery as a motive in the killing.

Condolences on your behalf were expressed early this morning to the Israeli Ambassador, and a letter is being prepared.

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1973

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


SUBJECT: Aircraft Deliveries for Israel

The President has reviewed the options for F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel presented in the State Department's memo of April 2, 1973. The President has directed the following:

-- That the US offer to deliver 48 F-4 aircraft to Israel over a four-year period with deliveries evenly spaced at the rate of 12 aircraft in each twelve-month period following the expiration of present deliveries.

-- That the US deliver 42 A-4 aircraft evenly spaced over the period between June 1974 and December 1977.

The President has emphasized that this decision should remain confidential between the governments of the US and Israel.


Henry A. KissingerSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 4, 1973

7310201

3125

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israeli Public Reaction to Sale of
F-4s to Saudi Arabia

The Israelis have made known publicly their unhappiness with any sale by us to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait of Phantoms. But they are now showing forbearance in their public reaction and, contrary to initial indications, seem disinclined at this time to make this a major issue between us.

Today's Washington Post reports from Jerusalem that "Israel plans a low-key public reaction to the large-scale U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia..." This seems to describe well the GOI's current stance. While preserving an element of watchful waiting, Israeli public figures speaking for the record to date have expressed their understanding of the need for a strong U.S. role in the context of Persian Gulf security and stability and their confidence that, at least for the time being, the Middle East arms balance will remain weighted in favor of Israel.

Our reports indicate Mrs. Meir has been silent on the issue up until now. Foreign Minister Eban's statements have been restrained. A report he had "denounced" the U.S. for selling Phantoms to Saudi Arabia was incorrect.

In a May 30 address, Defense Minister Dayan noted the Israeli edge in terms of skilled manpower and forecast that Israel can maintain military

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

superiority as a deterrent to Arab belligerence for at least the next ten years. Israeli editorialists are falling into line behind the relatively restrained view from the top. In this country, supporters of Israel have shown as yet no indications of gearing up a public campaign against such sales. The amount of public discussion of this issue already, however, virtually assures there will be at least some critical spontaneous reaction from that quarter.

Robert Blackwill for

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

000000
DECLASSIFIED

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACT
MO DA	MO DA HR		
6 4 6 5 9		125	Thur

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS ☒ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER ☒ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT ☒ S _____ SENSITIVE _____

TS _____

SUBJECT: Israeli public reaction to US sale of F-4s to Saudi Arabia

REFERENCE: S/S 7310201 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <u>6/10</u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	6/5/73	Launders	NSC/S		This was covered in 3080 and the add-on - both given to HAK 6/2. No further action. HHS	
	6/05				C See 7303080NS for action	

S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D <u>AC</u> BY _____ CYS FOR) SA _____ ORIG) <u>1973</u> TO) PA <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) SF _____) NS _____) EP _____ DESTROY) DY _____
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
	OR RECORD COMMENT: _____	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
	CROSS REF W/ <u>7303080NS</u> JOINED BY LOG # _____	
	SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

May 29th

Mr. Saunders:

This is the duplicate memo I was speaking to
you about earlier, we had it pulled at the last minute
before it went in to Pres/ as you can see the May ~~27th~~
17th is a duplicate with the exception of (revised)
after log # ???

tom

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 1827 (revised)

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

May 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel

You will recall that in your meeting with Prime Minister Meir you indicated that we would view Israeli requests for additional aircraft with sympathy but made no specific commitment on numbers. The Departments of State and Defense have now developed several options for responding.

The Israelis have formally requested 36 F-4 Phantoms and 30 A-4 Skyhawks during the period 1974-1975.

One possible response is to meet their request in full for the next two years, although Defense would prefer to bunch the delivery of F-4s primarily in 1975 in order to allow the USAF to rebuild its own inventory.

A theoretically possible alternative would be to provide a much lower number than requested as a signal that we intend to cut back significantly on the level of our military assistance to Israel. This might gain us some credit among the Arab states at a time when we are being sharply criticized for making it possible for Israel to "remain intransigent" on issues of a settlement. However, it would cause a crisis of confidence with Israel without getting anything in return, and I assume that you do not want to pursue this approach.

A more attractive alternative to giving Israel what it has asked for over the next two years would be to aim for a longer term agreement over a period of four years--1974 to 1977--involving at least as many, and perhaps more, aircraft than the Israelis have now requested, but somewhat less than we anticipate they will want during the whole four-year period ahead. The advantage to us would be that we might not have to

XGDS-3

DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

make new decisions on aircraft for Israel at least until late 1975 or 1976. This longer-term agreement would provide the Israelis with continuity of supply, though in somewhat smaller numbers than they might like.

The Departments of State and Defense prefer this four-year approach and recommend that you approve the delivery of 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s during the 1974-77 period. As a modification of this option, they suggest that the number of F-4s could be increased to 48, or even higher, over four years, if you feel we should be more forthcoming.

I see considerable merit in deciding now on a delivery schedule on aircraft that would cover a four-year period. The basic Israeli request would be met, although with fewer aircraft than they would request over that period. Our relations with Arab friends would not be periodically strained by announcements of new agreements on aircraft for Israel. And our air force would be able to rebuild its inventory of F-4s instead of diverting planes from its own inventory for Israel.

I would recommend offering Israel a four-year agreement for 48 F-4 Phantoms rather than the 36 that State and Defense suggest and offering 42 A-4 Skyhawks.

There is a question of timing. It would not be helpful to have publicity on these decisions until reaction to Israel's raid on Beirut dies down. I shall work that out when a decision has been made.

Apart from this decision, Defense is going ahead as you instructed with aid to permit Israel to produce at least 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve a four-year delivery schedule for aircraft to Israel, consisting of 48 F-4 Phantoms delivered at the rate of 12 a year and 42 A-4 Skyhawks distributed more or less evenly over the four years. If you approve, I shall sign the attached decision memorandum.


Approve _____

Prefer two-year package meeting present Israeli requests for
36 F-4s and 30 A-4s _____

Prefer four-year approach with State-Defense recommendation option
of 36 Phantoms and 42 Skyhawks _____

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Aircraft Deliveries for Israel

The President has reviewed the options for F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel presented in the State Department's memo of April 2, 1973. The President has directed the following:

--That the US offer to deliver 48 F-4 aircraft to Israel over a four-year period with deliveries evenly spaced at the rate of 12 aircraft in each twelve-month period following the expiration of present deliveries.

--That the US deliver 42 A-4 aircraft evenly spaced over the period between June 1974 and December 1977.

The President has emphasized that this decision should remain confidential between the governments of the US and Israel.

Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) 3

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

1827

(revised)

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel

You will recall that in your meeting with Prime Minister Meir ~~the~~ ~~you~~ you indicated that we would view Israeli requests for additional aircraft with sympathy but made no specific commitment on numbers. The Departments of State and Defense have now developed several options for responding.

The Israelis have formally requested 36 F-4 Phantoms and 30 A-4 Skyhawks during the period 1974-1975.

One possible response ^(Defense would prefer to bunch) is to meet their request in full for the next two years, although ^{the USAF} the delivery of F-4s ~~would take place~~ primarily in 1975 in order to allow ~~our air force~~ ^{the USAF} to rebuild its own inventory.

A theoretically possible alternative would be to provide a much lower number than requested as a signal that we intend to cut back significantly on the level of our military assistance to Israel. This might gain us some credit among the Arab states at a time when we are being sharply criticized for making it possible for Israel ~~to~~ "remain intransigent" on issues of a settlement. However, it would cause a crisis of confidence with Israel without getting anything in return, and I assume that you do not want to pursue this approach.

A more attractive alternative to giving Israel what it has asked for over the next two years would be to aim for a longer term agreement over a period of four years--1974 to 1977--involving at least as many, and perhaps more, aircraft than the Israelis have now requested, but somewhat less than we anticipate they will want during the whole four-year period ahead. The advantage to us would be that we might not have to make new decisions on aircraft for Israel at least until late 1975 or 1976. This longer-term agreement would provide the Israelis with continuity of supply, though in somewhat smaller numbers than they might like.

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

The Departments of State and Defense prefer this four-year approach and recommend that you approve the delivery of 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s during the 1974-77 period. As a modification of this option, ^{they suggest that} the number of F-4s could be increased to 48, or even ^{higher} 60, over four years, if you feel we should be more forthcoming.

I see considerable merit in deciding now on a delivery schedule on aircraft that would cover a four-year period. The basic Israeli request would be met, although ^{with fewer aircraft than they would request over that period,} not quite as they would prefer. Our relations with Arab friends would not be periodically strained by announcements of new agreements on aircraft for Israel. And our air force would be able to rebuild its inventory of F-4s instead of diverting planes from its own inventory for Israel. ^{Phantom} I would recommend ~~offering~~ offering Israel a four-year agreement for 48 F-4s rather than the 36 that State and Defense suggest and ~~being prepared to go to 60 if Israel feels 48 is too low.~~ On Skyhawks, I would propose offering 42 ^{A-4 Skyhawks} with willingness to go as high as 60 if they wish.

There is a question of timing. It would not be helpful to have publicity on these decisions until reaction to Israel's raid on Beirut dies down. I shall work that out when a decision has been made.

Apart from this decision, ^{Defense is} we are going ahead ^{as you instructed} with aid to permit Israel to produce at least 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve a four-year delivery schedule for aircraft to Israel, consisting of 48 F-4 Phantoms and 42 A-4 Skyhawks ^{delivered at the rate of 12 a year} distributed more or less evenly over the four years. If you approve, ~~with readiness to go to 60 of each if the Israelis wish.~~

Approve _____

Prefer two-year package meeting present Israeli requests for 36 F-4s and 30 A-4s _____

Prefer within four-year approach, ^{with} ~~State-Defense~~ ^{recommendation} option of ~~48~~ 36 Phantoms and 42 Skyhawks _____

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

I shall ~~and~~ sign the attached decision memorandum.

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 1827
(revised)

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

April 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel--Revised Package

As you requested, I have revised the memorandum for the President at Tab A to reflect the judgment expressed in your note on my earlier memo (next page).

Two changes have been made in the memorandum for the President:

1. The recommendation is revised to reflect the numbers you propose.
2. A decision memorandum is now attached to the memo for the President for your signature if he approves.

There is one issue I would like you to think about before sending this memorandum forward: What will be our answer if the Israelis either insist on a higher number now or reserve their right to increase the number in a year or two? I particularly raise this in connection with the Skyhawks. We could provide a larger number now relatively easily if they wished and the Skyhawk has less symbolic importance.

This leads to even a more fundamental issue: What rationale should be used in explaining to the Israelis why we are providing fewer aircraft than they would be likely to request over the four-year period ahead? Over that long a period, it is difficult to cite our own aircraft requirements because the production line over that period could be geared to larger output. The only approach I can see is to say that our decision is a combination of other needs and the US desire to see some restraint introduced into the Mid-East arms race. Do you agree?

Yes ✓

Other rationale _____

Recommendation: That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President and, if he approves, that you sign the decision memorandum attached to it.

XGDS- 3

DECLAS - Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7305748

NSC #1827

April 2, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Options on A-4 and F-4 Deliveries
to Israel

In response to your request of March 2, we have prepared a number of options for both F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel.

As you know, Israel requested last November a total of 30 additional A-4s and 36 additional F-4s for delivery in 1974 and 1975 after current contracts are filled. In addition, as we mentioned in our Memorandum to the President of February 27, Israel has indicated it is thinking of requesting delivery of 18 more of each aircraft each year beginning in 1976 for the indefinite future. The Israelis seem to be planning therefore to acquire a total of 72 F-4s and 66 A-4s over the next four years.

Our options are as follows:

F-4

Option A - Delivers 36 aircraft in two years, as requested, but concentrates deliveries in the second year, thus reducing the adverse impact on USAF caused by diversion.

SECRET/NODIS

XGDS-3

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

2

Option B - Delivers 36 aircraft over four years. This would provide liberally for peacetime attrition, plus enough aircraft for one additional squadron; it is less (36 vs. 72) than we expect the Israelis will eventually request for delivery over the four years. Stretching deliveries through 1977 reinforces the principle of continuity, minimizes the impact of diversions on our own forces, and begins the long-term supply, attrition-oriented policy we recommended in our February 27 memorandum.

Option C - Delivers 48 aircraft over four years. This would provide liberally for peacetime attrition plus enough aircraft for almost two additional squadrons. It would have psychological advantage over B in that it would provide a larger number of F-4s than Israel has requested for 1974/75, although deliveries would be stretched over four years, and fewer aircraft (48 vs. 72) than their total anticipated four-year request.

Option D - Delivers 20 aircraft for attrition for four years (1974-1977) as proposed in the February 27 memorandum, assuming an annual loss rate to 5%. This is a liberal attrition figure in view of Israel's actual peacetime attrition of 1-3% (i.e., 1-3 aircraft per year).

A-4

Option A - Delivers 30 aircraft in two years as Israel desires and is almost identical to the Israeli request, but with deliveries adjusted to fit efficiently into present production schedules.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

3

Option B - Provides for 42 aircraft delivered over the period June 1974-December 1977. Covers estimated attrition at 5% or 10 A-4s a year (slightly less in 1974), which is liberal based on past experience, plus 5 additional training aircraft in the first year, as the Israelis requested. This option provides more aircraft (42 vs. 30) than requested but over a longer period of time and is designed to support a principle of continuity based primarily on attrition replacement. It is less (42 vs. 66) than what we expect the Israelis will eventually request for delivery over the four years.

The options are summarized in terms of total aircraft deliveries per year by type on the attached table.

Consistent with your guidance and our recommendations in the State-Defense memorandum of February 27, we recommend Option B for both aircraft. These options provide as many F-4s as requested and more A-4s than requested for 1974-75, but spread deliveries through 1977 -- and (barring unforeseen circumstances) obviate the need for further aircraft decisions over the next four years -- an approach we strongly endorse. Also, they reflect the principles of continuity and longer-term commitment which Israel values highly.

Timing of deliveries, particularly of A-4s, depends on an early decision. Delivery schedules for CY 1975 and beyond can be varied, however, within rather broad production line constraints.

If the President wishes to be even more generous, such an option is described in Option C which would call for 48 F-4s over a four-year period rather than 36.

Upon receipt of the President's decision, the Department of Defense, as in the past, will work out

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

4

the technical details, including delivery schedules, with the Israelis.

As a related matter, and in accordance with your memorandum of March 2, 1973, the necessary arrangements are being made to assist Israel in the production of 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

The Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have seen and approved this memorandum.

Amiller for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Table - Options on F-4 and A-4
Deliveries to Israel

SECRET/NODIS

BECLASSIFIED

DOC		RECD		LOG NoR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
30	2	30	3	12	1827
					Saunders

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
		ACTION		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION (X)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: 4/8
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

[illegible]

★ GPO: 1973-489-668

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

Options on
F-4 and A-4 Deliveries to Israel

The top line on each chart shows Israel's current request of 36 F 4s (18 each in 1974 and 1975) and 30 A 4s at a rate of 2 or 3 each month. The 18 of each aircraft the Israelis are thinking of requesting in 1976 and following years are not shown on the chart.

<u>F-4*</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOI Request	18	18	-	-	36
Option A	8	28	-	-	36
Option B	6	12	12	6	36
Option C	6	12	18	12	48
Option D	5	5	5	5	20

<u>A-4**</u>					
GOI Request	14***	16***	-	-	30
Option A	20	10	-	-	30
Option B	12	10	10	10	42

* Current F-4 deliveries end December 1973.

** Current A-4 deliveries end May 1974.

*** Request is for 30 aircraft, at 2 or 3 per month, beginning June 1974; the chart assumes delivery at 2 per month.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
1827

SECRET/NODIS(XGDS)

April 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Aircraft for Israel

During Prime Minister Meir's visit last month the Israelis were told that we would help them to produce up to 100 of their own aircraft--the Super Mirage--and would continue to supply A-4 and F-4 aircraft in 1974 and 1975. We agreed to view sympathetically the Israeli request for delivery of 30 A-4s and 36 F-4s over the next two years, but did not commit ourselves to any specific number.

The Departments of State and Defense have now responded to your directive of March 2 by sending an options memo to you [Tab B] seeking a decision on numbers and delivery schedules. The Israeli requests and possible options are presented simply in the table below. Discussion follows the table.

<u>F-4</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOI Request	18	18	-	-	36
Option A	8	28	-	-	36
Option B	6	12	12	6	36
Option C	6	12	18	12	48
Option D	5	5	5	5	20

A-4

GOI Request	14	16	-	-	30
Option A	20	10	-	-	30
Option B	12	10	10	10	42

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

Phantoms

The Israelis have requested 36 F-4 Phantoms in 1974 and 1975. They have talked about asking for 18 more each year in 1976 and 1977, but this request has not been made formally. The options presented are:

- A. Deliver the requested 36 aircraft in 1974 and 1975, with the bulk of these (28) in the second year in order to allow providing most of them in an orderly way from the production line rather than by diverting them from the USAF inventory. This would allow the USAF to rebuild its own inventory of F-4s.
- B. Deliver 36 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977-- thereby meeting the Israeli desire for continuity of supply, but not satisfying them on numbers..
- C. Over the same four-year period--1974 to 1977--provide 48 aircraft. This would provide a long-term commitment, more planes than they have asked for in two years, but less than they might ask for over four years. Deliveries would be lowest in the first year (6), highest in the third (18).
- D. Deliver 20 aircraft over the four-year period. The effect would be replacement of Israel's attrition losses, but only very little increase in overall strength. This would be seen as a sharp change in the US-Israeli arms relationship by Israelis and Arabs.

Skyhawks. The Israelis have requested 30 Skyhawks at 2 or 3 per month beginning in June 1974. It is anticipated that they will request 18 per year in 1976 and after. The options include:

- A. Deliver 30 in two years as requested, but adjust deliveries to fit production schedules (20 in 1974, 10 in 1975).
- B. Deliver 42 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977. This is more than the Israelis have requested for the next two years, but less than we anticipate they will want over four years.

|| State and Defense recommend Option B for both aircraft--namely 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s, over a four year period.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 3 -

Two issues are involved in whatever decision is made on aircraft for Israel:

First is whether to use our policy on aircraft supply as a signal of our intentions to both Israel and the Arab states. The only option that meets this criterion is the one that recommends an attrition replacement policy on F-4 Phantoms (5 aircraft per year over four years). This choice is so far from what the Israelis have requested that they would read it as a sign that we intend to reverse the very generous supply policy of the past years. Likewise the Arabs would notice that we are holding back on Israeli aircraft requests. The other higher options would earn us little credit in the Arab world, and, insofar as they fall significantly short of Israeli requests, would be a shock there. Thus, we assume that the low option can be dismissed and that the real choice is among the more forthcoming ones.

The second, and more significant question, therefore, is whether to aim for a four-year delivery program now, even though the Israelis have formally requested aircraft only for the next two years. A strong argument for a four-year program is that it could eliminate the need for new decisions on aircraft for Israel during the rest of this Administration. The principles of continuity and long-term commitment to Israel's defense would be preserved. In addition, we might avoid the periodic crises in our relations with the Arab states stemming from leaks of new agreements every other year. The technical argument is that this longer time frame would permit us to get the Israelis back into the Phantom production line rather than diverting planes from the USAF inventory.

If the four-year framework is preferred, the question of numbers still remains. We might reasonably anticipate that the Israelis will want approximately 72 F-4 Phantoms during this period. State and Defense recommend 36, but present an option for 48. There is no reason why we could not go a bit higher--say 60--in order to be more fully responsive.

One way of being responsive while retaining flexibility and allowing the USAF to rebuild its inventory would be to agree to a four-year program for the delivery of 48 F-4s and 42 A-4s (or 60 of each).

In addition to these issues, there is a problem of timing. If it were not for the Beirut raid, we could just go ahead in the normal course of business. Now it would seem best to wait until reaction settles down.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

BECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 4 -

However, there is a technical problem on Skyhawk production that may make it desirable to permit some of the practical arrangements to be worked out immediately. When I know the President's decision I shall propose a way of doing this.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President recommending a four-year program for Israel involving 48 F-4s and 42 A-4s (with readiness to go to 60 of each if the Israelis wish). Once there is a decision, we shall draft an appropriate directive.

Concurrence: R. T. Kennedy *[Signature]*

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

001177
DECLASSIFIED

May 29th
1215 hrs

Mr. Murphy:

Mr. Saunders is aware of this package and
has requested that you show this package to him
before memo to State/Defense is dispatched.

tom

ALSO SHOW HIM
MEMO UNDER THIS
ONE W/OTHER YELLOW NOTE.

THE PRES: INT HAS SEEN.../C.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 1827

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

May 17, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel

You will recall that in your meeting with Prime Minister Meir you indicated that we would view Israeli requests for additional aircraft with sympathy but made no specific commitment on numbers. The Departments of State and Defense have now developed several options for responding.

The Israelis have formally requested 36 F-4 Phantoms and 30 A-4 Skyhawks during the period 1974-1975.

One possible response is to meet their request in full for the next two years, although Defense would prefer to bunch the delivery of F-4s primarily in 1975 in order to allow the USAF to rebuild its own inventory.

A theoretically possible alternative would be to provide a much lower number than requested as a signal that we intend to cut back significantly on the level of our military assistance to Israel. This might gain us some credit among the Arab states at a time when we are being sharply criticized for making it possible for Israel to "remain intransigent" on issues of a settlement. However, it would cause a crisis of confidence with Israel without getting anything in return, and I assume that you do not want to pursue this approach.

A more attractive alternative to giving Israel what it has asked for over the next two years would be to aim for a longer term agreement over a period of four years--1974 to 1977--involving at least as many, and perhaps more, aircraft than the Israelis have now requested, but somewhat less than we anticipate they will want during the whole four-year period ahead. The advantage to us would be that we might not have to

XGDS-3

DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

-2-

make new decisions on aircraft for Israel at least until late 1975 or 1976. This longer-term agreement would provide the Israelis with continuity of supply, though in somewhat smaller numbers than they might like.

The Departments of State and Defense prefer this four-year approach and recommend that you approve the delivery of 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s during the 1974-77 period. As a modification of this option, they suggest that the number of F-4s could be increased to 48, or even higher, over four years, if you feel we should be more forthcoming.


I see considerable merit in deciding now on a delivery schedule on aircraft that would cover a four-year period. The basic Israeli request would be met, although with fewer aircraft than they would request over that period. Our relations with Arab friends would not be periodically strained by announcements of new agreements on aircraft for Israel. And our air force would be able to rebuild its inventory of F-4s instead of diverting planes from its own inventory for Israel.

I would recommend offering Israel a four-year agreement for 48 F-4 Phantoms rather than the 36 that State and Defense suggest and offering 42 A-4 Skyhawks.

There is a question of timing. It would not be helpful to have publicity on these decisions until reaction to Israel's raid on Beirut dies down. I shall work that out when a decision has been made.

Apart from this decision, Defense is going ahead as you instructed with aid to permit Israel to produce at least 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve a four-year delivery schedule for aircraft to Israel, consisting of 48 F-4 Phantoms delivered at the rate of 12 a year and 42 A-4 Skyhawks distributed ~~more~~ or less evenly over the four years. If you approve, I shall sign the attached decision memorandum.

Approve 

Prefer two-year package meeting present Israeli requests for 36 F-4s and 30 A-4s _____

Prefer four-year approach with State-Defense recommendation option of 36 Phantoms and 42 Skyhawks _____

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3042
ISRAEL
INFORMATION

SECRET (XGDS)

May 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*
WILLIAM B. QUANDT *W.B.Q.* *HK*

SUBJECT: Dayan's Views on Peace with Egypt and Jordan

Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's views on possible peace arrangements with Egypt and Jordan have been conveyed to an official of the US embassy in Tel Aviv by a "political ally" of Dayan who is now Deputy Minister of Transport [Cable at Tab A]. As usual, Dayan's views are unorthodox, imaginative, and probably subject to considerable modification. His thoughts are nonetheless of interest for the following reasons:

- On the Egyptian front, Dayan's reported ideas are fully compatible with the concept of transitional measures leading to the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in most of Sinai.
- Dayan's thinking suggests that Israeli views on the terms of a peace settlement are probably more fluid than is generally believed.
- Dayan shows enough flexibility on the Egyptian front to suggest that the US should not be intimidated from trying new ideas on the Israelis.
- On the question of a settlement with Jordan, Dayan takes a very hard line on territory, but has a number of ideas that might be of interest in the absence of a settlement.

Dayan's reported views are outlined in detail below.

The Egyptian Front

Dayan believes that nothing concrete can be done about new arrangements with Egypt until after Israeli elections this fall. His most recent thinking is reflected in the following points:

XGDS - 1
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Attached Cable

SECRET (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET (XGDS)

- 2 -

--Dayan would like to see a "military vacuum" in Sinai with neither Israeli nor Egyptian combat forces there.

--The only military presence in Sinai would be Israeli and Egyptian technical crews located on high ground in central Sinai to maintain surveillance of military airfields in populated areas of Egypt and Israel.

--Dayan now thinks that Israeli forces should remain at Sharm al-Shaykh, but he might agree to their removal if Egypt were to accept the concept of a military vacuum for the entire Sinai and Israeli "administration" over Sharm al-Shaykh and a land corridor to it.

--The present consensus in the Israeli Labor Party is that the final Israeli-Egyptian border should run from Sharm al-Shaykh to a point just east of Al-Arish on the Mediterranean Coast. Dayan agrees with this position now, but he is reported to be among the many Israeli leaders who would completely rethink their assumptions about the territorial issue if genuine peace negotiations ever began.

--The most important territorial issues for Dayan on the Egyptian front are the Rafah junction--at the south-western edge of the Gaza strip--and a strip along the coast toward Sinai, plus an area around Eilat. In return, Dayan might consider conceding a small bit of Israeli-controlled territory at Al-Auja to Egypt. [See map at Tab C for sketch of Dayan's alleged position on the Egyptian-Israeli border.]

--Dayan favors the idea of new boundary in Sinai, but he reportedly has never said so explicitly. Dayan will not necessarily insist on Israeli sovereignty in these areas, but he has spoken of the need for Israeli administration and control.

Our embassy's comments on these views is that they demonstrate Dayan's strong desire for a stable relationship with Egypt and that Dayan is the one Israeli leader who thinks imaginatively about these problems.

SECRET (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET (XGDS)

- 3 -

The Jordan Front

Dayan's views on the Jordan-Israel front are consistent with his belief that a peace settlement in which Israeli troops would have to withdraw from the West Bank is not desirable. His thinking is based on the assumption that Israel will remain in control of these areas for another generation. Dayan has been focusing primarily on what Israel should do in the West Bank pending a final settlement. His thoughts are reported to be as follows:

--A final settlement with Jordan will not come for another 20 years. By then Jordan will have been taken over by the Palestinians, which may simplify a final settlement.

--In the lengthy interim period prior to a settlement, Israel should encourage the West Bankers to orient themselves toward Amman. To this end, Dayan favors expansion of the open bridges policy and other measures to facilitate movement back and forth across the Jordan River.

--Israelis should be allowed to settle everywhere in the West Bank and not just within the lines of the Allon plan. The only qualification Dayan makes is that Israelis should not settle in Arab metropolitan areas, with the exception of Jerusalem, which should expand to include Bethlehem and Ramallah.

--Israeli forces must maintain security control throughout the West Bank. At the same time, local municipalities should be given greater autonomy.

--In Dayan's tentative views on the shape of a final territorial settlement, the area of Nablus-Jenin would be under the sovereignty of the Arab nation east of the Jordan River. [See map at Tab D.] The Greater Jerusalem area would be expanded and incorporated into Israel and its inhabitants would become Israeli citizens. The rest of the West Bank should also be annexed to Israel, but its Arab inhabitants should be citizens of the Arab state on the other side of the river. Gaza might be an autonomous area affiliated with the Arab state east of the river.

SECRET (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET (XGDS)


- 4 -

Ambassador Brown in Amman has commented that the distance between Dayan's position and that of Jordan is far greater than he had assumed. [See Tab B.] Brown does not believe that the idea of West Bankers remaining under Israeli military control while enjoying Jordanian political rights is viable. Hussein does not have any incentive to give larger political voice to the politically troublesome Palestinians unless he recovers the occupied territories. The incorporation of Bethlelehem and Ramallah into a greater Jerusalem is particularly unacceptable to the Jordanians and Palestinians.

Comment: It is not unusual that Dayan's views on an Egyptian settlement show flexibility and imagination, while on the Jordan-West Bank front he puts forth a very tough position on territory. This report of Dayan's views should not be taken as a definitive statement of his position, but rather as an indication of his efforts to go beyond the confines of the negative consensus on settlement issues reached within the Israeli Labor Party.

SECRET (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED





Department of State

tab A
TELEGRAM

SECRET 150

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

R 181047Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8466
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 3903

EXDIS

E O 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: DAYAN'S THINKING ON POSSIBLE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH
JORDAN AND EGYPT

REF: TEL AVIV 3837

SUMMARY: CLOSE DAYAN POLITICAL ALLY GAD YAACOBI IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION HAS TOLD EMBOFF DAYAN IS CONCENTRATING THESE ON WHAT ISRAELI POLICY SHOULD BE TOWARD WEST BANK BEFORE FINAL SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED. THEREFORE, DAYAN'S IDEAS ON FINAL PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH EITHER JORDAN OR EGYPT WERE SOMEWHAT TENTATIVE. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN PREPARING MOVES TO BRING ABOUT FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OPEN BRIDGES POLICY AND DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR WEST BANK MUNICIPALITIES. AS FOR DAYAN'S THINKING ON ULTIMATE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN, YAACOBI SAID DAYAN WOULD RETURN ONLY ONE OR TWO SMALL ENCLAVES OF WEST BANK. BUT DAYAN ACCORDING TO YAACOBI ENVISAGES REST OF WEST BANK POPULATION THOUGH LIVING UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY AS BEING FULLFLEDGED JORDANIAN CITIZENS, WITH EXCEPTION INHABITANTS OF RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM WHO WOULD BECOME ISRAELI CITIZENS. ACCORDING TO YAACOBI DAYAN ASSUMES NO EFFORTS TOWARD ACCOMMODATION WITH EGYPT BEFORE KNESSET ELECTIONS AND CURRENTLY IS NOT FOCUSING ON THIS SUBJECT. HIS MOST RECENT IDEAS CENTERED ON

100057

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGRO, CIVE _____
ODIER _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDIN _____
SANDERS _____
SCHWEN, ELOP _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

D-H

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

NOTION THAT SINAI SHOULD BECOME MILITARY VACUUM, WITH ONLY ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN ELECTRONIC CREWS STATIONED ON CENTRAL SINAI MOUNTAIN TOPS TO MONITOR MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF MAIN AIRFIELDS OF OTHER SIDE'S COUNTRY. YAACOBBI BELIEVED THAT DAYAN ASSUMES THERE WILL BE PERMANENT ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH, BUT YAACOBBI SPECULATED THAT IF EGYPTIANS SATISFIED DAYAN ON OTHER POINTS AND REAL PEACE WAS IN PROSPECTS, DAYAN CONCEIVABLY WOULD FAVOR ACCEDING TO ANY EGYPTIAN REQUEST THAT SHARM BE INCLUDED IN SINAI MILITARY VACUUM. MAIN OTHER POINTS ON WHICH DAYAN WOULD REQUIRE EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT WOULD BE: ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION (NOT NECESSARILY FORMAL SOVEREIGNTY) OVER SHARM AND CORRIDOR TO IT; AND REDRAWING OF PRE-1967 BORDER TO INCLUDE RAFAH JUNCTION PLUS AREA WEST OF EILAT IN ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION MAY 16 FMBOFF ASKED DAYAN CONFIDANT AND DEPUTY TRANSPORT MINISTER YAACOBBI FOR GENERAL OUTLINE OF DAYAN'S VIEWS ON POLICY TOWARD WEST BANK IN ABSENCE OF PEACE SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS ON EVENTUAL PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT. YAACOBBI SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DESCRIBE DAYAN'S THINKING ON THESE SUBJECTS BECAUSE SOME CONFUSION HAS RESULTED FROM RECENT DAYAN STATEMENTS. YAACOBBI BELIEVED THAT MAIN CAUSE OF OVERALL CONFUSION WAS THAT DAYAN HAS BEEN FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON WHAT ISRAEL SHOULD DO IN WEST BANK PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT, WHEREAS OTHER ISRAELI POLITICIANS HAVE INSISTED ON ADDRESSING NATURE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT AS IT WOULD AFFECT WEST BANK.

2. POPULAR MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF DAYAN. TURNING TO DAYAN INTERVIEWS OF MAY 9 AND 14 (REFTEL), YAACOBBI NOTED THREE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WIDELY HELD IN ISRAEL AS RESULT OF MANNER IN WHICH MEDIA HAD PLAYED INTERVIEWS. A) SOME PEOPLE ARE UNDER IMPRESSION DAYAN IS READY TODAY TO RETURN MOST IF NOT ALL OF WEST BANK TO JORDAN. YAACOBBI SAID THIS IS NOT TRUE AND RESULTS FROM OVER-EMPHASIS BY MEDIA ON DAYAN COMMENT HE WOULD BE OPPOSED TO INCORPORATING ADDITIONAL ONE MILLION ARAB CITIZENS INTO ISRAEL IF THIS WERE AT ISSUE TODAY AND THEREFORE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP WEST BANK IN THEORY. B) MANY IN ISRAEL HAVE MISREAD DAYAN'S ASSERTION OF THEORETICAL READINESS TO SERVE IN CABINET UNDER SAPIR AS PRIMIN AS BEING DAYAN FEELER FOR COOPERATION WITH SAPIR. IN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

YAACOBI'S ESTIMATION DAYAN IS CONVINCED THERE IS ALMOST NO CHANCE HE AND SAPIR CAN MOVE CLOSE ENOUGH IN THEIR OUTLOOKS TO ENABLE DAYAN TO SERVE IN A SAPIR CABINET. C) INACCURATE VIEW ISRAELIS GATHERED FROM DAYAN'S JOCLAR REMARK TO BBC INTERVIEWER THAT HE WOULD RATHER SEE EGYPTIAN TROOPS THAN UN FORCES IN SINAI IN THAT DAYAN IS INDIFFERENT ON QUESTION OF WHETHER CAIRO SHOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER SETTLEMENT TO PLACE COMBAT TROOPS IN SINAI. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN IS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH NEITHER EGYPT NOR ISRAEL WOULD HAVE FORCES IN SINAI AND SINAI WOULD SERVE AS BUFFER AREA BY BECOMING MILITARY VACUUM.

3. WEST BANK PENDING PEACE SETTLEMENT. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN IS CERTAIN FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN WILL NOT COME FOR TWENTY YEARS. DAYAN ACCORDING TO YAACOBI BELIEVES THAT WHEN SETTLEMENT DOES COME, JORDAN BY THAT TIME WILL HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER BY PALESTINIANS BECAUSE OF THEIR NUMBERS AND ABILITIES, AND CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT, PROBABLY A PRESIDENT, WILL BE PALESTINIAN. DAYAN BELIEVES THIS MAY SIMPLIFY FINAL SETTLEMENT.

A. DURING LENGTHY INTERIM PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT, YAACOBI STATED DAYAN FEELS ISRAEL SHOULD DO EVERYTHING TO ENCOURAGE WEST BANKERS TO ORIENT THEMSELVES TOWARD AMMAN. DAYAN PREDICTS WEST BANKERS IN DUE COURSE WILL DEMAND EXERCISE OF THEIR POLITICAL RIGHTS AS JORDANIAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE IN JORDANIAN ELECTIONS, AND AMMAN WILL HAVE TO PERMIT THIS.

B. TO FURTHER PROCESS OF ORIENTING WEST BANKERS TOWARD AMMAN, YAACOBI SAID DAYAN HAS IN MIND EXPANSION OF OPEN BRIDGES POLICY. YAACOBI SHARED DAYAN'S PREDICTION THAT THIS WOULD WORK, NOTING THAT EVERYONE HAD DOUBTED DAYAN'S PREDICTION IN 1969 OF SUCCESS WHICH POLICY WOULD ACHIEVE IN THREE YEARS, BUT DAYAN HAD BEEN PROVEN RIGHT. ACCORDING TO YAACOBI, DAYAN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERWHELMING CABINET VOTE MAY 12 IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING ISRAEL'S PRESENT WEST BANK SUMMER VISITOR PROGRAM TO YEAR ROUND BASIS. DAYAN HAD IN MIND OTHER MEASURES WHICH GOI COULD TAKE TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT BACK AND FORTH.

C. NEXT MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE FOR DAYAN RE WEST BANK, YAACOBI SAID, IS FOR ISRAELIS TO SETTLE EVERYWHERE AND NOT JUST

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

WITHIN LINES OF ALLON PLAN. YAACOBY SAID ONLY QUALIFICATION

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

26

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 313

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

100155

34

R 181047Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8467
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 TEL AVIV 3903

EXDIS

DAYAN MAKES AS TO LOCATIONS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE WITHIN ARAB METROPOLITAN AREAS, WITH EXCEPTION OF GREATER JERUSALEM AREA, WHICH DAYAN WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND TO INCLUDE BETHLEHEM AND RAMALLAH.

D. YAACOBI SAID THIRD BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR DAYAN IS THAT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SECURITY CONTROL THROUGHOUT WEST BANK. AT SAME TIME DAYAN FAVORS INCREASING AUTONOMY FOR LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING BROADER ROLE FOR LOCAL POLICE. YAACOBI PREDICTED DAYAN WOULD SOON START MOVING TO EXPAND THEIR AUTONOMY.

4. WEST BANK UNDER EVENTUAL FINAL SETTLEMENT. RECALLING DAYAN'S CONVICTION THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT IS SOME TWENTY YEARS AWAY, YAACOBI SAID DAYAN INTENTIONALLY HAS NOT COME TO FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HOW FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD LOOK IN RELATION TO WEST BANK. YAACOBI OUTLINED DAYAN'S TENTATIVE VIEWS AS FOLLOWS.

A. METROPOLITAN COMPLEX OF NABLUS-JENIN SHOULD BECOME TERRITORY UNDER SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB NATION EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. AREA WOULD INCLUDE ROUGHLY ONE-THIRD OF WEST BANK ARAB POPULATION. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE ENCLAVE SMALLER THAN THE ONE ENVISAGED UNDER ALLON PLAN FOR NORTHERN PART OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
25

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

WEST BANK. ALSO UNLIKE THRUST OF ALLON PLAN, DAYAN WOULD EXPECT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES TO CONTINUE TO HAVE INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN ENCLAVE, WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH LOCAL ARAB POLICE.

B. DAYAN WOULD EXPECT ENLARGE JERUSALEM AREA INCLUDING RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM TO BE INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL WITH ITS ARAB INHABITANTS BECOMING ISRAELI CITIZENS.

C. IN DAYAN'S VIEW, REST OF WEST BANK ACCORDING TO YAACOBBI SHOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE ANNEXED TO ISRAEL, BUT WITH PROVISIO THAT ARAB INHABITANTS WOULD BE CITIZENS OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. YAACOBBI SAID DAYAN HAS NOT ENTIRELY DECIDED WHETHER HE WOULD FAVOR CREATION OF VERY SMALL ENCLAVE AROUND HEBRON WHICH LIKE ENCLAVE TO NORTH WOULD BE SOVEREIGN TERRITORY OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. YAACOBBI PREDICTED DAYAN WOULD DECIDE AGAINST HEBRON ENCLAVE.

5. GAZA STRIP. YAACOBBI NOTED DAYAN HAS ALWAYS TAKEN GREAT CARE TO LIMIT HIS PUBLIC UTTERANCES ABOUT FUTURE OF GAZA TO SAYING THAT EGYPTIANS SHOULD NEVER EXPECT TO RETURN THERE. IN YAACOBBI'S OPINION SILENCE OF DAYAN RE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE MEANS HE ALLOWS FOR POSSIBILITY THAT GAZA MIGHT BECOME AUTONOMOUS REGION AND MIGHT BE AFFILIATED IN SOME FASION WITH ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER.

6. SINAI. TURNING TO DAYAN'S VIEWS ON SINAI, YAACOBBI SAID THAT VAGUE DISCUSSION IN ISRAELI PRESS THIS WINTER ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF "ELECTRONIC BORDERS" BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS TO ENABLE IDF FROM HIGH GROUND IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO MAINTAIN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES' AIRFIELDS, DREW ULTIMATE INSPIRATION FROM PHASE OF DAYAN'S THINKING AT THAT TIME. YAACOBBI CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT DAYAN CURRENTLY IS NOT TURNING OVER IN HIS MIND POSSIBLE WAYS ISRAEL COULD STIMULATE SADAT INTO TAKING SECOND LOOK AT INTERIM SUEZ SETTLEMENT, AND YAACOBBI'S READING OF DAYAN ON THIS SUBJECT WAS SOMEWHAT DATED. YAACOBBI SAID DAYAN ASSUMES EVERYONE AGRESS NOTHING CONCRETE CAN BE DONE ABOUT NEW ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI ELECTIONS THIS FALL. YAACOBBI DESCRIBED DAYAN'S MOST RECENT THINKING RE ACCOMMODATION WITH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRETORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

26

FORM 100-1070

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

EGYPT AS FOLLOWS.

A. DEMILITARIZATION. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN WOULD LIKE MILITARY VACUUM IN SINAI WITH NEITHER ISRAELI NOR EGYPTIAN COMBAT FORCES THERE. SOLE MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD BE ISRAELI AND ALSO EGYPTIAN CREWS OF TECHNICIANS LOCATED ON MOUNTAIN TOPS IN MIDDLE OF SINAI TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN POPULATED AREAS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT DAYAN UNDER FINAL SETTLEMENT WOULD GIVE UP IDEA OF ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH, YAACOBI ADMITTED ONE WOULD HAVE TO DESCRIBE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AS PART OF SINAI REGARDLESS OF WHICH SIDE CONTROLLED IT AND SAID THAT DAYAN'S AUTOMATIC REACTION, IF ASKED TODAY, WOULD BE THAT ISRAEL MUST MAINTAIN PERMANENT FORCES AT SHARM. YET IF FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT BECAME REALISTIC PROSPECT, YAACOBI'S OPINION WAS THAT DAYAN MIGHT AGREE TO REMOVAL OF FORCES FROM SHARM PROVIDED EGYPT AGREED TO MILITARY VACUUM CONCEPT FOR ENTIRE SINAI AND ALSO AGREED TO ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION OVER SHARM AND LAND CORRIDOR TO IT.

B. BOUNDARY. YAACOBI SAID THERE IS BROAD CONSENSUS TODAY IN LABOR PARTY THAT FINAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE STRAIGHT LINE FROM SHARM EL-SHEIKH TO A POINT ON MEDITERRANEAN COAST JUST EAST OF EL ARISH. FOR THAT MATTER, YAACOBI ESTIMATED THERE ARE TWENTY MEMBERS OF KNESSET WHO ADAMANTLY CALL FOR ANNEXATION OF ENTIRE SINAI BY ISRAEL, WHEREAS NOT MORE THAN TEN KNESSET MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SINAI TO PRE-1967 LINE. DAYAN'S INCLINATION IS THE SAME AS LABOR PARTY CONSENSUS, YAACOBI SAID, BUT HE EXPRESSED BELIEF DAYAN IS AMONG THE MANY ISRAELI LEADERS WHO WOULD COMPLETELY RETHINK THEIR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TERRITORIAL ISSUE WITH EGYPT IF GENUINE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS EVER BEGAN. TERRITORIAL POINTS ALONG 1967 LINE WITH EGYPT WHICH YAACOBI THOUGHT WERE IMPORTANT TO DAYAN ARE RAFAH JUNCTION PLUS AREA IMMEDIATELY WEST OF EILAT--SETTING ASIDE FOR MOMENT DISPOSITION OF SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND LAND CORRIDOR TO IT. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN FIRMLY HOLDS THAT ISRAEL MUST ANNEX MOST OF COASTAL AREA BETWEEN EL ARISH AND GAZA STRIP. DAYAN ALSO WANTS ISRAELI TERRITORY WIDENED WEST OF EILAT. BOTH OBJECTIVES COULD BE ACHIEVED MOST LOGICALLY, YAACOBI SAID, BY MOVING ENTIRE LENGTH OF 1967 LINE SEVERAL KILOMETERS WEST. ASKED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRETORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

15

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TFL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

HOW DAYAN MIGHT RACT IF EGYPTIANS WERE WILLING TO REDRAW
1967 LINE AND TO CONCEDE SOME TERRITORY IN RAFAH JUNCTION AREA

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ^{SECRET} AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

01107
DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 297

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03903 03 OF 03 181248Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

100224

R 181047Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8468
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET SECTION 3 OF 3 TEL AVIV 3903

EXDIS

AND WEST OF FILAT, BUT ONLY IN RETURN FOR FACE-SAVING ISRAELI CONFESSION OF SMALL PIECE OF DESERT AROUND EL AUJA, YAACOBZ REMARKED DAYAN WAS JUST DARING ENOUGH THAT IF HE WERE CONVINCED EGYPTIANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE, HE MIGHT AGREE.

C. SOVEREIGNTY OVER SHARM EL-SHEIKH. YAACOBZ SAID THAT ALTHOUGH DAYAN, AS NOTED, INCLINED TOWARD LABOR PARTY CONSENSUS FAVORING NEW BOUNDARY IN SINAI, HE HAD NEVER SAID SO. YAACOBZ FELT DAYAN PROBABLY STILL ADHERES TO LABOR PARTY ORAL TORAH OF 1969 ON ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND LAND CORRIDOR TO IT. ORAL TORAH CALLS FOR THESE AREAS TO BE UNDER ISRAELI "ADMINISTRATION," AND "ADMINISTRATION" DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN SOVEREIGNTY. YAACOBZ ADDED THAT "ADMINISTRATION" DOES MEAN MORE THAN "CONTROL," WORD THAT DAYAN CURRENTLY IS USING TO DESCRIBE ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP TO THAT PART OF WEST BANK WHICH DAYAN WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE PLACED UNDER THEORETICAL SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER UNDER FINAL SETTLEMENT. YET DAYAN HAD NEVER CALLED FOR SHARM OR ITS CORRIDOR TO BE INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL AND FLY ISRAELI FLAG, AND YAACOBZ DOUBTED THAT ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THIS CASE WERE IMPORTANT TO DAYAN.

7. COMMENT. YAACOBZ'S SPECULATION ABOUT DAYAN'S INNERMOST THOUGHTS ON HOW FAR ISRAEL CAN GO TO REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ^{SECRET} AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03903 03 OF 03 181248Z


EGYPT SUPPORTS OUR BELIEF THAT DAYAN A) STRONGLY DESIRES MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT, AND B) IS THE ONE ISRAELI LEADER WHO LOOKS AT THIS PROBLEM IMAGINATIVELY. IT ALSO SHOWS HOW DAYAN BLOWS HOT AND COLD ON SUBJECT. WHEN IN ICONOCLASTIC MOOD, SEEKING RECONSIDERATION OF OLD ASSUMPTIONS BY ISRAELIS, HE CAN SHOCK PUBLIC WITH NEW IDEAS; WHEN TROUBLED BY BELLICOSE TALK OUT OF CAIRO (OR BY US PROBS FOR ISRAELI CONCILIATORY GESTURE TOWARD EGYPT), HE CAN TAKE VERY TOUGH LINE RE SINAI. IF NEGOTIATING PROCESS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT SHOULD EVER GET UNDER WAY, DAYAN WOULD PROBABLY NUMBER AMONG ADVOCATES OF HARD OPENING POSITION BUT MIGHT BE PREPARED EVENTUALLY TO MOVE FARTHER THAN SOME ISRAELI LEADERS TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

25

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Tab B
Tarring

SECRET 439

5

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02756 221206Z

3

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

129097

R 221044Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8488
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
OBLEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

SECRET AMMAN 2756

return
TV

HS
WQ

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IS, JO, XF

SUBJ: DAYAN'S THINKING ON POSSIBLE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH
JORDAN AND EGYPT

Emb. Amman Comments

REF: TEL AVIV 3903

SUMMARY: REFTEL PROVIDES FASCINATING INSIGHTS INTO DAYAN'S PERCEPTIONS, WORDS AND DEEDS. IF THIS IS PREVIEW OF LIKELY GOI POLICY LINE, ROAD TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS CONSIDERABLY LONGER THAN WE HAD IMAGINED. END SUMMARY.

on Jordan
from, two.

1. DAYAN'S IDEAS ON POSSIBLE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT NOT ONLY GIVE US CLUES ON THINKING OF KEY GOI LEADER BUT ALSO VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PLOT IMPORTANT LOCUS OF ISRAELI OPINION ON PEACE MAP. APPARENT DISTANCE BETWEEN DAYAN POSITION AND THAT OF JORDAN (PRESUMABLY THAT OF EGYPT TOO) IS FAR GREATER THAN WE HAD ASSUMED AND, AS SUCH, FRIGHTENING. IT NO LONGER SEEMS THAT PRO- NOUNCEMENTS BY DAYAN AND OTHER GOI LEADERS REFLECT PRE-NEGOTIATION TACTICS. YACOBI APPEARS TO HAVE DESCRIBED WHAT HIS MENTOR REALLY BELIEVES. ✓

2. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY TO SUBJ

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 02756 221206Z

OF WEST BANK AND JORDAN SETTLEMENT AND ARE NUMBERED TO CORRESPOND WITH REFTEL PARAS.

3. IF THESE ARE THE TERMS, ESTIMATE THAT JORDAN PEACE WILL TAKE TWENTY YEARS IS OVER-OPTIMISTIC.

3A. CONCEPT OF PERPETUATING OCCUPATION OF ANOTHER'S TERRITORY WITH EXPECTATION THAT CITIZENRY EVENTUALLY WILL DEMAND--AND GET-- VOTING RIGHTS WITH LOSER REGIME MAY BE EXAMPLE OF DAYAN'S IMAGINATIVE THINKING (SEE PARA 7), BUT IT PRESUPPOSES EXTRAORDINARY NAIVETY OR NON-EXISTENT DESPERATION ON PART OF HUSSEIN. IDEA OF WEST BANKERS HAPPILY VENTING FRUSTRATIONS IN AMMAN POLITICAL ARENA WHILE REMAINING UNDER DE FACTO GOI CONTROL IS FANTASY KING DOES NOT SHARE. DAYAN IS OFFERING PRECISELY WHAT HASHEMITES DO NOT WANT OR NEED; A BIGGER POLITICAL VOICE FOR POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME PALESTINIAN SUBJECTS.

3B. EXPANSION OF OPEN BRIDGE POLICY IS LOGICAL DEVICE TO ORIENT WEST BANKERS TOWARD AMMAN, BUT IT TAKES TWO SIDES TO KEEP BRIDGES OPEN. GOJ WILL COOPERATE ONLY AS LONG AS BENEFITS ARE MUTUAL. DAYAN'S GIFT BAG IS SHORT ON BENEFITS.

3C. THIS IS BLUEPRINT FOR ANNEXATION, NOT PEACE. UNDER COMMON ENGLISH USAGE, ONLY "METROPOLITAN" AREA IS JERUSALEM. SINCE BAN ON JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN ARAB "METROPOLIS" EXCLUDES GREATER JERUSALEM (INCLUDING BETHLEHEM AND RAMALLAH), PROPOSAL IS MEANINGLESS.

3D. REQUIREMENT IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT IF SECURITY IS TO BE MAINTAINED INDEFINITELY BY ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES, DAYAN IS TALKING ABOUT CONTINUING OCCUPATION RATHER THAN PEACE SETTLEMENT. QUESTION AGAIN ARISES, WHY SHOULD HUSSEIN SIGN?

4B. INCORPORATION OF RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM INTO ISRAELI GREATER JERUSALEM IS MOST GALLING PROPOSAL OF ALL. THIS IS TOO INCONCEIVABLE TO MERIT COMMENT IN CONTEXT OF PEACE SETTLEMENT. ALARMING FEATURE IS THAT IT REVEALS EVEN TOUGHER STAND ON PART OF SOME GOI DECISION MAKERS THAN WE ENVISIONED.

5. GAZA PROPOSAL BY CONTRAST IS REALISTIC. CREATION OF AUTONOMOUS REGION HAVING EVEN LOOSE AFFILIATION WITH AMMAN LIKELY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET


PAGE 03 AMMAN 02756 221206Z


TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO GOJ, ESPECIALLY SINCE SOME OF HUSSEIN'S ADVISERS WARY OF TOO-CLOSE TIES.

7. TEL AVIV COMMENTS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL USEFUL INSIGHTS INTO DAYAN AS POLITICAL STRATEGIST. WHILE REALIZING THAT HE DOES NOT SPEAK FOR ENTIRE GOI, WE SUGGEST THAT REFTEL MERITS SPECIAL ATTENTION AND ANALYSIS AT U.S. POLICY MAKING LEVEL. IF ISRAELI STRATEGY EVOLVES ALONG THESE LINES, PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE THAT THE USG PROFESSES TO SEEK WILL BE REMOTE. BROWN


NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED






DAYAN'S VIEWS ON SINAI



69 D



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROCEDURE

DOC	RECD	OG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
MO DA	MO DA HR		
5 29 5	30 03 30	42	<i>Handwritten initials</i>

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS NO FORN NODIS
 KISSINGER RICHARDSON LOU EYES ONLY EXDIS
 SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C CODEWORD
 ELIOT S SENSITIVE
 TS

SUBJECT: *Lebanon's Unrest on Peace with Egypt and Jordan*

REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT					MEMO FOR HAK..... (<u> </u>)
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES. (<u> </u>)
FAR EAST					REPLY FOR (<u> </u>)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					APPROPRIATE ACTION (<u> </u>)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		X			MEMO TO (<u> </u>)
EUROPE / CANADA					RECOMMENDATIONS (<u> </u>)
LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO (<u> </u>)
UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO FOR: (<u> </u>)
ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (<u> </u>)
SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE (<u> </u>)
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP					DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
5/30	<i>Sambo</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>CIX</i>	<i>Noted</i>	
7/10				<i>Noted by HAK</i>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH NOTIFY & DATE

SPECIAL DISPOSITION)

OR RECORD COMMENT:)

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:

CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG #

SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D BY

CYS FOR) SA

) HP

ORIG) WH

TO) PA

) SF

) NS

) EP

DESTROY) DY

JUL 12 1973

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 21 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
2650

SECRET (GDS)

May 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Has*

SUBJECT:

Your Talk with Foreign Minister Eban--
9:30 a.m. Saturday, May 12

Eban's Main Points

Eban in his conversation with Secretary Rogers covered the following points:

- Security Council Debate. There was agreement that there should be no change in the balance of Resolution 242 and that it would be undesirable for the Council to establish new machinery for dealing with the dispute.
- Area Stability. Eban said Israel estimated the chance that Egypt would initiate hostilities as very low.
- Lebanon. He does not expect as clean-cut a solution of the Fedayeen problem in Lebanon as there had been in Jordan but felt Lebanese government action definitely made for a better situation. Israel is watching for Syrian intervention but has some optimism that this will not happen.
- Aircraft. He asked about the status of Israel's aircraft requests. Secretary Rogers indicated that we did not expect that a decision would be long delayed. [Note: You have a decision memo for the President, but the timing of any public knowledge should be considered for its effect on Egypt.]
- Soviet Jews. Eban expressed gratitude for US efforts to facilitate the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, though he also expressed concern at continuing harrassment of Jews desiring to emigrate. Secretary Rogers stressed the key place that MFN holds in our plans for improving relations with the USSR and expressed the hope its approval would not be linked to further Soviet concessions on Soviet-Jewish emigration. Eban was noncommittal.

SECRET (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

Eban saw Secretary Shultz, who explained that we will be starting GATT consultations directed at minimizing the damages to US trade from the discriminatory provisions of Israel's agreements with the EEC. The point to be made to Eban is this is directed at broader trade problems and should not be read as an anti-Israeli act. We want to cooperate with Israel.

Points You Might Make

1. We have no desire to see pressure on Egypt to negotiate diminished. Nor do we want to see Resolution 242 tampered with.
2. We do, however, believe it is important to get the Arab-Israeli problem into a negotiating context. The alternative is a continuing confrontation which Israel can manage now but which would endanger Israel over an historical period. Israel's success depends on coexistence with its neighbors and, to some degree, on US support.
3. A policy of simply standing pat is not necessarily the best way to get talks started.
4. A strong US position in the Middle East is important both to the US and to Israel. While the US position over the past six years has not suffered as much as the scare-mongers predicted, it is not basically improving.
5. We recognize that there is an element of posturing in Sadat's present threats of military action. We do not, however, discount the possibility of his taking a foolish step. No rational prediction would have foreseen war in 1967.
6. We like Israel have a strong interest in quashing the Black September. We wonder whether raids like the one in Beirut are the best way to do this. Americans potentially bear the brunt of Arab retaliation because our people and property are accessible.
7. On aircraft: The President's decision to continue unbroken supply stands. We have had to work on the question of delivery schedules to take our own needs into account.

SECRET (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1198

*Original
in E.C.*

CONFIDENTIAL

April 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: KEN DAM
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: European Community Preferences
for Spain and Israel

As you know, the President has approved the proposed scenario (copy of the memorandum at Tab A) concerning consultations with the European Community, Spain, and Israel on the Community's preferential trade agreements which impair our trade. The President has directed that Secretary Shultz handle the initial presentation to the parties involved.

Subject, of course, to the Secretary's concurrence, we would like to offer several suggestions for the presentation, designed to keep political risk at a minimum.

1. The Secretary may wish to take advantage of the visit to Washington by Foreign Minister Abba Eban on May 10-11 to make the presentation to Israel.

2. With regard to the presentation to the European Community and Spain, alternate approaches might be:

a. For the Secretary to make the presentation to the representatives of the Community and Spain accredited in Washington; or

b. To request Under Secretary Casey or another appropriate official to visit Brussels and Madrid to make the presentations. It is important that the three presentations be made simultaneously or nearly so and that they be completely confidential. It is also important that the action be closely held within our government, lest the fact that we are going to undertake this GATT action get to the press or the country involved before it is placed in a proper political

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS - December 31, 1979

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 1827
(revised)

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

April 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel--Revised Package

As you requested, I have revised the memorandum for the President at Tab A to reflect the judgment expressed in your note on my earlier memo (next page).

Two changes have been made in the memorandum for the President:

1. The recommendation is revised to reflect the numbers you propose.
2. A decision memorandum is now attached to the memo for the President for your signature if he approves.

There is one issue I would like you to think about before sending this memorandum forward: What will be our answer if the Israelis either insist on a higher number now or reserve their right to increase the number in a year or two? I particularly raise this in connection with the Skyhawks. We could provide a larger number now relatively easily if they wished and the Skyhawk has less symbolic importance.

This leads to even a more fundamental issue: What rationale should be used in explaining to the Israelis why we are providing fewer aircraft than they would be likely to request over the four-year period ahead? Over that long a period, it is difficult to cite our own aircraft requirements because the production line over that period could be geared to larger output. The only approach I can see is to say that our decision is a combination of other needs and the US desire to see some restraint introduced into the Mid-East arms race. Do you agree?

Yes AK

Other rationale _____

Recommendation: That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President and, if he approves, that you sign the decision memorandum attached to it.

XGDS- 3

DECLAS - Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
1827

SECRET/NODIS(XGDS)

April 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Aircraft for Israel

During Prime Minister Meir's visit last month the Israelis were told that we would help them to produce up to 100 of their own aircraft--the Super Mirage--and would continue to supply A-4 and F-4 aircraft in 1974 and 1975. We agreed to view sympathetically the Israeli request for delivery of 30 A-4s and 36 F-4s over the next two years, but did not commit ourselves to any specific number.

The Departments of State and Defense have now responded to your directive of March 2 by sending an options memo to you [Tab B] seeking a decision on numbers and delivery schedules. The Israeli requests and possible options are presented simply in the table below. Discussion follows the table.

<u>F-4</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOI Request	18	18	-	-	36
Option A	8	28	-	-	36
Option B	6	12	12	6	36
Option C	6	12	18	12	48
Option D	5	5	5	5	20

A-4

GOI Request	14	16	-	-	30
Option A	20	10	-	-	30
Option B	12	10	10	10	42

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

Phantoms

The Israelis have requested 36 F-4 Phantoms in 1974 and 1975. They have talked about asking for 18 more each year in 1976 and 1977, but this request has not been made formally. The options presented are:

- A. Deliver the requested 36 aircraft in 1974 and 1975, with the bulk of these (28) in the second year in order to allow providing most of them in an orderly way from the production line rather than by diverting them from the USAF inventory. This would allow the USAF to rebuild its own inventory of F-4s.
- B. Deliver 36 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977-- thereby meeting the Israeli desire for continuity of supply, but not satisfying them on numbers.
- C. Over the same four-year period--1974 to 1977--provide 48 aircraft. This would provide a long-term commitment, more planes than they have asked for in two years, but less than they might ask for over four years. Deliveries would be lowest in the first year (6), highest in the third (18).
- D. Deliver 20 aircraft over the four-year period. The effect would be replacement of Israel's attrition losses, but only very little increase in overall strength. This would be seen as a sharp change in the US-Israeli arms relationship by Israelis and Arabs.

Skyhawks. The Israelis have requested 30 Skyhawks at 2 or 3 per month beginning in June 1974. It is anticipated that they will request 18 per year in 1976 and after. The options include:

- A. Deliver 30 in two years as requested, but adjust deliveries to fit production schedules (20 in 1974, 10 in 1975).
- B. Deliver 42 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977. This is more than the Israelis have requested for the next two years, but less than we anticipate they will want over four years.

|| State and Defense recommend Option B for both aircraft--namely 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s, over a four year period.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 3 -

Two issues are involved in whatever decision is made on aircraft for Israel:

First is whether to use our policy on aircraft supply as a signal of our intentions to both Israel and the Arab states. The only option that meets this criterion is the one that recommends an attrition replacement policy on F-4 Phantoms (5 aircraft per year over four years). This choice is so far from what the Israelis have requested that they would read it as a sign that we intend to reverse the very generous supply policy of the past years. Likewise the Arabs would notice that we are holding back on Israeli aircraft requests. The other higher options would earn us little credit in the Arab world, and, insofar as they fall significantly short of Israeli requests, would be a shock there. Thus, we assume that the low option can be dismissed and that the real choice is among the more forthcoming ones.

The second, and more significant question, therefore, is whether to aim for a four-year delivery program now, even though the Israelis have formally requested aircraft only for the next two years. A strong argument for a four-year program is that it could eliminate the need for new decisions on aircraft for Israel during the rest of this Administration. The principles of continuity and long-term commitment to Israel's defense would be preserved. In addition, we might avoid the periodic crises in our relations with the Arab states stemming from leaks of new agreements every other year. The technical argument is that this longer time frame would permit us to get the Israelis back into the Phantom production line rather than diverting planes from the USAF inventory.

If the four-year framework is preferred, the question of numbers still remains. We might reasonably anticipate that the Israelis will want approximately 72 F-4 Phantoms during this period. State and Defense recommend 36, but present an option for 48. There is no reason why we could not go a bit higher--say 60--in order to be more fully responsive.

One way of being responsive while retaining flexibility and allowing the USAF to rebuild its inventory would be to agree to a four-year program for the delivery of 48 F-4s and 42 A-4s (or 60 of each).

In addition to these issues, there is a problem of timing. If it were not for the Beirut raid, we could just go ahead in the normal course of business. Now it would seem best to wait until reaction settles down.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 4 -


However, there is a technical problem on Skyhawk production that may make it desirable to permit some of the practical arrangements to be worked out immediately. When I know the President's decision I shall propose a way of doing this.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President recommending a four-year program for Israel involving 48 F-4s and 42 A-4s (with readiness to go to 60 of each if the Israelis wish). Once there is a decision, we shall draft an appropriate directive.

Concurrence: R. T. Kennedy *JK*

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

00517
DECLASSIFIED





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7305748

NSC #1827

tab B

April 2, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Options on A-4 and F-4 Deliveries
to Israel

In response to your request of March 2, we have prepared a number of options for both F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel.

As you know, Israel requested last November a total of 30 additional A-4s and 36 additional F-4s for delivery in 1974 and 1975 after current contracts are filled. In addition, as we mentioned in our Memorandum to the President of February 27, Israel has indicated it is thinking of requesting delivery of 18 more of each aircraft each year beginning in 1976 for the indefinite future. The Israelis seem to be planning therefore to acquire a total of 72 F-4s and 66 A-4s over the next four years.

Our options are as follows:

F-4

Option A - Delivers 36 aircraft in two years, as requested, but concentrates deliveries in the second year, thus reducing the adverse impact on USAF caused by diversion.

SECRET/NODIS

XGDS-3

DECLASSIFIED

- Option B - Delivers 36 aircraft over four years. This would provide liberally for peacetime attrition, plus enough aircraft for one additional squadron; it is less (36 vs. 72) than we expect the Israelis will eventually request for delivery over the four years. Stretching deliveries through 1977 reinforces the principle of continuity, minimizes the impact of diversions on our own forces, and begins the long-term supply, attrition-oriented policy we recommended in our February 27 memorandum.
- Option C - Delivers 48 aircraft over four years. This would provide liberally for peacetime attrition plus enough aircraft for almost two additional squadrons. It would have psychological advantage over B in that it would provide a larger number of F-4s than Israel has requested for 1974/75, although deliveries would be stretched over four years, and fewer aircraft (48 vs. 72) than their total anticipated four-year request.
- Option D - Delivers 20 aircraft for attrition for four years (1974-1977) as proposed in the February 27 memorandum, assuming an annual loss rate to 5%. This is a liberal attrition figure in view of Israel's actual peacetime attrition of 1-3% (i.e., 1-3 aircraft per year).

A-4

- Option A - Delivers 30 aircraft in two years as Israel desires and is almost identical to the Israeli request, but with deliveries adjusted to fit efficiently into present production schedules.

SECRET/NODIS

3

Option B - Provides for 42 aircraft delivered over the period June 1974-December 1977. Covers estimated attrition at 5% or 10 A-4s a year (slightly less in 1974), which is liberal based on past experience, plus 5 additional training aircraft in the first year, as the Israelis requested. This option provides more aircraft (42 vs. 30) than requested but over a longer period of time and is designed to support a principle of continuity based primarily on attrition replacement. It is less (42 vs. 66) than what we expect the Israelis will eventually request for delivery over the four years.

The options are summarized in terms of total aircraft deliveries per year by type on the attached table.

Consistent with your guidance and our recommendations in the State-Defense memorandum of February 27, we recommend Option B for both aircraft. These options provide as many F-4s as requested and more A-4s than requested for 1974-75, but spread deliveries through 1977 -- and (barring unforeseen circumstances) obviate the need for further aircraft decisions over the next four years -- an approach we strongly endorse. Also, they reflect the principles of continuity and longer-term commitment which Israel values highly.

Timing of deliveries, particularly of A-4s, depends on an early decision. Delivery schedules for CY 1975 and beyond can be varied, however, within rather broad production line constraints.

If the President wishes to be even more generous, such an option is described in Option C which would call for 48 F-4s over a four-year period rather than 36.

Upon receipt of the President's decision, the Department of Defense, as in the past, will work out

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

4

the technical details, including delivery schedules, with the Israelis.

As a related matter, and in accordance with your memorandum of March 2, 1973, the necessary arrangements are being made to assist Israel in the production of 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

The Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have seen and approved this memorandum.

for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Table - Options on F-4 and A-4
Deliveries to Israel

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

Options on
F-4 and A-4 Deliveries to Israel

The top line on each chart shows Israel's current request of 36 F 4s (18 each in 1974 and 1975) and 30 A 4s at a rate of 2 or 3 each month. The 18 of each aircraft the Israelis are thinking of requesting in 1976 and following years are not shown on the chart.

<u>F-4*</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOI Request	18	18	-	-	36
Option A	8	28	-	-	36
Option B	6	12	12	6	36
Option C	6	12	18	12	48
Option D	5	5	5	5	20

<u>A-4**</u>					
GOI Request	14***	16***	-	-	30
Option A	20	10	-	-	30
Option B	12	10	10	10	42

* Current F-4 deliveries end December 1973.

** Current A-4 deliveries end May 1974.

*** Request is for 30 aircraft, at 2 or 3 per month, beginning June 1974; the chart assumes delivery at 2 per month.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 16, 1973

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Civil Aviation Negotiations
with Israel

Civil aviation negotiations with Israel, begun in November at Israel's request, were resumed March 26-29. The subject at issue remained as before: Israel's desire for expanded landing rights in the United States. (For background see my memorandum dated November 3, 1972.)

It was not possible to reach agreement on the methodology to be used in calculating the actual benefits derived by each country under the bilateral air transport agreement. Under the approach used by the United States Delegation, the benefits are 2.4 to 1 in favor of Israel, while the Israeli approach showed an imbalance of 1.7 to 1 in Israel's favor. In the end, we took the position that, whichever ratio was used, there remains a marked imbalance between the revenue benefits under the Agreement (in real terms amounting to over \$30 million using the US methodology), and there was thus no economic justification for granting additional landing rights to El Al at this time.

Israel's argument concerning the excessive share of the United States-Israel market being obtained by third country airlines (an argument used to support its claim to additional landing rights) was carefully considered. The US Delegation stated that the United States shared Israel's concern on this matter, that the United States had already initiated steps to bring the capacity of third country airlines into conformity with the provisions of our bilateral agreements with those countries, and that the United States invited Israel also to tackle the problem directly with the third countries. Our Delegation did not agree, however, that the solution to this third country problem lay in granting Israel further landing rights.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

7307003

2122

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

At Israel's request, the talks were recessed to give Israel the opportunity to review the whole situation in Israel. It is anticipated that further talks will be requested, possibly in July. While the US Delegation said that it did not see how the economic facts would change sufficiently in the short run to make a different US position possible, it recognized Israel's interest in reviewing the situation and would be prepared to meet again if Israel so desired.

The Israelis were clearly disappointed with the US response on landing rights. While they hinted on several occasions that they might be satisfied with something less than their full shopping list (which still remains on the table as "Los Angeles and Chicago at the minimum"), they at no time advanced any specific alternative proposal.

Ed Miller for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

1. EVIDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA	MO DA	
04 16	04 17	08 22	SAUNDERS

SOURCE/CLASS/DESL

PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
KISSINGER X RICHARDSON _____ LOU X NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____
ELIOT X S _____ CODEWORD _____
TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Civil Aviation Negotiations with Israel

REFERENCE: S/S 7307003 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... (<u>X</u>)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<u>X</u>			MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC		<u>X</u>		ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <u>4/24</u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: <input type="checkbox"/>					
DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<u>4/25/73</u>	<u>Saunders</u>	<u>NSC/s</u>		<u>Close file. we have covered this issue in past memos on our economic aid for Israel & will continue in the future. HHS</u>	
<u>4/25</u>				<u>Close file per Saunders (see note)</u>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D _____ BY _____ CYS FOR) SA _____) HP _____ ORIG) WH _____ TO 1973) PA _____) SF _____) NS _____) EP _____ DESTROY) DY _____
SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____	
OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____	
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____	
SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <u>X</u>	

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 2041

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

April 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Our Position in UN Security Council
on Israeli Attack on Beirut

*OBE - This
stuff should
be handled
wif
HK*

The Lebanese have apparently decided to ask the UN Security Council to discuss the recent Israeli attack on Beirut. We have been told that they will strive for a "balanced" resolution, but the chances are that we will end up having to vote on a one-sided condemnation of Israel rather than a broader resolution deploring all acts of violence and loss of innocent life.

The meeting may begin this afternoon; past experience indicates that there would be prolonged discussions at least overnight of the text of a resolution. But Ambassador Scali would like some indication of our thinking early so he does not get too far off course in his discussions.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Abouhamad has told Ambassador Buffum that both Egypt and Algeria are willing to accept a resolution which would include condemnation of "all" violence. He considers this opportunity to put Arab governments on record against terrorist violence as one to be exploited. He even reports that some moderate fedayeen leaders have told the Algerians they would welcome such UN action. Buffum comments that this sounds a bit far-fetched, though the Egyptian and Algerian governments may be concerned over seeing the fedayeen get out of control.

One hooker likely to come out is Lebanon's interest in differentiating terrorist acts from official government acts by regular troops. That moves toward something we would want to avoid.

The issue for us will probably be whether to abstain or veto. This judgment cannot be made until we see the resolution. Scali has

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

- 2 -

expressed a tentative preference for abstention, but wanted to be sure he is not too far off base. He fears that if we use the veto this will receive a great deal of publicity, thus reinforcing views in the Arab world that we are in collusion with Israel. Rumors of our alleged involvement in the raid are already rampant there. In abstaining, of course, he would make a statement that will satisfy our domestic need to go on record with a balanced position of not standing against Israel alone. He recognizes, however, that it is important not to get too far from Israel if we may want to draw on our relationship soon for the purpose of moving toward a settlement.

Thus, the question today is whether in principle we can keep the abstention option open as long as a resolution has some balance.

Recommendation: That Ambassador Scali be told that we could consider abstaining rather than vetoing, provided a relatively moderate resolution is produced, but we cannot make a judgment until we see a text. In other words, there is no pre-judgment that we will have to veto any resolution even mildly critical of Israel.

Agree _____

Other _____

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

REFERENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
4	12	4	12	17	20	41	

FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS NO FORN NODIS
 KISSINGER ✓ RICHARDSON LOU EYES ONLY EXDIS
 SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C ✓ CODEWORD
 ELIOT S SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: US Position in UN Security Council on Israeli
Attack on Beirut

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK.....	()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR	()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION	()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____	()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO.....	()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____	()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE:	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
4/12		HAK	X	Decision (4/15)	
4/24			C	OPBE per HAK	

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D _____ BY _____ APR 30 1973 CYS EDR SA ORIG) WH TO) PA <u>X</u>) SF) NS) EP DESTROY) DY
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
	OR RECORD COMMENT: _____	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
	CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____	
	SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <u>✓</u>		

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1957

FILE
INFORMATION

SECRET (GDS)

April 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Hal
w.b.2.

SUBJECT:

Israeli Policy on the West Bank

You will want to be aware of the latest debate within Israel over policy toward the West Bank. It was on the agenda at yesterday's Cabinet meeting and Hussein may be sending the President a letter on the subject. More important is the relationship of any Israeli moves to strategy for a Jordan-Israel settlement.

As you know, since June 1967 the Israelis have adopted a policy of gradually building up their presence in selected areas of the occupied territories. Until recently, Israeli policy has been to encourage settlement in the Golan Heights, to make East Jerusalem an integral part of Israel, and to establish an Israeli settlement at Rafah junction on the southwestern end of the Gaza Strip. Otherwise the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Sinai has been largely dictated by military considerations, with the exception of a civilian settlement near religiously important sites at Hebron in the West Bank. Now, however, pressure has increased to allow Israelis to buy land on the West Bank.

Israeli Policy on Land Purchases in the West Bank

Defense Minister Dayan has long been an advocate of closer economic integration between Israel and the occupied areas, especially the West Bank. He shares with other Israelis who are very much hard-liners on territory a generally liberal view of how Israelis and Arabs should coexist within geographic Palestine. He is less worried than Prime Minister Meir or Finance Minister Sapir about the social, economic and political consequences of absorbing one million Arabs into Israeli society. Dayan, perhaps as part of his private electoral campaign, has recently publicly called for a change in Israeli policy of restricting land purchases on the West Bank. The Israeli government has already acquired a small amount of land, largely near Jerusalem, but private individuals and companies are barred from making purchases. This is the policy Dayan would like to change.

SECRET (GDS)

BECLASSIFIED

SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

The Israeli Cabinet has now met to consider policy on land purchases and for the moment a decision has been taken to make no changes. In advance of the Cabinet meeting, Assistant Secretary Sisco informed the Israeli Ambassador here that we feel our interests would be affected if Israeli policy on land purchases were to change. He expressed concern that a new "liberal" policy allowing for individual purchases of land would be seen as creating new facts and making the occupation permanent. For the moment the sense of urgency surrounding this issue is likely to die down, but it will doubtless arise again.

King Hussein has expressed serious concern over the possibility of a change in Israeli land purchase policy. He has received reports from West Bankers that reflect their high level of anxiety. The King has said he intends to write to the President and Secretary Rogers in order to get US help in urging Israel to freeze its activities in Jerusalem and the West Bank. He apparently feels he was told during his February visit that we would approach the Israelis along these lines.

Israeli View of West Bank Trends

Apart from this particular issue is the broader question of what strategy to adopt toward the West Bank, especially if movement toward a Jordan-Israel settlement is to be slow.

A broader assessment of developments on the West Bank has been provided by David Farhi, adviser to Dayan on the occupied West Bank. He was recently in Washington and spoke with a number of US officials. Farhi, like Dayan, does not believe a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is likely, and consequently thinks that the future of the West Bank will have to be worked out within the context of the Israeli occupation. He envisages a long-term outcome that could provide the Palestinians with self-government on the West Bank and would eventually lead to a loose, informal confederative relationship among Israel, the West Bank and Jordan.

Farhi believes that West Bankers are now better disposed toward King Hussein than was the case two years ago. This is not because they like his regime any better, but rather because it is the best available alternative to indefinite Israeli occupation, which they do not like despite some material benefits. They fear being isolated from the Arab world, as were the Palestinians who remained in Israel after 1948.

SECRET (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET (GDS)

- 3 -

While preferring to return to Jordan under some new relationship, the West Bank Palestinians do not expect any imminent settlement. Consequently they are increasingly looking for ways to improve their lot under occupation. Demands on the Israeli authorities for the provision of social services, loans, and technical advice are increasingly being made in a businesslike way, and some joint Arab-Jewish enterprises have been established. Industrialization is just beginning, while agriculture has already been vastly improved. These changes have not contributed to greater friendship between Jews and Arabs, but some of the myths have been eroded on both sides, which makes for a tolerable, if not very warm coexistence.

Comment: The Israelis have still not faced up to the political issue of what to do with the West Bank, but through a series of individual decisions, perhaps most important of which will be the relaxation of restrictions on land purchases by Israelis in the occupied areas, they are convincing others that they intend to stay indefinitely. When they also reach this conclusion, other difficult economic and political choices will confront them involving their responsibilities toward the Palestinian Arab population living under their control.

At present we have no framework for dealing with these changes other than to regret any actions that make a settlement more difficult. If the chances for a settlement are rapidly receding in the West Bank, we should soon consciously decide between two possible courses: whether to press hard for a Jordan-Israel agreement that will reestablish Jordanian sovereignty in these areas, or, alternatively, to work quietly toward a joint US-Jordan-Israel understanding of where the occupation might lead over a fairly long period of time.

SECRET (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

RESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD
NO. 67	NO. 67
4/9	4/9
19	19

INITIAL ACTION O

#1957

RES FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS NO FORN NODIS
 KISSINGER RICHARDSON LOU EYES ONLY EXDIS
 SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C CODEWORD
 ELIOT SENSITIVE

SUBJECT:

Israeli Policy on the West Bank

REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		
STAFF SECRETARY		
FAR EAST		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA		
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		
EUROPE / CANADA		
LATIN AMERICA		
UNITED NATIONS		
ECONOMIC		
SCIENTIFIC		
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP		
PROGRAM ANALYSIS		
NSC PLANNING		
CONGRESSIONAL		
OCEANS POLICY		

REC
CY
FOR

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
 MEMO FOR PRES. ()
 REPLY FOR ()
 APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
 MEMO TO ()
 RECOMMENDATIONS ()
 JOINT MEMO ()
 REFER TO FOR: ()
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
 CONCURRENCE ()
 DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
4/5		WMA		dis	
6/12				COBE	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH NOTIFY & DATE
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION)
 OR RECORD COMMENT:)
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
 CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG #
 SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D ADG BY

CYS FOR)

SA

) HP

ORIG)

WH

TO)

PA

) SF

) NS

) EP

DESTROY) DY

JUN 14 1978

* GPO: 1973-489-668

DECLASSIFIED

APPROVED IN S 3/22/73;1

SECRET/NODIS

7305107

COMPLETE DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MADE IN FIVE

Date 3/22/73

Initials

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 9, 1973

SUBJECT: MFN, Israel and Russian Jewish Emigration

PARTICIPANTS: Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel

Mr. Avner Idan, Minister, Embassy of Israel

Mr. Moshe Raviv, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. H. H. Stackhouse, Country Director, NEA/IAI

COPIES TO: S,D,P, S/S, WH, EUR, NEA, American Embassy MOSCOW, TEL AVIV

In the course of Ambassador Rabin's farewell call March 9 the Secretary raised the subject of MFN legislation before Congress and its relationship to problems of Russian Jewish emigration to Israel. The Secretary said that as Rabin knew, we had consistently discussed the matter of Soviet exit fees at the highest levels with the USSR. We thought we had been able to be helpful; this we believed was manifest in the way the numbers of emigrants each had gone up. Moreover, we did detect some liberalization in the requirements for emigration as actually applied; there was some exercise of administrative discretion.

We had no complaint about public or Congressional discussion of the issue of Soviet exit fees the Secretary said; this was understandable. We were concerned, however, that Congressional interest was being translated into blocking improvement in US-USSR relations. The fact was settlement of the lend-lease debt question rested on the outcome of the MFN issue, and other trade legislation rested on settlement of debt. In our improving relationship with USSR we thought it was essential that we go ahead with our part of the bargain. MFN for USSR would permit the President to go ahead with MFN for China and

NEA/IAI:HHStackhouse:kha

(Drafting Office and Officer)

Concurrence:

NEA - J.J. Sisco

NEA - A.L. Atherton

FORM 2-65 DS-1254

SECRET/NODIS

XGDS-3

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

2

others. In a sense, MFN legislation was the key to the President's whole foreign policy. We hoped Jewish leaders could be convinced it would be counter-productive if this legislation were blocked. If in fact this legislation were blocked, this would be a setback to the President's foreign policy. We would be meeting with Jewish leaders shortly to say we would be continuing to express to the Soviets privately our opposition to exit fees. But we will also say we believe any effort to link this effort with MFN legislation before Congress would be a mistake. We did not believe the Soviets would back down before such a threat, anyway. If there was anything Israel could do to help us, it would be appreciated.

Rabin responded that the Israelis had to look at this matter both as Jews and as Israelis. They believe that there was some sort of moral commitment to do all that could be done, to bring about an increase in the numbers emigrating, to liberalize emigration procedures, and to assure that those who want to emigrate did not have to live under unbelievable threats. Israel could not accept an exit fee which was related to education received by the applicant. He was not talking about repeal of Soviet legislation but about practical arrangements that are made. He did not believe that Israel could say this was not an important issue. The whole education exit fee issue had been introduced a year ago by the Soviets; why had they done it?

Secretary said we did not expect Israel to change its policy. What concerned us was the most effective US approach to the matter. We thought events demonstrated our help had had a good effect. Larger emigration to Israel was evidence of this. We thought we could continue to be effective if our relations with USSR continued to improve. But we did not believe we could be as effective if there was a reversion to a Cold War situation because of opposition on this issue. We were not asking Israel to make public statements, but to pass word to those who respect Israel's word that Israel did not want the President's long run policy fouled up.

The Secretary said we could be certain that if Congress refuses to pass MFN legislation unless the Soviets disavow their exit visa policy, this would not have the desired effect on the Soviets. We gathered the Soviets were trying to apply their legislation more flexibly; it seemed to us best if we could find ways to get them to apply their laws with more fairness and flexibility. Rabin expressed doubt the Soviets would be more flexible without a threat hanging over them. Secretary again noted we had frequently discussed matters with the Soviets and could continue to do so. He had mentioned it to Gromyko when he saw him last. They said there were many other

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

3

countries that had similar kind of arrangements. The U.S., for example, required that Annapolis and West Point graduates discharge the obligation of their USG-financed education by service or payment. Rabin argued this was not the same thing. The Secretary said he did not want the Ambassador to think we were arguing the Soviet position. But they did say that they provided free education to their best people; therefore they were entitled to have compensation in the form of work or pay for this education. This was their argument. There was flexibility in the Soviet regulations; they did have administrative flexibility. Each time we had had discussions with them, we presented a list of people we were interested in, and the list got longer each time. Gromyko had said that in 1971 there were 15,000 Jewish emigrants, and in 1972, 30,000; don't we Russians get any credit?

The Secretary summed up that we would continue to do all we could to help Israel in this matter. But it would be a major setback for Israel and U.S. Jews if, because we were unsuccessful in getting MFN, the President's foreign policy with respect to the USSR was aborted. Everything was based on the fate of MFN legislation.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC/S

3/7/73

Lofise:

Mr. Saunders
asked me to give this
back to you so you
could send it back
through the system. He
says he got it from
Slowcroft.

Irene

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Henry-

I see no reason
to go to the President
on this.

Do you concur in
the \$25 million cut?

Brent

H yes

— stay at \$50 million

MEMORANDUM

NSC# 1104

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

March 2, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
RICHARD T. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: Supporting Assistance for Israel

You will recall that, in the talking paper for the President's meeting with Prime Minister Meir, we suggested that he sustain the December decision to provide for Israel in FY 1974 \$25 million in Supporting Assistance. This compares with \$50 million in FY 1973. The small cut was made because of Israel's good foreign exchange position and the President's desire to maintain a tight budgetary ceiling.

It is necessary in the next few days to print the presentation to Congress on the aid program, and we would appreciate confirmation that the President did indeed follow the approach that was suggested for his use with Mrs. Meir. A memo is attached for your use as the vehicle for decision.

Recommendation: That you seek a decision on the attached by about March 6.

1. HAK approved.
2. Kenned informed OMB
(Frey) 3/6.

HHS

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Supporting Assistance for Israel

You will recall from the talking paper prepared for your meeting with Prime Minister Meir the suggestion that you sustain the December decision to provide for Israel in FY 1974 \$25 million in budget support from Supporting Assistance. This compares with \$50 million in FY 1973. The small cut was made because of Israel's good foreign exchange position and your determination to maintain a tight budgetary ceiling.

It is necessary in the next few days to print precise numbers on the aid program for presentation to the Congress. Thus the question is, after your talk with Mrs. Meir, whether you wish to go ahead with this modest reduction. US economic assistance would still run close to \$500 million -- \$300 million in military credits, \$55 million in PL 480, \$30 million in Export-Import Bank loans, \$75 million in housing guarantees and the \$25 million in budget support.

Secretary Shultz has begun a series of discussions with the Israeli economic experts so that they will understand our budgetary problem and so that ways may be sought of perhaps partially compensating them for this cut of \$25 million (from a total of \$520 million). An atmosphere of cooperation has been established and this small a cut in the light of our general budget problems should not become a political issue since our overall support remains at such a high level.

The main point to consider in setting Israel's aid level is that Israel's economic need is much less acute than when US aid climbed to this level in 1970-71, and most of the US aid is going into Israel's rapidly rising foreign exchange reserves. Because of that, some argue for cuts as

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

- 2 -

high as \$150 million. A small cut should be sustainable, but now does not seem the time for anything more.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve \$25 million in Supporting Assistance for FY 1974.

Approve _____

No, we must stay at the present level of \$50 million for FY 1974. _____

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	L	NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR		1104	

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ☒ FROM: ROGERS ☐ UNCLAS ☐ LOG IN/OUT ONLY ☐

KISSINGER ☐ RICHARDSON ☐ LOU ☐ NO FORN ☐ NODIS ☐

SCOWCROFT ☐ SCHLESINGER ☐ C ☐ EYES ONLY ☐ EXDIS ☐

ELIOT ☐ S ☐ CODEWORD ☐

TS ☐ SENSITIVE ☐

SUBJECT: *Supporting Assistance for Israel*

REFERENCE: S/S ☐ OTHER ☐ NOT XEROXED ☐

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
3/2		HAK	x	Pres for decision (3/5)	
3/6		HAK		confirmed decision	
3/7				Chenney advised OMB	
				M/R / Keep all notes	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

OR RECORD COMMENT: _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ☒

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

MAF'D BY *SA*

CYS FOR SA *9*

ORIG) ☒

TO) PA ☒

) SF ☐

) NS ☐

) EP ☐

DESTROY) DY ☐

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

DP IMMED
ESA153ADA304
DE RUESAD #0144 3471900
O 131824Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0886
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3805

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 10144

EXDIS
CAIRO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
REF: TEL AVIV 10116
IN MY CONVERSATION TODAY WITH ABBA EBAN, EBAN NOTED THAT ISRAEL
WAS PREPARED, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY, TO PROPOSE THAT
ISRAEL AND EGYPT DISCUSS DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AT GENEVA
DURING OR AFTER INITIAL SESSION OF CONFERENCE. EVRON (MFA)
WHO WAS PRESENT APOLOGIZED FOR "MISUNDERSTANDING" REFLECTED
IN REFTEL. EBAN CONFIRMED THAT SUCH PLANS WOULD ONLY BE
FINALIZED AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY.
KEATING
BT

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, LL, QUANDT

PSN:008468 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:348/06:33Z DTG:131824Z DEC 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

DECLASSIFIED

JERUSALEM

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 31 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 32 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 33 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 215

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01216 271016Z

14
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

095323

P R 270944Z OCT 73
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4624
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 1216

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, EG, IS
SUBJ: ISRAELI SIEGE OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY

1. WE DOUBTLESS ARE SEEING ONLY PIECES OF THE PUZZLE, BUT SUCH PIECES AS WE DO SEE LEAD ME TO A SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE APPARENT INTENTION OF THE ISRAELIS TO FORCE THE SURRENDER OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY BY CUTTING OFF WATER AND OTHER SUPPLIES. NOT ONLY DOES THIS SEEM AT BEST A QUESTIONABLE COURSE OF ACTION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TWO SC CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY IT COULD WELL FRUSTRATE HOPES WE MAY HAVE FOR THE NEXT AND CRITICAL PHASE OF THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS. WE HERE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ABOUT SADAT'S CURRENT STRENGTH AND STANDING, BUT IT REQUIRES LITTLE IMAGINATION TO PREDICT WHAT COULD HAPPEN TO IT IF THIS ARMY IS FORCED INTO HUMILIATING SURRENDER, WITH LOSS OF ALL ITS EQUIPMENT, ETC. WE COULD FIND, JUST AS THE NEGOTIATING PERIOD WAS TO BE ENTERED UPON, THAT THERE WAS NO EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF NEGOTIATING. AS THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR COMMENTED TO ME THIS MORNING, THE ISRAELIS WOULD NO DOUBT PROTEST LOUDLY IF THEY WERE PRESSED TO ALLOW THE EGYPTIAN FORCE TO REMAIN IN BEING, BUT UNLESS THAT HAPPENS THE CHANCES OF A CONSTRUCTIVE RESULT OF ALL THIS SEEM MUCH DIMMER.
DAY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 27 PM 2:02

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 35 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 36 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 37 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars are positioned on the left and right sides of the seal.

WV

$$\frac{2}{3}$$

43
ACTION SS-30

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

116274

C P 161111Z OCT 73
 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4571
 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 AMCONSUL STUTTGART
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 1141

EXDIS

STUTTGART FOR ELG

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJ: E&E PLANNING

REF: STATE 204191

1. FOLLOWING ARE RESPONSES TO LETTERED QUERIES CONTAINED
PARA 2 REFTEL:

A. WE BELIEVE IF DEPT HAS NOT ALREADY ISSUED ONE THERE NOW SHOULD BE LOW-KEY STATEMENT DISCOURAGING TRAVEL TO GENERAL AREA, I. E. MIDDLE EAST OR AREA OF HOSTILITIES OR WAR ZONE. WE WOULD NOT WANT JERUSALEM SINGLED OUT AS SPECIAL AREA OF DANGER, ALTHOUGH NO OBJECTION TO INCLUSION OF ISRAEL AND JORDAN IN LISTING OF ALL COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN AREA. IN FACT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE LEAVE ANY COUNTRY IN AREA OUT OF SUCH LISTING.

B. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO BEGIN ENCOURAGING PRIVATE AMCITS TO LEAVE. (THIS COULD NOT BE DONE "DISCREETLY", SINCE WORD WOULD IMMEDIATELY SPREAD THROUGHOUT COMMUNITY.

~~SECRET~~
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DE 1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01141 161102Z

WE HAVE ALREADY HAD TO SCOTCH NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT AMERICANS ARE EVACUATING OR PREPARING TO DO SO.) TO THOSE INQUIRERS WHO SEEM PARTICULARLY UNEASY (INSIGNIFICANT IN NUMBER), WE HAVE SUGGESTED THEY MAY WISH ARRANGE TO DEPART, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER AND HAVE NO PLANS TO LEAVE OR SEND AMCITS OUT.

C. WE DO NOT CONSIDER EVACUATION, LIMITED OR OTHERWISE, NECESSARY AT PRESENT AND DO NOT AS OF NOW ANTICIPATE IT WILL BE REQUIRED IN FUTURE.

2. ABOVE BEING WRITTEN BEFORE WE ARE ABLE ASSESS FULL IMPACT OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL. REACTION COULD LEAD TO SOMEWHAT INCREASED DANGER TO AMCITS IN OUR CONSULAR DISTRICT. WE WILL WATCH SITUATION CLOSELY, BUT WE CONSIDER IT UNLIKELY THAT ISRAELIS WOULD PERMIT SITUATION TO DEVELOP TO POINT THAT DANGER WOULD BE SUCH AS TO LEAD US TO REVISE OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT.

3. RE PARA 3 REFTEL: (A) WE ESTIMATE UPWARDS OF 1,000 PRIVATE AMERICANS WHO WOULD REQUEST EVACUATION. (B) WE ESTIMATE APPROXIMATELY 300 TOURISTS IN DISTRICT.

4. WE ARE CONTINUING TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH EMBASSY TEL AVIV.
DAY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

22/00/017

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

WH

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

3 OCT 14 AM 11:5

53
ACTION SS-30

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

097172

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 1128

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMER, JO, IS
SUBJECT: E & E SITUATION IN JERUSALEM

1. WITH ENTRY OF JORDAN, THE WAR MOVES CLOSER TO JERUSALEM. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE HOW THE SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS HERE MAY BE AFFECTED, HOWEVER, JORDANIAN FORCES HAVING MOVED INTO SYRIA, SITE OF ACTUAL HOSTILITIES WOULD STILL SEEM TO BE IN THAT AREA. SEEMS UNLIKELY, FROM WHAT WE HAVE HEARD, THAT JORDANIANS WILL ATTEMPT AT THIS STAGE TO MOVE ACROSS JORDAN INTO WEST BANK. WHETHER OR NOT HOSTILITIES COME TO NEIGHBORHOOD OF JERUSALEM SEEMS IN FIRST INSTANCE, THEREFORE, TO DEPEND ON HOW ISRAELIS REACT. IF THEY LIMIT THEMSELVES TO DEALING WITH JORDANIAN FORCE IN SYRIA, COUPLED PERHAPS WITH AIR RAIDS IN JORDAN, THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT HERE WILL NOT BE GREAT. IF THEY USE OCCASION TO MOVE FORCES OF THEIR OWN ACROSS JORDAN RIVER, STORY WILL BE DIFFERENT.

2. JORDAN'S MOVE, OF COURSE, PUTS BULK OF ARAB POPULATION IN EAST JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK (ALMOST ALL ARE JORDANIAN CITIZENS) TECHNICALLY AT WAR WITH ISRAEL. ISRAELI CONTROLS ON WEST BANK CAN BE EXPECTED TO TOUGHEN, AND BRIDGES WILL NO DOUBT CLOSE, BUT WE DO NOT SEE IMMEDIATE AND SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

30

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01128 131447Z

QUENCES FOR AMERICANS RESULTING FROM THIS CURIOUS SITUATION. OVER LONGER RUN, TENSIONS MAY BUILD TO POINT WHERE PROBLEMS DO ARISE.

3. WE PLAN TO RESPOND TO QUERIES FROM AMERICANS WHO MAY BE CONCERNED ABOUT EFFECT OF JORDANIAN ENTRY THAT FOR THE MOMENT OUR ADVICE REMAINS THE SAME -- NO IMMEDIATE DANGER, STAY CLOSE TO HOME AND LISTEN TO NEWS, REGISTER AT CONSULATE. WE WILL, HOWEVER, BEGIN TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE ENTRY INTO WARNING PHASE ONE SHOULD SITUATION CHANGE.

4. FOR TEL AVIV: IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE OF GREAT INTEREST TO US, WITH EYE TO SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS HERE, TO HAVE WHATEVER INDICATIONS YOU MAY PICK UP ABOUT LIKELY ISRAELI REACTION.
DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DS-1652

62/80/019

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. A small five-pointed star is positioned to the left of the shield.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET **813**

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01107 111226Z

2

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W

073711

Q R 111157Z OCT 73
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4542
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 1107

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMER
SUBJECT: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. WE CONTINUE BELIEVE AMERICANS HERE IN NO RPT NO IMMEDIATE DANGER BUT TWO DEVELOPMENTS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE SITUATION: A) ENTRY OF JORDAN INTO WAR, AND B) US RE-SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT OR OTHER MAJOR ARMS TO ISRAEL. WHILE LATTER EVENT WOULD NOT POSE SAME DANGER HERE AS IN ARAB POSTS, SINCE WE BELIEVE ISRAELIS COULD BE EXPECTED TO KEEP SECURITY SITUATION PRETTY WELL UNDER CONTROL, IT DOUBTFUL THAT ALL MANIFESTATION OF ARAB RESENTMENT COULD BE PREVENTED AND POTENTIAL DANGER WOULD CERTAINLY INCREASE. THOUGH SOMEWHAT WILD RUMORS OF PLANS FOR FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES ON WEST BANK, ESPECIALLY IN HEBRON AND NABLUS AREAS, BEGINNING TO CIRCULATE, WE NOT AWARE OF ANY SUCH ACTIVITY SO FAR OR OF SPECIFICALLY ANTI-AMERICAN INCIDENTS IN OUR DISTRICT.

2. WE HAVE NO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL PREPARATORY ACTIONS BY DEPT. ADDITIONAL INTERNAL ACTIONS TAKEN BY POST SINCE THOSE REPORTED JERUSALEM 1073 INCLUDE FOLLOWING:

A. DESTROYING OR PREPARING FOR RETIREMENT (IF FEASIBLE)

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ²⁶AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 41 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 42 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 43 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 44 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 45 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 46 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State

WITH THE ROOM
SITUATION ROOM

OCT 3

TELEGRAM

SECRET 526

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01067 061106Z

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00 CCO=00 /026 W 035248

O R 061037Z OCT 73
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4506
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 1067

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MARR, SY, LE, EG, IS
SUBJ: REPORTED MILITARY BUILDUP

REF: JERUSALEM 1066; USDAO TEL AVIV 1483

1. IN VIEW PARTICULARLY OF ASSURANCES UNTSO CONVEYING DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT AT OUR SUGGESTION (JERUSALEM REFTEL) I FELT IT NECESSARY TO GIVE UNTSO SOME SENSE OF TURN EVENTS WERE TAKING AS REFLECTED IN TEL AVIV REFTEL. I THEREFORE TOLD ACTING COFS KRAWCIW, WITHOUT BEING PRECISE ABOUT DETAILS OR SOURCE, THAT ISRAELIS SEEMED TO BE TAKING VERY SERIOUSLY INFORMATION THEY HAD THAT MILITARY ACTION FROM SYRIA AND EGYPT MIGHT BE IMMINENT. IN RESPONSE, AND ENTIRELY DEFENSIVELY, THEY SEEMED LIKELY TO TAKE MEASURES THEMSELVES THAT COULD IN TURN BE MISINTERPRETED BY OTHER SIDE.

2. I SUGGESTED HE GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICER, TELL HIM THAT UNTSU WAS PASSING ASSURANCES ABOUT ISRAELI DISPOSITIONS AND APPARENT INTENTIONS TO OTHERS, AND IN EFFECT SEEK ASSURANCES THAT SITUATION ON ISRAELI SIDE REMAINED SAME. I ALSO SUGGESTED HE CONTACT SIILASVOU IN CAIRO, SAY THAT REPORTS OF IMPENDING MILITARY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01067 061106Z

ACTION FROM ARAB SIDE PERSISTED AND SEEMED EVEN HAVE TAKEN ON NEW URGENCY, AS ASK IF SIILASVOU COULD PROVIDE FURTHER ASSURANCES THAT NOTHING IMMINENT BEING PREPARED IN EGYPT, I ASKED HIM NOT TO INCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO US AS SOURCE OF INFO.

2. KRAWCIW SAID HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING CONTACTING ISRAELI LIAISON FOR THIS PURPOSE IN ANY CASE, AND WOULD DO SO. HE WOULD ALSO GET IN TOUCH WITH SIILASVOU. HE WOULD LET ME KNOW ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

3. I SUGGEST FOR DEPARTMENT'S AND TEL AVIV'S CONSIDERATION THAT WE URGE ISRAELIS TO INFORM UNTSO OF THEIR MOBILIZATION MEASURES AND REASONS THEREFORE, AND REQUEST UNTSO TO APPROACH SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS URGENTLY BOTH TO SEEK AND CONVEY ASSURANCES OF NON-AGGRESSIVE INTENT. I DID NOT FEEL I COULD GO FARTHER THAN I DID AT THIS STAGE.
DAY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Lh/eo/ala

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 48 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 49 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 50 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

Wt
TELEGRAM

SECRET 437

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00240 071451Z

62

ACTION SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

120031

R 071424Z MAR 73
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4037
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL ASMARA
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AEEMBASSY SANAA 0004
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 240

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, YE, ET, IS
SUBJECT: ALLEGED ISRAELI OCCUPATION ZUGAR ISLAND

REF: TEL AVIV 1156 (NOTAL); STATE 41441; AMMAN 928

1. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM STATE 41441 THAT THERE IS SOME
CONFUSION AS TO SOURCE OF STORY ALLEGING ISRAELI OCCUPATION
OF ZUGAR ISLAND. AMMAN 928 STATES THAT STORY WAS LEAKED TO
BILL MARMON BY HIGH RANKING GOI OFFICIAL. CONGEN, ON MARCH
1, SPOKE TO MARLIN LEVIN ABOUT STORY SOLELY IN ATTEMPT TO
DETERMINE IF AND WHEN IT MIGHT BE PUBLISHED. LEVIN PROVIDED
INFORMATION WE REQUESTED AND COMMENTED THAT HE AND MARMON HAD
CHECKED OUT STORY AND WERE CONVINCED IT WAS TRUE (JERUSALEM 211).
LEVIN IS NOT, THEREFORE, TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, "SOURCE"
OF STORY IN SENSE THIS TERM IS USED IN STATE 41441.

2. TO KEEP RECORD STRAIGHT ABOUT LEVIN, NEVERTHELESS, HE IS
AMERICAN CITIZEN (WE DON'T KNOW IF ALSO ISRAELI), FULL-TIME
CORRESPONDENT FOR TIME, AND IS LISTED AS SUCH ON MAGAZINE'S
MASTHEAD. HE IS ALSO PRESIDENT OF FOREIGN PRESS ASSOCIATION
IN ISRAEL.
G D S. DAY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

00117
DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 213

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08817 311400Z

2

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSA-00 INRE-00 /031 W 124436

P 311320Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 358

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8817

EXDIS
E.O. 11652 XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, US, IS UR
SUBJ: CAPTURED SOVIET EQUIPMENT

1. I TOLD FONIM EBAN TODAY HOW MUCH WE APPRECIATED COOPERATION OF GOI TO DATE WITH COL LA FON'S TEAM WHICH IS IN ISRAEL TO EXAMINE CAPTURED SOVIET EQUIPMENT. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE A FEW INITIAL PROBLEMS, THINGS SEEM TO BE WORKING WELL.

2. I NOTED, HOWEVER, WE HAD DETECTED UNDERSTANDABLE ISRAELI HESITATION IN LETTING US TAKE QUICKLY TO US FOR FURTHER, THOROUGH EXAMINATION CERTAIN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS, SUCH AS SAM-6 MISSILE, OF WHICH ISRAEL HAS ONLY ONE IN ITS POSSESSION, US, OF COURSE HAS SUPERIOR CAPABILITY. I SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT GOI CONSIDER FOLLOW-

ING PROPOSAL WHICH I WAS PUTTING FORWARD PERSONALLY BUT WITH WHICH I WAS SURE WASHINGTON WOULD AGREE; WE WOULD TAKE SUCH ITEMS TO US AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE ISRAELI TECHNICIANS ACCOMPANY WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IN EXAMINATIONS IN US. WHEN JOINT TEAMS HAD EXHAUSTED EXPLOITABILITY POTTENTIAL OF ITEM INUS, WE WOULD RETURN ITEM TO ISRAEL.

3. EBAN NOTED MINDEF DAYAN HAD YESTERDAY BRIEFED CABINET ON HIGH VALUE TO ISRAEL OF US-GOI COOPERATION RE EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED SOVIET EQUIPMENT. HE PROMISED TO SP-~~AK~~AK TO DAYAN TODAY ABOUT MY IDEA, AND BE BACK IN TOUCH SOON. AS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

20

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08817 311400Z

CONCERNS GENERAL SITUATION, HE MADE CLEAR GOI DESIRE
COOPERATE WITH US ON SQUEEZING AS MUCH OUT OF SOVIET EQUIP-
MENT AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

es/20/910

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 180

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08814 311351Z

2

50
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

124367

P 311310Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0355

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8814

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, US, IS
SUBJECT: MILITARY RESUPPLY

REF: A) STATE 212642, B) TEL AVIV 8688 C) TEL AVIV 8725

1. MY DATT YESTERDAY ACCOMPANIED USAF MG CASEY, CHIEF OF TEAM DESCRIBED IN REF A, TO MEETING WITH GEN (RET) ZVI ZUR, ASSISTANT TO MINDEF. PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TEAM VISIT. ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING AND LUNCHEON WHICH FOLLOWED WAS AMICABLE AND COOPERATIVE AND TEAM IS WELL LAUNCHED ON ITS MISSION.

2. MEETING BEGAN ON VERY INTERESTING NOTE. ZUR'S FIRST QUESTION TO GEN CASEY CONCERNED DURATION OF CURRENT AIRLIFT. BEFORE CASEY COULD RESPOND, ZUR MADE STRONG PITCH THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL AIRLIFT CONTINUE UNTIL FIRST SHIP CARRYING ARMS RESUPPLIES FROM U.S. WAS PHYSICALLY PRESENT IN HAIFA. HE STRESSED THIS WAS A POLITICAL RATHER THAN A PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION.

3. GEN CASEY REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN OUT OF TOUCH FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS BUT THAT HIS LATEST INFO WAS THAT AIRLIFT WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL 4 OR 5 NOVEMBER. ZUR EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT FIRST VESSEL DEDICATED TO RESUPPLY WOULD NOT BE IN PORT BY THEN. HE REITERATED THAT WHEN AIRLIFT TERMINATES IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL PRIMIN BE ABLE TO POINT TO VISIBLE SEALIFT AND THUS DENY HER OPPOSITION ANY ROOM FOR CRITICISM.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08814 311351Z

4. COMMENT: IT IS EVIDENT THAT ISRAELI CONCERN OVER CONTINUOUS
PROOF OF U.S. RESUPPLY (RPTD IN REF B) REMAINS INTENSE. I
THINK MRS MEIR'S VISIT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TIME TO PASS
TO GOI WHATEVER HARD INFO WE HAVE ON AIRLIFT TERMINATION AND
EXPECTED ARRIVAL TIMES SEALIFT VESSELS * PARTICULARLY U.S.
BOTTOMS.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

29

ES/20/019

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top left corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars are positioned on either side of the eagle's head.

SECRET 132

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08697 311203Z

02

53
ACTION SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 W

123562

R 311103Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0351

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8697

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION JIDDA 28 OCT REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO
OCT 28, 1973.

QUOTE

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP
SUBJECT: CODEL RYAN/STEELE

FOR AMBASSADOR

REF: TEL AVIV 8690

QM CONGRESSMEN RYAN AND STEELE HAVE REPEATED TO US THEIR DESIRE TO MEET WITH KING FAISAL AND OTHER SAUDI OFFICIALS. CONGRESSMEN HAVE PROVEN THUS FAR TO BE QUITE FORCEFUL EXPONENTS OF CONFLICT EMERGING IN US BETWEEN ENERGY REQUIREMENTS AND AMERICAN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL AND DILEMMA THIS POSES FOR PROFESSLITICIANS. IN MY PRESENCE LAST EVENING, STEELE TOOK ON FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN IN VIGOROUS TERMS. RYAN QUOTED IN LOCAL PRESS THIS MORNING TO EFFECT THAT US BEING HURT BY ITS SUPPORT OF ISRAEL.

2. THE ABOVE INFORMATION MAY BE USEFUL.
KEATING

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM NO. 1-570

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is centered at the top of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

CONFIDENTIAL 087

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08779 310332Z

2

70
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00

NSCE=00 SSO=00 USSS=00 /031 W
120219

P R 301421Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 345
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8779

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XG, MQPS
SUBJ: ISRAELI POWS

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN TOOK OCCASION OF OUR MEETING TODAY TO GIVE ME COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF POW SITUATION, IN CONTEXT OF IMPORTANCE OF THE POW ISSUE IN ISRAEL. HE NOTED THAT IN THE MEETING OF ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN GENERAL YESTERDAY THE EGYPTIANS TURNED OVER THE NAMES OF FORTY ISRAELI WOUNDED AND ISRAEL EXPECTS EGYPT TO PROVIDE THE FULL LIST OF PRISONERS. HE ADDED HOWEVER THAT THERE WAS STILL NO INFORMATION AS TO EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW ICRC VISITS AS PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 122 OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

2. WHILE NOTING THE LIMITED EGYPTIAN ACTION TO DATE, HE STATED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD A LONG WAY TO GO AND THAT IT WAS ISRAEL'S AIM TO HAVE A TOTAL EXCHANGE OF POWS WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. EBAN MADE IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL'S DECISION CONCERNING HUMANITARIAN MEASURES TOWARD THE THIRD ARMY WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO FURTHER EGYPTIAN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

L

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by small stars on the left and right sides.

TELEGRAM

AGE 02 TEL AV 08779 310332Z

IF THE ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL CONCERNING POWS IN EGYPT IS RIM, SAID EBAN, THE ATMOSPHERE CONCERNING POWS IN SYRIA S DEADLY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT QUICK ICRC VISITS TO THE POWS ELDED BY SYRIA AS THE ONLY MEANS OF INSURING THE SURVIVAL OF HESE PRISONERS. HE NOTED THAT THE GOI WAS BEGINNING O DOCUMENT SYRIAN ATROCITIES WHICH CREATED TERRIBLE APPREHENSION N ISRAEL ABOUT THE FATE OF THESE MEN. IN THIS RESPECT, HE STAED RANKLY THAT ISRAELIS WERE AFRAID THAT THE SYRIANS WERE DELAYING RNING OVER ANY LISTS OF POWS TO THE ICRC UNTIL THEY COULD SEE HICH ISRAELIS SURVIVED THE TORTURES WHICH WERE ASSOCIATED WITH YRIAN INTERROGATIONS OF PRISONERS.

8. COMMENT. EBAN WAS DESCRIBING WHAT IS A FACT OF LIFE IN ISRAEL: GREAT, ALMOST CONSUMING CONCERN WITH POWS--THE SUBJECT OF A SPECIAL KNESSET DEBATE TODAY. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT WE CAN IN GENEVA--AND ELSEWHERE--EMPHASIZE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HOPES FOR PEACE IN THE MID EAST.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

55/00/0101

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 823

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08744 291604Z

02

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODF-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

106179

O 291448Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0323

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8744

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS
SUBJECT: REPORTED ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO EGYPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 21 PM 9:19

1. HAARETZ RESPECTED AND USUALLY RELIABLE COMMENTATOR AVRAHAM SCHWEITZER, CLAIMING TO KNOW ABOUT NPIS FROM DEEP BACKGROUNDEES WHICH HE SAID MRS MEIR AND DAYAN HAD BEEN GIVING TO SELECTION OF ISRAELI EDITORIS OVER PAST FEW DAYS, TOLD US OCT 29 THAT GENERAL YARIV GAVE ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO EGYPTIAN GENERAL AT THEIR EARLY MORNING MEETING OCT 28. ACCORDING TO SCHWEITZERBN PROPOSAL AMONG OTHER THINGS (WHICH HE DID NOT IDENTIFY) WAS FOR ISRAELI FORCES TO BE PULLED BACK EAST OF CANAL AND EGYPTIAN FORCES TO BE PULLED BACK WEST OF CANAL FORTHWITH.

2 SCHWEITZER EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ALLON IN MAKING PUBLIC THE WILLINGNESS OF GOI TO MOVE INTO SUCH ARRANGEMENT DURING HIS TV INTERVIEW OCT 27 (TEL AVIV 8714) MAY HAVE HURRU PROSPECTS OF GOE AGREEMENT. WE NOTED TO SCHWEITZER THAT ALLOFSHAD ALSO SAID, CONCERNING GOE PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE EAST OF CANAL, THAT HE "WOULD BE WILLING FOR US TO RELATE TO THIS WITH SUFFICIENT TOLERANCE SO LONG AS WE DO GET TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. SCHWEITZER STATED HE BELIEVD THAT PROPOSAL GIVEN EGYPTTIANS BY YARIV CONTAINED SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MM DS 1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08744 291604Z

3. SCHWEITZER VOICED OPINION THAT GOI FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASON BADLY NEEDS FOR USG TO PRODUCE EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT RAPIDLY ON SOME PACKAGE THAT WILL MOVE SITUATION FORWARD. PACKAGE COULD CONTAIN VIRTUALLY ANYTHING SHORT OF ISRAELI COMMITMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-JUNE 1967 LINES. IT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE PROGRESS ON POW ISSUE. SCHWEITZER SAID THAT GOI OVER PAST TWO DAYS HAD NOT ONLY PERMITTED BUT HAD EVEN ENCOURAGED MUSHROOMING OF EMOTION IN ISRAEL (SEPTTEL) OVER POW ISSUE AND ISRAEL'S ALLEGED SUBMISSION TO US PRESSURE FOR ONE-TIME RELIEF CONVOY TO THIRD EGYPTIAN ARMY. PURPOSE ACCORDING TO SCHWEITZER WAS NOT AT ALL TO AROUSE ANTI-US FEELING IN ISRAEL, BUT TO PUT PRESSURE ON US TO START PRODUCING IN CAIRO.

4. ABOVE FITS WITH WHAT WE HAVE BEEN HEARING TODAY FROM AMERICAN JOURNALISTS.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

LS/EO/019

RM DS-1652

0 5 7 7
DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 058

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08720 290137Z

2

64

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 DODE-00 /031 W

101792

0 290104Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0314

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8720

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PCSS SECDEF, JCS, DIA, CNO, CSA, CSAF, CMC, USCINCEUR
IF DESIRED

EO 21652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP IS

SUBJ: US MILITARY EQUIPMENT VALIDATION TEAM VISIT TO ISRAEL

REF: STATE 212642

ASSUMING REFTEL REFERS TO TEAM HEADED BY GENERAL CASEY, GOI
APPROVES VISIT.

AS DEFENSE MINISTRY HAS INFORMATION THAT TEAM WAS TO HAVE LEFT WASHINGTON 28 OCT AT 15:00 WASHINGTON TIME. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST ETA TEL AVIV.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 033

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08715 282006Z

2

41
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

DDDE-00 USSS-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

101057

P 281450Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBAYCY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0312
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8715

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, IS
SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS

REF: A. BEIRUT 12487
B. TEL AVIV 8655

1. ON OCT 27 WE PASSED ON INFO IN REF A TO MORDECHAI
GAZIT, DIRGEN, PRIMIN'S OFFICE. HE EXPRESSED APPRE-
CIATION FOR INFO AND SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE
LEBANESE ISRAELI BORDER CONTINUED QUIET.

2. IDF TOLD DATT TODAY THAT LAST TWO NIGHTS THERE HAD BEEN
NO INCIDENTS ALONG THE LEBANESE BORDER. IT WAS CLEAR FROM
CONVERSATION THE INFO WE HAVE BEEN FEEDING INTO GOI
HAS RAPIDLY FOUND ITS WAY TO THE IDF, AND WE ASSUME, THEREFORE,
IDF FORCES ON BORDER ARE AWARE OF PRESENCE LEBANESE ARMY
PATROLS (PARA 2, REF A).
KEATING

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 26 AM 8:22

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 817

HALK
SCOWCROFT
L.L.

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08685 272225Z

64
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

098242

O 272113Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

SECRET TEL AVIV 8685

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US
SUBJECT: US-ISRAEL RELATIONS

1. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE WHICH ARRIVED PRIOR TO MY 1700 MERTING WITH ABBA EBAN. WE HAD GOOD DISCUSSION ON SUBJECT OF CONVOY AND MILITARY MEETING, MUCH OF WHICH NEED NOT BE REPORTED, SINCE IT ONLY WOULD REPEAT INFO ALREADY AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, AND I HAVE SENT DEPARATMENT TELEGRAMS ON OTHER SUBJECTS.

2. EBAN EMPHASIZED UNPRECEDENTED NATURE OF DIRECT MEETING BETWEEN ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN REPS AND NOTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD PLACE ON THE "CEASEFIRE AGENDA" SUBJECTS OF POW'S AND THE MARITIME BLOCKADE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT GOI AGREEMENT TO ALLOW CONVOY TO PASS THROUGH IDF LINES TO THIRD ARMY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED "ONE TIME THING." CABINET WILL MEET TOMORROW TO ASSESS RESULTS OF THE MEETINGS AND TO DISCUSS "WHERE WE GO FROM HERE."

3. SUBSEQUENT TO MEETING WE WERE INFORMED BY SENIOR MFA AIDE THAT DUE TO VARIETY OF "MISHAPS" MEETING NOW SCHEDULED FOR MIDNIGHT LOCAL TIME AND CONVOY SCHEDULED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08685 272225Z

SIMULTATEOUSLY TO BE CLEARED THROUGH IDF ON WAY TO
THIRD ARMY. WE HAVE ALSO JUST LEARNED FROM UPI
TICKER THAT DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAS JUST MADE PUBLIC
STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS WHOLE SUBJECT.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

20/00/010

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 313

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08674 271152Z

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

O P 271050Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0300
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8674

EXDIS

E O 11652; GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, SY, JO
SUBJECT: ISRAEL AND JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA

REF: A. AMMAN 5710
B. AMMAN 5712

1. TWICE THIS WEEK IN CONTEXT OTHER CONVERSATIONS
PRIMIN MEIR HAS VOICED PUZZLEMENT TO ME
ABOUT CONTINUATION OF JORDANIAN PRESENCE IN SYRIA. AS
SHE EXPLAINED, ISRAEL HAD HOPED THAT COMPLETE SILENCE
ON SYRIAN FRONT, PLUS JORDAN'S OWN ACCEPTANCE OF
CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION AND PRIOR EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE
WOULD HAVE PROVIDED KING HUSSEIN BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL.
MRS MEIR, AND OTHER ISRAELI LEADERS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN,
HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE OVER IDF'S ABILITY
TO CONTAIN ANY RENEWED ATTACKS BY ARABS IN SYRIA. CERTAINLY,
UNDER PRESENT AND FORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, THE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

095856
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

3 OCT 27 PM 2:02

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08674 271152Z

IDF DOES NOT PLAN TO ATTACK; AMONG OTHER REASONS, SUCH AN ISRAELI ACTION WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF CREATING IRAQI-SYRIAN UNITED FRONT, AND ISRAELIS ARE QUITE AWARE OF CURRENT SUSPICIONS AND GROWING DISTRUST BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THEY LIKE IT THIS WAY.

2. I AM CERTAIN, THEREFORE, ISRAEL WANTS JORDANIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA SIMPLY OUT OF DESIRE TO MINIMIZE TO GREATEST POSSIBLE EXTENT ANY CONCEIVABLE CHANCE OF FUTURE ISRAEL-JORDANIAN CLASHES, AND NOT BECAUSE OF AN ISRAELI DESIRE TO SEE ARAB FORCES ON SYRIAN FRONT WEAKENED FOR PURPOSES OF SOME FUTURE MILITARY CONJUNCTION THERE.

3. AMB BROWN IS FREE TO DRAW ON THIS CABLE AS HE WISHES IN HIS TALKS WITH JORDANIANS, IF HE FEELS IT WILL HELP THEM MAKE UP THEIR MIND TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM SYRIA.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

10/20/01

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 295

2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08673 271127Z

20
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 DIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

Z 271047Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0299

SECRET TEL AVIV 8673

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJ: EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY

REF: A. CAIRO 3245, 3248, 3249
B. DAO TEL AVIV 1992 DTG 270106Z OCT 73
C. GENEVA 5682

1. AS I SEE IT, FATE OF THIRD ARMY APPEARS CENTRAL TO OUR HOPES OF CREATION OF STABLE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH WHICH IN TURN IS BASIC TO AVOIDING FURTHER SERIOUS STRAINS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH, WITH RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL INPUTS, IT BASIS FOR ANY HOPES FOR MOVING PARTIES TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ISRAELIS DO NOT HIDE FACT THAT FINAL LIND IN SIEGE CHAIN AROUND THIRD ARMY WAS FORGED BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND CEASEFIRES (FITTING FINAL SUPPLY ROAD ON WEST BANK AND ISOLATING SUEZ CITY). THEY MAINTAIN, OF COURSE, THAT EGYPTIANS WERE (AND ARE) RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING INITIATIVE FOR FIRST (AND OTHER) VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRES(S) AND IDF REACTED IN TIMELY MANNER TO TAKE PRIME OBJECTIVES. SINCE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO TRY TO DETERMINE WHO SHOT FIRST, I WILL LEAVE THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT, AS IT NOT GERMANE TO MAIN THRUST OF THIS MESSAGE.

OCT 20 PM 2:02
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
095716

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars are positioned on either side of the shield.

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08673 271127Z

3. THERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON GOI FROM MILITARY COMMANDERS IN SOUTHERN SUEZ FRONT TO GIVE AUTHORITY TO IDF TO FORCE SURRENDER TO THIRD ARMY ELEMENTS TRAPPED ON EAST BANK, ESTIMATED AT UP TO 30-35,000 MEN, PREFERRED OPTION OF IDF, AS DEP PRIME MIN ALLON INTIMATED TO ME ON OCT 24, HAD BEEN TO "FINISH OFF" ALL EGYPTIAN ARMY ON SUEZ FRONT, A MOVE WHICH HE RECOGNIZED WAS TEMPTING MILITARILY BUT UNWISE POLITICALLY FROM INTERNATIONAL POINT OF VIEW. THIS OPTION, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN EXPLICITLY REJECTED BY GOI WHEN IT ACCEPTED SC RES. 338, AND CEASEFIRE. IF, HOWEVER, EGYPTIAN SECOND ARMY INDEED JOINS FRAY TO EXTRICATE TRAPPED THIRD ARMY--AS IDF APPARENTLY BELIEVES IS LIKELIHOOD--THEN THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES AND CEASEFIRE WILL GO UP IN SMOKE, WITH UNPREDICTABLE WIDER IMPLICATIONS.

4. WE DO NOT KNOW HERE IF GOI HAS ORDERED IDF QUIETLY TO SQUEEZE THIRD ARMY INTO SURRENDER (ALLON A FEW DAYS AGO SUGGESTED WITH TRAP SHU, POL AND WATER LINES CUT, EGYPTIANS COULD ONLY LAST UP TO WEEK WITHOUT GIVING UP.), OR IF ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO ALLOW ENOUGH ESSENTIAL, HUMANITARIAN HELP THROUGH TO KEEP THIRD ARMY ALIVE, BUT HELPLESS. WIDELY PUBLICIZED (BY GOI) DISPATCH OF 200 UNITS OF PLASMA FROM ISRAEL TO THIRD ARMY THROUGH RED CROSS CHANNELS, AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE DAYAN'S

RECENT REMARKS (TEL AVIV 8654) AS POLITICAL RESTRAINTS ON IDF MILITARY GOALS OF "DESTRUCTION OF ARAB ARMIES AND THEIR WEAPONS," ARE SUGGESTIONS THAT GOI IS AT LEAST CONSIDERING NOT FORCING SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY, IF INDEED DECISION TO THAT EFFECT NOT ALREADY TAKEN.

5. AS I SEE IT, PERSONNEL OF THIRD ARMY, WHETHER ACTUALLY CAPTURED OR TRAPPED, ARE MOST IMPORTANT CHIPS FOR GOI IN ATTEMPT FORCE EGYPTIANS TO AGREE TO RAPID EXCHANGE OF POWS, A MOST SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE HERE. I GATHER EGYPTIANS ARE STILL DRAGGING THEIR FEET, PROBABLY ON ASSUMPTION ISRAELI POWS WILL FETCH QUITE A PRICE IN CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOI.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08673 271127Z

6. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I RECOMMEND WE MOVE FAST ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS, IF WE HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, TO AVOID WHAT APPEARS TO BE WORST CASE SHORT TERM MILITARY POSSIBILITY IN SOUTH-ENGAGEMENT OF IDF AND EGYPTIAN ARMIES ALL ALONG SUEZ FRONT:

A. GET SOVIETS TO INDUCE EGYPTIANS TO AGREE TO EARLY EXCHANGE OF POWS. (THIS IS CRUCIAL.)

B. GET GOI TO AGREE NOT TO FORCE SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY.

C. GET SOVIET AND EGYPTIANS TO FORCE COMMANDERS OF THIRD AND SECOND ARMIES TO STOP SHOOTING, OR NOT TO START SHOOTING. REASSURANCE THAT GOI NOT TRYING TO OBTAIN SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY IS KEY TO SUCCESS HERE.

7. SINCE THINGS APPEAR TO HAVE THEIR OWN MOMENTUM OUT HERE WITH SUCH POTENTIALLY DIRE CONSEQUENCES, IT IS OBVIOUS ALL OF THE ABOVE SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN MATTER OF HOURS, NOT DAYS. I WOULD APPRECIATE QUICK RESPONSE TO ABOVE. IF I'M WRONG OR IF THINGS ARE ALREADY IN HAND, I WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING. IF I'M RIGHT AND THINGS ARE NOT IN HAND AND WE NEED TO MOVE FAST, PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT I CAN DO. IN THIS RESPECT, I HAVE APPOINTMENT AT 1700 LOCAL (1500Z) WITH FONMIN EBAN.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
33

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 320

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08672 01 OF 02 271204Z

41
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DOD-00 CPAC-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

R 271045Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0297

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8672

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS XX
SUBJ: EXTENT OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IN WORLD

REF: USUN 4008

1. SUMMARY: EBAN HAS EXPRESSED VIEW TO ME THAT ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THIS WAR: WORLD SAW THAT ISRAEL DID NOT START IT AND THAT ARABS FOREWENT POLITICAL OPTION IN DOING SO. OUR IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, IS THAT ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION HAS BEEN STEADILY DETERIORATING SINCE 1967 AND 1973 WAR HAS NOT SLOWED THIS DOWN. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER REASONS FOR DETERIORATION IN SPECIFIC INSTANCES, THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT ISRAEL'S POSTURE ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE HAS BEEN KEY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. THERE IS DISINCLINATION ABROAD TO ACCEPT THESIS THAT MILITARILY POWERFUL COUNTRY LIKE ISRAEL NEEDS LARGE TERRITORIAL BUFFER FOR ITS SECURITY, AND MANY WILL PROBABLY NOT AGREE WITH CURRENT ISRAELI ARGUMENT THAT 1973 WAR IS PROOF OF THIS THESIS. ALTHOUGH I PERSONALLY SO VIEW IT, THUS, IF ISRAELI ATTITUDE ON TERRITORY SHOULD HARDEN IN POSTWAR PERIOD, ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION IS LIKELY TO DETERIORATE FURTHER. THIS WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECT IN TURN ON ATTITUDES OF PARTIES TO ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE AND ON US-ISRAELI RELATIONS, AND I BELIEVE THEREFORE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO SEEK TO PREVENT HARDENING OF AT LEAST PUBLIC POSTURE OF GOI ON TERRITORIAL ISSE. END SUMMARY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08672 01 OF 02 271204Z

2. IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH ME EBAN TOUCHED ON QUESTION OF WORLD RECOGNITION THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT STARTED LATEST WAR AND THAT ARABS' ASSERTION WAS FALSE THAT THEY HAD NO RECOURSE BUT MILITARY MEANS TO PURSUE THEIR MID EAST OBJECTIVES, HAVING EXHAUSTED POLITICAL MEANS. HE MENTIONED-- AS IF TO IMPLY WHOLE WORLD KNEW IT-- THAT EGYPT AND SYRIA HAD BEEN AWARE OF ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT LAST MONTH WITH US TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS IN NOVEMBER, AS SOON AS ISRAELI ELECTION WAS OUT OF WAY, ABOUT HOW TO START A PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD TO MID EAST ACCOMMODATION (REFTEL).

3. I DID NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE SUITABLE OCCASION TO PURSUE MATTER WITH EBAN IN ORDER TO PROBE EXTENT OF HIS CONVICTION ON SUBJECT, BUT I RECEIVED IMPRESSION EBAN BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL POSITION HAD BECOME CONSIDERABLY STRONGER BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD MADE CERTAIN NO ONE COULD ACCUSE ISRAEL OF HAVING STARTED WAR AND BECAUSE ARABS HAD FOREGONE CONCRETE POLITICAL OPTION IN RESORTING TO FORCE.

4. FROM WHAT INDICATIONS WE HAVE HERE, ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION HAS IN FACT BEEN DETERIORATING. FROM END OF 1972 UNTIL START OF WAR, SEVEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES PLUS CUBA BROKE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. DURING WAR, ELEVEN MORE AFRICAN COUNTRIES (INCLUDING ETHIOPIA OCT 23, NIGERIA OCT 25, AND GAMBIA OCT 26) DID SO. THIS MEANS A TOTAL OF 27 NATIONS SINCE JUNE 1967 WAR HAVE SEVERED TIES. FURTHERMORE, BEHAVIOR OF WEST EUROPEANS DURING WAR, FOR WHATEVER REASONS, LEAVES US WITH IMPRESSION THAT ONLY NETHERLANDS STOOD SOLIDLY WITH ISRAEL. ISRAELIS OF COURSE ARE PAINFULLY AWARE OF EROSION OF THEIR POSITION IN AFRICA AND WEAKENING OF THEIR POSITION IN EUROPE. BUT EBAN'S REMARK TO ME LEADS ONE TO WONDER WHETHER GOI HAS MADE REALISTIC TALLY OF ITS POSITION GLOBALLY.

5. ONE OF GROUNDS CITED EVEN AS EARLY AS JUNE 1967, WHEN SOVIET BLOC AND GUINEA BROKE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AT END OF SIX DAY WAR, WAS OSTENSIBLE JUSTICE OF DEMAND OF ARAB STATES NEIGHBORING ISRAEL FOR RESPECT OF THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. ISRAEL'S ALLEGED REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES HAS BECOME KEY GROUNDS CITED BY STATES WHICH HAVE SEVERED TIES WITH ISRAEL IN 1972-1973. IN ALL THESE CYNICAL

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08672 01 OF 02 271204Z

RUPTURES THERE WERE OF COURSE UNSTATED REASONS WHY COUNTRIES CONCERNED BROKE TIES WHICH WERE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH RELATIVE POLITICAL POSITIONS OF PARTIES TO MID EAST DISPUTE. SOME OF SEVERING GOVTS HAVE CONTINUED PRIVATELY TO ACKNOWLEDGE JUSTICE OF ISRAEL'S DEMAND THAT NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDE ISRAELI COMMITMENT ON EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WORLD OVER PAST SIX AND A HALF YEARS HAS COME SERIOUSLY TO QUESTION ISRAELI TERRITORIAL INTENTIONS WHICH LIE BEHIND GOI DEMAND FOR NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENT, AND THAT THIS QUESTIONING HAS BEEN MAJOR FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO DETERIORATION OF ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

SECRET 322

2

41
ACTION SS-30

CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

095887

R 271045Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0298

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8672

EXDIS

7. AS SEEN FROM TEL AVIV VANTAGE POINT, ISRAELI POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS AND WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN LOSING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT BECAUSE OF (A) GROWING BELIEF ABROAD THAT ISRAEL WILL INSIST IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON ACQUISITION OF LARGE PIECES OF TERRITORY AND (B) GROWING REJECTION ABROAD OF DEMANDS PERCEIVED FOR GOI DESIRE FOR TERRITORY. WE SEE NO SIGNS THAT ISRAELI HISTORICAL ATTACHMENT TO PARTS OF WEST BANK IS VIEWED ABROAD WITH ANY SYMPATHY. AS FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY PROBLEMS, ISRAEL'S IMAGE SINCE 1967 HAS BEEN THAT OF THE MOST POWERFUL NATIONAL MILITARILY IN NEAR EAST--PRESUMABLY AN IMAGE SHAKEN A LITTLE BUT NOT SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY LATEST WAR-- AND IT SEEMS THAT PROFOUND SKEPTICISM HAS EMERGED ABROAD ABOUT ISRAEL'S NEED FOR TERRITORY AS SECURITY BUFFER. CURRENT TENDENCY IN ISRAEL IS TO ARGUE THAT 1973 WAR PROVES VALUE OF BUFFER WITH WHICH I PERSONALLY AGREE, GIVEN NATURE OF ARAB SURPRISE ATTACK. THIS MAY MEET COUNTER-ARGUMENT ABROAD TO EFFECT THAT 1973 WAR HAS ACTUALLY SHOWED THAT TERRITORIAL BUFFER OFFERS ISRAEL LITTLE REAL SECURITY.

8. IN ANY EVENT, IF GOI POSITION ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE SHOULD HARDEN IN WAKE OF SUDDEN WAR, WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD ENHANCE SIEGE MENTALITY INSIDE ISRAEL, AND IT WOULD REENFORCE ARAB CONVICTIONS ABOUT NON-LEGITIMACY OF STATE OF ISRAEL. IT WOULD ALSO MAKE ISRAEL EVEN MORE DEPENDENT ON US, WHICH WOULD BE UNHEALTHY DEVELOPMENT IN US-

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

STELLA

24

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08672 02 OF 02 271156Z

ISRAELI RELATIONS FROM BOTH PARTIES' POINT OF VIEW.

9. IN SHORT, IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO LET THIS HAPPEN. DESIRE TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION IN ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION IS THUS STILL ONE MORE REASON FOR US TO WORK HARD TO PREVENT HARDENING OF AT LEAST PUBLIC GOI ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRITORIAL ISSUE IN DAYS AHEAD.

10. THIS MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL OF WHICH I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE. BUT IN CASE IT HAS NOT, I FELT THIS SHOULD BE URGENTLY BROUGHT TO DEPT'S ATTENTION.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DS-1652

201/20/0107

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 614

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08655 261849Z

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
088924

P R 261458Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0293
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8655

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE IS
SUBJ: LEBANON

REF: A. BEIRUT 12470, (B) BEIRUT 12485, (C) TEL AVIV 8578

1. SINCE DEPRIMIN ALLON TOOK INITIATIVE TO CONVEY GOI CONCERN OVER DEFAYEEN ACTIVITIES DURING OUR CONVERSATION ON OCT 24, I RELAYED TO ALLON NEWS IN REFTELS RE REPORTED GOL EFFORTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN. ALLON WAS PLEASED TO HEAR IT APPEARS LEBANESE MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION.

2. I ASKED HIM IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY CHANGE FOR BETTER WITH RESPECT TO FEDAYEEN ATTACKS IN NORTH. HE SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION THERE HAD BEEN FEWER ATTACKS LAST NIGHT THAN IN RECENT PAST. HE WOULD HOWEVER CHECK INTO THIS AND BE BACK TO US LATER TODAY.

3. AT ALLON'S REQUEST, MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN PRIMINGS OFFICE CALLED TO RELAY FOLLOWING INFORMATION: LAST NIGHT AND NIGHT BEFORE IDF AMBUSHED SEVERAL SMALL BANDS OF FEDAYEEN INFILTRATING IN NORTH, DISCOVERED SOME ANTI-VEHICLE MINES WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED IN ROADS AND PICKED UP SOME MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, TWO BAZOOKA SHELLS FIRED FROM LEBANON ON ISRAELI BORDER. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ROCKET ATTACKS

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08655 261849Z

4. GAZIT SAID REDUCED LEVEL OF ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY ABSENCE
ROCKET ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATION, HOPEFULLY WAS SIGN
GOL WAS MAKING INFLUENCE FELT WITH FEDAYEEN. GOI SINCERELY
HOPES THIS WAS CASE, BUT IT STILL TOO EARLY TO TELL.

5. I HAVE JUST SEEN BEIRUT 12485 WITH ITS ENCOURAGING INFO.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

h9/00/0107

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 65 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Small stars flank the central emblem.

Wk

• • •

$$\frac{2}{3}$$

NSAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

004800

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL WQIV 8629

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, SY, IZ, JO, SA
SUBJ: SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE

1. MID EAST AFFAIRS DIRECTOR VERED OF MFA INFOR RD US
OCT 26 THAT WHEN SARG SENT MESSAGE TO UNSYG IN EARLY
HOURS OFNOCT 24 ACCEPTING CEASEFIRE, SARG ALSO SENT
UNSYG CLASSIFIED MESSAGE (WHICH TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
HAS NOT SURFACED) ADDING THAT CEASEFIRE WOULD ALSO
APPLY TO FOREIGN ARAB FORCES ON SYRIAN SOIL.

2. IF THIS IS TRUE, WE CAN NOW UNDERSTAND WHAT ISRAELIS MEANT WHEN THEY SAID SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE DID NOT MEET PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS (REFTEL. PRESUMABLY SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT MEET PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN US VIEW EITHER, SINCE A CEASEFIRE HAS TO BE PUBLIC NMT HALF PUBLIC AND HALF SECRET. WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING DEPT'S POSITION HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO GOI.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08029 261040Z

3. MRS VERED ADDED THAT IRAQIS HAVE CONTINUED REENFORCING
THEIR FORCES IN SYRIA AND THAT EVERYTHING SHE SAID YESTERDAY
(REFTEL) IN DESCRIBING SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION STILL
APPLIES.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

99/00/0107

FORM 1650

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest with a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08614 252001Z

WITHOUT GIVING REASON--OF IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT, PREFERRING TO REMAIN IN THE CITY.

3. AS CONCERNS NORTH, EVRON SAID GOI HAD APPROVED UNTSO DEPLOYMENTS ALONG NEW LINE.

4. COMMENT: GOI OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES SENIOR UNTSO COMMAND LEVELS ARE FULLY SATISFIED WITH ISRAELI COOPERATION RE DEPLOYING UNTSO TEAMS TO SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ FRONT AND ELSEWHERE. INDEED, GOI OFFER OF HELICOPTERS SHOULD REMOVE DOUBTS RE GOI WILLINGNESS TO GET TEAMS TO SUEZ FRONT FAST.

5. MY GUESS IS THAT BEST EXPLANATION FOR WHATEVER DELAYS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN DEPLOYING TEAMS IN GENERAL IS SHORT TIME UNTSO HAS HAD TO GET ORGANIZED (JERUSALEM 1187 NOTES THAT AS OF AFTERNOON OF OCT 23 UNTSO HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM UN HQTRS "TO LIE LOW AND TAKE NO INITIATIVE TO INSERT ITSELF IN CURRENT CEASEFIRE SITUATION.") AS CONCERNS SOUTHERN SUEZ SECTOR, TIME PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BY FACT FIGHTING DID NOT STOP UNTIL LAST EVENING. HOPEFULLY, TEAMS CAN NOW BE PUT INTO PLACE EVERYWHERE AT ACCELERATED PACE.

KEATING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DS-1652

49/00/010

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET **162**

2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08578 250100Z

73

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE=00 NSAE=00 /031 W

069924

O 242145ZGOCY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHCOSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 267
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8578

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALLON

REF: BEIRUT 12333

1. PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH MRS MEIR TODAY, I HAD ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES WITH DEPRIMIN ALON IN CABINET ROOM ADJOINING PM'S OFFICE.

2. ALLON DESCRIBED SITUATION IN SOUTH ALONG LINES ALREADY REPORTED WITH EMPHASIS ON FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT TAKEN INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE CEASEFIRE. HE REITERATED GOI POSITION THAT EGYPTIANS INITIATED MASSIVE VIOLATION OF CEASEFIRE TODAY IN ORDER MAKE SUPREME - AND HOPEFULLY LAST - EFFORT BREAK IDF SEIGE OF THIRD ARMY. HE NOTED HOW TEMPTING IT WOULD BE FOR ISRAEL TO GIVE IDF THE 3-5 MORE DAYS REQUIRED ALONG SUEZ FRONT TO WIN A MILITARY VICTORY OVER EGYPT OF TRULY ASTOUNDING PROPORTIONS - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE EGYPTIAN ARMY. WHEN ONE RECALLS WHAT THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS IN SOUTH WHEN FIGHTING BEGAN, SUCH A

MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT WOULD BE EVEN MORE REMARKABLE. DESPITE THE TEMPTATION, HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE GOI MEANT IT WHEN IT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08578 250100Z

TOLK THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE. ISRAEL HAS NOT AND WILL NOT, THEREFORE, TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT OR ANYWHERE ELSE.

3. REFERRING TO THE TEMPTATION IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS TO FINISH OFF THE EGYPTAIN ARMY, ALLON SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THIS PROBABLY WAS THE WRONG THING TO DO FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ANY HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE NOTED IT WAS PROBABLY A GOOD THING EGYPTIANS COULD STILL CLAIM SOME SEMBLANCE OF VICTORY IN HAVING CROSSED THE CANAL AND, AT LEAST IN SOME PLACES, STAYED THERE AND ALL THIS IMPLIED FOR EGYPTIAN PRIDE AND HONOR.

4. ALLON THEN TURNED TO THE NORTHERN FRONT POINTING OUT IT WAS TOTALLY QUIET, "NOT A SINGLE SHOT." HE NOTED THIS SHOULD BE CONVINCING

EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL ONLY SHOOTS BACK WHEN SOMEONE ELSE VIOLATES THE CEASEFIRE AND SHOOTS FIRST.

5. ALLON DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE CAPTURE OF MT. HERMON, NOTING THAT BY CAPTURING THE LAST SYRIAN HELD POST ISRAEL HAD TOTAL CONTROL OF THIS MOST STRATEGIC POSITION. IN THIS RESPECT HE ALSO NOTED THE CAPTURED SYRIAN POSITION IS ASTRIDE THE "ARAFAT TRAIL," A FAVORITE INFILTRATION ROUTE OF THE FEDAYEEN FROM LEBANON TO ISRAEL.

6. ALLON THEN EXPANDED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE FEDAYEEN BY STATING "AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE TAKING CARE OF YOUR FRIENDS AS WELL," MAKING CLEAR HE WAS REFERRING TO GOI DECISION TO ABSTAIN FROM ATTACKS ON JORDAN OR RETALIATION AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT ON BEHALF OF MRS. MEIR HE WAS RECEIVING THE DELEGATIONS OF CIVILIANS FROM THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE NORTH THAT ARE UNDER ATTACK BY THE FEDAYEEN. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE GOI TO TELL THESE PEOPLE WHY THE IDF IS NOT PROTECTING THEM, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT EVEN SYRIA HAS ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GOI ACTIONS AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO DATE HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO AMBUSHES AND OTHER ACTIONS TOTALLY ON ISRAELI SOIL. ISRAEL, HE NOTED, UNDERSTOOD THE DILEMMA. LEBANON CLAIMS IT IS TOO WEAK TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN; ISRAEL COULD VERY EASILY CONTROL THEM BY SENDING A NUMBER OF SMALL UNITS INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS, OF

SECRET

REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08578 250100Z

COURSE, WOULD CREATE ANOTHER POLITICAL CRISIS WHICH ISRAEL SINCERELY WISHES TO AVOID. HE STRESSED THAT HE HOPED THE LEBANESE HAD BY NOW LEARNED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MRS. MEIR'S WORDS AND BY THIS HE MEANT THE REFERENCE TO THE FEDAYEEN IN HER REMARKS TO THE KNESSET YESTERDAY. THIS, HE STRESSED, WAS A CLEAR WARNING THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO ACT OR THE GOI WOULD BE FORCED TO BY DOMESTIC PRESSURES.

7. I TOOK THIS OCCASION TO SUMMARIZE THE MANY EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE WITH THE GOL, STRESSING AMBASSADOR BUFFUM'S LATEST HIGH LEVEL CONVERSATIONS IN BEIRUT, DRAWING LIBERALLY ON BEIRUT'S 12333. ALLON WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THE INFORMATION THAT PRESIDENT FRANGI HAD CONVOKED THE LEBANESE MILITARY WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS AND HE SAID "I HOPE THIS WILL PRODUCE THE REQUIRED RESULT." I TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE NOT, OF COURSE, IN A POSITION TO GUARANTEE ANYTHING BUT IT SEEMED CLEAR LEBANESE WERE TRYING AND UNDERSTOOD THE CEASEFIRE WAS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT IN SITUATION. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE SURE GOL UNDERSTOOD SIGNIFICANCE OF MRS. MEIR'S COMMENTS BEFORE KNESSET.

8. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM IS PERFECTLY FREE TO DRAW ON RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THIS TELEGRAM IN CONVERSATIONS WITH GOL ON PROBLEM OF NECESSITY CONTROL FEDAYEEN.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

000000
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

617
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 684

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08457 221019Z

15
ACTION SS-30

2

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
047761

Z 221002Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0226

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8457
EXDIS
DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S AIRPLANE

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP(HENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S VISIT

REF: TEL AVIV 8451

1. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY MFA THAT PRIMIN MEIR
HAS HAD GOOD NIGHT SLEEP AND JUST NOW FOCUSED ON PROPOSED
ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT. SHE CONFIRMS GENERAL OUTLINE INFO
IN REFTEL WITH FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS:

(1) PRIMIN WISHES TO SEE SECRETARY ALONE
AFTER ARRIVING AT GUEST HOUSE.

(2) SHE WILL THEN HOST A WORKING LUNCH. ON ISRAELI
SIDE WILL BE PRIMIN MEIR, FUNMIN EBAN,
DEFENSE MINISTER DAYAN, DEPUTY PRIMIN ALLON AND
MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRECTOR OF PRIMIN'S OFFICE WHO
WILL FUNCTION AS NOTE TAKER.

2. ON OUR SIDE I RECOMMEND SECRETARY, MYSELF, SISCO AND
ATHERTON AND MYSELF. FIFTH MEMBER PROBABLY SHOULD BE NOTE TAKER
WHO CAN BE DESIGNATED EITHER FROM THIS MISSION OR SECRETARY'S
PARTY.

3. MFA PLANS HOST LUNCH FOR REMAINDER OF PARTY AT AIRPORT.

4. WE HAVE ALERTED EBAN THROUGH MFA THAT, AFTER GREETING
CREMONY, SECRETARY MIGHT FIND IT DESIRABLE FOR HIM AND
ME TO HAVE A FEW MOMENTS ALONE AT PLANESIDE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08457 221019Z

KEATING

NOTE BY DC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. KURZE, 10/22/73.
NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
69/00/019

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 24 PM 5:22
CWK

SECRET 111

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08655 241527Z

50/54
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 CIAE-00 /031 W

065120

Z O 241438Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0263
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8655

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: HOSTILITIES ON SUEZ FRONT

1. DEPDIRGEN, MFA, EVRON PASSED TO US THE FOLLOWING
CONCERNING SITUATION ON SUEZ FRONT AS OF 1600 LOCAL (DETAILS
OF THE ACTION WILL, AS USUAL, BE FORWARDED THROUGH DATT CHANNELS).

2. ACCORDING TO EVRON, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE AGAIN INITIATED
HOSTILITIES IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR
WITH THE AIM OF IMPROVING THEIR TERRITORIAL HOLDINGS ON THE EAST
BANK AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, BREAKING THE SIEGE OF THE THIRD
ARMY ON EAST BANK BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY
TO JELL. AS CONCERNS THIS OPERATION, EVRON
CLAIMS THAT THE EGYPTIAN FORCES ARE ATTEMPTING TO BREAK OUT TO
THE EAST AND OTHER EGYPTIAN FORCES ARE ATTACKING THE ISRAELI
FORCES FROM THE WEST. EVRON ALSO SAID THAT EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT
WERE PARTICIPATING IN THESE ENGAGEMENTS.

3. EVRON CONCLUDED THAT THE GOI BELIEVES THAT, GIVEN THE
NATURE OF THE EGYPTIAN ATTACKS ON THE GROUND AND THE USE OF
EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT, THE HOSTILITIES WERE NOT INITIATED BY THE
LOCAL COMMANDER ON THE GROUND BUT THAT THIS IS A COORDINATED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRETARY'S AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08655 241527Z

OPERATION UNDER ORDERS OF THE EGYPTIAN GHQ IN CAIRO. HE
ADDED THAT THE IDF WOULD "DO WHAT IT HAD TO DO" UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. DATT CURRENTLY BEING GIVEN SPECIAL BRIEFING BY GEN ZEIRA
IDF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF.

5. PRIMIN HAS ASKED TO SEE ME 5:30 PM LOCAL.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

OL/20/019

RM 06-1050

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is a circular emblem. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. The eagle holds an olive branch in its right talon and a bundle of arrows in its left. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of thirteen stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are inscribed in a circle around the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" around the bottom. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 OCT 24 PM 5:22 *WH*

SECRET 724

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08552 241219Z

53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-03 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE=00 NSAE=00 USSS=00 /031 W

063457

O P 241122Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0254
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8552

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS IS
SUBJ: CEASEFIRE

1. WE CONTACTED DEPDIRGEN, MFA, EVRON THIS MORNING TO ASK FOR AUTHROITATIVE GOI VIEW ON STATUS OF CEASEFIRE WHICH WAS TO HAVE GONE INTO EFFECT AT 0700 LOCAL. EVRON CALLED BACK AND PASSED ON FOLLOWING WHICH IS GOI VIEW OF SITUATION AT ABOUT 1200 LOCAL:

A. THE NORTH IS QUIET WITH NO REPORTS OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS.

B. BASED ON REPORTS FROM THE SUEZ FRONT, THE GOI HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THE FIRING AND FIGHTING IS DYING OUT ALONG ENTIRE FRONT. THE ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION IS AROUND SUEZ WITH WHERE SPORADIC FIRING IS CONTINUING. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE GOI TO ASSESS WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SPORADIC SHOOTING FROM THE EGYPTIAN SIDE, IT COULD JUST BE LOCAL COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND WHO ARE GIVING ORDERS TO FIRE. BUT EVEN IN THIS SECTOR, THERE IS NOTHING IN SITUATION WHICH LEADS GOI TO BELIEVE SHOOTING WILL CONTINUE, ESCALATE OR THREATEN THE GENERAL CEASEFIRE.

2. EVRON NOTED, OF COURSE, THAT THE FOREGOING DOES NOT MEAN

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08552 241219Z

THE GOI IS CONFIDENT IT KNOWS "WHAT WILL HAPPEN" BUT AT PRESENT
GOI IS REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT CEASEFIRE SHOULD HOLD. IN
ANSWER TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION, EVRON NOTED THAT BEFORE RELAYING
THIS INFORMATION HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER'S
OFFICE AND "WITH THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY" IN THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE I ASSUME HE MEANS DAYAN.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR

M 05-1652

0107
DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 72 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

66H
TELEGRAM

SECRET 653

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08451 220925Z

15
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
***** 047523

Z 220852Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0223

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8451

EXDIS

DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S AIRPLANE

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S TRAVEL

1. DELIGHTED AT YOUR VISIT AND FOLLOWING IS CURRENT STATUS OF
ARRANGEMENTS AS OF 9:45AM LOCAL:

2. SECRETARY AND PARTY WILL BE MET BY FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN,
CHIEF OF PROTOCOL SHOHAM, DIRGEN MFA KIDRON AND DEPDIRGEN
EVRON. DCM AND I WILL ALSO BE AT PLANESIDE. AFTER BRIEF
GREETING SECRETARY WILL GO IN EBAN'S CAR TO MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER. MY CAR, SECURITY CAR AND THREE STAFF CARS
WILL ALSO BE AT PLANESIDE. I ASSUME SISCO WILL ACCOMPANY ME
TO MEETING WITH PRIMIN.

3. PRIMIN HAS ARRANGED MEETING AT GOVERNMENT GUEST HOUSE
ABOUT 20 MINUTES FROM AIRPORT. GUEST HOUSE IS ALMOST EQUI-
DISTANT FROM AIRPORT, EMBASSY AND MY RESIDENCE.

4. GOI PREPARED TO SET UP OPEN LINE TO WHITE HOUSE AS REQUESTED
IN PICKERING TELCON WITH OPS CENTER. WHERE SHOULD THE LINE
BE LOCATED? AT PRIMIN'S GUEST HOUSE, AT EMBASSY OR MY
RESIDENCE? PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST SO NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS
CAN BE MADE.

5. WIRE SERVICES REPORT FROM WASHINGTON THAT SECRETARY FLYING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08451 220925Z

TO TELAVIV. WE ARE GETTING CALLS FROM PRESS HERE. UNTIL AND UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY WE WILL NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY WIRE SERVICE REPORTS. AT LAST COUNT OUR LOCAL PRESS CORPS INCLUDED ABOUT 200 AMERICANS OUT OF CLOSE TO 1000 FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS WHO WILL SEEK TO COVER ARRIVAL. GOI STATES THEY WILL BE GUIDED COMPLETELY BY SECRETARY'S DESIRES RE PRESS HANDLING. DOES SECRETARY WISH MEET WITH PRESS IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM? ARE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE STATEMENTS CONTEMPLATED? MY PRESS ATTACHE, LEN LEFKOW, WILL BE AT AIRPORT AND WILL CONTACT MCCLOSKEY ON ARRIVAL. (LOD AIRPORT IS, OF COURSE, SITE OF OUR VERY SUCCESSFUL AND OBVIOUS AIRLIFT. EVEN WITHOUT NEWS OF SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL, THERE IS HIGH CURIOSITY AMONG PRESS ABOUT WHAT'S GOING ON OUT THERE.)

6. DO WE ASSUME ALL MEMBERS OF PARTY NOT PARTICIPATING IN TALKS AT GUEST HOUSE ARE PLANNING TO REMAIN AT AIRPORT? WE ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR RESTAURANT/LOUNGE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE. IN THIS RESPECT, CAN I ASSUME THAT SECRETARY AND IMMEDIATE PARTY WILL HAVE LUNCH AND DINNER ON AIRCRAFT?

7. EMBASSY IS, OF COURSE, OPEN AND OPERATING WITH 24 HOURS COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD ANY MEMBERS OF PARTY WISH TO COME TO EMBASSY AND WORK.

8. MFA HAS PUT US IN TOUCH WITH APPROPRIATE GOI SECURITY OFFICE. GOI WILL ASSURE TIGHT SECURITY THROUGHOUT VISIT.

9. WE HAVE JUST INFORMED GOI AND IAF OF 10:17 DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW. WOULD APPRECIATE FLIGHT INFO REQUIRED TO OBTAIN LANDING CLEARANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. DEFENSE ATTACHE COL FORSMAN WILL BE AT PLANESIDE TO COORDINATE WITH AIRCRAFT COMMANDER.

10. GOI HAS ESTABLISHED OPEN LINES FROM AIRPORT AND GUEST HOUSE TO WHITE HOUSE. WE ARE ESTABLISHING ONE FROM EMBASSY ALSO.
KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EL/00/010

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 74 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two stars are positioned on the left and right sides of the seal.

TELEGRAM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08441 212110Z

2. EBAN REPLIED THE ISRAELIS HAD SHOWN COMMENDABLE RESTRAINT IN THUS FAR NOT MOUNTING ANY RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. HE NOTED, IN THIS RESPECT, THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD "DECLARED WAR" AND JORDANIAN TROOPS WERE ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN COMBAT IN SYRIA, THE GOI HAD NO INTENTION OF "OPENING A FRONT ON JORDANIAN TERRITORY." IT IS CLEAR, THEREFORE, HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT JUST BLOODTHIRSTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HOPED THAT OUR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OCCASION TO IMPRESS UPON THE GOL THAT NEITHER LEBANON NOR THE FEDAYEEN SHOULD COUNT ON ISRAELI PREOCCUPATION IN THE SINAI OR SYRIA AS IMPEDING ANY MILITARY OPERATION THE GOI SHOULD DECIDE TO MOUNT AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN. HE CONTINUED THAT THE GOL SHOULD CONSIDER THE LACK OF A GOI MOVE AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO DATE AS GOOD FORTUNE, BUT THEY SHOULD BE WARNED NOT TO TRY "TO PUSH THEIR LUCK TOO FAR." EBAN CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE APPRECIATED HAVING MY LATEST VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY WERE GIVEN CONSIDERATION.

3. COMMENT. EBAN DID NOT AND WAS OBVIOUSLY UNABLE TO GIVE ANY GUARANTEES RE FUTURE GOI POLICY TOWARDS THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. TO JUDGE FROM HIS COMMENTS, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT AT PRESENT THE GOI HAS NOT GIVEN ITS TROOPS ANY MARCHING ORDERS. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM MIGHT WISH TO RELAY THE SUBSTANCE OF EBAN'S REMARKS TO THE GOL AT A HIGH LEVEL AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OCCASION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO MAKE SURE THE GOL UNDERSTANDS, DESPITE WHAT MAY EMANATE FROM DAMASCUS AND CAIRO, THAT ISRAEL IS FAR FROM BEING ON THE ROPES MILITARILY. IF, HOWEVER, THINGS CONTINUE AS THEY ARE WITH THE 15-20 NORTHERN VILLAGES COMING UNDER FEDAYEEN ATTACK, ROCKET OR OTHERWISE, EBAN GAVE THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THE IDF WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE ACTION BECAUSE - AS HE PUT IT - THE ISRAELI PEOPLE - PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE NORTH - "WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND" WHY THEIR GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROTECT THEM.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SL/EO/0109

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central shield.

SECRET 434

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

P 201520Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0202

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8393

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

E O 116521 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: AID TO ISRAEL

1. I ASSUME AT APPROPRIATE TIME WE WILL GET DETAILS HERE OF OUR PROPOSED DOLS 2 BILLION ASSISTANCE GRANT TO ISRAEL. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WHOLEHEARTEDLY CONCUR WITH PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED LINE OF ACTION.

2. I HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT NO ONE IN WASHINGTON IS THINKING OF ADMINISTERING THIS AID THROUGH ANY FORM OF MAAG/MEDT OR OTHER VARIANT WHICH WOULD RESULT IN LARGE-SCALE, AT LEAST SEMI-PERMANENT US MILITARY PRESENCE HERE. AS I BELIEVE IS OBVIOUS TO ALL CONCERNED, EMERGENCY AIRLIFT OPERATION IS GOING VERY SMOOTHLY WITH ISRAELIS ABLE TO TAKE POSSESSION OF AND IMMEDIATELY UTILIZE THE VAST MAJORITY OF ITEMS RECEIVED. WHERE TECHNICAL HELP IS REQUIRED, IT IS BEING PROVIDED BY ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN TECH REPS ON TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT IN COUNTRY. I SEE NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE CURRENT PRACTICES WHICH APPEAR TO BE WORKING VERY WELL. OUR LATEST INFO FROM AIR FORCE CHANNELS SUGGESTS AIRLIFT ABOUT ONE-THIRD COMPLETE. IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE, THEREFORE, AIRLIFT SHOULD TERMINATE AND THE 50 SOME USAF PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN THIS ACTIVITY WILL DEPART.

3. TO DATE, MY DATT AND DAO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ABSORB

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

21 MAY 11 45
22 MAY 11 45
23 MAY 11 45
24 MAY 11 45
25 MAY 11 45
26 MAY 11 45
27 MAY 11 45
28 MAY 11 45
29 MAY 11 45
30 MAY 11 45
31 MAY 11 45
1 JUN 11 45
2 JUN 11 45
3 JUN 11 45
4 JUN 11 45
5 JUN 11 45
6 JUN 11 45
7 JUN 11 45
8 JUN 11 45
9 JUN 11 45
10 JUN 11 45
11 JUN 11 45
12 JUN 11 45
13 JUN 11 45
14 JUN 11 45
15 JUN 11 45
16 JUN 11 45
17 JUN 11 45
18 JUN 11 45
19 JUN 11 45
20 JUN 11 45
21 JUN 11 45
22 JUN 11 45
23 JUN 11 45
24 JUN 11 45
25 JUN 11 45
26 JUN 11 45
27 JUN 11 45
28 JUN 11 45
29 JUN 11 45
30 JUN 11 45
1 JUL 11 45
2 JUL 11 45
3 JUL 11 45
4 JUL 11 45
5 JUL 11 45
6 JUL 11 45
7 JUL 11 45
8 JUL 11 45
9 JUL 11 45
10 JUL 11 45
11 JUL 11 45
12 JUL 11 45
13 JUL 11 45
14 JUL 11 45
15 JUL 11 45
16 JUL 11 45
17 JUL 11 45
18 JUL 11 45
19 JUL 11 45
20 JUL 11 45
21 JUL 11 45
22 JUL 11 45
23 JUL 11 45
24 JUL 11 45
25 JUL 11 45
26 JUL 11 45
27 JUL 11 45
28 JUL 11 45
29 JUL 11 45
30 JUL 11 45
31 JUL 11 45
1 AUG 11 45
2 AUG 11 45
3 AUG 11 45
4 AUG 11 45
5 AUG 11 45
6 AUG 11 45
7 AUG 11 45
8 AUG 11 45
9 AUG 11 45
10 AUG 11 45
11 AUG 11 45
12 AUG 11 45
13 AUG 11 45
14 AUG 11 45
15 AUG 11 45
16 AUG 11 45
17 AUG 11 45
18 AUG 11 45
19 AUG 11 45
20 AUG 11 45
21 AUG 11 45
22 AUG 11 45
23 AUG 11 45
24 AUG 11 45
25 AUG 11 45
26 AUG 11 45
27 AUG 11 45
28 AUG 11 45
29 AUG 11 45
30 AUG 11 45
31 AUG 11 45
1 SEP 11 45
2 SEP 11 45
3 SEP 11 45
4 SEP 11 45
5 SEP 11 45
6 SEP 11 45
7 SEP 11 45
8 SEP 11 45
9 SEP 11 45
10 SEP 11 45
11 SEP 11 45
12 SEP 11 45
13 SEP 11 45
14 SEP 11 45
15 SEP 11 45
16 SEP 11 45
17 SEP 11 45
18 SEP 11 45
19 SEP 11 45
20 SEP 11 45
21 SEP 11 45
22 SEP 11 45
23 SEP 11 45
24 SEP 11 45
25 SEP 11 45
26 SEP 11 45
27 SEP 11 45
28 SEP 11 45
29 SEP 11 45
30 SEP 11 45
31 SEP 11 45
1 OCT 11 45
2 OCT 11 45
3 OCT 11 45
4 OCT 11 45
5 OCT 11 45
6 OCT 11 45
7 OCT 11 45
8 OCT 11 45
9 OCT 11 45
10 OCT 11 45
11 OCT 11 45
12 OCT 11 45
13 OCT 11 45
14 OCT 11 45
15 OCT 11 45
16 OCT 11 45
17 OCT 11 45
18 OCT 11 45
19 OCT 11 45
20 OCT 11 45
21 OCT 11 45
22 OCT 11 45
23 OCT 11 45
24 OCT 11 45
25 OCT 11 45
26 OCT 11 45
27 OCT 11 45
28 OCT 11 45
29 OCT 11 45
30 OCT 11 45
31 OCT 11 45
1 NOV 11 45
2 NOV 11 45
3 NOV 11 45
4 NOV 11 45
5 NOV 11 45
6 NOV 11 45
7 NOV 11 45
8 NOV 11 45
9 NOV 11 45
10 NOV 11 45
11 NOV 11 45
12 NOV 11 45
13 NOV 11 45
14 NOV 11 45
15 NOV 11 45
16 NOV 11 45
17 NOV 11 45
18 NOV 11 45
19 NOV 11 45
20 NOV 11 45
21 NOV 11 45
22 NOV 11 45
23 NOV 11 45
24 NOV 11 45
25 NOV 11 45
26 NOV 11 45
27 NOV 11 45
28 NOV 11 45
29 NOV 11 45
30 NOV 11 45
31 NOV 11 45
1 DEC 11 45
2 DEC 11 45
3 DEC 11 45
4 DEC 11 45
5 DEC 11 45
6 DEC 11 45
7 DEC 11 45
8 DEC 11 45
9 DEC 11 45
10 DEC 11 45
11 DEC 11 45
12 DEC 11 45
13 DEC 11 45
14 DEC 11 45
15 DEC 11 45
16 DEC 11 45
17 DEC 11 45
18 DEC 11 45
19 DEC 11 45
20 DEC 11 45
21 DEC 11 45
22 DEC 11 45
23 DEC 11 45
24 DEC 11 45
25 DEC 11 45
26 DEC 11 45
27 DEC 11 45
28 DEC 11 45
29 DEC 11 45
30 DEC 11 45
31 DEC 11 45

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08393 201554Z

ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF COORDINATING AIRLIFT HERE AND PERFORM THESE AND NORMAL DAO DUTIES IN TIME OF CRISIS IN OUTSTANDING MANNER. I HAVE NO DOUBTS THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE. WHEN THE EMERGENCY NATURE OF OUR RESUPPLY EFFORT IS OVER THE DAO SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY HERE FOR COORDINATION OF THE MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM.

4. TO RECAPITULATE, I WOULD APPRECIATE ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON OUR GRANT PROGRAM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT THE MAJOR PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE YOU WITH AMMUNITION IN CASE YOU HAVE TO SHOOT DOWN ANY ILL CONCEIVED MAAG-TYPE IDEAS THAT MIGHT RAISE THEIR UGLY HEADS.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

92/20/0107

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem with a star. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 387

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08391 201535Z

73
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE=00 NSA=00 1031 W

P 201520Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0200

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8391

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR AIRLIFT

REF: TEL AVIV 8319

1. THERE ARE CURRENTLY TOTAL OF 56 USAF PERSONNEL ON TDY IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF AIRLIFT OPERATION. THIS INCREASE IS RESULT OF ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OFF-LOADING SPECIALISTS.

2. NUMBER WILL BE REDUCED TO 51 ON OCT 22 BY DEPARTURE (AT REQUEST OF DATT TO USAF) OF 5 MEMBERS OF USAF DOCUMENTARY TEAM. THIS TEAM WILL LEAVE BEHIND ONE STILL CAMERAMAN AND ONE MOTION PICTURE CAMERAMAN TO DOCUMENT AIRLIFT TO ITS TERMINATION.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE 5 RESIDENT US CONTRACOR REPS NOTED IN REFTEL --2 FROM MC/D AND 3 FROM GE-- THERE ARE AN ADDITIONAL 11 REPS ON TEMPORARY DUTY, ASSISTING THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE TO ABSORB AND PREPARE TO USE CERTAIN SYSTEMS RECEIVED ON AIRLIFT. EXACT LENGTH OF THEIR STAY IS UNKNOWN, BUT DATT ESTIMATES THAT NONE SHOULD BE HERE LONGER THAN TWO WEEKS. CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR REPS NOW NUMBER 16, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

A. RESIDENT

SECRET

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08391 201535Z

1 -- MCD/D
3 -- GE
5
8. TEMPORARY
7 -- HUGHES
2 -- MCD/D
1 -- RATHEON
1 -- NORTHUP
11

4. AS OF 12 NOON TODAY, THEREFORE, TOTAL NUMBER OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN ISRAEL AS RESULT OF AIRLIFT IS 67-56 MILITARY (SOON TO BE 51) AND 11 CIVILIAN.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

LL/eo/019

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

TELEGRAM

SECRET 994

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08380 201108Z

21:11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 7031 W

O 201038Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0195

SECRET TEL AVIV 8380

ENDIS:

EQ 11652: XGD8-2
TAGS: PINR IS US
SUBJ: PROTECTION OF US-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP

REF: STATE 208585

1. DAILY DEPARTMENTAL TELEGRAM RECEIVED THIS MORNING, IN DESCRIBING EGYPTIAN FRONT, REFERS TO ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY IDF SPOKESMAN AT A NOON BRIEFING. CONTENT OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT COINCIDES WITH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GIVEN EXCLUSIVELY TO MY DATT AT 1200GMT YESTERDAY IN STRICT CONFIDENCE WHICH.

TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, ISRAELIS HAVE NOT RELEASED TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT, MUCH LESS TO PUBLIC.

2. OUR EFFORTS TO HEAR IF THERE WAS IDF PRESS BRIEFING YESTERDAY TO WHICH REFTEL COULD BE REFERRING LEADS US TO CONCLUSION THERE WAS NOT, AND THAT REFTEL WAS ERRONEOUSLY BADLY DRAFTED. IF THIS IS CORRECT, I CANNOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY POTENTIAL DAMAGE WHICH DRAFTING ERRORS OF THIS KIND IN A CABLE GOING TO ALL OUR POSTS WORLDWIDE CAN CAUSE TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR MANY RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOI.

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest with stars and stripes. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are written in a semi-circle above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is written in a semi-circle below it. Two small stars are positioned on the left and right sides of the seal.

614

TELEGRAM

SECRET 842

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08375 200934Z

66
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

035252

P R 200859Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0193
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8375

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: AEMR

SUBJ: E AND E PLANNING

REF: A) STATE 207762, B. TEL AVIV 8199, C) BEIRUT 12310

1. AS OF THIS MORNING, NO CHANGE IN ASSESSMENT SINCE LAST REPORT (REFTEL B).

2. I CANNOT ANSWER THE QUESTION POSED IN BEIRUT 12310. I DO NOT THINK THE ISRAELIS CAN EITHER, SINCE SO MUCH DEPENDS ON FUTURE COURSE OF WAR AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY ISRAELIS FROM FEDAYEEN ATTACKS LAUNCHED FROM LEBANON. AT THIS POINT, I BELIEVE OUR BEST COURSE IS TO CONTINUE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS TO SAY THE RIGHT THINGS TO THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE IN HOPES OF REDUCING CHANCES OF SUCH ACTION BY GOI.

KEATING

NOTE BY OCT: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED/ PER S/S-O MR. PERKINS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

WH
TELEGRAM

SECRET 770

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08374 200936Z

21 15
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

035283

P 200856Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0192

SECRET TEL AVIV 8374

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: MILI, PFOR, MASS, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION MCDONNEL DOUGLAS PERSONNEL

REF: STATE 208333

1. FROM INFO IN REFTEL, PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTED MCD/D
TEAM SEEMS TO US TO BE COST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF ASSISTING
ISRAELI AIR FORCE.

2. RE AUSPICES, DIRECT COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN
GOI AND MCD/D SEEMS TO BE MOST UNCOMPLICATED WAY TO
HANDLE THIS. IN ADDITION, WE WONDER IF USG DESIRES
INCREASE NUMBERS OF MILITARY RELATED PERSONNEL WHO ARE IN
ISRAEL UNDER US OFFICIAL UMBRELLA. WE SEE SOME MERIT IN KEEPING
NUMBER DOWN, PARTICULARLY IF RESUPPLY EFFORT IS EXPECTED
TO LAST SOME TIME.

3. WE ASSUME, OF COURSE, THAT REGARDLESS OF AUSPICES,
THIS GROUP WOULD BE BRIEFED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE ON NEED TO
KEEP LOW PROFILE AND TO FOLLOW EMBASSY GUIDANCE TO THIS
EFFECT. AS IS CURRENTLY THE CASE, MY DATT WILL BE THE
POINT OF LIAISON FOR THIS MISSION.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 872

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08359 191927Z

2

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

028360

O 191820Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 189

SECRET TEL AVIV 8359

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAEL AND THE WAR AFTER TWO WEEKS

1. AS WE HAVE REPORTED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL OVER PAST FEW DAYS, THE ISRAELIS RECOVERED QUICKLY FROM INITIAL SHOCK OF ARAB ATTACKS ON OCT 6 AND SUBSEQUENT SHOCK OF RECONCILING THEMSELVES TO THE FACT THAT VICTORY THIS TIME OVER THE ARABS WILL COST A HEAVY PRICE IN ISRAELI XLOOD. EVIDENCE OF THIS RECOVERY IS ALL AROUND US HERE AS IS THE OBVIOUS ISRAELI DETERMINATION TO STAY THE COURSE IN THIS WAR, WHATEVER THAT MAY MEAN. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT CENTRAL TO THIS SITUATION IS THE U.S. DECISION TO MOUNT AN EXPEDITIOUS MILITARY RE-SUPPLY EFFORT.

2. IN ANY EVENT, ECONOMICALLY THE ISRAELIS HAVE ADAPTED TO A LOWER LEVEL OF ESSENTIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY; MOBILIZATION IS BY NO MEANS 100 PERCENT AND NECESSARY SERVICES AND INDUSTRIES ARE BEING MANNED; THERE IS NO ANTICIPATED SHORTAGE OF FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES ESSENTIAL FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION; FINANCIALLY THE GOI IS BUSY RAISING NECESSARY FUNDS ABROAD TO COVER ITS PROJECTED FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS; ABOVE ALL, MILITARILY THE IDF HAS DEMONSTRATED A REMARKABLE ABILITY TO ADAPT ITS METHODS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VAST ARRAY OF NEW SOVIET WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY. IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THIS ADAPTATION HAS NOT BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a star and rays. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08359 191927Z

THE IDF'S AUDACITY AND OFFENSIVE SPIRIT, AS EVENTS IN THE NORTH AND PARTICULARLY IN AND AROUND THE SUEZ CANAL SO CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED.

3. THIS, THEN, IS ISRAEL AFTER TWO WEEKS OF THE WAR ISRAEL DIDN'T EXPECT AND CERTAINLY DIDN'T WANT, BUT INTENDS TO WIN.

4. AS CONCERNS THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF OUR MAGNIFICENT MILITARY RESUPPLY EFFORT HAS STRENGTHENED MRS MEIR AND HER GOVERNMENT DOMESTICALLY AND, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, HAS SERVED TO STILL THE GROWING UNDERCURRENT OF DISSATISFACTION OVER ISRAEL'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE ARAB

THREAT IN TIME AND TO DELIVER PREEMPTIVE STRIKES. THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT THE PUBLIC MOOD IN ISRAEL HAS "SOFTENED" WITH RESPECT TO DEALINGS WITH THE ARABS. INDEED, I WOULD HAZARD A GUESS THAT MOST ISRAELIS ARE AT THIS POINT IN TIME CONVINCED THAT, SINCE IT APPEARS TO THEM THE ARABS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN COMING TO TERMS WITH ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AND RIGHT OF SURVIVE, THERE IS NOT MUCH HOPE FOR A VIABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES. THIS LINE OF REASONING LEADS THE ISRAELIS LOGICALLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ISRAEL, PERHAPS REGRETFULLY, CAN ONLY HOPE TO BUY TIME FOR ITS SECURITY. THIS MEANS THE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION OF ARAB FORCES ON BOTH FRONTS PRIOR TO A CEASEFIRE. ALTHOUGH I CANNOT ESTIMATE WITH AN PRECISION WHAT PROPORTION OF THE GENERAL ISRAELI PUBLIC BELIEVES THIS LINE, IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY A LARGE MAJORITY; WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF CERTAINTY, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE CAN ASSUME 100 PERCENT OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY CURRENTLY FEEL THIS WAY.

5. TO SOME EXTENT, THIS WIDESPREAD FEELING IN ISRAEL MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A CONSTRAINT ON THE DIPLOMATIC FLEXIBILITY OF THE GOI. CONCEIVABLY AND EVEN PROBABLY MRS. MEIR COULD SELL TO HER CABINET AND TO THE COUNTRY A CEASEFIRE UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD NOT INVOLVE THE WHOLESAL DESTRUCTION OF REMAINING ARAB FORCES. I AM NOT, THEREFORE, ATTEMPTING TO PAINT A PICTURE OF PESSIMISM WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN EARLY END TO THE HOSTILITIES, PARTICULARLY IF THE US SHOULD INSIST. I AM SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT AS ISRAEL ENDS ITS SECOND WEEK

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08359 1919271

IN THE WAR WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY THE GENERAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION HERE ON THE GROUND, COUPLED WITH
CURRENT ISRAELI MILITARY POSTURE, WOULD POSE FOR THE GOI IN
ITS ATTEMPTS TO AGREE TO ANY SUCH PROPOSAL.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

'73 OCT 19 PM 9:24

SECRET 263

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08348 191403Z

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

025627

P R 191423Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0185

INFO USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8348

EXDIS

F O :1652: XGDS=3
 TAGS: PFOR, PINR, IS, US
 SUBJECT: US ESTIMATES ON ARAB-ISRAELI WAR APPEARING IN PRESS

1. ISRAELI PRESS OCTOBER 19 CARRIES LENGTHLY AP STORY CLAIMING TO REFLECT DETAILED ESTIMATES OF US DEFENSE DEPT ANALYSTS OF HOW MID EAST WAR IS GOING. AP ITEM SAYS ANALYSTS' JUDGMENTS ARE BASED ON REPORTS FROM US MILITARY ATTACHES AND DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

2. AMONG OTHER THINGS, AP ITEM SAYS PENTAGON HAS RECEIVED REPORTS SHOWING ISRAELI LOSSES AS: 3,000 CASUALTIES, 700 TANKS, AND 100 AIRCRAFT. WE NOTE IN STATE 205539 THAT DIA ESTIMATED ISRAELI LOSSES THROUGH OCTOBER 15 AS: 3,300 CASUALTIES, 800 TANKS, AND 95 AIRCRAFT.

3. THE HARM TO OUR CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WHICH CAN COME FROM APPEARANCE OF STORIES LIKE THIS, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE TRACED DIRECTLY TO REPORTS FROM THIS EMBASSY, IS OBVIOUS.

4. I APPRECIATE THAT POSSIBLE SOURCES FOR SUCH LEAKS ARE NUMEROUS, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE APPEAR TO DISTRIBUTE THIS KIND OF INFO VERYWIDELY THROUGH THE BUREAUCRACY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

THE REALITY

29

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08348 191453Z

BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD, WITHOUT PARTICULARLY STRICT
INTERPRETATION OF PRINCIPLE OF "NEED TO KNOW." I HOPE, HOWEVER,
THAT DEPT WILL MAKE RENEWED EFFORT TO PLUG POTENTIAL
LEAKS OF SUCH SENSITIVE INFO.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

28/00/019

DECLASSIFIED

'73 OCT 19 PM 9:24

WHITE HOUSE - 2
SITUATION ROOM

13
ACTION 95-30

INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

022372

O 191019Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WWAHDC IMMEDIATE 0175
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8334

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PO, XF
SUBJECT: EL AL FLIGHTS VIA LAJES

REF: (A) LISBON 3866 (B) TEL AVIV 8327

1. EVRON CALLED BACK THIS MORNING TO CONFIRM THAT GOI HAD INSTRUCTED MIGDAL NOT RPT NOT TO MAKE APPROACH TO GOP AND IF HE ALREADY HAD MADE APPROACH TO WITHDRAW GOI REQUEST.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 731

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08327 190814Z

15
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

020959

O 190600Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 0173
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8327

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PO, XF
SUBJECT: EL AL FLIGHTS VIA LAJES

REF: STATE 207380

AT 8:30 AM LOCAL WE PASSED INFO REFTEL TO EPHRAIM EVRON,
DEPOIRGEN, MFA. HE CONVEYED IMPRESSION TO US THAT GOI
WOULD ACCEDE TO OUR REQUEST THAT THEY NOT RPT NOT APPROACH
PORTUGUESE. AT ANY RATE, OUR DEMARCHE WILL AT LEAST
RESULT IN A REVIEW OF SUBJECT BY GOI POLICY-MAKERS.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 924

2

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

017069

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8319

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: AIRLIFT - ALL SYSTEMS GO

THE AIRLIFT IS IN FULL SWING AND OPERATING SMOOTHLY. I PAID VISIT TO LOD ON OCT 16 TO INSPECT OPERATION AND WAS MOST IMPRESSED BY ALL PHASES BOTH FROM US AND ISRAELI SIDES. SHOULD NOTE THAT MOSHE DAYAN AND MRS. MEIR PAID SUBSEQUENT VISITS TO CONVEY PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO OUR CREWS. (COMMENT, SHE HAD SHOWN TREMENDOUS FASCINATION WITH MY DESCRIPTION OF AIRLIFT IN OUR MEETING.)

2. I NOTE FROM TODAY'S WIRELESS FILE AND TELS REPORTING PRESS BRIEFINGS AT PENTAGON AND DEPT THAT INEVITABLE QUESTIONS ARE BEGINNING TO SURFACE CONCERNING THE PRESENCE AND NATURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND IN ISRAEL SUPPORTING THE AIRLIFT. INDEED, ONE REPORTER AT PENTAGON RAISED QUESTION IN TERMS OF PRESENCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM AND I PRESUME HE WAS REFERRING TO CAMBODIAN MODEL.

3. WE ARE, OF COURSE, GETTING PRESSURE FROM OUR CORPS OF ABOUT 200 U.S. CORRESPONDENTS WHO WANT TO FILM OR GET DETAILS ABOUT AIRLIFT. WE ARE CAREFUL, OF COURSE, TO STAY COMPLETELY IN STEP WITH OFFICIAL GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON.

4. IT WORTH NOTING THAT CRAIG WHITNEY, NEW YORK TIMES, HAS TODAY TWICE QUERIED MY PRESS ATTACHE ON POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF "AMERICAN PERSONNEL" IN FIGHTING ON NORTHERN FRONT. WHITNEY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest with a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08319 190022Z

BASING HIS QUERIES ON HIS ALLEGATION THAT HE OVERHEARD "AMERICAN VOICES" ON IDF RADIO IN THE GOLAN AREA. PRESS ATTACHE EMPHATICALLY DENIED ANY SUCH INVOLVEMENT IN FIGHTING. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTION, PRESS ATTACHE DENIED ANY U.S. RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT WERE CARRYING MATERIAL DIRECTLY TO FRONT. AT LAST READING, WHITNEY STILL DIGGING AROUND TOWN IN THIS PARTICULAR HOLE, DESPITE OUR ATTEMPTS TO SET HIM STRAIGHT. AS TIME GOES ON, AND IN ABSENCE ANY OFFICIAL INFO FROM USG CONCERNING NATURE AND NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED, WE CAN EXPECT MORE OF THESE FLIGHTS OF FANCY BY THE PRESS HERE.

5. AS DEPT IS AWARE, MY DATT IS COMMAND CHANNEL FROM THIS MISSION TO THE LOGISTICS/COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND AT LOD. HE HAS JUST PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFO WHICH I BELIEVE WILL BE OF INTEREST:

6. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 41 USAF PERSONNEL AT LOD AIRPORT PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THE AIRLIFT. THESE INCLUDE:

- A. 6 AIRCRAFT MECHANICS TO ASSIST ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES IN PERFORMING ANY MAINTENANCE REQUIRED ON C-54 OR C-141 AIRCRAFT.
- B. 16 COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS WHO PROVIDE REQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.
- C. 2 OFFICERS IN COMMAND ELEMENT.
- D. 10 TECHNICIANS WHO OPERATE THE SPECIALIZED OFF LOADING EQUIPMENT.
- E. A DOCUMENTARY TEAM OF 6 AND A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER WHO ARE RECORDING THE AIRLIFT FOR USAF HISTORICAL PURPOSES. THESE PERSONNEL ARE SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO THE U.S. IN NEXT FEW DAYS WHICH WILL DROP FIGURE FROM 41 TO 34. THESE REMAINING 34 PRESUMABLY WILL RETURN WITH FINAL AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT.

7. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE ARE ALSO U.S. CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES IN ISRAEL WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO BE USG TECHNICIANS, ALBEIT CIVILIAN. PRIOR TO THE AIRLIFT THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 5 SUCH REPS RESIDENT IN ISRAEL -- 2 FROM MACDONNELL-DOUGLAS AND 3 FROM G.E. WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS WE UNDERSTAND THERE WILL BE AN ADDITIONAL 10 OR 11 CONTRACTOR REPS ARRIVING. DURATION OF THEIR STAY UNKNOWN BUT SHOULD BE RELATIVELY SHORT, SINCE ISRAELI TECHNICIANS ARE EXPECTED TO ABSORB NEW INFO QUICKLY.

8. UNLESS THERE IS INFO WE DO NOT HAVE, THEREFORE, OUR SUPPORT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

BECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08319 190022Z

TEAM SHOULD STABILIZE AT 34 USAF PERSONNEL, PLUS 5 CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS PREVIOUSLY IN COUNTRY.

9. THE ORDERS ARE THE SAME, OF COURSE, FOR ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE RESUPPLY EFFORT: HEADS DOWN AND MOUTHS SHUT.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central eagle.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 735

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08295 181104Z

2

72:
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

009184

R 181014Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0163

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 8295

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ECON IS

SUBJECT: MATERIAL SHORTAGES IN ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES

1. AS PART OF OUR CONTINUING EFFORT TO KEEP TRACK OF GENERAL CONDITIONS OF CIVILIAN ECONOMY, COMMERCIAL ATACHE OCT 17 WAS GIVEN TOUR OF ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES (IMI) PLANT NEAR HAIFA THAT PRODUCES LINE OF SHELLS, ARTILLERY AMMUNITION AND AIRPLANE GASOLINE TANK ASSEMBLIES FOR IDF. SUBSEQUENTLY COMATT WAS INVITED TO MEET IMI'S DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES ASHER PELEG.

2. MANAGER OF HAIFA PLANT INDICATED PRODUCTION MANPOWER SHORTAGE HIS BIGGEST PROBLEM. 700-800 FACTORY WORKERS CALLED TO FRONT LINE OUT OF A NORMAL WORK FORCE OF 1400 EMPLOYEES SERIOUSLY CURTAILING PRODUCTION CAPACITY. PLANT HAS HIRED 700 UNSKILLED REPLACEMENTS. TRANSPORT OF RAW MATERIAL AND FINISHED PRODUCT IS NOT PARTICULAR PROBLEM ALTHOUGH SOME DELAYS DUE TO SHORTAGE OF DRIVERS. PRODUCTION MACHINERY AND SPARES IN GOOD SHAPE.

3. RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY NEEDS ARE CRITICAL FOR STEEL, ALUMINUM, BRASS AND COPPER.

4. PELEG, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF ENTIRE IMI COMPLEX ADVISED THAT GENERAL RAW MATERIAL SHORTAGE FOR STEEL, ALUMINUM, BRASS AND COPPER WAS BECOMING CRUCIAL. DELIVERIES NEEDED BY NOVEMBER.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

C

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08295 181104Z

PRINCIPAL SUPPLIERS FOR IMI ARE REPUBLIC STEEL AND US STEEL. PELEG ANGRILY STATED THAT DUE TO BRITISH EMBARGO AND FRENCH POSTURE, ALL FUTURE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLIES, MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT, AND SPARE PARTS NEEDS WILL BE PURCHASED FROM THE US AFTER THE WAR BECAUSE OF US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. PELEG REQUESTED WE DO ALL POSSIBLE TO ASSURE US FIRMS PROMPTLY FILL ORDERS FOR URGENT STEEL NEEDS, PURCHASING DIRECTOR OF IMI HEADING FOR US TO COMPLETE SALES. THEY APPARENTLY CONTEMPLATE DELIVERY BY AIR LINES.

5. PELEG ADDED THAT MANPOWER SHORTAGES ARE SEVERE AND HAVE CRIPPLED ESSENTIAL PRODUCTION AT SOME FACTORIES DUE TO SKILLED PERSONNEL SENT TO FRONT. HOWEVER SOME OF THESE KEY PERSONNEL ARE NOW BEING RECALLED TO THEIR FACTORIES.

6. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO IMI THAT REQUESTS FOR US ASSISTANCE BEING CAREFULLY COORDINATED IN WASHINGTON AND THAT ANY FORMAL REQUESTS SHOULD UTILIZE WASHINGTON CHANNELS.

7. COMMENT: IT IS OBVIOUSLY UP TO GOI TO DECIDE WHETHER IT MAKES SENSE TO FABRICATE ITEMS LIKE SHELLS AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION IN ISRAEL OR ORDER THEM AS FINISHED PRODUCTS FROM US. PACE AND DURATION OF WAR WILL BE KEY FACTOR IN SUCH DECISIONS. KEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DS-1652

48/00/010

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

with

$$\frac{2}{3}$$

13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-71 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAЕ-00 INRE-00 7031 W

116669

C P 161146Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0135
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8199

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR JCS/DOD CUMAC

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJ: E & E PLANNING

REF: STATE 204191

1. OUR RESPONSE TO PARA 2 REFTTEL AS FOLLOWS:

A. NO NEED FOR SUCH A WARNING RE ISRAEL. SHOULD POSTS IN NEIGHBORING ARAB COUNTRIES BELIEVE SUCH A WARNING ADVISABLE, DEPT MIGHT WISH TO INCLUDE ISRAEL IN AREA AFFECTED BY WARNING. IF DECISION IS MADE TO ISSUE WARNING, BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE AN OVERALL AREA WARNING " "COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST" - WITHOUT MENTIONING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08199 161221Z

SPECIFIC COUNTRIES.

B. NO
C. NO

2. RESPONSE TO PARA 3 REFTEL:

A. ESTIMATE NO MORE THAN 2,500 - 5000.

B. NO ACCURAGE FIGURE AVAILABLE. OUR BEST ESTIMATE DURING
NORMAL TIMES WOULD BE 5000. NUMBER OF TOURISTS DOWN, OUR CURRENT
GUESSTIMATE IS ABOUT 3000-3500.

3. COORDINATION WITH CONGEN JERUALEM CONTINUES.
KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR AND COMAC.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

L8/00/010

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 88 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 065

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08003 121449Z

45
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

NSAE-00 /031 W

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

OCT 12 PM 3:46

2

087281

O 121409Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0087

SECRET TEL AVIV 8003

EXDIS

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT IS
SUBJ:
THE ARABS IN EYES OF ISRAELIS

REF: CAIRO 3042

1. WHILE WE HAVE NOT HAD OPPORTUNITY IN PAST FEW DAYS TO LEARN PRIVATE VIEWS OF ISRAELI LEADERSHIP ON SUCH MATTERS, THOSE ISRAELIS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN, INCLUDING ISRAELI MILITARY OFFICERS, SEEM TO BE EXPERIENCING SOME CHANGES IN ATTITUDE TOWARD ARABS WHICH IS PARALLEL TO GROWING EGYPTIAN SELF-CONFIDENCE VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL DESCRIBED IN REFTEL. FOR EXAMPLE, THESE ISRAELIS ARE SAYING THEY MUST RETHINK THEIR PREVIOUS ASSUMPTION ABOUT ARAB CHARACTER, COURAGE, ABILITY TO LEARN MODERN TECHNOLOGY, AND CAPACITY FOR PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND KEEPING OF SECRETS. THEY ARE IMPRESSED BY EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN STRATEGY AND WAR EFFORT SO FAR.

2. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY BODE WELL FOR FUTURE MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS. OUT OF ITS NEWLY GAINED RESPECT FOR ARAB MILITARY PROSESS, ISRAELMAY BE STILL MORE CONCERNED ABOUT SEEKING ENLARGED BORDERS THAN BEFORE, BUT CHANGED ISRAELI ATTITUDE COULD, AT LEAST IN ONE SMALL RESPECT, HELP: ISRAELI REFERENCES TO ARABS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08003 121449Z

IN FUTURE WAY OMIT NOTE OF CONDESCENSION OCCASIONALLY PRESENT IN PAST.

3. THESE ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO BEEN WATCHING CAREFULLY EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN DESCRIPTIONS OF WAR AIMS. THEY HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN OCCASIONAL HINTS (C.F. FBIS KYRENIA 081013Z OCTOBER; TEXT OF SYRIAN RADIO APPEAL TO ISRAELI TROOPS) OUT OF CAIRO AND DAMASCUS THAT OBJECTIVE IS NOT DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL BUT ONLY LIBERATION TERRITORIES ISRAEL OCCUPIED IN 1967. (OUR CONTACTS HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT GOE WAR REPORTS HAVE BEEN CALMER AND ALTHOUGH CONSIDERABLY EXAGGERATED AT LEAST, MORE FACTUAL THAN IN 1967.) THESE ISRAELIS TEND TO DOUBT ARABS HAVE HAD CHANGE OF HEART

ON QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, BUT THEY ARE STRUCK BY POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION LYING BEHIND SUCH MODERATE ARAB APPROACH, AND THEY ALLOW THEMSELVES TINY BIT OF HOPE THAT ARABS HAVE BECOME MORE REALISTIC ABOUT POSSIBLE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

4. AS IN CASE OF EGYPTIAN MOOD DESCRIBED IN REFTEL, ISRAELI ABILITY AT THIS MOMENT TO LOOK AT ARABS WITH NEW RESPECT MAY BE FLEETING, SINCE WARS CAN SO CHARGE ATMOSPHERE WITH EMOTIONS, ESPECIALLY IF CIVILIAN TOLL MOUNTS.

5. USINT CAIRO HAS SUGGESTED (REFTEL) THAT NEWLY SELF-CONFIDENT EGYPT MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO FACE ISRAEL DIRECTLY IN NEGOTIATIONS, HAVE PROVEN ITSELF IN ITS OWN EYES BY SEIZING BARLEV LINE. IF EGYPT WHILE STILL IN POSSESSION OF BARLEV LINE SHOULD COMMUNICATE OFFICIALLY TO ISRAEL A READINESS TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, THIS OF COURSE WOULD HAVE IMPACT ON GOI, BUT IT IS VERY HARD TO GUESS HOW MUCH. IT IS TRUE THAT BEFORE THIS WAR STARTED THERE WERE THOSE IN ISRAEL, EVIDENTLY INCLUDING DAYAN, WHO WERE SPECULATING ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED ISRAELI EFFORT TO REACH INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT UNDER WHICH EGYPT WOULD PLACE MILITARY FORCE EAST OF CANAL AND ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES TO EASTERN SINAI. I AM AFRAID, HOWEVER, FACTS THAT (A) ISRAEL WAS VICTIM OF SURPRISE EGYPTIAN ATTACK OCTOBER 6 AND (B) ISRAEL HAS SUSTAINED HEAVY HUMAN LOSSES AS RESULT OF THIS MAY HAVE CHANGED THE BALLGAME.

6. IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL, BUT OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT EFFECT OF

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right.

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08003 121449Z

WAR ON ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION RE OVERALL TERRITORIAL ISSUE HAS BEEN, SO FAR, TO REINFORCE BOTH MODERATES AND HARDLINERS IN THEIR PREEXISTING VIEWS. THERE ARE INDEED VOICES SAYING WAR HAS PROVED THAT 1967 CEASEFIRE LINES WERE NOT REALLY SECURE AND THAT ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION IN RECENT YEARS WAS WRONG. FOR EXAMPLE, BLOCH, A JOURNALIST GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS DOVISH, WROTE IN DAVAR OCTOBER 10 THAT ONE OF MANY MYTHS EXPLODED BY WAR WAS IDEA THAT 1967 CEASEFIRE LINES WERE MUCH EASIER TO DEFEND THAN 1948 ARMISTIC LINES; ALTHOUGH POPULATIN CENTERS WERE FURTHER FROM 1967 LINES THAN THEY WERE FROM 1948 LINES, BLOCH WROTE THAT THIS HAD BEEN OFFSET BY CONSTANT IMPROVEMENT IN WEAPONS AND ADDED THAT ISRAELI POLITICATIONS IN RECENT YEARS WERE STILL WAGING PALESTINIAN JEWS' CAMPAIGNS OF THE 1930S IN THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD TERRITORIAL ISSUE, BUT MOST VOICES WE HAVE HEARD ARE SAYING THE OPPOSITE, AND SINCE HARDLINERS ON THIS SUBJECT FAR OUTNUMBERED MODERATES ON EVE OF WAR, WE SUSPECT THAT IF ANYTHING THEIR NUMBER IS MUCH GREATER TODAY.

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, TENDENCY IN ISRAEL WILL PROBABLY BE TO INSIST ON DRIVING EGYPTIANS BACK ACROSS CANAL AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES AND NATURE OF ANY EGYPTIAN MESSAGE: PUBLIC UNAMBIGUOUS EGYPTIAN DECLARATION WOULD OF COURSE HAVE GREATER IMPACT THAN MESSAGE THROUGH THIRD PARTY.

8. ONE THING SEEMS CLEAR: IF EGYPTIANS WERE TO CONVEY
READINESS FOR TALKS TO ISRAEL, AND IF AT THAT TIME ISRAEL SHOULD
BE SERIOUSLY TIRING IN ITS WAR EFFORT, EGYPTIAN MESSAGE TO ISRAEL
MIGHT CONCEIVABLY CHANGE SITUATION ENTIRELY AND WOULD BE WORTH
A TRY.
KEATING

KEATING

۱۰۰

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~DC 1652~~

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Small stars flank the central shield.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 378

2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07971 111757Z

45/53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAЕ-00 /026 W

076968

0 111316Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0074
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
WREMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0484
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7971

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY (FOR PARA #1 REFERENCE)

DEPT PASS CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, JCS/DOD, COMAC AND AMCONSUL NAPLES
AT YOUR DISCRETION

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. CONTINUATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI WAR HAS NOT, IN OUR OPINION, CREATED ANY MAJOR CHANGE IN SECURITY STATUS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS THIS AREA. THEREFORE, SUBSTANCE OF TEL AVIV 7809 STILL VALID.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07971 111707Z

2. NO SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS ANTICIPATED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES SHORT OF HIGHLY UNLIKELY EVENT OF CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY THAT WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO STATE OF ISRAEL. EVEN UNDER THESE REMOTE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE PHYSICAL DANGER TO AMERICANS.

3. E & E PLAN CONTINUES TO BE REVIEWED AND WE REMAIN IN A "STANDFAST CONDITON." BELIEVE NO OTHER ACTION REQUIRED AT THIS TIME. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM.
KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: NSAE, TAKE AS ORIGINAL.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

06/00/010

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 072

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07971 111400Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W

074546

O 111316Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0074
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY REHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL STUTTGART PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7971

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, JCS/DOD, COMAC AND AMCONSUL NAPLES
AT YOUR DISCRETION

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUXJFT: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. CONTINUATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI WAR HAS NOT, IN OUR OPINION, CREATED ANY MAJOR CHANGE IN SECURITY STATUS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS THIS AREA. THEREFORE, SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL STILL VALID.

2. NO SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS ANTICIPATED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES SHORT OF HIGHLY UNLIKELY EVENT OF CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY THAT WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO STATE OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRETARY AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DC 16E2

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07971 111400Z

ISRAEL. EVEN UNDER THESE REMOTE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE PHYSICAL DANGER TO AMERICANS.

3. E & E PLAN CONTINUES TO BE REVIEWED AND WE REMAIN IN A "STANDFAST CONDITON." BELIEVE NO OTHER ACTION REQUIRED AT THIS TIME. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH CONGEN JERUDALSM.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

16/00/0107

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with the words "E PLURIBUS UNUM". The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
JUN 10 PM 1:00

2. REGARDLESS OF THE TRUE FACTS WE STILL HAVE A PROBLEM OF ENCOURAGING THE ISRAELIS TO MINIMIZE IF NOT ABSTAIN FROM ATTACKS ON LEBANON. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE WILL INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF AMBASSADOR BUFFUM'S COMMENDABLE DEMARCHE REPORTED IN REF A.

KEATING

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 162

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07938 101151Z

51

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00

USSS-00 /026 W

061289

Z O 101118Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0062
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7938

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, IS, JO
SUBJ: JORDAN

1. IN MY CONVERSATION TODAY WITH DEPRIMIN ALLON, HE HIT HARD ON THEME THAT ISRAEL WILL CRUSH JORDAN IF HUSSEIN IS FOOLISH ENOUGH TO INTERVENE IN THE WAR. HE NOTED MATTER-OF-FACTLY THAT HUSSEIN LOST A GOOD PART OF HIS KINGDOM THE LAST TIME HE BELIEVED THE SYRIANS AND THERE WOULD BE LITTLE INDEED LEFT FOR HIM TO REIGN OVER IF HE MADE THE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN. I TOOK THE OCCASION TO NOTE THAT IT WAS IN OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS THAT HUSSEIN NOT ONLY NOT INTERVENE BUT SURVIVE CURRENT HOSTILITIES. I HOPED THEREFORE ISRAELIS HAD THIS VERY MUCH IN MIND. WHEN CONSIDERING MILITARY OPTIONS AGAINST SYRIAN SPECIFICALLY, I ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS WERE CONTEMPLATING A LAND THRUST ACROSS JORDANIAN TERRITORY. ALLON ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE BUT DID SAY IAF OVERLIGHTS OF SMALL EDGE OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY WOULD CONTINUE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM 88-1052

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07938 101151Z

2. ALLON MADE IT CLEAR THAT GOI WANTS HUSSEIN TO SURVIVE AND HE CONTRASTED JORDAN'S POSTURE TO DATE WITH LEBANESE WHO FORCED ISRAELIS TO HIT RADAR STATION (SEPTTEL). HE ADDED IN THIS RESPECT, THAT JORDANIAN RADAR IS NOT ASSISTING SYRIANS IN CURRENT HOSTILITIES.

3. I HAVE JUST SEEN AMMAN'S 5390 RE POSSIBLE SAUDI ENTRY INTO THE WAR. IN INTERESTS OF KEEPING THIS WAR LIMITED AND BRINGING IT TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION, I FERVENTLY HOPE SAUDI'S CAN BE DISSUADED FOR ALL THE OBVIOUS REASONS, INCLUDING JORDAN.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

8b/00/0107

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst and stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central design.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 781

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07888 091017Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 1026 W

050230

0 090949Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0034
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7888

EXDIS

E O 11652; GDS
TAGS: XX
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: TEL AVIV 7816

APPRECIATE AND WELCOME FURTHER VIEWS EXPRESSED IN KUWAIT 3690
AND BEIRUT 11923. I NEVERTHELESS STAND BY MY RECOMMENDATIONS
IN REFTEL, AND I CONGRATULATE AMP SCALI ON HIS FIRST RATE
HANDLING OF THIS MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL
(REFTEL USUN 3744).
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

WH
TELEGRAM

SECRET 887

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07816 071451Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 1026 W

041963

0 071357Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0009
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7816

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS.

TAGS: XX

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: A) BEIRUT 11891; (B) BEIRUT 11877; (C) BEIRUT 11878

1. AS I READ REFTELS, IMPLIED RECOMMENDATION IS FOR US TO TAKE LEAD OR AT LEAST JOINT IN CALL FOR CEASEFIRE WHILE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS ARE STILL IN POSSESSION OF TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL AS RESULT OF JUNE 1967 WAR.

2. MOOD HERE, AMONG BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS, IS PRETTY GRIM. IN THIS RESPECT, ALTHOUGH OPPOSING SIDES HAVE LONG DEBATED JUST WHO STARTED '67 WAR, IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS BASED ON AVAILABLE EVIDENCE THAT SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS STARTED THE OCT '73

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07816 071451Z

WAR. I ASSUME WE HAVE GOOD TACTICAL REASONS FOR NOT STATING THIS PUBLICLY, BUT I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT ALL CONCERNED RECOGNIZE THIS.

3. MY DATT HAS JUST RETURNED FROM IDF BRIEFING WHICH STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT AS A RESULT ARAB ATTACK -- AND FAILURE OF ISRAEL TO LAUNCH PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES DUE PRIMARILY, I BELIEVE, TO RECOGNITION OF OUR CONCERNS --- BATTLE ON BOTH FRONTS WILL PROVE TO BE QUITE COSTLY IN TERMS OF ISRAELI BLOOD. IF, AFTER REGAINING ITS BALANCE, AS IS EXPECTED, ISRAEL TAKES MILITARY INITIATIVE GOI WILL BE IN NO MOOD TO LISTEN TO ANY GOVERNMENT OR GROUP OF GOVERNMENTS WHICH SEEK TO RESTRAIN ITS ARMED FORCES FROM THROWING AGGRESSORS AT LEAST BACK TO STARTING POINT.

4. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOULD WE ATTEMPT SUCH A PLOY, THIS WOULD INITIALLY RESULT IN BENEFIT TO OUR RELATIONS WITH ARABS; GOI WOULD IGNORE ANY SUCH CALL, CLOBBER THE ARABS WHO PREDICTABLY WOULD TURN ON US. WE WOULD GAIN NOTHING, AND LOSE A LOT OF PRESTIGE AND AT LEAST SOME INFLUENCE WITH THE ISRAELIS. WE ARE PROBABLY GOING TO NEED ALL THE INFLUENCE WE CAN MUSTER WHEN THE TIDE FINALLY TURNS IF WE HOPE TO RESTRAIN ISRAELIS FROM GOING AFTER WHAT REMAINS OF ENEMY ARMOR AND AIR IN EGYPT AND SYRIA.

5. I STRONGLY ENDORSE, THEREFORE POSITION OUTLINED IN PARA 5 OF STATE 199688 AND URGE THAT WE STICK TO THIS POSTURE IN UN CONTEXT. KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

56/00/010

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 391

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07866 081907Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

1026 W

046811

0 081830Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7866

EXDIS

3. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, XF, IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES

REF: A. BEIRUT 11911; B. TEL AVIV DAO 081514Z OCT 73


1. AS MY DATT HAS REPORTED (REFTEL B), IDF TODAY EVINced SOME CONCERN TO HIM OVER LEBANON-BASED FEDAYEEN SHELLINGS OF CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL DURING PAST NIGHT (REFTEL A). WHILE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IDF HAS ITS HANDS FULL AT THIS POINT IN TIME IN COPING WITH FIGHTING AGAINST SYRIA AND EGYPT, ADDITIONAL INCIDENTS ALONG LEBANESE BORDER COULD BRING IDF TO CONSIDER SOME SORT OF ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS IN LEBANON, SOMETHING WHICH WE CERTAINLY WANT TO AVOID.

2. BEARING IN MIND MY RECOMMENDATION IN TEL AVIV 7810 THAT WE URGE RESTRAINT ON ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO LEBANON, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NOW CONSIDER GOING BACK TO LEBANESE ONCE AGAIN, URGING THEM TO EXERCISE GREATER CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN (OR AT LEAST APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO DO SO) IN ORDER TO LESSEN POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 595

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07878 090637Z

20

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00

/026 W

048964

O 090611Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0028
INFO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEL AVIV 7878

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, IS
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: WHERE DOES US GO FROM HERE

1. AS ISRAEL'S FORTUNES IN WAR ARE TAKING TURN FOR BETTER, MOMENT IS APPROACHING WHEN WE MUST DECIDE IF AND HOW US IS TO SEEK TO INFLUENCE ISRAELI ACTIONS AS THEY MAY AFFECT POSTWAR SITUATION IN AREA.

2. WE HAVE HEARD FROM ISRAELI CONTACTS THAT GOI IS INCREASINGLY BEING CRITICIZED PRIVATELY FOR NOT HAVING TAKEN PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION BEFORE ARABS ATTACKED OCTOBER 6 OR/AND FOR NOT HAVING MOBILIZED SOONER. WE CANNOT JUDGE HOW WIDESPREAD THIS CRITICISM IS. HOWEVER, IF AS WE FEAR ISRAELI CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS IN THIS WAR, CRITICISM WILL SPREAD WHEN CASUALTIES BECOME KNOWN. AND WITH ELECTION APPROACHING, GOI WILL BE SENSITIVE.

3. THERE ARE ALREADY CALLS IN PRESS FOR ISRAEL TO ADMINISTER THOROUGH TROUNCING TO SYRIA AND EGYPT TO COMPENSATE FOR ISRAEL'S HAVING ALLOWED ITSELF TO BECOME VICTIM OF ARAB ATTACKS. CONCEIVABLY, PRESSURES UPON AND WITHIN GOI MAY MOUNT TO PURSUE ONE OF FOLLOWING TWO SCENARIOS:
(A) ISRAEL DRIVES ALL EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES BACK BEHIND PRE-OCTOBER 6 CEASEFIRE LINES, THEN IN HOT PURSUIT DESTROYS THEM INSIDE EGYPT AND SYRIA PROPER, AND OCCUPIES SOME

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
3

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07878 090637Z

ADDITIONAL TERRITORY;

(B) ISRAEL DRIVES ALL EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES BACK BEHIND PRE-OCTOBER 6 CEASEFIRE LINES, ENGAGES IN HOT PURSUIT IN SOME INSTANCES AND THEN PULLS THESE ISRAELI FORCES BACK WITHIN PRE-OCTOBER 6 LINES, BUT THEN CONTINUES AERIAL ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN EGYPT AND SYRIA PROPER FOR TWO OR THREE ADDITIONAL DAYS.

4. FROM US VIEWPOINT, MASSIVE ISRAELI DESTRUCTION OF EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN WAR MACHINES AT END OF THIS WAR OFFERS NO ADVANTAGES THAT WE CAN DISCERN. IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT PART OF DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING 1967 WAR MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM ARAB FEELING ISRAELIS HAD BEEN LUCKY AND ARABS HAD NOT BEEN THOROUGHLY DEFEATED. WHATEVER THE CASE, ISRAELI OVERKILL IN THIS INSTANCE UNLIKELY TO HAVE EFFECT OF INDUCING ARABS TO COME QUICKLY TO NEGOTIATING TABLE.

5. DISADVANTAGES FROM US VIEWPOINT OF MASSIVE ISRAELI DESTRUCTION OF EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN WAR MACHINES - AND CERTAINLY OF ANY ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ADDITIONAL TERRITORY - SEEM OBVIOUS: HARM WOULD BE DONE TO WHATEVER CHANCES THERE MAY BE FOR ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, AND ISRAEL WOULD LOSE WHATEVER ADVANTAGE WILL OTHERWISE ACCRUE FROM GROWING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT ISRAEL WAS VICTIM OF AGGRESSION IN THIS LATEST WAR.

6. OPTIMUM SCENARIO, AS I SEE IT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF US INTERESTS, WOULD BE FOR ISRAEL TO DECLARE FORTHWITH, BEFORE END OF WAR, THAT (A) ISRAEL WISHES IN THIS WAR ONLY TO DRIVE BACK EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES TO PRE-OCTOBER 6 LINES, NOT TO CRUSH EGYPT AND SYRIA; (B) ISRAEL WILL STOP SHOOTING ONCE THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED IF OTHER SIDE ALSO STOPS; (C) ISRAEL INTENDS TO OCCUPY NO ADDITIONAL TERRITORY; AND (D) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE AFTER WAR TO SEEK PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT, SYRIA, AND JORDAN UNDER WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967 WAR TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES.

7. FOR REASONS STATED ABOVE, CHANCES OF GETTING GOI TO MAKE SUCH DECLARATION ARE PROBABLY NOT GOOD, BUT I THINK WE SHOULD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 07878 090637Z

TRY. ISRAELI DEPENDENCE ON US TO WARD OFF PRESSURES FOR
CEASEFIRE BEFORE EXPULSION OF REMAINING EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST
OF CANAL, AND ISRAELI NEED AFTER THIS WAR FOR ADDITIONAL
MILITARY HARDWARE FROM US, ARE FACTORS IN OUR FAVOR. IF WE
DECIDE TO GO THIS ROUTE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD START CONSULTATIONS
WITH ISRAELIS QUICKLY, SINCE MILITARY SITUATION MOVING RAPIDLY AND
WE WILL NEED TO HAVE INPUT INTO GOI DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
BEFORE POSITIONS IN CABINET ARE CRYSTALIZED.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DS 1652

DECLASSIFIED



TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07847 081104Z

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00
CCO-00 /026 W

045146

O 081041Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0017
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7847

EXDIS

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, XF
SUBJECT: THE FOURTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

REF: TEL AVIV 7816 (NOTAL)

1. AS WE MOVE INTO THE THIRD DAY OF THIS WAR, I BELIEVE IT IS STILL FAIRLY CERTAIN TO SAY THAT ISRAEL IS GOING TO WIN IT.

2. TODAY IS PROBABLY THE CRITICAL DAY. IDF, WHICH MUST PUSH BACK SYRIANS BEFORE IT CAN FOCUS ON EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST OF SUEZ CANAL, FACES SERIOUS ZDS#ON THE GOLAND HEIGHTS. IF

THE CLOUDY WEATHER WHICH PREVAILS THIS MORNING SHOULD INHIBIT THE USE OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE TO FULL EFFECT AGAINST THE SYRIAN ARMOR, THE ISRAELI GROUND FORCES COULD HAVE THEIR HANDS FULL, SINCE MOBILIZATION STILL ONGOING AND REINFORCEMENTS ARE NOT ALL IN PLACE. AS A RESULT, THE WAR COULD LAST LONGER AND COULD COST MORE THAN WE HAD THOUGHT YESTERDAY.

3. ONE THING IS BECOMING CLEAR: ISRAELI CASUALTIES ON BOTH FRONTS ARE MOUNTING. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS FACT IS IMPLIED IN THE FACT THAT THE GOI IS NOT TELLING ITS PEOPLE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07847 081104Z

ABOUT IT (NOR IS IT GIVING US HARD INFO ON THE SUBJECT).
I BELIEVE THAT WHEN THE FULL IMPACT IS FELT IN ISRAEL ON THE
BLOOD THIS WAR WILL HAVE COST, THE GOI'S POLITICAL OPTIONS MAY BE
REDUCED: THE NATION WILL EXPECT A DECISIVE WAR OUTCOME AND A
POSTWAR SITUATION WHICH LOOKS SECURE FOR ISRAEL.

4. ANOTHER THING WHICH THE GOI IS SHIELDING ITS PUBLIC FROM IS
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE IDF IS FACING. OBVIOUSLY
THE GOI'S FIRST CONSIDERATION IN DOING SO IS THE MAINTENANCE
OF MORALE. A SECONDARY CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE JORDAN:
SURELY THE ISRAELIS APPRECIATE THAT JORDAN (WITH MEMORIES OF
1967) DOES NOT BELIEVE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY COMMUNIQUE
AND IS MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI VERSION AS ACCURATE.
KEEPING JORDAN OUT OF THE WAR MUST BE HIGH ISRAELI PRIORITY.

5. AS SOON AS WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF HOW LONG THE WAR IS
GOING TO LAST AND WHAT IT IS GOING TO COST ISRAEL, WE WILL
BE BETTER ABLE TO JUDGE THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE USG
CAN USEFULLY SEEK TO GUIDE ISRAELI POLICY.
KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DS-1652

26/00/010

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 667

PAGE 01 TFL AV 07882 090822Z

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISN-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 UDDE-00 USSS-00 /026 W

049567

Z O 090813Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0029
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7882

EXDIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR IS JU US
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES AND JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 5368; DAO TEL AVIV 082335Z OCT 73 NOTAL

1. I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT (A) KING HUSSEIN'S SUGGESTION TO AMBASSADOR BROWN THAT JORDAN MIGHT BE SWEEPED INTO WAR, AND (B) THREAT MADE BY ISRAELI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF TO MY DATT THAT ISRAEL WILL DESTROY JORDAN AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE IF JORDAN MOVES AGAINST ISRAEL (REFTELS).

2. IT SEEMS TO ME WE MUST GO ON ASSUMPTION THAT BOTH ARE ACCURATE STATEMENTS AND MUST TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION WITH RESPECT TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS. I BELIEVE US SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY INFORM ISRAELIS THEY SHOULD HALT OVERFLIGHTS OF JORDAN FORTHWITH (IN OUR VIEW, GREATLY IMPROVED IDF POSITION ON SYRIAN FRONT MAKES SUCH OVERFLIGHTS LESS NECESSARY), AND INFORM KING HUSSEIN OF IDF THREAT. IN PROCESS, I FEEL ISRAELIS SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT KING HUSSEIN IN STATESMANLIKE MANNER HAS ATTEMPTED TO CALM DOWN KING FEISAL AND HAS RESISTED HIS REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF SAUDI FORCE IN JORDAN FOR DISPATCH TO SYRIAN FRONT (AMMAN 5367).

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 887

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07816 071451Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAT-00 DODE-00
USSS-00 1026 W

Q 071357Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0009
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7816

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: XX
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: A) BEIRUT 11891; (B) BEIRUT 11877; (C) BEIRUT 11878

1. AS I READ REFTELS, IMPLIED RECOMMENDATION IS FOR US TO TAKE LEAD OR AT LEAST JOINT IN CALL FOR CEASEFIRE WHILE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS ARE STILL IN POSSESSION OF TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL AS RESULT OF JUNE 1967 WAR.

2. MOOD HERE, AMONG BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS, IS PRETTY GRIM. IN THIS RESPECT, ALTHOUGH OPPOSING SIDES HAVE LONG DEBATED JUST WHO STARTED '67 WAR, IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS BASED ON AVAILABLE EVIDENCE THAT SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS STARTED THE OCT '73

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

73 OCT 10:44 PM
 DODGE
 WHITE HOUSE
 SITUATION ROOM
 04 06 63

973 OCT 10:44 PM '66

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07816 071451Z

WAR. I ASSUME WE HAVE GOOD TACTICAL REASONS FOR NOT STATING THIS PUBLICLY, BUT I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT ALL CONCERNED RECOGNIZE THIS.

3. MY DATT HAS JUST RETURNED FROM IDF BRIEFING WHICH STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT AS A RESULT ARAB ATTACK -- AND FAILURE OF ISRAEL TO LAUNCH PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES DUE PRIMARILY, I BELIEVE, TO RECOGNITION OF OUR CONCERNS --- BATTLE ON BOTH FRONTS WILL PROVE TO BE QUITE COSTLY IN TERMS OF ISRAELI BLOOD. IF, AFTER REGAINING ITS BALANCE, AS IS EXPECTED, ISRAEL TAKES MILITARY INITIATIVE GOI WILL BE IN NO MOOD TO LISTEN TO ANY GOVERNMENT OR GROUP OF GOVERNMENTS WHICH SEEK TO RESTRAIN ITS ARMED FORCES FROM THROWING AGGRESSORS AT LEAST BACK TO STARTING POINT.

4. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOULD WE ATTEMPT SUCH A PLOY, THIS WOULD INITIALLY RESULT IN BENEFIT TO OUR RELATIONS WITH ARABS; GOI WOULD IGNORE ANY SUCH CALL, CLOBBER THE ARABS WHO PREDICTABLY WOULD TURN ON US. WE WOULD GAIN NOTHING, AND LOSE A LOT OF PRESTIGE AND AT LEAST SOME INFLUENCE WITH THE ISRAELIS. WE ARE PROBABLY GOING TO NEED ALL THE INFLUENCE WE CAN MUSTER WHEN THE TIDE FINALLY TURNS IF WE HOPE TO RESTRAIN ISRAELIS FROM GOING AFTER WHAT REMAINS OF ENEMY ARMOR AND AIR IN EGYPT AND SYRIA.

5. I STRONGLY ENDORSE, THEREFORE POSITION OUTLINED IN PARA 5 OF STATE 199688 AND URGE THAT WE STICK TO THIS POSTURE IN UN CONTEXT. KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

201/20/0107

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

OCT 7 PM 8:11
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 850

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07810 071246Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 /026 W

041509

O 071148Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0006
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4938
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY
DA WASHDC PRIORITY
CNO PRIORITY WASHDC
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AF GER PRIORITY
CINCNAVEUR LONDON ENG PRIORITY
CINCUSAFEUR HEIDELBERG GER PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT PRIORITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7810

EXDIS

E O 116521 GDS
TAGS: MOPS, XF, IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES

REF: STATE 199677 (NOTAL); BEIRUT 11884 (NOTAL)

1. PER STATE REFTEL, DATT HAS PASSED INFO TO
GEN ZEIRA THROUGH HIS LIAISON OFFICER THAT WE ARE BRINGING
HIS MESSAGE TO ATTENTION OF LEBANESE. WE TOOK CONVENIENT
OCCASION TO INFORM MFA.

2. GIVEN SERIOUSNESS OF ANY POSSIBLE ISRAELI MILITARY
ACTION AGAINST LEBANON, I THINK IT WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07810 071246Z

WHETHER WE SHOULD RAISE SUBJECT WITH SENIOR GOI POLITICAL LEADERS. THIS COULD BE DONE HERE ON IN NEW YORK DIRECTLY WITH EBAN. IN ABSENCE OF ORGANIZED ATTACK ON ISRAEL BY REGULAR LEBANESE FORCES, ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST LEBANON WOULD, AMONG OTHER THINGS, GREATLY UNDERMINE GOOD CASE ISRAEL AT PRESENT HAS THAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN VICTIM OF AGGRESSION IN THIS WAR.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

101/00/0107

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 755

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07771 061444Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

/026 W

036664

Z 061429Z ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9989
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
USINT CAIRO FLASH
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH
AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH
AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH
AMEMBASSY ROME FLASH
USMISSION USUN FLASH

SECRET TEL AVIV 7771

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MOPS, XF
SUBJECT: HOSTILITIES IN MID-EAST

REF: STATE 199583 NOTAL

1. AT MY REQUEST, DCM AT 2130 P.M. TODAY OCT 6, TELEPHONED MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, TO PASS ON FOR INFO OF MRS MEIR FACT THAT US HAD RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY TO HER REQUEST IN ATTEMPT TO HEAD OFF HOSTILITIES. NOW THAT HOSTILITIES HAD ERUPTED ON BOTH FRONTS, HOWEVER, I BELIEVED WE HAD TO CONSIDER WHERE WE GO FROM HERE, AND SPECIFICALLY, DID GOI BELIEVE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LIMIT OR CONTAIN HOSTILITIES IN ORDER ALLOW ONGOING DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES PLAY ROLE IN ARRIVING AT CEASE FIRE?

2. GAZIT REPLIED THAT PRIMIN WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL TO LEARN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

OCT 7 AM 10:10
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars are positioned on either side of the eagle's head.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07771 061444Z

OF RAPIDITY WITH WHICH WE HAD RESPONDED TO HER REQUEST.
UNFORTUNATELY COORDINATED ATTACKS BY EGYPT AND SYRIA AT 2:00 P.M.
HAD FRUSTRATED OUR PEACE INITIATIVE. (HE CLAIMED AERIAL BOMBING
AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS INITIATED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY SYRIA AND EGYPT ON
BOTH FRONTS.)

3. GAZIT SAID HE COULD NOT ANSWER MY QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS GIVEN CURRENT SERIOUSNESS OF MILITARY SITUATION. CABINET WOULD CONTINUE TO MEET IN VIRTUAL CONTINUOUS SESSION IN TEL AVIV AND ALL HE COULD SAY WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE ANY ACTION IT CONSIDERED NECESSARY IN ITS OWN DEFENSE.

4. AT END OF CONVERSATION, DCM ASKED GAZIT TO INFORM MRS MEIR THAT I AM AT HER DISPOSAL AT ANY TIME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

5. COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE I COULD BE CALLED BY PRIMIN ON SHORT NOTICE AS CRISIS DEVELOPS. I WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY SPECIFIC GUIDANCE DEPT MIGHT HAVE FOR SUCH A CONVERSATION.

KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

SECRET
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C

1E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

201/20/010

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest with a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

TELEGRAPH
JAN 7 AM 10.10
SITUATION ROOM

45 S
ACTION SS-25

1026 W

037235

Z O 061600Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TFL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9992
USMISSION USUN FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSS LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7775

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJECT:
MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

REF: USUN 3681 NOTAL

1. REFTEL RECEIVED WELL AFTER OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, AND BASED ON STATE 199539, I HAD ALREADY INSTRUCTED DCM TO SEND MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM ME THROUGH DIRGEN GAZIT OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ABOUT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS US WAS MAKING (TEL AVIV 7771).
2. IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT REFTEL, AND AFTER WE HAD TOUCHED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07775 061619Z

BASE WITH DEPARTMENT BY TELEPHONE, I INSTRUCTED DCM TO CONVEY PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER USING GAZIT CHANNEL CONVEYING CONTENTS REFTEL, AND EXPLAINING THAT ALTHOUGH REFTEL PREPARED BEFORE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, I WANTED HER TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT FULL EXTENT OF US EFFORTS.

3. GAZIT, REACHED BY DCM AT 5:30 P.M. LOCAL, EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR WHAT YOU HAD DONE. GAZIT TOOK OCCASION TO SAY HE DID NOT KNOW HOW TO STRESS STRONGLY ENOUGH, IN CASE US HAD ANY CONCEIVABLE DOUBTS, THAT ARABS HAD INITIATED HOSTILITIES. (THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE JUST NOTED JERUSALEM 1069 NOTAL, REINFORCING THIS POINT.)
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

610/02/010

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

SECRET 574

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07766 061054Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W
***** 035133

Z 061033Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9988

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7766

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR XF IS US UR
SUBJECT: GOI CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN ATTACK TODAY

1. AT PRIME MINISTER'S URGENT REQUEST, I MET WITH HER AT HER
TEL AVIV OFFICE THIS MORNING AT 10:15. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM, AMB
DINITZ, MORDECHAI GAZIT OF PM'S OFFICE AND AVRAHAM KIDRON, DIRGEN MFA,
ALSO PRESENT.

2. MRS MEIR INITIATED CONVERSATION BY NOTING "WE MAY BE IN TROUBLE".
SHE THEN GAVE ME A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION RE REPORTED SYRIAN AND
EGYPTIAN BUILD-UPS DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS. I NOTED THAT WE
HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE IDF ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND WE WERE TOLD THE SITUATION WAS NOT DANGER-
OUS. MRS MEIR SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ACCURATE EVALUATION AT THE TIME,
BUT THAT WITHIN THE LAST 12 HOURS THE SITUATION HAD BECOME VERY
SERIOUS.

ISRAEL HAD INFO FROM A NUMBER OF TOTALLY RELIABLE
SOURCES THAT SYRIA AND EGYPT WERE PLANNING A COORDINATED ATTACK
AGAINST ISRAEL TODAY IN THE LATE AFTERNOON.

3. IN ADDITION TO INFO RE MILITARY SITUATION GOI HAD HARD
INFO THAT SOVIET DEPENDENTS AND AT LEAST SOME ADVISORS WERE
BEING EVACUATED FROM SYRIA AND AEGYPT. AT FIRST, SAID MRS MEIR,
THE GOI THOUGHT THE SOVIET EVACUATION FROM SYRIA MIGHT MEAN A
BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT THIS NOW DOES NOT SEEM TO BE
THE CASE SINCE A NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISORS ARE STILL IN COUNTRY AND

SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07766 061054Z

APPARENTLY PLANNING TO REMAIN. ALSO, GOI HAS INFO THAT SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS HAVE DEPARTED ALEXANDRIA. ISRAEL COULD ONLY SPECULATE ON REASON FOR SOVIET EXODUS, BUT ONE GOI SOURCE REPORTED THIS IS PART OF SOVIET NEGATIVE REACTION TO PLANNED EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN ATTACKS.

4. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, SAID MRS. MEIR, ISRAEL WANTED THE URGENT HELP OF THE US IN TRYING TO HEAD OFF HOSTILITIES. SHE ASKED IF WE WOULD PASS ON TO THE SOVIETS AND EGYPTIANS THE FOLLOWING AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.

A. ISRAEL IS NOT PLANNING TO ATTACK SYRIA OR EGYPT. IT HAS DEPLOYED ITS FORCES TO PROTECT ITSELF IN CASE OF ATTACK AND, ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS IS CALLING UP "SOME RESERVES". (SHE CONFIRMED THIS IS NOT GENERAL MOBILIZATION)

B. ISRAEL IS WELL AWARE OF THE MILITARY DISPOSITIONS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA. IF THEY ATTACK, THEY WILL LOSE AS SHE HAS BEEN ASSURED THIS AM BY DEFMIN DAYAN ALTHOUGH THE ATTACKERS CAN CAUSE DAMAGE AND INFLECT CAUSUALTIES WHICH ISRAEL WISHESVWO AVOID.

5. IN ANSWER TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION, MRS. MEIR REPLIED WITHOUT HESITATION THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT RPT NOT LAUNCH A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK, NOTING THAT ISRAEL WOULD SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND ITSELF IF ATTACKED, BUT EMPHASIZING THAT THE GOI WISHES TO AVOID BLOODSHED.

6. DATT HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY IDF RE DETAILS OF MILITARY SITUATION AND IS REPORTING SEPARATELY BY IMMEDIATE CABLE.

7. PM'S OFFICE HAS JUST CALLED FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE FOR IDF: IN ANSWER TO QUESTION IDF SPOKESMAN WILL SAY: "FOLLOWING CONCENTRATION OF SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN TROOPS THE IDF HAS TAKEN DEFENSIVE MEASURES INCLUDING A CALL UP OF SOME RESERVES."

8. AMB. DINITZ WILL LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON ON FIRST AVAILABLE PLANE, HE SHOULD BE THERE TOMORROW AT LATEST.

COMMENT: I BELIEVE MRS MEIR SINCERELY WISHES TO AVOID USELESS BLOODSHED. I TRUST WE CAN AID IN THIS WORTHY ENDEAVOR, IF POSSIBLE,

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 07766 061054Z

I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE SOME KIND OF REPLY TO PM WITHIN NEXT FEW
HOURS.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 105 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

'73 00 TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 744

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07555 302250Z

2

70
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W

106977

O 302225Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 9907
DIA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEL AVIV 7555

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1
TAGS: IS, FG, SY, MOPS
SUBJ: RUMORED EGYPTIAN MILITARY ALERT AND SYRIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY
REF STATE 194592, STATE 194280, USDAO TEL AVIV SFN 1442, DTG
301955Z SEP 73 (NOTAL)

1. REF DAO MSG GIVES DATT'S ASSESSMENT OF IMPROBABILITY OF SYRIAN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT IDF VIEW AS STATED BY COL REUTER, IS THAT SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT IS SEEN AS TYPICAL SYRIAN DEFENSIVE POSTURE. IDF IS WATCHFUL BUT DOES NOT APPEAR OVERLY CONCERNED. ALTHOUGH IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF IDF TO HOLD THEIR CARDS CLOSELY, IT IS NOT LOGICAL TO THINK THEY WOULD MINIMIZE ANY THREAT OF MILITARY ACTION BY ENEMIES. THEIR DISCOUNTING OF THREAT INDICATES TO DATT THAT THEY DO NOT PERCEIVE A REAL THREAT.

2. WHEN QUERIED ON 29 SEPT 73 ABOUT REPORTED EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE ALERT, REUTER WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY ALERT STATUS. AFTER CHECKING WITH IDF ANALYSTS HE REPORTED BACK THAT QTE: EGYPT HAS FREQUENT ALERTS UNQTE. HE DID NOT LINK EGYPTIAN ALERT STATUS WITH SYRIAN DISPOSITION OF FORCES. HE SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT INCREASED ALERT IS NORMAL IN EGYPT DURING RAMADAN.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S C O P Y

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
FSA483ADA703
OF PUESAD #7553 2721000
OR 290900Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9906

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0166
USINT CAIRO 3498
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6365
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4905
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4882
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3822

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 7553

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR IS AU XF
SUBJ: AUSTRIAN TERRORIST INCIDENT

1. AS DEPT PROBABLY AWARE, GOI CABINET REPORTEDLY MEETING TONIGHT TO CONSIDER AUSTRIAN GOVT DECISION TO CLOSE RECEPTION FACILITIES FOR JEWS EMIGRATING FROM USSR AS RESULT OF DEAL WITH ARAB TERRORISTS. GOI, CAN ONLY REACT WITH ANGER AND FURTHER DISALLUSIONMENT RE SENSE OF ISOLATION IN WAR AGAINST TERRORISM. IF I CORRECTLY UNDERSTAND FACT, I MUST ADMIT I FIND AUSTRIAN DECISION HARD TO UNDERSTAND AND CERTAINLY A GIANT STEP BACKWARD RE THE CAMPAIGN TO CONTAIN THE TERRORISTS. I ASSUME THE USG SHARES THIS VIEW.
 2. THE ISRAELIS WILL PROBABLY LOOK TO US IN THIS INSTANCE AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I COULD HAVE AT LEAST PRELIMINARY DEPT VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
 3. WE SHOULD ALL BE AWARE THAT THE ISRAELIS, IN THEIR INDIGNATION AND FRUSTRATIONS, MAY WELL DECIDE TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN SOME SPECTACULAR WAY(S), IF THE DECISION OF THE AUSTRIANS IS NOT REVERSED.
- KEATING
BT

PSN:042179 RECALLED
PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:272/11:36Z DTG:290900Z SEP 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S C O P Y

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst and stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two stars are positioned on the left and right sides of the seal.

SECRET 825

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07501 260859Z

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

R 251339Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9885
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7501

EXDIS

E O 11652; GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, UR, US, IS
SUBJECT: TERRORIST POSSESSION OF SOVIET ORIGIN
GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES

REF: STATE 189495

1. I NOTE THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY INFORMED ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DINITZ SEP 10 THAT WE HAD APPROACHED SOVIETS SEVERAL TIMES REGARDING DANGERS OF STRELA MISSILE GETTING INTO HANDS OF TERRORISTS (STATE 181236). SINCE UNDER SECRETARY PORTER HAS NOW TAKEN UP THIS MATTER AGAIN WITH SOVIETS (REFTEL, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD INFORM ISRAELIS OF THIS ACTION IN INTERESTS OF REASSURING THEM OF OUR STRONG CONCERN AND, HOPEFULLY, OF REINFORCING THOSE ISRAELI LEADERS WHO WOULD COUNSEL RESTRAINT RE ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES WHICH MAY BE UNDER CONSIDERATION. THIS NOTIFICATION, OF COURSE, COULD BE DONE EITHER HERE OR IN WASHINGTON.

2. PLEASE ADVISE.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SEP 27 AM 8:02
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
SEP 27

27 AM 8:02

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 178

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07483 250749Z

2

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

R 250442Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9877

SECRET TEL AVIV 7483

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XF, EG, IS, US

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR EGYPT-ISRAEL ACCOMMODATION - ONE
ISRAELI VIEW

1. IN COURSE INFORMAL LUNCH SEPT 21 WITH DCM AND EMBOFF, CHAIRMAN ZADOK OF KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE VOLUNTEERED HIS PERSONAL THINKING ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SITUATION. SINCE AS ZADOK NOTED, MRS MEIR, EBAN, AND DAYAN EACH GIVE POLICY BRIEFINGS TO COMMITTEE SEPARATELY ABOUT ONCE A MONTH (EBAN LAST DID SO PREVIOUS WEEK AND ZDINITZ DID SO SEPT 17), CERTAIN OBSERVATIONS ZADOK MADE MAY BE OF INTEREST.

2. ZADOK SAID HIS PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT ONLY WAY TO ATTACK MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM WAS WITH INTERIM SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT, THOUGH HE WAS DISCOURAGED ABOUT EGYPTIAN READINESS OR WILLINGNESS TO MOVE. ZADOK HAD BEEN INTERESTED IN SUCH SETTLEMENT EVER SINCE SADAT PUBLICLY BROACHED IT. (ZADOK SAID HE GAVE SPEECH FEBRUARY 6, 1971 IN WHICH HE WAS FIRST ISRAELI LEADER TO REACT PUBLICLY TO SADAT, AND HIS HIGHLY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO IDEA, WHICH HE HAD NOT COORDINATED WITHIN GOI, DID NOT PLEASE MRS MEIR AT THE TIME.)

3. ZADOK REMARKED THAT DAYAN HAD ALWAYS BEEN STEP AHEAD OF GOI IN FLEXIBILITY OF HIS IDEAS ON SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT. SINCE EGYPTIAN EXPULSION OF SOVIETS SUMMER 1972, DAYAN HAD BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE ON IDEA OF EGYPTIAN PRESENCE EAST OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

73 SEP 26 AM 8:03

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07483 250749Z

CANAL AND ON DEPTH OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ZADOK SAID LATEST FEATURE OF DAYAN THINKING, WHICH HAD STARTED EMERGING IN PRESS, WAS TO STRESS POINT THAT CONTINUED ISRAELI CONTROL OF PART OF SINAI UNDER PARTIAL SETTLEMENT NEED NOT IMPINGE ON EGYPT'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER WHOLE OF SINAI.

4. ZADOK COMMENTED THAT THIS NEW STRESS BY DAYAN WAS COMPATIBLE WITH WHAT HAD BEEN GOI POSITION ALL ALONG, THAT IS, ISRAEL UNDER SETTLEMENT WANTED "CONTROL" BUT NOT NECESSARILY "SOVEREIGNTY" OVER CERTAIN STRATEGIC POINTS IN SINAI. IF EGYPTIANS WERE CLEVER, THEY WOULD SEIZE ON THIS IDEA, AS IT CONTAINED GERM OF THE KIND OF FACE-SAVING ISRAELI ASSURANCE TO BE EXTENDED TO EGYPT IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH

EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN INSISTING THEY HAD TO HAVE.

5. ZADOK NOTED REPORTS US WAS CALLING ON ISRAEL TO COME UP WITH NEW IDEAS TO GET MOVEMENT STARTED TOWARD MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE HIMSELF, KNOWING HIS GOVERNMENT, DOUBTED THAT ANY SUCH IDEAS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. ONLY IF US COULD PRESENT GOI WITH CONVINCING CASE THAT A CERTAIN ISRAELI MOVE OR PROPOSAL WAS ASSURED OF A POSITIVE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE WAS GOI LIKELY TO MAKE SUCH MOVE. THERE WAS RESISTANCE WITHIN GOI AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO NOTION THAT ISRAEL SHOULD MAKE NEXT MOVE WITH EGYPT OR THAT ISRAEL SHOULD OFFER CONCILIATORY GESTURE TO GET TALKS STARTED (SUCH AS ADVANCE ASSURANCE RE SOVEREIGNTY IN SINAI AS MENTIONED IN PARAS 3 AND 4). FURTHERMORE, IT WAS MRS MEIR'S STYLE TO INSIST ON WIDE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS IN ISRAEL BEFORE AUTHORIZING ANY NEW ISRAELI MOVE. RESULT WAS SUCH MOVE LIKELY TO BECOME WIDELY KNOWN EVEN BEFORE IT WAS MADE, LEADING TO HEATED WRANGLE WITH ISRAELI RIGHTWING. HENCE MRS MEIR'S NEED TO KNOW CAIRO WOULD BE RESPONSIVE.

KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: (#)AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED ON REQUEST.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

211/29/012

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched across the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched across the bottom, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07371 191452Z

66
ACTION SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 /026 W

005531

R 191404Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9834

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 7371

EXDIS
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IS
SUBJECT: POSITION OF FOREIGN MINISTER STRENGTHENED

1. SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES TELL US THAT POSITION OF FONMIN ABRA EBAN HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY STRENGTHENED AS A RESULT OF THE "BACKLASH" IN ISRAEL FROM THE PUBLICATION IN SEPT 17 ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL EDITION NEWSWEEK THAT HE WAS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH MRS. MEIR AND MIGHT BE REPLACED AS A RESULT OF HIS CRITICISM OF MRS. MEIR'S DECISION TO INTERCEPT THE MEA AIRCRAFT ON AUG 10; THESE SOURCES CLAIM TO BE "SURE" THAT STORY WAS PLANTED WITH

NEWSWEEK BY EBAN'S ENEMIES AND THEY ARE DELIGHTED THAT THE TACTIC HAS BOOMERANGED.

2. SUPPORT FOR EBAN REPORTEDLY HAS COME FROM THE POWERFUL TEL-AVIV-BASED "GUSH FACTION" OF THE LABOR PARTY AND HAS INCLUDED A RECENT PERSONAL INITIATIVE BY FINMIN SAPIR TO EXPRESS PRIVATELY TO MRS. MEIR HIS SUPPORT FOR EBAN'S CONTINUING IN OFFICE AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

3. THE SOURCES ADD THAT LAST FRIDAY, SEPT 14, THE EDITOR OF MAARIV IN AN OFF-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW WITH MRS. MEIR RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHE MIGHT CONSIDER REPLACING EBAN AS A RESULT OF DISAGREEMENT OVER THE AUG 10 INCIDENT. MRS. MEIR REPORTEDLY DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION NOTING THAT SHE HAS HAD AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER DISAGREEMENT WITH ALL OF HER MINISTERS. THE EDITOR ASKED IF HE COULD PUT THIS PART OF THE INTERVIEW ON THE RECORD.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

47

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07371 191452Z

MRS. MEIR CONCURRED AND IT APPEARED IN MAARIV ON SUNDAY, SEPT 16.

4. WE ARE ALSO TOLD THAT, AFTER LAST SUNDAY'S CABINET MEETING, EBAN AND MRS. MEIR HAD A MEETING DURING WHICH EBAN'S FUTURE WAS DISCUSSED. ONE SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL SAID HE SAW EBAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS MEETING AND EBAN MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND MRS. MEIR HAD HAD A GOOD DISCUSSION AND THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR QUITE A WHILE YET.

5. COMMENT. WE ASSUME THAT MFA WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE AWARE THAT HE WOULD NOT BE MEETING WITH LAMEDUCK NEXT MONTH, BUT FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

111/20/0107

DECLASSIFIED



'73 SEP 15 PM 4:14

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07222 151034Z

INFO OCT-01 JSO-00 /026 W

103288

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7222

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAS. 6. & 7.)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: ERANIS COMMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

1. ON HIS INVITATION, I HAD LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY SEPT 13 WITH FONMIN ABBA EBAN. ALSO PRESENT WERE AVRAHAM KIDRON, DIRGEN MFA, EPHRIAM EVRON, DEPDIRGEN MFA, AND DCM. I RAISED WITH FONMIN HIS SEPT 4 COMMENTS ON THE LABOR PARTY DOCUMENT OUTLINING POLICY TOWARDS OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (TEL AVIV 7121). (SEPTELS HAVE BEEN SENT ON OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED.)

2. EBAN WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH TO ASSERT THAT THE GALILI DOCUMENT WAS MISUNDERSTOOD AS A VICTORY FOR THE HAWKS WHEREAS, IN REALITY, IT REPRESENTED A TRIUMPH FOR THE MODERATES. HE MENTIONED THAT WHILE ON HIS TRIP TO NORTH AMERICAN HE HAD EVEN TELEPHONED SAPIR TO ASSURE HIMSELF THAT THE LINE WAS BEING HELD AGAINST DAYAN IN LABOR PARTY LEADERSHIP DISCUSSIONS. HE BLAMED THE MISUNDERSTANDING ABROAD ON THE FACT THAT INITIAL NEWSPAPER PUBLICITY HAD BEEN DISTORTED, CITING PRIMARILY THE PRO-DAYAN ENGLISH LANGUAGE JERUSALEM POST. (NOTE: I MADE CLEAR THAT OUR NORMAL SOURCES INCLUDED ALL HEBREW-LANGUAGE PAPERS AND THAT WE DID NOT RELY EXCLUSIVELY ON THE POST.)

3. EBAN THEN COMMENTED THAT FOREIGN MISUNDERSTANDING EXTENDED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

29

DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07222 151034Z

ALSO TO LYOVA ELIAV'S VIEWS. HE CLAIMED THAT A CAREFUL READING OF ELIAV'S VIEWS WOULD SHOW THAT THEY WERE NOT THAT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF EBAN AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED LEADERS IN THE LABOR PARTY. EBAN REMARKED THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO DISPEL SOME OF THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING THE GALILI DOCUMENT, ON MONDAY HE BACKGROUNDED JERUSALEM REPS OF NYTIMES, AP AND TIMES OF LONDON. THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GALILI DOCUMENT, HE SAID, SHOULD BE EVIDENT TO ANYONE WHO CAN "READ OR WRITE."

4. I ASKED EBAN IF ALL OF THE OTHER LABOR PARTY LEADERS SHARED HIS VIEWS ON THE GALILI DOCUMENT. HIS REPLY WAS "THOSE WHO CAN READ AND WRITE" SHARED HIS VIEW; THIS WAS QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY QUALIFICATION "DIFFERENT PEOPLE MAY READ THE SAME THING DIFFERENTLY," AND ASIDE BY EVRON THAT IT ALSO DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU READ "WITH ONE OR TWO EYES" -- IN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO DAYAN. EBAN ALSO EMPHASIZED (AS HAD SPEAKER OF KNESSET WHOM I CALLED ON EARLIER IN DAY - MEMCON FOLLOWS) THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAMPAIGN RHETORIC AND POST-ELECTION GOVERNMENT POLICY.

5. EBAN MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC POINTS IN GALILI DOCUMENT:

A. IT MOST IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT GALILI DOCUMENT SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO FACT THAT NOTHING IN PROPOSED GOI POLICY WOULD CHANGE LEGAL OR JURIDICAL POSITION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

B. ANY PRIVATE PURCHASES OF LAND IN WEST BANK WOULD BE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND PROBABLY CONFINED TO CERTAIN AREAS AROUND JERUSALEM AND KALKILYA SALIENT NEAR NATANYA. MRS. MEIR IS ON RECORD AS BEING AGAINST SALE OF LAND TO INDIVIDUALS. SO IS HE, AND HE PLANS TO BE ON THE CABINET COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD ADMINISTER THE SALES PROGRAM.

C. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AT RAFAH JUNCTION IS A FAR CRY FROM DAYAN'S PLANS FOR A METROPOLIS OF 250,000 AND A DEEPWATER PORT. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT MEANT THAT THE GOI WOULD DESIRE TO OBTAIN TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS IN THIS AREA IN ANY EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN DEVELOPING THIS THOUGHT, EBAN THREW OUT THE IDEA THAT ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE RAFAH JUNCTION AREA COULD VERY WELL ALLOW ISRAEL TO BE LESS DEMANDING ABOUT THE NATURE OF ISRAELI PRESENCE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE SINAI, INCLUDING SHARM EL-SHEIKH. HE THEN SPECULATIVELY LINKED IDEA OF AN ISRAELI RAFAH JUNCTION TO

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 07222 151034Z

NOTION OF POLITICAL TIE FOR GAZA STRIP TO JORDAN AND THE WEST BANK, THEREBY ALLOWING HUSSEIN TO PORTRAY HIMSELF AS KING OF THE PALESTINIANS.

6. AS CONCERNS THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT IS REACHED, EBAN DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING FROM MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS TO DISTRICT ELECTIONS AT SOME FUTURE TIME. HE NOTED THAT THE "SECURITY PEOPLE" ALWAYS OBJECT TO SUCH PROPOSALS, BUT THAT THIS IS SOMETHING HE THINKS COULD BE FEASIBLE IN THE FUTURE.

7. COMMENT. EBAN TAILORED HIS PRESENTATION TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPERMANENCE OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAFAH JUNCTION AREA, EBAN SUGGESTED CONSIDERABLE GOI FLEXIBILITY IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. EBAN DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT HE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND IN IMPLYING THERE MIGHT BE TRADEOFF OF SOME KIND POSSIBLE BETWEEN NATURE OF ISRAELI PRESENCE AT SHARM AND ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY IN RAFAH JUNCTION AREA. IT MAY WELL BE THAT, AT THIS POINT, HE HAS NOT THOUGHT ABOUT THIS IN ANY GREAT DETAIL AND MAY HAVE BEEN JUST THINKING OUT LOUD. HE REPEATED THE THEME, HOWEVER, THAT ONCE AN ACTUAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS WERE TO START, COMPROMISES WERE TO BE EXPECTED.

8. EBAN'S REFERENCES TO POSSIBLE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN STARK CONTRAST TO MY CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN SEPT 10. DAYAN IN THE COURSE OF OUR 45 MINUTE CONVERSATION NEVER ONCE MENTIONED THE WORD NEGOTIATIONS (TEL AVIV 7092). AS FOR ATMOSPHERICS AT THE LUNCHEON TABLE, THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS STRONG UNDERCURRENT OF ANTIPATHY ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS PRESENT BOTH FOR DAYAN AND FOR HIS VIEWS.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

29

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 476

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07222 141555Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

095077

R 140620Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9772

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7222

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: EBAN'S COMMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

1. ON HIS INVITATION, I HAD LUNCH ON WEDNESDAY SEPT 13 WITH FONMIN ABBA EBAN. ALSO PRESENT WERE AVRAHAM KIDRON, DIRGEN MFA, EPHRIAM EVRON, DEPDIRGEN MFA, AND DCM. I RAISED WITH FONMIN HIS SEPT 4 COMMENTS ON THE LABOR PARTY DOCUMENT OUTLINING POLICY TOWARDS OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (TEL AVIV 7121). (SEPTELS HAVE BEEN SENT ON OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED.)

2. EBAN WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH TO ASSERT THAT THE GALILI DOCUMENT WAS MISUNDERSTOOD AS A VICTORY FOR THE HAWKS WHEREAS, IN REALITY, IT REPRESENTED A TRIUMPH FOR THE MODERATES. HE MENTIONED THAT WHILE ON HIS TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICAN HE HAD EVEN TELEPHONED SAPIR TO ASSURE HIMSELF THAT THE LINE WAS BEING HELD AGAINST DAYAN IN LABOR PARTY LEADERSHIP DISCUSSIONS. HE BLAMED THE MISUNDERSTANDING ABROAD ON THE FACT THAT INITIAL NEWSPAPER PUBLICITY HAD BEEN DISTORTED, CITING PRIMARILY THE PRO-DAYAN ENGLISH LANGUAGE JERUSALEM POST. (NOTE: I MADE CLEAR THAT OUR NORMAL SOURCES INCLUDED ALL HEBREW-LANGUAGE PAPERS AND THAT WE DID NOT RELY EXCLUSIVELY ON THE POST.)

3. EBAN THEN COMMENTED THAT FOREIGN MISUNDERSTANDING EXTENDED ALSO TO LYOVA ELIAV'S VIEWS. HE CLAIMED THAT A CAREFUL READING OF ELIAV'S VIEWS WOULD SHOW THAT THEY WERE NOT THAT MUCH DIFF-

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07222 141555Z

FERENT FROM THOSE OF EBAN AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED LEADERS IN THE LABOR PARTY. EBAN REMARKED THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO DISPEL SOME OF THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING THE GALILI DOCUMENT, ON MONDAY HE BACKGROUNDED JERUSALEM REPS OF NYTIMES, AP AND TIMES OF LONDON. THE TRUTH CONCERNING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GALILI DOCUMENT, HE SAID, SHOULD BE EVIDENT TO ANYONE WHO CAN "READ OR WRITE."

4. I ASKED EBAN IF ALL OF THE OTHER LABOR PARTY LEADERS SHARED HIS VIEWS ON THE GALILI DOCUMENT. HIS REPLY WAS "THOSE WHO CAN READ AND WRITE" SHARED HIS VIEW; THIS WAS QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY QUALIFICATION "DIFFERENT PEOPLE MAY READ THE SAME THING DIFFERENTLY," AND ASIDE BY EVRON THAT IT ALSO DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU READ "WITH ONE OR TWO EYES" -- IN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO DAYAN. EBAN ALSO EMPHASIZED (AS HAD SPEAKER OF KNESSET WHOM I CALLED ON EARLIER IN DAY - MEMCON FOLLOWS) THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAMPAIGN RHETORIC AND POST-ELECTION GOVERNMENT POLICY.

5. EBAN MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC POINTS IN GALILI DOCUMENT:

A. IT MOST IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT GALILI DOCUMENT SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO FACT THAT NOTHING IN PROPOSED GOI POLICY WOULD CHANGE LEGAL OR JURIDICAL POSITION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

B. ANY PRIVATE PURCHASES OF LAND IN WEST BANK WOULD BE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND PROBABLY CONFINED TO CERTAIN AREAS AROUND JERUSALEM AND KALKILYA SALIENT NEAR NATANYA. MRS. MEIR IS ON RECORD AS BEING AGAINST ASALE OF LAND TO INDIVIDUALS. SO IS HE, AND HE PLANS TO BE ON THE CABINET COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD ADMINISTER THE SALES PROGRAM.

C. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AT RAFAH JUNCTION IS A FAR CRY FROM DAYAN'S PLANS FOR A METROPOLIS OF 250,000 AND A DEEPWATER PORT. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT MEANT THAT THE GOI WOULD DESIRE TO OBTAIN TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS IN THIS AREA IN ANY EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN DEVELOPING THIS THOUGHT, EBAN THREW OUT THE IDEA THAT ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE RAFAH JUNCTION AREA COULD VERY WELL ALLOW ISRAEL TO BE LESS DEMANDING ABOUT THE NATURE OF ISRAELI PRESENCE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE SINAI, INCLUDING SHARM EL-SHEIKH. HE THEN SPECULATIVELY LINKED IDEA OF AN ISRAELI RAFAH JUNCTION TO NOTION OF POLITICAL TIE FOR GAZA STRIP TO JORDAN AND THE WEST BANK, THEREBY ALLOWING HUSSEIN TO PORTRAY HIMSELF AS KING OF THE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
25

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 07222 141555Z

PALESTINIANS.

6. AS CONCERNS THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT IS REACHED, EBAN DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING FROM MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS TO DISTRICT ELECTIONS AT SOME FUTURE TIME. HE NOTED THAT THE "SECURITY PEOPLE" ALWAYS OBJECT TO SUCH PROPOSALS, BUT THAT THIS IS SOMETHING HE THINKS COULD BE FEASIBLE IN THE FUTURE.

H

7. COMMENT. EBAN TAILOR
RBHISLPRESEPTATIMNLTO
PHMSIZE THEN
IMPERMANENCE OF THE IDYH VILPR

D

JQ

DWP OHELOCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
WITH OHELEXC

UINLOFLTHELRAFAH JUNCTION AREA, EBAN SUGGESTED CONSIDERABLE GOI FLEXIBILITY IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. EBAN DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT HE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND IN IMPLYING THERE MIGHT BE TRADEOFF OF SOME KIND POSSIBLE BETWEEN NATURE OF ISRAELI PRESENCE AT SHARM AND ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY IN RAFAH JUNCTION AREA. IT MAY WELL BE THAT, AT THIS POINT, HE HAS NOT THOUGHT ABOUT THIS IN ANY GREAT DETAIL AND MAY HAVE BEEN JUST THINKING OUT LOUD. HE REPEATED THE THEME, HOWEVER, THAT ONCE AN ACTUAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS WERE TO START, COMPROMISES WERE TO BE EXPECTED.

8. EBAN'S REFERENCES TO POSSIBLE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN STARK CONTRAST TO MY CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN SEPT 10. DAYAN IN THE COURSE OF OUR 45 MINUTE CONVERSATION NEVER ONCE MENTIONED THE WORD NEGOTIATIONS (TEL AVIV 7092). AS FOR ATMOSPHERICS AT THE LUNCHEON TABLE, THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS STRONG UNDERCURRENT OF ANTIPATHY ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS PRESENT BOTH FOR DAYAN AND FOR HIS VIEWS.

KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: TEL AVIV 7222 GARBLED TEXT END PARA 6 AND PARA 7 AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a star and rays. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central design.

Department of State

THE HOUSEL
SITATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

73 SFG 2 PM 12:05

CONFIDENTIAL 409

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07155 121048Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

070103

R 120931Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TFL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9744

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 7155

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ETRD, EAGR, PFOR, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PL 480 - CY 1974

REF: STATE 168208

1. ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR TITLE I, PL 480 COMMODITIES REFLECTS ACCURATE EVALUATION OF QUANTITIES ISRAEL WILL NEED TO PURCHASE IN CY '74, ASSUMING USUAL MARKETING PURCHASES (UMRS) SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF CURRENT YEAR. THERE IS OF COURSE NOTHING SACRED ABOUT PERCENTAGE ALLOCATION BETWEEN TITLE I AND UMRS, BUT THEY REFLECT PATTERN THAT HAS DEVELOPED OVER RECENT YEARS.

2. REAL PROBLEM FOR USG OBVIOUSLY IS TO DECIDE WHAT DOLLAR AMOUNTS WE WILL WISH TO COVER WITH EXTREMELY FAVORABLE FINANCING TERMS THAT PL 480 HAS PROVIDED IN PAST, SINCE THIS YEAR'S GOI REQUEST FOR ROUGHLY SAME QUANTITIES AS LAST YEAR WILL APPARENTLY COST OVER THREE TIMES WHAT IT COST LAST YEAR. GOI WILL OBVIOUSLY ARGUE THAT VASTLY INCREASED PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL AND MOST OTHER ISRAELI IMPORTS MAKES MORE PRESSING THAN BEFORE THEIR NEED FOR FAVORABLE TERMS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT USG DECISION IN THIS REGARD WILL OBVIOUSLY BE INFLUENCED BY WORLDWIDE DECISIONS IN PL 480 CONTEXT AS WELL AS ATTITUDE TOWARD OVERALL ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.

3. AS WE HAVE BEEN REPORTING, ISRAEL'S FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVE POSITION HAS CONTINUED TO BE GOOD, RISING STEADILY SINCE LOW POINT OF 1970 AND STANDING AT \$1.65 BILLION AT END OF JULY 1973. TEL AVIV'S A-217, JULY 26, CONTAINS OUR PROJECTION BALANCE OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

29

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07155 121048Z

PAYMENTS' POSITION FOR 1973. IT CONTAINS GENEROUS ESTIMATE OF LIKELY IMPORTS AND MODEST ESTIMATES OF EXPORTS. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT FULLY REFLECT INCREASE COMMODITY PRICES IN LATER MONTHS OF CURRENT YEAR, WE CONTINUE FEEL THAT RESERVE POSITION WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY BETTER AT END OF YEAR THAN IT WAS IN DECEMBER 1972 AND THAT IT WILL REPRESENT ABOUT FOUR MONTHS OF IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES.

4. FOR THESE REASONS, WE DO NOT RECOMMEND PROGRAM LARGER THAN \$60 MILLION. INDEED, IF USG WISHES TO IMPLEMENT EARLIER DECISION

TO TAPER OFF ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL (STATE 230962), PL 480 OFFERS SUIT-
BLE OPPORTUNITY, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF WORLDWIDE COMMODITY
SHORTAGES. ASIDE FROM OUTRIGHT GRANTS IN SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE,
RUSSIAN REFUGEES AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS PROGRAMS, PL 480
TITLE I OFFERS MOST FAVORABLE TERMS IN OVERALL US ASSISTANCE
PACKAGE. ISRAEL WILL THEREFORE BE MOST RELUCTANT TO ACQUIESCE
QUIETLY IN COMMODITY REDUCTIONS.

5. IN OUR EXPERIENCE, ISRAELIS ACCEDE MORE GRACEFULLY IN NEGATIVE US ECONOMIC POLICY DECISIONS WHEN WE CAN PLAUSIBLY ARGUE THAT THEY ARE PART OF A WORLD-WIDE POLICY DETERMINATION.

KEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

29

11/20/09

RM NS 1652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest with stars and a banner. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 762

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07092 01 OF 02 111046Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

R 110523Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9723
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 7092

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IS, XF
SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON DAYAN

1. SUMMARY. DURING COURSE OF 45 MINUTE MEETING, DAYAN NOTED THERE WOULD BE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN PARTY ALIGNMENT AFTER ELECTIONS AND DESCRIBED THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS GOOD POLITICS, SINCE ONLY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IS FROM RIGHT WHICH IS MOST HAWKISH AS CONCERNS THIS SUBJECT. I ASKED HIM HIS VIEWS ON POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM ON THE FUTURE OF ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS. IN REPLY HE EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR ISRAEL TO IMPROVE WELL-BEING OF ARABS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND STRESSED THE UNOFFICIAL BENEFITS THIS WOULD HAVE FOR ISRAELI-JORDANIAN RELATIONS AND PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. DAYAN DID NOT MENTION SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS NOR DID HE REFER TO JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY.

2. I PAID MY INITIAL CALL ON DEFMIN MOSHE DAYAN MONDAY MORNING, SEPT 10. WE HAD A MOST CORDIAL TALK WICH LASTED OVER 45 MINUTES. DCM AND DATT ACCOMPANIED. AFTER USUAL AMENITIES, I ASKED DAYAN FOR HIS EVALUATION OF OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS. DAYAN RESPONDED THAT IN HIS OPINION THERE WOULD BE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN PARTY LINEUPS IN THE KNESSET. COMMENT: SINCE HE MADE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SEP 11 PM 3:27
62 73

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
059678

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07092 01 OF 02 111046Z

NO CLAIM THAT LABOR ALIGNMENT WOULD INCREASE ITS STRENGTH, THIS APPRAISAL MEANS TO ME THAT HE ANTICIPATES LOSING SOME SEATS. I TOLD HIM I WAS INTERESTED, AS A FORMER PRACTICING POLITICIAN IN HIS EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT ON THE ELECTORATE OF THE RECENTLY ADOPTED LABOR PARTY POLICY TOWARD THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, ADDING THAT I DIDN'T SUPPOSE THIS PROPOSAL WOULD "LOSE ANY VOTES." DAYAN RESPONDED WITH GOOD HUMOR THAT I WAS CORRECT, THE LABOR PARTY WOULD NOT BE HURT IN THE ELECTIONS BY THE ADOPTION OF THIS POLICY. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN THAT THE ONLY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IN THE ELCTIONS CAME FROM THE RIGHT WHICH WAS KNOWN FOR ITS EXTREME HAWKISHNESS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE ADDED THAT ONLY THE "COMMUNISTS" WOULD VOTE IN FAVOR OF A DOVISH POLICY TOWARDS THE TERRITORIES - AS PROPOSED BY ELIAV - BUT THESE PEOPLE WERE NOT IMPORTANT NUMERICALLY OR POLITICALLY.

3. I ASKED DAYAN TO PROJECT WITH ME FOUR YEARS HENCE AND TO SPECULATE ON WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, HE THOUGHT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM WOULD HAVE ON ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS. IN REPLY, DAYAN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS HE DISCOURSED ON GOI POLICY TOWARD THE TERRITORIES:

(A) THE GOI HAD A HUMAN OBLIGATION TO TRY TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THIS WAS SO DESPITE THE FACT THAT ISRAEL WELL RECOGNIZED THAT IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS WOULD NOT RECONCILE THE ARABS TO LIVING UNDER ISRAELI DOMINATION NOR MUTE THE "NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS." OF THESE ARABS.

(8) GAZA REPRESENTED BY FAR THE MOST COMPLEX PROBLEM, SINCE IT COULD NOT SURVIVE AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY; THIS LEFT THE OPTION OF AFFILIATION WITH EGYPT, JORDAN OR ISRAEL. THE GAZANS, REFUGEES AND ORIGINAL INHABITANTS ALIKE, HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THEY WANT. THERE REALLY IS NO PROSPECT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIES IN GAZA (OR THE WEST BANK) SINCE THE REQUIRED HEAVY CAPITALIZATION WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING. ECONOMICALLY, THEREFORE, GAZA'S ONLY HOPE IS INCREASED ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH ISRAEL (I.E., ARABS WORKING IN ISRAEL), AND THE PROGRESSIVE REHABILITATION AND/OR RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN THE HOPE OF ENDING THE REFUGEE MENTALITY AND CULTURE.

(C) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY POLICY IN THE WEST BANK

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 07092 01 OF 02 111046Z

WOULD IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE ARABS, AND THOUGH CONTINUED "OPEN BRIDGES" POLICY AND CONTINUED PERSONAL AND COMMERCIAL INTERCHANGES BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS, LEAD TO "SOME FORM OF UNOFFICIAL NORMALIZATION." FOR DAYAN, THIS PROCESS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS COULD, WITH TIME, IMPROVE UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS AND BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND JORDANIANS. HE CITED THE RECENT DECISION OF A JORDANIAN BANK TO LOAN IL 5 MILLION TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF NABLUS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AT LEAST TACITLY APPROVED OF AND WAS ENGAGED IN THIS POLICY OF UNOFFICIAL TOGETHERNESS. HE HOPED THE JORDANIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE SUCH STEPS, AND HE NOTED THAT FOUR JORDANIAN MPS WHO LIVE IN THE WEST BANK DRIVE FREELY TO AND FROM AMMAN TO REPRESENT THEIR CONSTITUENTS. DAYAN CONCLUDED HIS COMMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM IN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK (IN PARALLEL WITH JORDAN'S REFUGEE REHABILITATION PROGRAM) WOULD EFFECTIVELY RESETTLE WELL OVER HALF OF THE 1948 REFUGEES -- I.E., THOSE IN GAZA, WEST BANK AND JORDAN.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the bottom of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with stars and stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

CONFIDENTIAL 741

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07092 02 OF 02 111041Z

14
ACTION SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

059124

R 110523Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9724
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 7092

EXDIS

(D) DAYAN STATED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS CONCERNS ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, SINCE THE ISSUES BETWEEN THEM ARE SINAI AND THE QUESTION OF "PRINCIPLE." IN THIS RESPECT, DAYAN STATED THAT EGYPT MUST CHANGE ITS BASIC VIEW WHICH IS TOTALLY NEGATIVE. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN, THEREFORE, WILL NOT MAKE THE SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT ANY WORSE.

(E) DAYAN STATED THAT JORDAN COULD NOT TAKE THE FIRST STEP, MAKING CLEAR ISRAEL EXPECTED NO EARLY INITIATIVE FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN. HIS OTHER REMARKS ON JORDAN WERE TIED IN WITH HIS COMMENTS CONCERNING GOI POLICY TOWARDS GAZA AND THE WEST BANK REPORTED ABOVE.

4. TURNING TO SITUATION IN EGYPT, DAYAN WAS NOT SURE WHETHER SADAT'S RECENT INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY WAS A SIGN OF HIS BEING STRONGER OR WEAKER. HE NOTED THAT SADAT'S POSITION AT HOME IS SECURE SINCE THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC IS VERY PASSIVE AND THE ARMY IS NOT ONLY PASIVE BUT DETERIORATING. SADAT'S STRENGTH IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DERIVES FROM THE FACT THAT NO ONE REALLY EXPECTS ANYTHING OF HIM. DAYAN BELIEVES SADAT WILL FIND IT SAFER AS WELL AS EASIER ONLY TO TALK ABOUT THE UNSOLVED ISRAELI PROBLEM (AND TO SET NO DEADLINES FOR ACTION) THAN TO TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR STEPS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT. SADAT WILL NOT,

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07092 02 OF 02 111041Z

THEREFORE, DO ANYTHING TO ACTIVATE STEPS TOWARDS AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT OR ANY OTHER KIND OF SETTLEMENT.

5. COMMENT: I FOUND MY CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN TO BE A MOST USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR FIRST-HAND EXPOSE TO THIS ENIGMATIC AND MOST CHARISMATIC MAN. HE DEFTLY AVOIDED THE MAIN THRUST OF MY QUESTION CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM BY NOT EVEN MENTIONING THE POSSIBILITY OR DESIRABILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ALSO, DAYAN DID NOT MENTION THE THEME THAT THE "CREATION OF FACTS" IN THE TERRITORIES COULD FORCE THE ARABS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, A LINE WHICH HAS BEEN EXPOUSED BY HIS SUPPORTERS AND WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO HIM. DAYAN CLEARLY WISHED TO AVOID THE SUBJECTS OF JEWISH SETTLEMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, NEITHER THE TIME NOR THE PLACE FOR ME TO INITIATE A DISCUSSION ON THESE PARTICULAR POINTS, SO I DID NOT PRESS. AS I WAS LEAVING I ASKED DAYAN IF HE HAD ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE THAT I MIGHT PASS ON. IN REPLY HE NOTED THAT I HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A LONG CONVERSATION WITH MRS. MEIR, AND HE PROCEEDED TO PRAISE HER IN MOST LAUDATORY FASHION. MY COLLEAGUES NOTE THAT DAYAN HAS IN PAST BEEN BURNED BY GIVING THE IMPRESSION TO MRS MERI THAT HE WAS DEALING WITH THE U.S. BEHIND HER BACK. HE APPARENTLY WAS TAKING NO CHANCES ON THIS OCCASION.

KEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

511/00/010
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 639

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06905 01 OF 02 030030Z

64
ACTION SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 AOP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

123485

O 021910Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9641

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 6905

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJECT: WALDHEIM VISIT

REF: TEL AVIV 6898

1. SUMMARY: MFA BRIEFING ON WALDHEIM SESSIONS WITH PRIMIN MEIR AND FONMIN EBAN FOLLOWED GENERAL LINES OF REFTEL REPORTING AMB'S DISCUSSION ON AUG 31 WITH MRS MEIR. ADDITIONAL POINTS WORTH HIGHLIGHTING ARE: (1) WHEN WALDHEIM FIRST RAISED POSSIBILITY OF UN CHARTER BEING BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS, MRS MEIR INDICATED ISRAEL WOULD AWAIT EGYPT'S REACTION TO PROPOSAL BEFORE MAKING DECISION. ABBA EBAN SUBSEQUENTLY MADE CLEAR TO WALDHEIM THAT ISRAEL REJECTED IDEA IN FAVOR OF RES 242; (2) EBAN DISPUTED WALDHEIM'S STATEMENT THAT SITUATION IN AREA BECOMING WORSE WITH PASSAGE OF TIME, NOTING INTER ALIA SADAT FACED CHOICE BETWEEN CONTINUATION OF STATUS QUO OR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE HIM MORE THAN HE HAS NOW; (3) WALDHEIM RAISED "AT REQUEST OF ARABS" QUESTION OF GOI FUTURE POLICY IN ADMINISTERED AREAS. EBAN DOWNPLAYED SUBJECT, NOTING SETTLEMENT LIMITED TO AREAS WHERE GOI WOULD PROPOSE TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS, POLICY UNCHANGED RE LAND ACQUISITION AND FINAL BORDERS TO BE DECIDED IN NEGOTIATIONS; (4) ABBA EBAN IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION TOLD WALDHEIM HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL "POSITIVE" AND

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched across the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched across the bottom. Two small stars are positioned on the left and right sides of the seal.

SECRET

URGED WALDHEIM CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE STUDY CHARACTER OF VISITS TO AREA. WALDHEIM AGREED WITH EBAN'S SUGGESTION AND NOTED HE GRATIFIED BY RECEPTION IN ISRAEL. HE EMPHASIZED TO EBAN HIS BELIEF THAT AT LEAST IMPRESSION OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN MID-EAST WAS REQUIRED; (5) ISRAELIS RELIEVE WALDHEIM CLEARLY HOPES FIND ROLE FOR UN AND FOR HIMSELF PERSONALLY IN EFFORT TO GET PARTIES TOGETHER. IN THIS RESPECT, WALDHEIM NOTED HE HOPED TO CREATE "CONTACTS" BETWEEN EBAN AND ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING GENERAL ASSEMBLY LATER THIS FALL. WALDHEIM STATED US NOT "ENTHUSIASTIC" OVER ANY PUBLIC ACTIVITY ON UN IN MID-EAST, BUT STATED US WOULD WELCOME QUIET ACTION BY UN. END SUMMARY.

3. CONVERSATIONS WITH MRS MEIR AND ABBA EBAN. WALDHEIM'S FIRST CONVERSATION WAS ON THURSDAY MORNING AUG 30 WITH MRS MEIR AND ABBA EBAN TOGETHER. WALDHEIM MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT, THROUGH A UN INITIATIVE, HE PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL IN GETTING THE PARTIES CLOSER TOGETHER BY CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO GET AWAY FROM PRESENT FORMULATIONS AND ONE SHOULD CONSIDER IF IT WOULDN'T BE WORTHWHILE TO BASE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UN CHARTER: IN THIS RESPECT HE RECALLED THE RHODES FORMULA. WALDHEIM STATED THAT HE SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT BUT THE EGYPTIANS REJECTED IT FOR FEAR THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT MIGHT FREEZE THE SITUATION. IN COMMENTING ON A POSSIBLE UN ROLE, WALDHEIM STATED THAT THE US WAS NOT "ENTHUSIASTIC" OVER A PUBLIC ACTIVITY ON THE UN IN THE MID EAST BUT HE SAID THE US WOULD WELCOME QUIET ACTION ON THE PART OF THE UN. WALDHEIM SAID HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO CREATE CONTACTS BETWEEN EBAN AND ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS FALL. HE ASKED IF THE GOI WAS INTERESTED IN UN HELP AND WHAT HE COULD TELL THE GOE ABOUT ISRAEL'S POSITION.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 06905 01 OF 02 030030Z

LINES IN REFTEL: NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHOUT PRE-COMMITMENTS AND/OR PRECONDITIONS IN WHICH EACH SIDE COULD PRESENT ITS POSITION AND DEMANDS. ISRAEL WILL WELCOME HELP FROM ANYONE - INCLUDING THE UN - WHO COULD HELP ACHIEVE THIS, BUT IT SHOULD BE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THIS "ANYONE" WILL NOT MEDIATE OR TRY TO IMPOSE SOLUTIONS. REGARDING THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON THE UN CHARTER, MRS MEIR REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WOULD AWAIT EGYPT'S REACTION AND THEN REPEATED THE

ISRAELI STAND RE PRECOMMITMENTS AND PRECONDITIONS. IN REPLYING TO A QUESTION BY WALDHEIM, MRS MEIR ASSURED HIM THAT THE GOI IS STILL READY TO ACCEPT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BE THE FIRST STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. SHE ADDED THAT THE GOI VIEWS SUCH AN AGREEMENT AS "UNFREEZING" THE SITUATION RATHER THAN "FREEZING" THE SITUATION AS THE EGYPTIANS FEAR.

5. THE PRIMIN DWELT AT LENGTH ON THE NATURE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT WITH EMPHASIS ON REFUSAL OF THE ARABS TO RECOGNIZE, ACCEPT AND BE WILLING TO LIVE WITH ISRAEL. SHE REVIEWED THE 1957 WITHDRAWALS, THE MAY-JUNE 1967 CRISIS AND THE HISTORY OF THE JARRING MISSION. SHE ALSO REFERRED TO THE HYPOCRISY AND IMBALANCE IN THE ATTITUDE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF ARAB TERRORISM AND ISRAEL.

6. CLARIFICATION OF GOI POSITION ON UN CHARTER PROPOSAL. EVRON NOTED THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE MEETING WITH MRS MEIR THERE HAD BEEN A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY IN THE GOI CONCERNING WALDHEIM'S PROPOSAL THAT THE UN CHARTER MIGHT BE THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS AND MRS MEIR'S REPLY WHICH LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR AT LEAST CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL AFTER WALDHEIM VISIT CAIRO. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE PRIMIN, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO INFORM WALDHEIM OF THE GOI NEGATIVE VIEW OF THIS IDEA AND THIS WAS DONE BY EBAN AT THE AIRPORT PRIOR TO WALDHEIM'S DEPARTURE. EBAN SAID TO WALDHEIM THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR EGYPT TO GET A CLEAR AND ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF THE GOI POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS: "READINESS TO NEGOTIATE A PEACE SETTLEMENT WITHOUT PREVIOUS CONDITIONS AND ISRAEL CONTINUES TO REGARD RES 242 AS THE BASIS FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS."

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FEATURE

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 06905 01 OF 02 030030Z

7. CONVERSATION BETWEEN WALDHEIM AND ERAN. ERAN WENT OVER GOI POSITIONS ON ALL RELEVANT ITEMS WITH WALDHEIM. WALDHEIM NOTED THAT RES 24 HAD NOT PRODUCED ANY PROGRESS AND AGAIN PUT FORWARD HIS IDEA OF USING THE UN CHARTER AS THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS. ERAN EXPRESSED DOUBTS BUT SAID THE GOI WOULD BE OPEN TO ANY SUGGESTION WHICH WOULD PRODUCE FREE NEGOTIATIONS AND WHICH WOULD NOT SEEK TO PREDETERMINE RESULTS, ETC.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 642

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06905 02 OF 02 030132Z

62
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-91 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

123489

2

0 021910Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9642

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 6905

EXDIS

8. EBAN TOUCHED UPON WALDHEIM'S STATEMENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MID EAST HAS WORSENERED WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME TO THE DETRIMENT OF ALL CONCERNED. IN THIS RESPECT EBAN NOTED THAT DETENTE BETWEEN THE US AND USSR MADE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEM IN THE AREA MOST REMOTE; FURTHERMORE, DESPITE SOVIET POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS, SOVIET POLICY IN THE AREA WAS LESS MILITANT THAN IN THE PAST. EBAN ALSO REFERRED TO THE ENERGY CRISIS AND NOTED THAT, WHILE THE PROBLEMS EXIST, THE USG HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT ITS POLICY TOWARDS THE MID EAST IS NOT GOING TO BE INFLUENCED BY THESE CONSIDERATIONS. THEREFORE, SAID EBAN, SADAT STILL FACES THE CHOICE BETWEEN CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO AND NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL CERTAINLY GIVE HIM MORE THAN HE HAS NOW. EBAN ALSO TOUCHED ON THE "HUMAN" ELEMENT IN THE RELATIONS DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE GOI AND ARABS IN THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES, NOTING IN THIS RESPECT THE "OPEN BRIDGES" POLICY. WALDHEIM AGREED WITH EBAN AS CONCERNS HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE GREATER REDUCED DANGER OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND USSR. WALDHEIM STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ARABS STILL BELIEVE TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE RELYING UPON THEIR NUMBERS AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM. WALDHEIM NOTED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD "DID NOT DENY" THAT SADAT DISCUSSED THE ENERGY SITUATION DURING HIS RECENT SECRET VISIT TO DAMASCUS AND EXCHANGED VIEWS ON HOW THIS COULD BE EXPLOITED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ARABS AGAINST ISRAEL. ALSO, NOTED WALDHEIM SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT ARE GETTING CLOSER TOGETHER. WALDHEIM STATED THAT THERE WERE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT AMONG THE ARABS; THE FIRST BELIEVES THE ARABS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THE ENERGY CRISIS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DC 1650

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 06905 02 OF 02 030132Z

NOW, WHILE THE OTHER BELIEVES AN ARAB EFFORT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE ONLY IN THE 1980S.

9. TERRORISM. EBAN ASKED WALDHEIM IF THE UN IS GOING TO MAKE ANY SERIOUS EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM. WALDHEIM REPLIED MERELY THAT THE SUBJECT WAS "ON THE AGENDA" BUT THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY "PRACTICAL" RESULTS.

10. NEAR THE END OF THE CONVERSATION WITH EBAN, WALDHEIM ASKED ABOUT THE FUTURE POLICY OF THE GOI IN THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES, NOTING THAT THE "ARABS" HAD ASKED HIM TO RAISE THAT SUBJECT WITH THE GOI. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THERE WAS CONCERN EXPRESSED PARTICULARLY ABOUT GOI SETTLEMENT AND LAND SALES POLICY. EBAN REPLIED THAT THE GOI WAS ACTING WITHIN ITS SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES. ONE COULD NOT INDEFINITELY FREEZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION IN THESE AREAS AND ISRAEL WAS CONTRIBUTING TO ALLEVIATING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BY PROVIDING HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT. EBAN STATED THAT SETTLEMENT IS LIMITED TO AREAS WHERE ISRAEL WOULD PROPOSE "TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS" DURING EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, EBAN STATED THAT THE GOI HAS NO FINAL POSITION WITH RESPECT TO EXACT BOUNDARY LINES AND REITERATED THAT THIS WOULD BE LEFT TO NEGOTIATIONS. EBAN CLAIMED IT WAS HIGHLY EXAGGERATED TO PRESENT SETTLEMENT IN THESE AREAS AS AFFECTING THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES THERE. AFTER ALL, HE NOTED, ONLY A FEW THOUSAND ISRAELIS WERE INVOLVED WHICH IS FAR BELOW THE ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH IN THE ADMINISTERED AREAS. EBAN ALSO STATED THAT THE GOI HAS NOT CHANGED ITS POLICY WITH RESPECT TO LAND ACQUISITION IN THE ADMINISTERED AREAS AND HE NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THAT EVEN THE NEW LABOR PARTY PROPOSALS INCLUDED MANY LIMITATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF LAND ACQUISITION AND THERE WAS NO PLAN TO ALLOW FREE SALE OF LAND.

11. WALDHEIM AGAIN PROMISED TO DO HIS UTMOST TO ENCOURAGE EXCHANGES OF POWS.

12. WALDHEIM REPEATED TO EBAN HIS COMMENTS TO MRS MEIR CONCERNING SYRIA'S UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT RES 242 WHILE INSISTING ON TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND HIS VIEW THAT LEBANON WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL BUT THE LEBANESE CANNOT BE THE FIRST. AS CONCERNS THE PALESTINIAN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ^{SECRET}AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 06905 02 OF 02 030132Z

ISSUE, EBAN NOTED THAT THIS WAS PRIMARILY A PROBLEM FOR JORDAN TO WORK OUT WITH THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

13. EBAN ASKED WALDHEIM TO STAY FOR A PRIVATE CHAT AND ALL ADVISORS LEFT THE ROOM. (READING FROM THE TELEGRAM EBAN DICTATED TO DINITZ, EVRON PASSED ON THE FOLLOWING. HE NOTED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCRIPTS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE.) EBAN TOLD WALDHEIM THAT HE SHOULD CONSIDER HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL AS HAVING BEEN "POSITIVE." EBAN NOTED THAT THIS IS NOT THE TIME FOR OPERATIVE INITIATIVES AS WALDHEIM COULD JUDGE BY THE ARAB POSITION. IN THIS RESPECT THE SYG DID WELL BY UNDERLINING THE STUDY CHARACTER OF THE VISITS AND EBAN RECOMMENDED THAT WALDHEIM CONTINUE TO SO CHARACTERIZE THIS ROUND OF VISITS TO THE AREA. EBAN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE "PRESS INCIDENTS" DID NOT CAUSE "UNPLEASANTNESS" FOR SYG SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT WALDHEIM HAD BEEN WARMLY RECEIVED IN ISRAEL. EBAN SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING WALDHEIM IN NEW YORK.

14. WALDHEIM REPLIED THAT HE WAS VERY GRATIFIED BY HIS RECEPTION AND HE EXPLAINED AND APOLOGIZED FOR THE "SKULL CAP" INCIDENT. HE SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN PUBLICLY THAT HE IS VISITING THE AREA ONLY TO STUDY THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND TO LEARN. AT THE SAME TIME HE EMPHASIZED TO EBAN HIS BELIEF THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO HAVE A DIPLOMATIC VACUUM IN THE MID EAST FOR ANY LONG PERIOD OF TIME. WALDHEIM STATED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE AT LEAST THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS ON-GOING ACTIVITY EITHER BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED, THE "POWERS" OR THE UN. WALDHEIM SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DOING SOMETHING NOW BUT CONSIDERS IT A PROFITABLE INVESTMENT OF HIS TIME IF HE HAS GAINED UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST AMONG THE ISRAELIS.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



'73 AUG 32 AM 8 53
Department of State
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

SECRET 339

KENNEDY
L.L.

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06817 311228Z

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

107029

R 300748Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9603
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET TEL AVIV 6817

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PROR IS
SUBJ: DAYAN'S THINKING ON EVOLUTION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: TEL AVIV 3903

SUMMARY. DAYAN WANTS ESTABLISHMENT IN NEAR FUTURE OF FOUR REGIONS, TWO IN GAZA STRIP AND TWO IN WEST BANK, WHICH EVENTUALLY WOULD EACH BE GOVERNED IN SOME MEASURE BY LOCALLY ELECTED COUNCIL. UNDER NEW LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER NEXT FOUR YEARS, DAYAN EXPECTS PRIVATE ISRAELI LAND PURCHASES TO BE LIMITED TO AREAS ON WHICH THERE IS GOI CONSENSUS AS TO NEED FOR THEIR PERMANENT RETENTION BY ISRAEL UNDER FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT, I.E. TULKARM AREA ALONG PRE-1967 JORDAN-ISRAEL LINE AND AREAS AROUND JERUSALEM. END SUMMARY.

1. DEPUTY TRANSPORT MINISTER AND DAYAN CONFIDANT YAACOBBI TOLD EMBOFF THAT IN DAYAN'S THINKING, REFUGEE REHABILITATION AND AREA DEVELOPMENT IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER NEXT FOUR YEARS SHOULD FACILITATE BEGINNING OF LOCAL POLITICAL AUTONOMY FOR INHABITANTS. AS YAACOBBI HAD EXPLAINED TO EMBOFF MAY 16 (REFTEL), IT WAS ARTICLE OF FAITH FOR DAYAN THAT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR POPULATION OF TERRITORIES WOULD BRING STEADY DECLINE IN TENSIONS AND

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PRM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 06817 311228Z

GROWING INTEREST IN COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL. ACCORDING TO YAACOBI, DAYAN ENVISAGES ESTABLISHMENT DURING NEXT FOUR YEARS OF FOUR AUTONOMOUS REGIONS, EACH TO BE GOVERNED IN SOME MEASURE BY OWN ELECTED COUNCIL: SOUTH GAZA, NORTH GAZA, JUDEA, AND SAMARIA. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN'S THINKING HAD NOT GONE SO FAR AS CONSIDERATION OF EVENTUAL FEDERATIVE COUNCIL FOR THE FOUR REGIONS TOGETHER. DAYAN INTENTIONALLY HAD NOT COME TO CONCLUSION ABOUT MANY SUCH QUESTIONS, PREFERRING TO LET EXPERIENCE BE HIS GUIDE, BUT HE HAD OPEN MIND.

2. DAYAN'S FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE, YAACOBI CONTINUED, WAS INTER-TWINGING OF DESTINIES OF ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLES. HE WANTED TIME AND FREE HAND TO WORK TOWARD THIS. IF FORCED TODAY TO DRAW BORDERS, HE WOULD PROBABLY INSIST ON ORDERS AND/OR LOCAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MAKING JUDEA (SOUTHERN WEST BANK) AND MUCH OF SAMARIA (NORTHERN WEST BANK) PART OF ISRAEL, LEAVING GAZA AND REST OF SAMARIA UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL, AND RETAINING SUBSTANTIAL PART OF EASTERN SINAI (INSIDE STRAIGHTLINE FROM POINT A FEW KILOMETERS EAST OF EL ARISH TO SHARM EL-SHEIKH) AS DEFENSIVE BUFFER. UNDER SUCH ARRANGEMENT HE MIGHT CALL FOR GRANTING OF ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP TO INDIGENOUS INHABITANTS OF GAZA STRIP AND JORDANIAN CITIZENSHIP TO 1948 REFUGEES IN GAZA (JUDEA POPULATION WOULD REMAIN JORDANIANS).

3. GIVEN PASSAGE OF TIME AND PEACFUL EVOLUTION, YAACOBI BELIEVED DAYAN WOULD BE READY FOR MUCH GREATER ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY ON TERRITORIAL ISSUES. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE LARGE PART OF SAMARIA REVERT TO JORDAN, WITH TULKARM AREA, AREA SOUTH OF RAMALLAH, AND OF COURSE MOST OF JORDAN RIVER VALLEY BEING INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL, AND WITH GAZA AND JUDEA BECOMING AUTONOMOUS REGIONS INHABITED BY BOTH ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN CITIZENS. YAACOBI REITERATED HIS CONVICTION THAT DAYAN WAS THE ONE ISRAELI LEADER IMAGINATIVE ENOUGH AND SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE TO ARAB FEELINGS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ACTUAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE TO ISRAEL IN THE ABSTRACT. DAYAN REPRESENTED ONLY PROMISE OF EVENTUAL MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

4. IN REVIEWING CONTEXTS OF NEW LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, YAACOBI IMPLIED HE PERSONALLY QUESTIONED VALUE AND PRACTICALITY OF DAYAN'S SCHEME OF CITY OF YAMIT IN RAFAH JUNCTION AREA AND ESPECIALLY ADJACENT DEEPWATER PORT, ON LAND SALES TO

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 06817 311228Z

PRIVATE ISRAELI FIRMS, YAACOB I SAID DAYAN INTENDED TO PERMIT THESE ONLY IN AREAS WHICH GOT GENERALLY AGREED WERE TO BE RETAINED BY ISRAEL UNDER ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT, SUCH AS TULKARM AREA AND SMALL AREA NORTH OF JERUSALEM. DAYAN WANTED AUTHORIZATION OF PRIVATE LAND SALES FOR PURPOSES OF ENCOURAGING ISRAELI INVESTMENT IN LABOR-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR LOCAL POPULATION.

5. COMMENT: (A) DAYAN HAS FLUCTUATED SINCE 1971 ON NOTION OF JORDANIAN ROLE IN GAZA: IN LENGTHY SEPT 16, 1971 INTERVIEW WITH HAARETZ, DAYAN FIRMLY OPPOSED IT, BUT MORE RECENTLY HE HAS BEEN OPENMINDED ON IT(SEE REFTEL). AS FOR CITIZENSHIP FOR GAZA REFUGEES, DAYAN IN AFORMENTIONED INTERVIEW SPOKE FAVORABLY OF IDEA OF GIVING THEM ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP, AND ON AT LEAST ONE OTHER OCCASION SINCE THEN IS SAID TO HAVE REMARKED THAT ISRAEL MAY SOME DAY HAVE TO INTEGRATE GAZA REFUGEES. THEREFORE, PERHAPS YAACOB I INADVERTENTLY REVERSED DAYAN'S IDEA AS TO WHICH CITIZENSHIP, JORDANIAN OR ISRAELI, WOULD GO TO REFUGEES VERSUS INDIGENOUS GAZANS (PARA 2 ABOVE).

(B) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT YAACOB I HAS NOW REVERSED HIMSELF ON WHETHER DAYAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE RAMALLAH INCORPORATED INTO GREATER JERUSALEM OR NOT (REFTEL), HAVING CAREFULLY STATED IN PRESENT CONVERSATION THAT DAYAN WANTS JERUSALEM EXPANDED NORTH TOWARD RAMALLAH BUT NOT INCLUDING IT.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

15
ACTION SS-25

103471

O 301036Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9605

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 6819

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAS. 1. & 2.)

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S CREEPING ANNEXATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES

SUMMARY: WITH IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF ERECTING TOWN OF YAMIT IN SINAI, TEMPO OF PLANTING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CONTEMPLATED UNDER NEW LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR NEXT FOUR YEARS DOES NOT REPRESENT DRASTIC ACCELERATION OVER 1967-1973 PERIOD. FROM TECHNICAL AS OPPOSED TO POLITICAL VIEW POINT, DIFFICULTY OF DISMANTLING PARTS OF NETWORK OF SETTLEMENTS WOULD NOT BY 1977 REPRESENT INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE. AS FOR AUTHORIZATION CONTEMPLATED FOR PRIVATE ISRAELI LAND PURCHASES IN TERRITORIES, EMB HAS BEEN TOLD THAT IT IS INTENDED FOR VERY LIMITED AREA. PLAN FOR ENLARGEMENT OF JERUSALEM WILL CERTAINLY COMPLICATE EVENTUAL SOLUTION OF JERUSALEM ISSUE, BUT IT IS OF MINOR IMPORTANCE WHEN COMPARED WITH BASIC PROBLEM OF ISRAEL'S 1967 ANNEXATION OF EAST PART OF CITY. AS FOR PLANS FOR AREA DEVELOPMENT, RESULTANT INTERLOCKING OF ECONOMY OF TERRITORIES WITH THAT OF ISRAEL WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY VISIBLE. AND THEREFORE POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING TO NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES. AREA DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS INTENDED UNDER PROGRAM PLUS PLANS FOR REFUGEE REHABILITATION WILL CERTAINLY BE POSITIVE IN HUMAN TERMS, BUT MANY FALL FAR SHORT OF ISRAEL'S PACIFICATION EXPECTATIONS AND DO NOT IN OUR VIEW CONSTITUTE REDEEMING FEATURE.

SECRET

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

L1652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 TFL AV 06819 01 OF 02 310436Z

1. PROGRAM FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WORKED OUT BY LABOR PARTY LEADERSHIP AND APPROVED AUG 15, WHICH IS LIKELY TO BECOME OFFICIAL GOI POLICY FOLLOWING OCTOBER ELECTIONS, CAN BE BROKEN DOWN INTO FOLLOWING COMPONENTS: (A) 29 ADDITIONAL ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS; (B) LAND PURCHASES; (C) ENLARGEMENT OF JERUSALEM; (D) ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF TERRITORIES AND REFUGEE REHABILITATION; AND (E) TOWN OF YAMIT IN SINAI. IT IS WORTH EXAMINING EACH COMPONENT TO ESTIMATE EFFECT ITS IMPLEMENTATION MIGHT HAVE ON PROSPECTS FOR MID EAST PEACE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 06819 01 OF 02 310436Z

3. LAND PURCHASES. DEPUTY TRANSPORT MINISTER AND DAYAN CONFIDANT YAACOBBI HAS TOLD EMB THAT INTENTION IS TO PERMIT LAND PURCHASES BY PRIVATE FIRMS ONLY IN PORTIONS OF WEST BANK WHERE EVERYONE IN GOI HAS AGREED SOVEREIGNTY MUST PASS TO ISRAEL UNDER FINAL SETTLEMENT. THIS MEANS ACCORDING TO YAACOBBI MAINLY TULKARM AND AREA IMMEDIATELY AROUND JERUSALEM. YAACOBBI SAID PURPOSE FOR WHICH SUCH PURCHASE WOULD BE APPROVED WOULD BE INVESTMENT TO PROVIDE LABOR INTENSIVE INDUSTRY FOR SAKE OF LOCAL POPULATION. IF YAACOBBI'S STATEMENT IS TRUE AND IF ISRAELI PLAN IS REALLY THIS LIMITED, AUTHORIZATION OF PURCHASES UNDER PROGRAM SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PEACE. BUT EMB AGREES WITH CONGEN JERUSALEM (JERUSALEM 877) THAT OPENING OF LAND SALES (PANDORA BOX) IS POTENTIALLY QUITE DANGEROUS AND COULD CONCEIVABLY SPREAD TO MANY PARTS OF WEST BANK.

4. ENLARGEMENT OF JERUSALEM. EMB DEFERS TO CONGE JERUSALEM AND EMBASSY AMMAN ON WHETHER THIS SEGMENT OF ISRAELI PROGRAM IS LIKELY TO CONSTITUTE MAJOR BARRIER TO MID EAST PEACE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT SIGNIFICANT QUESTION IS WHETHER TERRITORY TO BE ADDED TO JERUSALEM WOULD BE FORMALLY ANNEXED BY ISRAEL; OUR READING OF PROGRAM IS UNCLEAR ON THIS POINT. EVEN WITHOUT FORMAL ANNEXATION, ENLARGEMENT OF JERUSALEM CAN ONLY MAKE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM WORSE, BUT MAIN OBSTACLE IN OUR VIEW IS FACT OF ORIGINAL ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF EAST JERUSALEM IN 1967, IN FACE OF WHICH SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI ACTIONS ARE JERUSALEM PALE IN COMPARISON.

5. DEVELOPMENT AND REHABILITATION. THIS PART OF PROGRAM WILL INVOLVE INTERLOCKING OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMY WITH THAT OF TERRITORIES AS WELL AS INCREASING LINKAGE OF ELECTRICITY, WATER, AND HIGHWAY NETWORKS. PROGRAM IN THIS SEGMENT WILL THEREFORE MAKE UNSCRAMBLING OF ISRAEL AND TERRITORIES MUCH HARDER BY 1977 IF AIM OF FINAL SETTLEMENT WERE TO BE REESTABLISHMENT OF HERMETICALLY SEALED ISRAELI BORDERS OF PRE-1967 KIND. WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND NEIGHBORING STATES, ESPECIALLY JORDAN, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SUCH BORDERS IS IN CARDS. IMPORTANT THING IS THAT SUCH INTERTWINING OF TERRITORIES WITH ISRAEL ECONOMICALLY AND OTHER WAYS OVER NEXT FOUR YEARS WILL BE HIGHLY VISIBLE. PROCESS MIGHT THEREFORE MAKE VERY ACT OF ENTERING INTO UNCONDITIONAL NEGOT-

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 06819 01 OF 02 310436Z

IATIONS WITH ISRAEL MORE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY FOR NEIGHBORING STATES, AS ARAB GOVERNMENTS WILL FEAR ACCUSATIONS THAT ANY AGREEMENT TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS EQUALS TACIT ACQUIESCENCE IN DE FACTO ISRAELI ANNEXATIONS.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with vertical stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest with a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below. Two small stars are positioned on the left and right sides of the seal.

SECRET 368

2

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

095114

S E C R E T SECT 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 6819

6. AS FOR REHOUSING AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR REFUGEES, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW ANYONE (INCLUDING EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT) CAN QUARREL ABOUT THIS PART OF PROGRAM PER SE, IN VIEW OF WRETCHED LOT OF THESE PEOPLE AND POLITICAL VALUE OF BREAKING DOWN UNREAL REFUGEE MENTALITY AND GIVING REFUGEES STAKE IN NORMAL LIFE. WHETHER THIS CAN LEAD TO DAYAN'S DREAM OF STEADY REDUCTION OF TENSION IN OCCUPIED AREAS AND GREATER DESIRE ON PART OF POPULATION TO COOPERATE WITH ISRAEL, ENABLING ISRAELIS STEADILY TO INCREASE LOCAL POLITICAL AUTONOMY, SEEMS DOUBTFUL. ALTHOUGH DAYAN'S VISION OF GRADUAL INTERTWINING OF DESTINIES OF ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLES IN THIS FASHION IS COMMENDABLE, WE JUDGE IT TO BE GENERATIONS AWAY IF ATTAINABLE AT ALL, AND NOT SOMETHING LIKELY TO COME ABOUT UNDER CONDITIONS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION, NO MATTER HOW BENIGN.

7. YAMIT. BUILDING OF CITY WITH ROUGHLY 2,000 ISRAELI INHABITANTS BY 1977 IN NORTHEASTERN SINAI WILL CONSTITUTE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO OPENING OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN THOUGH TOWN WILL BE CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN DAYAN WANTED, AND WILL NOT FOR TIME BEING HAVE ADJACENT DEEPWATER PORT DAYAN SOUGH. DOVES HAVE SUGGESTED THERE IS QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE 2,000 SETTLERS CAN BE ENLISTED BY 1977, BUT WE DOUBT THIS WILL BE DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT NEW SOVIET IMMIGRANTS ARE BEING PLACED THERE (SEPTEL). CHARITABLE VIEW OF YAMIT IS THAT ITS CONSTRUCTION SHOULD ENABLE ISRAEL POLITICALLY TO (A) LET GAZA STRIP BE ARAB-RUN UNDER FINAL SETTLEMENT, AND (B) RETURN ALL THE REST OF SINAI (LESS SHARM EL-SHEIKH) AND CORRIDOR TO IT) TO EGYPT.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00002 301122Z

BUT WE ASSUME THIS CHARITABLE INTERPRETATION WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT
WHATEVER IN CAIRO.

8. CONCLUSION. ABOVE PROGRAM ADDS UP TO TWO NEW DEPARTURES--
YAMIT AND PRIVATE LAND PURCHASES-- PLUS ADDITION OF CONSIDERABLE
MOMENTUM TO EXISTING ISRAELI PROGRAMS IN TERRITORIES. IN OUR
VIEW, PROGRAM ONCE IMPLEMENTED WILL MOVE ISRAEL CLOSE TO
POINT OF NO RETURN DOWN PATH OF ANNEXATION. EVEN IF ISRAEL WILL
STOP SHORT OF EVENTUAL ANNEXATION, INCREASINGLY VISIBLE ISRAELI
RELATIONSHIP WITH TERRITORIES MAY GROW INTO SUCH A POLITICAL
EMBARRASSMENT TO ARAB STATES TO WHICH THESE TERRITORIES BELONG
THAT WHATEVER HOPE THERE IS FOR STARTING MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATING
PROCESS MAY SLIP AWAY.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

811/00/017

07000
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WA

SECRET 464

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06573 210923Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

008107

R 210726Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9490
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

SECRET TEL AVIV 6573

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, IS, TS, IT, XF
SUBJECT: BOURGUIBA INITIATIVE ON MIDDLE EAST

1. MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS DIRECTOR VERED IN TOUR D'HORIZON OF AREA DEVELOPMENTS SINCE END OF MAY TOOK INITIATIVE OF INFORMING EMBOFF THAT ISRAEL HAD SENT SECRET MESSAGE TO BOURGUIBA JN JUNE THROUGH ITALIANS SUGGESTING TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. BOURGUIBA REPLIED THAT IF GOI WOULD AGREE IN ADVANCE TO ACCEPT 1947 PARTITION RESOLUTION AS BASIS FOR TALKS, HE WOULD AGREE TO MEET WITH ISRAELI REP FOR TALKS IN WHICH BOURGUIBA WOULD BE SPEAKING ONLY FOR HIMSELF. BOURGUIBA ADDED THAT IF SUCH TALKS WENT WELL, HE WOULD THEN UNDERTAKE TO OBTAIN AUTHORIZATION TO SPEAK FOR GOVTS OF ARAB STATES CONFRONTING ISRAEL.

2. MRS VERED SAID BOURGUIBA INITIATIVE WAS STILLBORN, KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 120 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

73 AUG 12 5:31

CONFIDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1316307

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06346 131630Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

074005

0 R 131330Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9390
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 6346

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IS, US, XV
SUBJECT: ISRAELI SEIZURE OF LEBANESE AIRLINER

1. AS EMBASSY IS REPORTING SEPARATELY, THERE ARE UNDERCURRENTS IN ISRAEL OF SERIOUS DOUBT ABOUT WISDOM OF IDF INTERCEPTION AUGUST 10 OF LEBANESE AIRLINER. SEVERAL WELL INFORMED EMBASSY CONTACTS, IN EXPRESSING THEIR DISMAY TO US PRIVATELY, HAVE SAID AMONG OTHER THINGS THEY WERE POSITIVE THAT FOLLOWING TRAGIC SHOOTDOWN LAST FEBRUARY OF LIBYAN AIRLINER, IDF PILOTS IN THIS ACTION WERE UNDER STRICT ORDERS NOT TO FIRE. THEREFORE, IF PILOT OF LEBANESE AIRLINER HAD DEFIED INSTRUCTION TO FLY TO ISRAEL, THIS AFFAIR WOULD HAVE BEEN STILL GREATER FIASCO.

2. BACKGROUND FOR CONVERSATION CHARGE HAD LATE AUGUST 11 WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL GAZIT OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AT SOCIAL EVENT WAS LEBANESE CALL FOR UNSC ACTION AND CRITICAL BRITISH STATEMENT (USG CRITICISM OF ACTION HAD NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED HERE). GAZIT PREDICTABLY MADE FORCEFUL PRESENTATION OF GOI VIEWS:

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 06346 131630Z

A) ISRAEL IS AT WAR WITH TERRORISTS, AND BEST DEFENSE IS OFFENSE, AND B) TERRORISTS ARE COMMON ENEMY OF ISRAEL AND US, AND US SHOULD VIEW SITUATION IN PERSPECTIVE OF ISRAEL'S FIGHTING BOTH COUNTRY'S BATTLE. GAZIT EMPHASIZED HIS ESTIMATE THAT IF HABASH OR OTHER FEDAYEEN LEADERS HAD ACTUALLY BEEN CAUGHT, ISRAEL'S FRIENDS INCLUDING US WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH LESS CRITICAL. CHARGE REPLIED THAT ISRAEL UNDERESTIMATES REAL PROBLEMS CAUSED FOR ISRAEL'S FRIENDS BY SUCH ACTION, WHICH MANY WERE CALLING AIR PIRACY, AND ISRAEL COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT USG TO SUPPORT SUCH ACTIONS NOR REFRAIN FROM CRITICISM. GAZIT ACKNOWLEDGED ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO EXPECT SOME NEGATIVE ELEMENTS IN USG PUBLIC POSTURE BUT STILL THOUGHT THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF HABASH HAD BEEN CAPTURED.

3. GAZIT'S TOUGH ATTITUDE IS FAIRLY REPRESENTATIVE OF PUBLIC POSTURE ADOPTED BY GOI WHICH APPEARS TO BE COMBINATION OF DEFENSIVE REACTION TO INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF ISRAELI SEIZURE OF AIRLINER AND CHAGRIN OVER FAILURE OF OPERATION. DESPITE GOI ATTEMPT PROJECT AGGRESSIVE, CONFIDENT POSTURE, WE SUSPECT ISRAELIS ARE LESS THAN SURE OF THEMSELVES AS WE MOVE TO UNSC ARENA. AN INDICATION OF THIS WAS REMARK EX-AMBASSADOR RABIN MADE TO CHARGE AT SAME AUGUST 11 SOCIAL EVENT. RABIN SAID HE WAS GLAD HE WAS NOT THE ONE IN WASHINGTON TRYING TO EXPLAIN THIS ISRAELI ACTION TO USG.
VELIOTES

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

29

10/20/01

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

W H
TELEGRAM

'73 AUG 6 AM 6:31

SECRET 616
3352 WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06199 071335Z SITUATION ROOM

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W

025064

0 R 071301Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9321
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 6199

EXDLS

F. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, PINT, IS, XF
SUBJECT: LABOR PARTY POLICY ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. EMBASSY IS REPORTING SEPARATELY ON APPROACHING CRUNCH IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AMONG ISRAEL'S TOP LABOR PARTY PERSONALITIES OVER COMPROMISE IN PARTY POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO MOLLIFY DAYAN. WHILE THERE IS NO CERTAINTY ARGUMENT WILL BE RESOLVED THIS WEEK, DAYAN CAMPAIGN HAS SUDDENLY GATHERED CONSIDERABLE STEAM, MRS METZ SURELY IS TIRED OF WHAT SHE CONSIDERS UNSIGHTLY DEBATE AND WANTS IT TO END, AND MEETING SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 9 IS DESCRIBED AS FINAL ONE.

2. FROM VIEWPOINT OF US INTERESTS, PROBABLY WORST RESULT THAT COULD EMERGE WOULD BE ISSUANCE OF LABOR PARTY DOCUMENT AUGUST 9 CALLING FOR (A) ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDIUM-SIZED ISRAELI TOWN (YAMIT) OVER NEXT FEW YEARS ON EGYPTIAN MEDITERRANEAN COAST NEAR OLD SINAI-GAZA LINE; (B) AUTHORIZATION FOR LIMITED AND CONTROLLED ISRAELI PURCHASES OF WEST BANK LAND; AND (C) FUNDING OF ADDITIONAL SMALL ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AND DOCUMENT MIGHT BE MUCH MORE GENERAL OR MODERATE THAN THIS. DOCUMENT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN PORTION OF LABOR PARTY PLATFORM FOR COMING ELECTIONS BUT WOULD AMOUNT TO NEW PLAN IN PLATFORM, CONSTITUTING IMPORTANT REFINEMENT OF GENERALIZED TERMS OF (LARGELY UNIMPLEMENTED) 1969

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

30

M DE 1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TFL AV 06199 071335Z

LABOR PARTY PLATFORM ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. DEPARTMENT WILL NEED TO REVIEW EFFECT OF SUCH DEVELOPMENT ON
US AREA INTERESTS AND TO CONSIDER WHETHER USG APPROACH TO ISRAELIS
IS NEEDED. EMBASSY IS UNABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER USG APPROACH
WOULD APPRECIABLY ALTER TREND OF EVENTS, BUT PRESUMABLY IT WOULD
LEND AT LEAST SOME AMMUNITION TO MODERATES. AT THE LEAST IT
WOULD AVOID GOI MISINTERPRETING OUR SILENCE AS APPROVAL. IT IS
WORTH NOTING THAT BOTH EBAN AND BAR-LEV ARE
ABSENT FROM ISRAEL THIS WEEK, MEANING THAT RANKS OF
MODERATES WHO HAVE SPOKEN UP AGAINST DAYAN ON THIS ISSUE IN
RECENT DAYS ARE DEPLETED.
VELIOTES

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

ee 1/00/010

M 05 1652

0701
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 830

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03193 201356Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 W

O 201250Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6936
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEL AVIV 3193

EXDIS

EAST GHOR CANAL

REF AMMAN 3953

1. EVEN IF IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ZAUY RAFIA'S REMARKS RE FINALITY OF GOJ POSITION DO NOT IN FACT INDICATE THAT GOJ WOULD REFUSE TO DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT JORDANIANS HAVE ABOUT DECIDED THAT ISRAELI PRICE (MILITARY COMMANDERS MEETING PRIOR TO CANAL REPAIR) IS TOO HIGH TO PAY AND THAT JORDANIAN POSITION WILL BE STRONGER IF THEY BRAVE OUT SITUATION. ONCE IRREVERSIBLE DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE TO CITRUS AND BANANA GROVES, PRESSURES ON GOJ FROM OWNERS THEREOF WOULD PRESUMABLY DECLINE. ON ISRAELI SIDE, REFUSAL TO LET CANAL BE REPAIRED WOULD HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY CONTINUAL INTERDICTION OF CANAL AREA TO PREVENT REPAIRS. OVER TIME, THEREFORE, GOJ MIGHT BELIEVE THAT IT CAN BEAR BURDEN OF LOSS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN RETURN FOR WHATEVER BOOST IN MORALE MAY COME FROM REFUSING TO KNUCKLE UNDER TO ISRAELIS AND FOR IRRITANT IN US-SOJ RELATIONS WHICH NONREPAIR OF CANAL WOULD ENTAIL.

2. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY NOTED, OUR FEELING IS THAT GOJ OBJECTIVE IS MORE TO FIND ADEQUATE QUID PRO QUO TO ALLOW CANAL TO BE REPAIRED THAN TO HAVE IT REMAIN BROKEN. LESSON THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD LEARNED IN JUNE WAS THAT CANAL WAS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO KING AND THAT HE WOULD GO TO GREAT LENGTHS AND MAKE CATEGORICAL PROMISES IN ORDER TO

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
32

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03193 201356Z

GET IT REPAIRED. ON THAT BASIS, GOI HOPED FOR GOOD-SIZED
QUID FOR ITS QUO. IF VALUE OF QUO TO JORDANIANS CAN BE
SHOWN TO HAVE DECREASED MARKEDLY, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE
THAT GOI WILL ALSO REDUCE ITS DEMANDS TO LEVEL
THAT WILL
ACCOMMODATE ALLOWING CANAL AGAIN TO BE REPAIRED.

3. THOUGH ZAID RIFAI SAYS ASSURANCES NOT IN EFFECT IN THIS
PERIOD, IT APPEARS TO US THAT VIOLENCE IN BET SHEAN VALLEY HAS
IN FACT DROPPED MARKEDLY SINCE CANAL WAS CUT. THIS MAY BE
MEANINGFUL TO GOI, ESPECIALLY IF IT CONTINUES.

4. WE TEND TO DOUBT EFFICACY OF USG FURTHER URGING ON GOI
RELIANCE ON KING'S JUNE ASSURANCES. IF OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT
GOI WILL NOT PAY PRICE OF MILITARY MEETING, THEN IT WOULD SEEM
THAT BETTER ARGUMENT WITH ISRAELIS WOULD BE THAT LEVERAGE OF
CANAL REPAIR AT THIS TIME IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MOVE GOI TO
FURTHER CONCESSIONS AND EVEN THAT LEVERAGE WILL DECREASE
RAPIDLY IF CROP DAMAGE GOES TO IRREVERSIBLE POINT. FROM GOI
OWN POINT OF VIEW, THEREFORE, CANAL
WOULD REPRESENT GREATER
POTENTIAL LEVERAGE FOR SOME FUTURE SITUATION IF IT IS RESTORED
TO OPERATION NOW. CONTRARY COURSE, REFUSAL TO ALLOW CANAL
REPAIR AND CONTINUED INTERDICTION OVER MONTHS AHEAD MORE LIKELY
TO INCREASE JORDANIAN BITTERNESS, MIGHT SUBJECT GOI TO ADVERSE
CRITICISM OR ACTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, AND WOULD REMAIN
IRRITANT IN US-GOI RELATIONS BECAUSE OF US INVESTMENT IN CANAL.

5. WHILE THIS SEEMS TO US MOST PROFITABLE LINE OF ATTACK, WE
ARE STILL NOT SANGUINE THAT ANY APPROACH WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL.
GOI MIGHT WELL ARGUE THAT ITS UNYIELDING ATTITUDE THIS TIME HAS
RESULTED IN MUCH GREATER DROP IN LEVEL OF VIOLENCE THAN WAS CASE
BETWEEN JUNE ATTACK ON CANAL AND JULY REPAIR THEREOF. IT MAY
THUS CHOOSE TO LET CANAL REST UNREPAIRED, IN HOPE THIS WILL
CONVINCE JORDANIANS TO KEEP VIOLENCE DOWN IN FEAR THAT NEXT
TARGET WOULD BE SOMETHING OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE AND SEN-
SITIVITY.

GP-3
ZURHELLEN

SECRET

ee/ee/010

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**
'73 JUL 13 PM 1:32

SECRET 342

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM 2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05495 130626Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

072742

R 121403Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9082
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 5495

EXDIS

F. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAEL-TUNISIA CONTACTS

1. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY BY CHARGE JULY 12, FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN FURTHER EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN ISRAELI AND TUNISIAN GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM BOURGUIBA THROUGH ITALIANS APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS BEFORE. IT PROPOSED A MEETING AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL "IN THE SPIRIT OF THE 1947 PARTITION RESOLUTION." EBAN SAID GOI HAD REPLIED RAPIDLY ACCEPTING LEVEL OF MEETING, ASKING TUNISIANS TO DESIGNATE TIME AND PLACE, BUT STATING THAT DOCUMENTARY BASIS FOR DIALOGUE SHOULD BE RESOLUTION 242, WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ISRAELIS, TUNISIANS AND THE ARAB PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE. THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER REPLY TO THIS ISRAELI MESSAGE.

2. EBAN NOTED THAT EVEN THOUGH "SPIRIT OF 1947 PARTITION RESOLUTION" DID NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE COMMITMENT TO SPECIFIC BOUNDARIES ENVISAGED BY UN AT THAT TIME, ANY NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THAT CONCEPT WOULD INVOLVE IDEA OF A JEWISH STATE AND A PALESTINIAN STATE WITHIN 1947 MANDATE BOUNDARIES. THIS IDEA IS AIMED AGAINST JORDAN, BUT EBAN BELIEVES

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 05495 130626Z

IT IS INSPIRED BY CERTAIN PALESTINIANS LIVING IN TUNISIA (HE SAID HE EVEN KNEW WHO THEY WERE BUT DID NOT SPECIFY) AND TUNISIA COULD NOT EXPECT ISRAEL TO COOPERATE ON ANY SUCH ANTI-JORDAN BASIS.

3. CHARGE ASKED WHETHER EBAN BELIEVED BOURGUIBA WAS MOVING TOWARD ACTUAL DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL ON MIDDLE EAST. EBAN REPLIED IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BE SURE. ISRAEL WAS ALWAYS READY FOR A DIALOGUE, BUT REAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO COME WITH ACTUAL PARTIES TO DISPUTE IN MIDDLE EAST, AMONG WHICH TUNISIA WAS NOT COUNTED. ON BALANCE, EBAN APPEARED TO FEEL THAT PRESENT MOVES WERE MORE AIMED AGAINST JORDAN THAN FOR PROMOTING SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO BE FORTHCOMING IN MESSAGES TO BOURGUIBA AS LONG AS IT DID NOT HAVE TO COMMIT ITSELF TO ANY UNACCEPTABLE CONCEPT.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

he/10/0107

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 645

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05494 121415Z

44

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 121403 JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9081

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 5494

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: SYG VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST

REF: USUN 2528

EBAN CONFIRMED TO CHARGE JULY 12 THAT ISRAEL NOW EXPECTS SYG VISIT TO AREA. HE NOTED HE HIMSELF WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL AUGUST 18 AND THAT SYG ALSO COULD NOT COME BEFORE THAT TIME BECAUSE OF A COMMITMENT TO VISIT EASTERN EUROPE. EBAN THEREFORE BELIEVED AUGUST 22-23 MOST LIKELY TIMING.
ZURHELLEN

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

064298

73 JUL 12 PM 7:33

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

30

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows. A shield with stars and stripes is on the eagle's chest. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst and stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars are positioned on either side of the eagle's head.

SECRET 422

45
ACTION SS-25

R 121030Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9075
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 5482

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS
SUBJECT: DAYAN'S VIEWS ON REFUGEES.

1. DURING CHARGE'S FAREWELL CALL JULY 9, DEFENSE MINISTER DAYAN (MIS) QUOTED THE NIXON-BREZHNEV COMMUNIQUE AND ASKED CHARGE WHAT WERE THE "LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" WHICH THE US THOUGHT HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. CHARGE TURNED QUESTION BACK ON DAYAN, WHO THEN SUMMARIZED HIS VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. DAYAN SAID "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" COULD NOT BE ALL LUMPED TOGETHER AS HAVING SINGLE SET OF ASPIRATIONS. THOSE ARABS WHO HAD LEFT ISRAELI-HELD TERRITORY IN 1948 AND WHO HAD GONE TO GAZA, WEST BANK, JORDAN, LEBANON, SYRIA, ETC., ASPIRED TO RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES IN JAFFA, RAMLE, HAIFA, ETC. THESE ASPIRATIONS CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED. FOR THOSE OUTSIDE TERRITORIES PRESENTLY CONTROLLED BY ISRAEL, I.E., THOSE IN JORDAN, LEBANON, SYRIA, ETC., PROBLEM IS THAT OF RESETTLEMENT IN COUNTRIES OF PRESENT RESIDENCE. SITUATION OF THESE REFUGEES VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, BUT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THEIR RETURN TO ORIGINAL HOMES IN ISRAEL. MOREOVER, MOVEMENT OF THESE REFUGEES FROM COUNTRIES OF PRESENT RESIDENCE TO WEST BANK WOULD NOT SATIS-

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

APR 12 PM 7:33
WHITE HOUSE
STUDY ROOM
0090

FORM 50-1072

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 05482 121237Z

FY THEIR ASPIRATIONS, BUT WOULD ONLY EXACERBATE PROBLEM. E.G., ARAB FROM JAFFA NOW IN OTHER COUNTRY WOULD NOT HAVE HIS ASPIRATIONS SATISFIED BY BEING SETTLED IN NABLUS ANY MORE THAN BY BEING PERMANENTLY RE-SETTLED IN COUNTRY WHERE HE NOW IS. DAYAN CLAIMED THAT JORDAN, AT LEAST, REALIZES THIS AND IS READY TO CARRY OUT PERMANENT RE-SETTLEMENT OF 1948 REFUGEES WITHIN EAST BANK, WITH PROJECTS FEASIBLE IN VALLEY ON EAST SIDE OF JORDAN RIVER.

3. NINETEEN FORTY-EIGHT REFUGEES WHO FLED TO GAZA, DAYAN CONTINUED, FORM ANOTHER CATEGORY. ISRAEL CANNOT ALLOW THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES. ON OTHER HAND, IT HAS NO INTENTION OF FORCING THEM TO LEAVE GAZA. DAYAN'S ANSWER IS TO GIVE DUE COMPENSATION TO THESE PEOPLE WHO CAN THEN USE MONEY EITHER TO ESTABLISH LIVELIHOOD IN GAZA OR MOVE ELSEWHERE (I.E., ELSEWHERE OUTSIDE ISRAEL) AS THEY CHOOSE.

4. PALESTINIANS INDIGENOUS TO WEST BANK WHO FLED IN 1967 ARE A THIRD GROUP, DAYAN CONTINUED, AND EASIER TO HANDLE. THEIR PRESUMABLE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATION IS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. IF A NATIVE OF NABLUS WENT TO AMMAN IN 1967 AND IS LATER ALLOWED TO RETURN TO NABLUS, THAT SHOULD SETTLE HIS PROBLEM AND REMOVE HIM ENTIRELY FROM THE CATEGORY OF REFUGEE. CHARGE ASKED WHETHER DAYAN WAS PREPARED NOW TO SEE THIS CATEGORY OF REFUGEE RETURN TO WEST BANK AND DAYAN ANSWERED HE WAS NOT SAYING NO, AND FOR HIM NOT TO SAY NO MEANT A VERY POSITIVE ATTITUDE!

5. DAYAN SAID THESE IDEAS FOR SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEE PROBLEM COULD TAKE CARE OF AS MUCH AS TWO-THIRDS OF ALL PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, DEPENDING ONLY ON WILLINGNESS OF JORDAN TO COOPERATE. THUS, ALL REFUGEES IN GAZA, WEST BANK AND JORDAN WOULD HAVE THEIR ASPIRATIONS SATISFIED, LEAVING THE ONE-THIRD IN LEBANON, SYRIA AND ELSEWHERE FOR LATER SETTLEMENT. DAYAN THOUGHT ALL OF THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY DIRECT DEALING BETWEEN GOI AND PALESTINIANS UNDER ITS CONTROL, PLUS SILENT COOPERATION BY GOJ WITHOUT ANY GOVT-TOGOVT AGREEMENT BEING MADE. HE REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT ARABS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND JORDANIAN GOVT ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED ALONG THESE LINES. THIS WOULD ENABLE SEPARATION TO BE MADE BETWEEN PROBLEMS WHICH CAN BE SETTLED NOW, IN ADVANCE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL AGEEMENT, FROM PROBLEMS WHICH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 05482 121237Z

MUST AWAIT GOVT-TO-GOVT SETTLEMENTS, SUCH AS EVENTUAL BORDERS OF ISRAEL, RELATIONS BETWEEN ISREL AND ARAB STATES, AND RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES OUTSIDE MANDATE AND JORDAN.

6. IN PASSING, DAYAN REFERRED TO STATEMENTS OF BOURGUIBA, ZAYYAT AND THOSE OTHERS WHO HAVE SPOKEN OF GOING BACK TO 1947 PARTITION PLAN OR TO BINATIONAL NON-ZIONIST STATE IN PALESTINE. HE MADE PLAIN THAT HE BELIEVED NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE AS LONG AS EFFORTS ARE FOCUSED IN THAT DIRECTION.

7. DAYAN EMPHASIZED HE WAS SPEKING ENTIRELY FOR HIMSELF, AND NOT FOR THE GOVT OF ISRAEL. IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, FROM THE EASE AND CLARITY WITH WHICH HE SET FORTH HIS IDEAS THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING BEFORE ON THE SAME SUBJECT AND WE ASSUME THESE IDEAS ARE INTEGRAL PART OF DICUSSIONS DAYAN HAS BEEN HAVING WITH MRS MEIR AND OTHER PARTY LEADERS IN ANTICIPATION OF ESTABLISHING PLATFORM FOR COMING ELECTIONS. ESPECIALLY TO THE EXTENT THAT ARABS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL GO ALONG WITH THESE IDEAS, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED AT ALL TO FIND THEM BEING IMPLEMENTED OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.
ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular crest containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 122

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05438 110529Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 101422Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9057

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 5438

EXDIS

FOR NEA

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: APER, IS
SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF AMASSADOR KEATING

1. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL SHOHAM INQUIRED OF CHARGE JULY 10 WHEN IT IS NOW ANTICIPATED AMBASSADOR KEATING WILL ARRIVE IN ISRAEL. SHOHAM NOTED THAT PREVIOUS INFORMATION HAD BEEN THAT AMBASSADOR WAS EXPECTED ABOUT JULY 18 OR 20. HE WONDERED WHETHER THAT TIMING WAS LIKELY. SHOHAM SAID THAT HIS QUESTION WAS PROMPTED BY FACT THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ABRA ERAN VERY MUCH WANTS TO BE PRESENT WHEN AMBASSADOR KEATING PRESENTS HIS CREDENTIALS. EBAN IS LEAVING ISRAEL AUGUST 3 FOR TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA AND U.S. OF TWO TO THREE WEEKS DURATION. HE HAD THEREFORE ASKED SHOHAM TO SEEK AMBASSADOR KEATING'S ETA.

2. CHARGE REPLIED THAT CURRENT INFORMATION INDICATED AMBASSADOR KEATING WOULD BE DELAYED BEYOND ORIGINAL PLANS, PERHAPS FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. SHOHAM NOTED IT WOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK FROM AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL TO PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS, WHICH MEANT THAT EBAN COULD NOT BE PRESENT UNLESS AMBASSADOR HAD ARRIVED BY AROUND JULY 27. CHARGE REITERATED AMBASSADOR'S PLANS NOT YET FIRM BUT THAT HE WOULD INQUIRE OF DEPARTMENT IN VIEW OF EBAN'S INTEREST AND SHOHAM'S QUERY.

3. CHARGE WILL REITERATE TO SHOHAM WITHIN FEW DAYS
THAT SITUATION STILL REMAINS AS ABOVE UNLESS DEPARTMENT
WANTS US TO DO OTHERWISE.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

2

73 JUL 11 PM 9:30
WHITE HOUSE
STATION ROOM
0485

DECLASSIFIED

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S JOPY

OP IMMED
ESA958ADA537
DE RUESAD #5162 1820945
O 010945Z ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8940 NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 5162

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINS MILI IS
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF ISRAELI ATTACHE
IN ORDER TO DRAMATIZE AMERICAN SHOCK AND CONCERN AT
ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL ALON, RECOMMEND THAT
ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO TRANSPORT HIS REMAINS AND FAMILY,
WITH SUITABLE ESCORT, TO ISRAEL BY US GOVERNMENT
AIRCRAFT.
ZIRHELLEN
BT

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

SAUNDERS

PSN:026294 RECALLED
PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:182/13:05Z DTG:010945Z JUL 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

'73 JUN 27 PM 2:27

SECRET 625

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05063 271502Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

064951

P R 271442Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8894
INFO USMISSION USUN
USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 5063

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OTRA, IS, XF
SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY SYG TRIP TO ME

REF: STATE 125143 AND TEL AVIV 4987

1. RE FIRST SENTENCE PARA 3 REFTTEL, WE REGRET TEL AVIV
4987 WAS SENT DURING RECESS OF MEETINGS OF BINATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION AND WITHOUT RECOURSE TO NOTES. AS WILL
BE SEEN FROM FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATION BEING CABLED
TODAY, EBAN DID NOT SAY THAT GOI HAD ALREADY REPLIED
TO WALDHEIM BUT
ONLY INDICATED WHAT GOI THOUGHT OF
REPLYING.
ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 877

2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05061 01 OF 02 281012Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
***** 072897

R 271437Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8895
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBAGXABEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 5061

EX01S

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS
SUBJECT: EBAN'S CURRENT ESTIMATE OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION


SUMMARY. AFTER CHARGE'S JUNE 25 BRIEFING ON AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, FONMIN EBAN SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT SUMMIT HAD CONCLUDED WITH US AND USSR AGREEING TO DISAGREE ON MIDDLE EAST. FONMIN, COMMENTING ON BOURGUIBA FEELER RE MEETING WITH ISRAELIS, SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS CONCERNED AT PRESENT ABOUT ITS IMAGE BUT THIS IS NOT TO SAY ISRAEL IS HESITANT ABOUT MEETIN

EBAN ADDED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF US WERE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTEREST IN MEETING TO TUNISIANS IN NORMAL COURSE OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACT. EBAN TURNED TO RECENT EGYPTIAN TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS AND SAID THIS RESULTED FROM FRUSTRATION WITH UNSC DEBATE AND WAS NOTHING MORE THAN LIP SERVICE. ZAYYAT HAD POSED CONDITIONS HE KNEW ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT. IN THIS REGARD EBAN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ABOUT REGRESSION IN ARAB PUBLIC POSITION. WHEREAS EGYPTIANS HAD ONCE DEMANDED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-1967 LINES,

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ^{SECRET}AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 05061 01 OF 02 281012Z

THEY WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT 1947 PARTITION PLAN BORDERS IN POSING PRE-CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. EBAN FELT THAT SADAT IS DISCOURAGED WITH SUMMIT RESULTS AND WITH FIRST PART OF UNSC DEBATE. HE SAID THAT UNSYG HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN VISITING MIDDLE EAST CAPITALS AND ISRAEL WAS INCLINED TO AGREE PROVIDED HE CAME AS SYG AND NOT TIED TO ANY UN RESOLUTION. SYG TOUR IN LATE JULY OR AUGUST COULD GIVE SADAT AN OUT AND MIGHT RESULT IN INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT OR CURTAILMENT OF UNSC DEBATE. IN ANY EVENT, EBAN SAID, ISRAEL IS OPPOSED TO CHANGING VENUE OF MEETING TO GENEVA. END SUMMARY.

1. ON JUNE 25 CHARGE BRIEFED EBAN ON AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR MAKING POINTS IN STATE 122213. EBAN ASKED IF AGREEMENT MEANT THAT US WOULD BE WILLING TO CONCLUDE SIMILAR AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS CHINA. CHARGE REPLIED THIS COMMITMENT OF EACH PARTY TOWARDS THIRD PARTIES WAS ALREADY EXPLICIT AND THIS IS ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT.

2. EBAN COMMENTED THAT ON BASIS OF DINITZ MEETING WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY, PICTURE MERGES FROM SUMMIT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND USSR TO DISAGREE ON MIDDLE EAST WITH SOVIET UNION APPEARING LESS FEROCIOUS THAN IN PAST. EBAN SAID, HOWEVER, THAT SUMMIT DID NOT LEAD TO OPTIMISTIC CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST IN SUPPORT OF RESOLVING CONFLICT. BOTH SIDES APPEARED REALISTIC IN THEIR RECOGNITION OF OBLIGATIONS EACH HAS TO ITS FRIENDS AND NEITHER SIDE IS PREPARED TO DO WHAT OTHER WANTS. FONMIN, THEREFORE, CONCLUDED THAT DISCUSSIONS OF MIDDLE EAST AT SUMMIT HAD ESSENTIALLY WOUND UP ON SAME NOTE AS PREVIOUS SUMMIT IN MAY 1972.

3. EBAN TURNED TO QUESTION OF RECENT ARAB FEELERS ON NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT BOURGUIBA HAD CHOSEN STRANGE PLACE, A MAGAZINE INTERVIEW, TO LAUNCH HIS FEELER. ISRAEL HAD REPLIED POSITIVELY TO BOURGUIBA AND HAD ASKED ITALIANS TO DRAW HIS ATTENTION TO THIS RESPONSE. FONMIN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN NOTE OF BOURGUIBA'S POSITION ON 1947 PARTITION PLAN BUT DID NOT CONSIDER TUNISIAN POSITION AS REASON FOR NOT MEETING. QUITE THE CONTRARY, IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENT OVER POSITIONS THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NECESSARY. FONMIN SAID HE FELT BOURGUIBA HAD BACKTRACKED SOMEWHAT FROM IDEA OF MEETING IN HIS SPEECH TO ILO. HOWEVER, EBAN WAS ENCOURAGED BY BOURGUIBA'S PLAGIARISM FROM SECRETARY ROGERS IN COMMENTING ON INTERNATIONAL TREND TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Small stars flank the central emblem.

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 05061 01 OF 02 281012Z

AND PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE.

4. FONMIN SAID ITALIANS HAD NOT REPORTED ANY SPECIFIC TUNISIAN REACTION TO ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT FOR MEETING, BUT ADDED THAT ITALIANS HAD NOTED BOURGUIBA'S DIMINISHED STATUS AT HOME AND IN ARAB WORLD. FONMIN COMMENTED THAT IT IS NOT SAME BOURGUIBA WHO WAS ONCE FIRMLY IN CHARGE OF TUNISIA.

5. EBAN SAID THAT G I HAD FAVORABLE INTERPRETED REPORTED TUNISIAN DESIRE FOR LOWER LEVEL AND PREPARATORY CONTACTS AS POSSIBLE INDICATION OF BOURGUIBA'S SERIOUSNESS AND THIS IS WHY EBAN HAD CALLED ON TUNISIANS TO MAKE DIPLOMATIC CONTACT ANYWHERE IN WORLD.

6. AT THIS POINT, EBAN ADDED, ISRAEL IS CONCERNED WITH ITS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL IMAGE IN HANDLING BOURGUIBA'S CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THIS IS NOT TO SAY THERE IS ANY DOUBT OR HESITANCY ABOUT ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS FOR A MEETING. FONMIN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER EXERCISE WOULD IN FACT LEAD TO A MEETING. HE COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE US TO EXPRESS ITS INTEREST AND ENCOURAGEMENT FOR A MEETING WHILE SPEAKING TO TUNISIANS AND PROBE LATTER'S REACTION TO FAVORABLE ISRAELI RESPONSE.

7. CHARGE ASKED IF FONMIN WAS REQUESTING US APPROACH TO TUNISIANS ON QUESTION OF MEETING OR SIMPLY OFFERING NO OBJECTIONS IF US DISPOSED TO MOVE ON ITS OWN. FONMIN REPLIED HE WAS NOT MAKING A REQUEST SINCE HE DOES NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT US POSITION IS IN TUNISIA AND WHAT IMPACT OF SUCH A REQUEST WOULD BE. BUT FONMIN FELT IT WOULD BE NATURAL FOR US IN ITS NORMAL CONTACTS WITH TUNISIAN AMBASSADOR TO EXPRESS ITS INTEREST, AND IN VIEW OF US ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED UNNATURAL FOR US NOT TO DO SO.

8. AS FOR EGYPTIAN TALK OF NEGOTIATIONS, FONMIN SAID THAT ZAYYAT IS FEELING FRUSTRATED WITH UNSC MEETING. MEETING WAS LOW KEY AND DID NOT ATTRACT HEADLINES IN US PRESS. MEANWHILE, EGYPTIANS WERE BEING PRESSED FOR NEGOTIATIONS FROM MANY QUARTERS INCLUDING AUSTRIANS AND IRANIANS. IN A SENSE ISRAEL HAD STOLEN ZAYYAT'S POKETBOOK. THIS HAD LET TO ZAYYAT STATEMENT IN COPENHAGEN ABOUT HIS WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH FONMIN EBAN IN PRESENCE OF JARRING. FONMIN SAID ISRAEL HAS NO PROBLEM WITH SUCH A MEETING; HOWEVER,

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 05001 01 OF 02 281012Z

ZAYYAT HAD ADDED CONDITIONS WHICH MADE HIS OFFER PURE LIP SERVICE TO NEGOTIATIONS. ZAYYAT FULLY AWARE THAT ISRAEL CANNOT ACCEPT PRECONDITION OF AGREEING TO 1947 PARTITION PLAN. IT IS SIMPLY MORE ELEGANT FOR ZAYYAT TO SAY HE WANTS NEGOTIATIONS WHILE ADDING IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM 86-1650

077-1
DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central design.

SECRET 756

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05061 02 OF 02 271551Z

2

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W 065382

R 271437Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8896
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 5061

EXDIS

9. FONMIN SAID WE MUST BE AWARE THERE HAS BEEN A REGRESSION IN ARAB POSITION. WITH BOURGUIBA AND ZAYYAT SPEAKING OF 1947 PARTITION PLAN IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS A COORDINATED ARAB EFFORT IN PROCESS WHICH EXCLUDES JORDAN. WHEREAS SADAT HAD ONCE TALKED OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES ARABS HAVE NOW DIVIDED MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM INTO TWO ASPECTS. THE FIRST IS A QUESTION OF ACHIEVING PRE-1967 LINES. BUT THIS, THEY CLAIM, WOULD NOT RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF 1947. EVEN IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, PROBLEM OF PALESTINIANS AND OF IMPLEMENTING 1947 PARTITION PLAN WOULD REMAIN ACCORDING TO ARABS. THUS, WHILE ISRAEL HAS CONTINUED SAYING THERE MUST BE CHANGES IN 1967 LINES, EGYPT HAS REGRESSED TO DEMANDING 1947 PARTITION PLAN. THIS COULD BE NEGOTIATING POSITION ON PART OF ARABS, BUT EVEN SO GAP BETWEEN SIDES HAS WIDENED.

11. CHARGE COMMENTED THAT ISRAELI STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO BLOCK OTHER EGYPTIAN OPTIONS TO POINT THAT THEY MUST NEGOTIATE AND ASKED IF THERE IS NOT DANGER OF MISSING OPPORTUNITY BY NOT RECOGNIZING WHEN EGYPTIANS ARE PREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. FONMIN REPLIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 05061 02 OF 02 271551Z

THAT EGYPTIANS AND ARABS WILL NOT SIGNAL INTEREST THROUGH NEWS-
PAPERS BUT WILL WHISPER IN SOMEONE'S EAR. IN THIS REGARD FON-
MIN FELT CHANCELLOR BRANDT'S EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE WAS RELEVANT
THOUGH OF COURSE NOT IDENTICAL SINCE IN EUROPE OBJECTIVE WAS
SANCTION OF EXISTING BORDERS.

12. FONMIN POINTED OUT THAT SADAT HAS RECEIVED NO ENCOURAGE-
MENT FROM SOVIETS WHO HAVE INDICATE THEY WILL NOT ALLOW MIDDLE
EAST TO STAND IN WAY OF RAPPROACHMENT WITH WEST. HE ADDED THAT
CHANCES ARE SADAT WILL FIND CONTINUED UNSC DEBATE NO MORE
PRODUCTIVE THAN SUMMIT. ISRAEL IS TRYING TO SUGGEST IN EUROPEAN
CAPITALS THAT THIS IS DESIRABLE OUTCOME AND THAT EUROPEANS WOULD
DO WELL NOT TO BE SO CLEVER IN COMING UP WITH FORMULAS TO GIVE
SADAT AN OUT.

13. FONMIN SAID THAT UNSYG WANTS TO COME TO MIDDLE EAST AND HAD
APPROACHED ISRAEL WITH PROPOSAL FOR VISIT. ISRAEL IS INCLINED TO
LOOK FAVORABLY ON VISIT PROVIDED SYG COMES IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AND NOT AS RESULT OF OR BOUND BY ANY UN RESOLUTION. FONMIN SAID
HE FELT THIS MIGHT BE ONE WAY OF LETTING EGYPT OFF HOOK SO THAT CON-
TINUED UNSC DEBATE COULD BE INDEFINITELY POSTPONED OR CURTAILED
TO AWAIT RESULTS OF SYG'S VISIT. ISRAEL IS THINKING OF SYG VISIT FOR
END OF JULY OR EARLY AUGUST.

14. IN ANY EVENT, FONMIN SAID, ISRAEL WOULD OPPOSE ATTEMPTS TO
HOLD CONTINUED UNSC DEBATE IN GENEVA. ISRAEL WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF
DEBATE IN FIRST PLACE AND CERTAINLY DID NOT WANT TO PAY ADDITIONAL
SUMS IT WOULD COST TO SET UP OPERATION IN GENEVA. FONMIN SAID
THAT EXPERIENCE OF UNSC MEETING IN PANAMA WAS NOT GOOD AND THAT
UK AND FRANCE DID NOT SUPPORT MOVE TO GENEVA. EBAN CONCLUDED
THAT IF DEBATE CONTINUES, ARABS WILL TRY TO REINTERPRET UNSC
RESOLUTION 242. ISRAEL HAS AGREED TO ORIGINAL RESOLUTION AND NOT
SOME ARAB INTERPRETATION. EVEN CHANGE IN EMPHASIS BETWEEN
ELEMENTS OF 242 WOULD BE SEEN BY ISRAEL AS DESTROYING ESSENTIAL
BALANCE AND NEGATE ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF ORIGINAL RESOLUTION.

ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

0211/00/0107

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



WHL
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 126

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04986 251437Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

043372

R 251331Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8867
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1632
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4986

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, TS
SUBJ: BOURGUIBA INITIATIVE ON MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN JUNE 25 GAVE CHARGE RUNDOWN ON BOURGUIBA INITIATIVE AS SEEN BY ISRAEL. DETAILED REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED. MEANTIME, TWO POINTS MAY BE NOTEWORTHY:

A. EBAN TOLD CHARGE OF ISRAELI APPROACH TO TUNIS THROUGH ITALIANS AND THAT NO REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

B. EBAN INDICATED IT MIGHT BE WELL FOR USG TO SOUND OUT GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA AS TO LATTER'S REACTION TO ISRAELI MESSAGE.

2. CHARGE PRESSED EBAN AS TO WHETHER THIS WAS REQUEST OR RECOMMENDATION OF GOI OR SIMPLY "NO OBJECTION" IF USG MADE MOVE ON ITS OWN. EBAN CAREFULLY AVOIDED STATING THAT THIS WAS REQUEST OF GOI BUT NOTED IT WOULD BE ONLY NATURAL FOR USG TO DO THIS ON ITS OWN, IN LOW KEY. IN FACT, HE SAID, IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED UNNATURAL IF USG DID NOT DO SO, IN VIEW OF ITS ROLE IN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TFL AV 04986 251437Z

MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS. IT IS EMBASSY'S FEELING EBAN WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO SEE US DO THIS BUT DID NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY OFFICIAL REQUEST, PERHAPS LEST IT CAUSE DIFFICULTY WITH ITALIANS.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

121/00/010

0775
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WA

SECRET 774

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04910 211417Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 211401Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8843

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4910

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, JO
SUBJECT: ISRAELI DRONE ASTRAY

APPROXIMATELY 1500 LOCAL JUNE 21 GOI ASKED EMBASSY PASS
MESSAGE URGENTLY TO GOJ THAT IDF DRONE ON TEST FLIGHT HAD HAD
MALFUNCTION AND WAS HEADING ACROSS JORDAN RIVER. BEFORE
MESSAGE COULD BE SENT, GOI INFORMED US MALFUNCTION HAD BEEN
CORRECTED AND DRONE HAD BEEN SAFELY RETURNED TO ISRAELI
TERRITORY. THIS MESSAGE IS THEREFORE FOR INFO ONLY.
ZURHELLEN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DIA.

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 JUN 21 PM 4:45

2
3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM 8-65

0774
DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with thirteen stars and stripes. Above the eagle is a circular emblem with a sunburst and the words "E PLURIBUS UNUM". The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars.

W H
TELEGRAM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04654 151448Z

USG AID HAS BEEN LARGEST SINGLE FACTOR IN SOLVING ECONOMIC PROBLEM WHICH CAUSED ISRAEL TO TURN TO US FOR AID FOUR YEARS AGO AND WE HAVE REACHED STAGE WHERE REEVALUATION OF OUR AID RELATIONSHIP IS DESIRABLE.

4. CURRENT AND PLANNED DEFENSE SPENDING REFLECTS ISRAEL'S PERCEPTION OF ITS GREATLY IMPROVED MILITARY SITUATION. DEFENSE EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF BUDGET AND GNP, AND DEFENSE IMPORTS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS, HAVE DECLINED EACH YEAR SINCE 1970, INCLUDING 1973, AND NEW ECONOMIC PLAN FORECASTS CONTINUATION OF THIS TREND. DEFENSE BUDGET IN REAL TERMS, THAT IS AFTER ALLOWING FOR PRICE INCREASES, HAS LEVELED OFF. DEFENSE IMPORTS DECLINED ABSOLUTELY BOTH IN 1971 AND 1972, AND ONLY MODEST INCREASE IS EXPECTED THIS YEAR.

5. ALTHOUGH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONTINUES TO BE STRONGLY NEGATIVE, TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL IMPORTS, NOT INCLUDING USG AID, CONTINUE TO PRODUCE ALMOST ENOUGH TO COVER DEFICIT. DESPITE PERSISTENT AND RISING INFLATION THERE HAS BEEN NO DRAMATIC INCREASE IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS GO ON RISING.

6. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES HAVE MULTIPLIED 3-1/2 TIMES DURING LAST THREE YEARS, AND SHOULD REACH DOLS 1,600 MILLION BY END OF THIS YEAR. THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO FOUR MONTHS' IMPORTS OF GOOD AND SERVICES. IN OUR JUDGMENT RESERVES ARE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT FOR ISRAEL'S NEEDS. DURING MARCH 1970-APRIL 1973 RESERVES INCREASED BY 1,040.0 MILLION DOLLARS (FROM 415.2 TO 1,455.2 MILLION DOLLARS) DEMONSTRATING ROUGH CORRELATION BETWEEN TOTAL USG AID, RISE IN DEBT TO USG AND RISE IN RESERVES.

7. FOREIGN DEBT REACHED DOLS 4.3 BILLION IN MARCH 1973, OR DOLS 1,335 PER CAPITA, APPARENTLY HIGHEST PER CAPITA FOREIGN DEBT IN WORLD. SINCE MARCH 1970, DEBT HAS NEARLY DOUBLED; BUT 75 PERCENT OF INCREMENT IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO LOW-INTEREST BORROWING. ABILITY TO SERVICE DEBT CONTINUES TO BE GOOD, ALTHOUGH SHEER SIZE OF ANNUAL PAYMENTS OF INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL INCLINES ISRAELIS TO ARGUE THAT US AID IS NEEDED TO HELP COVER PAYMENTS ON PAST BORROWING.

8. IF DOLS 25 MILLION CUT IN SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE PROPOSED BY ADMINISTRATION IS RESTORED BY CONGRESS AND NO OTHER SOURCES

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 04654 151448Z

OF CUTS ARE FOUND, FY 1974 WILL BE THIRD YEAR IN A ROW IN WHICH US AID ROUGHLY LEVEL AT AROUND DOLS 500 MILLION. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IN ASKING CONGRESS ONLY FOR DOLS 25 MILLION CUT WHEREAS CONSIDERABLY LARGER CUT COULD HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS AND ALSO DIFFICULTY OF GETTING ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO ANY CUT, ESPECIALLY TO GRANT ASSISTANCE, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO SET TREND OF DECREASING AMOUNT OF AID. EACH YEAR AID CONTINUES AT PREVIOUS HIGH LEVELS MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CUT IN FUTURE YEARS. NOT ONLY IS IT MORE DIFFICULT TO WITHSTAND GENERAL POLITICAL PRESSURES BUT CONTINUATION WEAKENS THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO SEE PATTERN OF DEPENDENCE ON US CREATING DANGERS FOR HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAELI ECONOMY.
ZURHELLEN

NOTE BY DC/T: EXDIS CAPTION INSERTED PER S/SO, MR. NEWLIN.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0770
DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 134 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

JUN 11 PM 1:56

057155

2. REDIES OF GERMAN FONOFF TOLD CHARGE THAT ICE WAS BROKEN FOR VISITS AT HEAD OF GOVT LEVEL AND THIS IN ITSELF WAS WELL WORTH THE WHOLE VISIT. REDIES SAID GERMAN VIEW WAS THAT REACTIONS OF ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS ON BASIC QUESTION OF MOVING TOWARDS PEACE SETTLEMENT WERE REMARKABLY SIMILAR. ISRAELIS SEE EGYPTIANS AS COMMITTED TO FUTURE ACTIONS TO RECLAIM PALESTINE FOR ARABS AND EGYPTIANS SEE ISRAELIS AS INEVITABLY EXPANSIONIST. EACH PARTY INSIST IT IS READY TO NEGOTIATE BUT SAYS OTHER SABOTAGES CHANCES WITH UNACCEPTABLE PRIOR CONDITIONS. GERMANS ACCEPT ISRAEL'S DESIRE FOR PEACE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04537 111350Z

AND ALSO FEEL EGYPT HAS MOVED CONSIDERABLY TOWARDS ACCEPTING ISRAEL AS ZIONIST STATE. SITUATION SEEMS READY, ACCORDING TO REDIES, FOR SOME FORMULA TO ENABLE PARTIES TO BEGIN NEGOTIATING. ZE INDICATED GERMANS ARE TALKING OF SEPARATING QUESTIONS OF RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES AND IDF WITHDRAWAL. FOR INSTANCE, ISRAEL COULD RECOGNIZE EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL SINAI BUT EGYPTIANS COULD AGREE TO LONG TERM STATIONING OF IDF IN PARTS OF SINAI. FEDERAL REPUBLIC NOT OFFERING MEDIATION, BUT ALONG WITH REST OF WESTERN EUROPE, HAS LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN URGING PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE.

3. REFLECTING ISRAELI VIEW OF SAME GERMAN PROPOSITIONS, DIRECTOR GENERAL GAZIT OF PRIMIN'S OFFICE TOLD CHARGE GERMANS SY M TO BE LOOKING FOR WAY TO "PACIFY" AREA IN INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT. GAZIT PROFESSED TO FIND GERMAN IDEAS VAGUE AND NOT BACKED BY REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF ARABS.

4. ACCORDING TO BOTH SIDES, GERMANS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET POINT ACROSS THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL WILL ALWAYS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NAZI ERA, BUT THAT "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP," IMPLYING UNUSUAL GERMAN FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IS NO LONGER EFFECTIVE. BOTH ISRAELIS AND GERMANS HAVE APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT ACTUAL GERMAN DEEDS IN FUTURE ARE WHAT COUNT, NOT TERM APPLIED TO RELATIONSHIP. PRINCIPAL ISRAELI CONCERN SEEMS TO BE THAT GERMANY AVOID FALLING INTO FRENCH TRAPS IN FORMULATING EEC POSITIONS ON MID EAST.

5. HAVING SEEN MEIR, ALLON, EBAN AND SAPIR (AS WELL AS BEN GURION) BRANDT FINALLY GOT APPOINTMENT TO MEET DAYAN ON JUNE 11, DAY OF DEPARTURE. ACCORDING TO GAZIT, DAYAN WAS UNABLE TO ATTEND MEIR'S DINNER FOR BRANDT JUNE 7 AND SINCE THERE WERE NO SPECIAL DEFENSE MATTERS NEEDING DISCUSSION AND DAYAN HAD NOT REQUESTED MEETING, NONE WAS ARRANGED FOR HIM. WHEN PRESS MISUNDERSTOOD AND CHARGED INTERNAL POLITICS INVOLVED, MRS MEIR INTERVENED AND GOT A MEETING SET UP. ACCORDING TO REDIES, HOWEVER, DAYAN WAS "FURIOUS" WHEN HE WAS NOT GIVEN ROLE IN BRANDT VISIT, ESPECIALLY WHEN BRANDT MET SEPARATELY WITH SAPIR AND WENT TO ALLON'S KIBBUTZ FOR WEEKEND. GERMANS WERE NONPLUSSED, SINCE ARRANGEMENT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0777
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 04537 111350Z

OF SCHEDULE HAD BEEN LEFT ENTIRELY TO GOI AND GERMANS DIE NOT WANT TO GET CAUGHT IN LOCAL POLITICS. WHEN MATTER BLEW UP IN PRESS AND DAYAN MEETING WAS ARRANGED, GERMANS WERE RELIEVED.

6. BOTH GAZIT AND REDIES CONFIRM THAT MRS MEIR'S ACCEPTANCE OF INVITATION FOR RETURN VISIT TO FRG WAS SIMPLY FORMAL ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE AND DID NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY EITHER THAT MRS MEIR INTENDS TO STAY IN OFFICE PAST THIS FALL'S ELECTIONS OR THAT SHE WILL BE THE PRIMIN WHO MAKES VISIT TO BONN. ON OTHER HAND, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT RELATIVE LACK OF PROTEST AGAINST BRANDT VISIT IN ISRAEL, CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRANDT AND MRS MEIR, AND REALIZATION FROM THESE TALKS THAT CONTINUED PRESSURE ON GERMANY MAY BE NEEDED IF ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVES ARE TO BE GAINED MAY COMBINE TO CHANGE MRS MEIR'S LONG-STANDING FEELING AGAINST VISITING GERMANY AND CAUSE HER TO DO SO, ASSUMING THAT SHE REMAINS IN OFFICE.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0777
DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 134 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars are positioned on either side of the eagle's head.

TELEGRAM

SECRET 792

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM:

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04135 251425Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

037697

P R 251322Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8566
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4135

EXDIS

E. O. 116521 XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ARTICLE ON IDF GENERALS' MEETING

REF: STATE 98932 NOTAL, CAIRO 1495

1. THOROUGH CHECK OF MAARIV APRIL 20 TO MAY 12 REVEALS NO ARTICLE DESCRIBING MEETING OF ISRAELI GENERALS EXCEPT FOR INTERVIEW PUBLISHED MAY 11 WITH RETIRING CHIEF OF ISRAELI AIR FORCE GENERAL HOD. EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF PERTINENT PORTIONS FOLLOWS.

2. BEGIN TEXT. QUESTION: RECENTLY...THE DEBATE HAS COME UP AGAIN: WHETHER THE EVALUATIONS OF THE GENERAL HQ IN THE WAITING PERIOD IN MAY 1967 ENCOURAGED THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THE DECISION TO FIGHT OR WEAKENED ITS POSITION... WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION ON THE SUBJECT AS COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE?

3. ANSWER: ... THE POSITION OF THE GENERAL HQ IN THE CABINET DISCUSSIONS WAS PRESENTED ON THE WHOLE BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT THE TIME, GENERAL YITZHAK RABIN. TWICE THE POLITICAL LEVEL CAME TO MEET WITH THE GENERALS IN THE GENERAL HQ. THESE MEETINGS TOOK PLACE BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED TO HEAR THE CONCEPTS AND EVALUATIONS NOT ONLY OF THE MAN WHO SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL HQ, BUT ALSO THOSE OF HIS COLLEAGUES, OTHER MEMBERS IN THAT BODY.

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04135 251425Z

4. QUESTION: WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION: TO EXTEND THE WAITING PERIOD OR TO STOP WAITING?

5. ANSWER: I, LIKE OTHERS, THOUGHT THAT THE LONGER WE WAIT, THE HARDER THE WAR WAS GOING TO BE. I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE AIR FORCE, THE WAITING WOULD MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE. HOWEVER, LIKE MY OTHER COLLEAGUES, IS SAID THAT THE LONGER OUR PREPARATIONS CONTINUE, THE MORE THINGS THERE WILL BE WHICH THE EGYPTIANS WILL MANAGE TO ORGANIZE. THEY WOULD GET BETTER ORGANIZED, THEY WOULD FIND SOLUTIONS AND THE WAR WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT FOR US. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE IN THE QUESTION AS TO WHO TAKES THE INITIATIVE IN THE WAR. FROM THE AIR FORCE POINT OF VIEW IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT INITIATIVE IS FIFTY PERCENT OF THE ACHIEVEMENT. I HAD THE UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING THAT WE WERE WAITING TOO LONG. WE HAD RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE FACT THAT EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE WAS GETTING ORGANIZED AND THIS PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE INTENSIVE. I DID NOT HAVE A MOMENT'S, A A SECOND'S DOUBT AS TO WHAT WE WOULD ACHIEVE, (ALTHOUGH) I DID NOT KNOW THAT IT WOULD LAST THREE HOURS. IN THE END WE ACHIEVED OUR OBJECTIVE, WHICH WAS TO PUT THE ARAB AIR FORCES OUT OF ACTION AFTER 80 MINUTES. I PRESENTED A PLAN. WHAT IRKED EVERYBODY WAS THAT IT WAS TOO SIMPLE...

6. QUESTION: ... IF, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF TODAY, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD CALL YOU AND ASK YOU TODAY WHETHER TEL AVIV WOULD BE BOMBED, WHAT WOULD YOU REPLY?

7. ANSWER: TODAY? I WOULD SAY WITH EVEN GREATER CERTAINTY, WITH MUCH MORE CONFIDENCE, THAT TEL AVIV WOULD NOT BE BOMBED. NOW? WITH THE WARNING SPACE OF SINAI? THIS IS A TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENT, HOLDING ON TO SINAI. IT HAS NO GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN ON THE SUBJECT OF AIR WARFARE. THE ARMOR CAN MANAGE ON OTHER BORDERS AS WELL...

8. QUESTION: CAN YOU IMAGINE HOW THE NEXT WAR, IF IT SHOULD BREAK OUT, BETWEEN US AND THE EGYPTIANS AND THE OTHER ARAB ARMIES, WILL LOOK LIKE?

9. ANSWER: WHETHER I CAN IMAGINE IT? IT IS ALL PLANNED, IN THE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0 7 7 1
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 04135 251425Z

HEAD AND ON PAPER. WHAT IT WILL BE LIKE? IT WILL BE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THE PREVIOUS ONE, ABSOLUTELY! IT WILL BE DECIDED VERY QUICKLY.

10. QUESTION: MORE QUICKLY THAN IN SIX DAYS?

11. ANSWER: WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMPARISONS, VERY QUICKLY! IN ITS STRENGTH, IT WILL NOT AT ALL BE LIKE THE PREVIOUS ONE. IT WILL BE SURPRISING FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW. THIS TIME WE ARE NOT TRYING TO MINIMIZE OUR STRENGTH. WE MADE THAT MISTAKE BEFORE THE SIX-DAY WAR. THAT ENCOURAGED NASSER TO LEAD US INTO A STATE OF WAR. NOW WE ARE TALKING OPENLY: IT IS NOT WORTH YOUR WHILE! ALSO THE LAST MILITARY PARADE, WITH THE FLIGHTS OF JET PLANES, OUGHT TO SHOW THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SYRIANS THAT IF IS REALLY NOT WORTH THEIR WHILE. AND TODAY, THIS IS NOT JUST A THEORY. THIS AIR FORCE, WITH ITS RELATIVE STRENGTH -- IS REALLY STRONG! THIS HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE WHOLE WORLD. END TEXT.

12 COMMENT. UNLESS REFERENCE WAS CONFUSED AND ANOTHER ISRAELI NEWSPAPER WAS MEANT, OR UNLESS THERE WAS PASSING REFERENCE TO AN ISRAELI GENERALS' MEETING BURIED IN SOME LENGTHY MAARIV ARTICLE ESCAPING OUR ATTENTION, ABOE HOD ARTICLE MUST BE ITEM IN QUESTION. IF SO, REASON FOR SHARP SADAT REACTION TO IT DURING DISCUSSIONS MAY 12 OR 13 WOULD PROBABLY DEPEND ON THE FORM IN WHICH THE REPORT CAME TO SADAT'S ATTENTION. HOD'S EMPHASIS ON VALUE OF SURPRISE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS, OR HIS STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF OCCUPATION OF SINAI TO GIVE ISRAEL STRATEGIC DEPTH, OR HIS CASUAL REFERENCE -- MADE AS MILITARY PLANNER -- TO POSSIBLE NEW ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AS IF CERTAIN TO TAKE PLACE, COULD ALL HAVE CAUGHT EGYPTIANS' ATTENTION.
ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0 7 7 7 7
DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W H

SECRET 937

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03917 181521Z

72
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 181351Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8476
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET TEL AVIV 3917

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: UNSC, XF
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON MID EAST

1. CHARGE MET MORNING MAY 18 WITH MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN
PRIMIN'S OFFICE, AND SUBJECT CAME UP OF UNSC DEBATE ON MIDDLE
EAST.

2. GAZIT SAID GOI WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH ANY NEW COMMITTEE OR
UN MACHINERY SET UP AS RESULT OF SC DEBATE TO DEAL WITH MID
EAST. IN HIS OPINION, UN WAS ANTI-ISRAELI BODY NOW AND HAD NO
CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TOWARDS SETTLEMENT IN MID EAST, WHEHTER
BY COMMITTEE, JARRING OR IN ANY OTHER WAY.
GAZIT SAID THIS DETERMINATION NOT TO COOPERATE WITH ANY NEW
MACHINERY HAD NOT YET BEEN FORMALIZED IN ANY GOVT
DECISION BUT HE HAD NO DOUBT IT WOULD BE IF SC TRIED TO SET UP
SUCH MACHINER6. RE JARRING, GAZIT SAID HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO
ANYTHING MORE UNLESS HE COMPLETELY DISASSOCIATED HIMSELF FROM
HOS OWN PREVIOUS ACTIONS, SOMETHING NOT TO BE EXPECTED.

3. GAZIT COULD SEE NO WAY IN WHICH SC DEBATE COULD CONTRIBUTE
TOWARDS OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE THOUGHT ISRAELI POLICY ON
SC WAS DAMAGE-LIMITING OPERATION AND WOULD
ADMIT NO POSITIVE ASPECTS. PROBLEM IN DEBATE, HE SAID, WOULD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03917 181521Z

BE TO DEAL WITH EGYPTIAN WISHES AND FRUSTRATIONS IN SOME WAY THAT MIGHT EASE GOE'S PROBLEMS. HE EXPRESSED BELIEF WORD WAS GOING AROUND THAT EGYPTIANS LOOKING FOR POSITIVE OUTCOME THIS TIME RATHER THAN CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION, BUT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS STRICTLY BLUFF. HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS OF HOW GOI WANTED TO HANDLE ITSELF IN DEBATE, BUT INDICATED CONVERSATIONS BEING HELD IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK ON THESE ASPECTS.

4. CHARGE QUERIED GAZIT ABOUT GOI ESTIMATE OF POSSIBILITY EGYPT WOULD RESUME FIGHTING. GAZIT REPEATED INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED TO EFFECT THAT THERE NO INDICATIONS OF PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION, RESORT TO FIGHTING BY EGYPT IS UNLIKELY BUT IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT SADAT MIGHT AT ANY TIME CARRY OUT SMALL SCALE ATTACK. HE INSISTED THIS WAS AN OBJECTIVE AN ESTIMATE AS ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS COULD MAKE IT, NOT COLORED BY ANY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AIMED AT PERUSADING USG OR OTHERS NOT TO TAKE EGYPTIAN THREATS SERIOUSLY.

5. COMMENT: WHILE GAZIT WAS CATEGORICAL IN HIS STATEMENTS THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH ANY NEW UN MACHINERY AND COULD SEE NO FURTHER USEFULNESS UNDER REALISTIC CIRCUMSTANCES TO JARRING, EMB BELIEVES THIS APPROACH DICTATED AT LEAST TO SOME EXTENT BY TEACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT GOI WOULD NOT REASSESS SITUATION AND MAKE DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS INTERESTS AS THEY THEN WOULD APPEAR IF UNSC SHOULD IN FACT SET UP NEW MECHANISM OR REVITALIZE JARRING.
ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCE

ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

281/20/010



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 150

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

100057

R 181047Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8468
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 3903

EXDIS

E O 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: DAYAN'S THINKING ON POSSIBLE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH
JORDAN AND EGYPT

REF: TEL AVIV 3837

SUMMARY: CLOSE DAYAN POLITICAL ALLY GAD YAACOBI IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION HAS TOLD EMBOFF DAYAN IS CONCENTRATING THESE ON WHAT ISRAELI POLICY SHOULD BE TOWARD WEST BANK BEFORE FINAL SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED. THEREFORE, DAYAN'S IDEAS ON FINAL PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH EITHER JORDAN OR EGYPT WERE SOMEWHAT TENTATIVE. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN PREPARING MOVES TO BRING ABOUT FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OPEN BRIDGES POLICY AND DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR WEST BANK MUNICIPALITIES. AS FOR DAYAN'S THINKING ON ULTIMATE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN, YAACOBI SAID DAYAN WOULD RETURN ONLY ONE OR TWO SMALL ENCLAVES OF WEST BANK, BUT DAYAN ACCORDING TO YAACOBI ENVISAGES REST OF WEST BANK POPULATION THOUGH LIVING UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY AS BEING FULLFLEDGED JORDANIAN CITIZENS, WITH EXCEPTION INHABITANTS OF RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM WHO WOULD BECOME ISRAELI CITIZENS. ACCORDING TO YAACOBI DAYAN ASSUMES NO EFFORTS TOWARD ACCOMMODATION WITH EGYPT BEFORE KNESSET ELECTIONS AND CURRENTLY IS NOT FOCUSING ON THIS SUBJECT. HIS MOST RECENT IDEAS CENTERED ON

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

NOTION THAT SINAI SHOULD BECOME MILITARY VACUUM, WITH ONLY ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN ELECTRONIC CREWS STATIONED ON CENTRAL SINAI MOUNTAIN TOPS TO MONITOR MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF MAIN AIRFIELDS OF OTHER SIDE'S COUNTRY. YAACOB I BELIEVED THAT DAYAN ASSUMES THERE WILL BE PERMANENT ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH, BUT YAACOB I SPECULATED THAT IF EGYPTIANS SATISFIED DAYAN ON OTHER POINTS AND REAL PEACE WAS IN PROSPECTS, DAYAN CONCEIVABLY WOULD FAVOR ACCEDING TO ANY EGYPTIAN REQUEST THAT SHARM BE INCLUDED IN SINAI MILITARY VACUUM. MAIN OTHER POINTS ON WHICH DAYAN WOULD REQUIRE EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT WOULD BE: ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION (NOT NECESSARILY FORMAL SOVEREIGNTY) OVER SHARM AND CORRIDOR TO IT; AND REDRAWING OF PRE-1967 BORDER TO INCLUDE RAFAH JUNCTION PLUS AREA WEST OF EILAT IN ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION MAY 16 EMBOFF ASKED DAYAN CONFIDANT AND DEPUTY TRANSPORT MINISTER YAACOBI FOR GENERAL OUTLINE OF DAYAN'S VIEWS ON POLICY TOWARD WEST BANK IN ABSENCE OF PEACE SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS ON EVENTUAL PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT. YAACOBI SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DESCRIBE DAYAN'S THINKING ON THESE SUBJECTS BECAUSE SOME CONFUSION HAS RESULTED FROM RECENT DAYAN STATEMENTS. YAACOBI BELIEVED THAT MAIN CAUSE OF OVERALL CONFUSION WAS THAT DAYAN HAS BEEN FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON WHAT ISRAEL SHOULD DO IN WEST BANK PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT, WHEREAS OTHER ISRAELI POLITICIANS HAVE INSISTED ON ADDRESSING NATURE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT AS IT WOULD AFFECT WEST BANK.

2. POPULAR MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF DAYAN. TURNING TO DAYAN INTERVIEWS OF MAY 9 AND 14 (REFTEL), YAACOB I NOTED THREE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WIDELY HELD IN ISRAEL AS RESULT OF MANNER IN WHICH MEDIA HAD PLAYED INTERVIEWS. A) SOME PEOPLE ARE UNDER IMPRESSION DAYAN IS READY TODAY TO RETURN MOST IF NOT ALL OF WEST BANK TO JORDAN. YAACOB I SAID THIS IS NOT TRUE AND RESULTS FROM OVER-EMPHASIS BY MEDIA ON DAYAN COMMENT HE WOULD BE OPPOSED TO INCORPORATING ADDITIONAL ONE MILLION ARAB CITIZENS INTO ISRAEL IF THIS WERE AT ISSUE TODAY AND THEREFORE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP WEST BANK IN THEORY. B) MANY IN ISRAEL HAVE MISREAD DAYAN'S ASSERTION OF THEORETICAL READINESS TO SERVE IN CABINET UNDER SAPIR AS PRIMIN AS BEING DAYAN FEELER FOR COOPERATION WITH SAPIR. IN

~~NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY~~

5. HEALTH

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

YAACOBBI'S ESTIMATION DAYAN IS CONVINCED THERE IS ALMOST NO CHANCE HE AND SAPIR CAN MOVE CLOSE ENOUGH IN THEIR OUTLOOKS TO ENABLE DAYAN TO SERVE IN A SAPIR CABINET. C) INACCURATE VIEW ISRAELIS GATHERED FROM DAYAN'S JOCLAR REMARK TO BBC INTERVIEWER THAT HE WOULD RATHER SEE EGYPTIAN TROOPS THAN UN FORCES IN SINAI IN THAT DAYAN IS INDIFFERENT ON QUESTION OF WHETHER CAIRO SHOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER SETTLEMENT TO PLACE COMBAT TROOPS IN SINAI. YAACOBBI SAID DAYAN IS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH NEITHER EGYPT NOR ISRAEL WOULD HAVE FORCES IN SINAI AND SINAI WOULD SERVE AS BUFFER AREA BY BECOMING MILITARY VACUUM.

3. WEST BANK PENDING PEACE SETTLEMENT. YAACOBBI SAID DAYAN IS CERTAIN FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN WILL NOT COME FOR TWENTY YEARS. DAYAN ACCORDING TO YAACOBBI BELIEVES THAT WHEN SETTLEMENT DOES COME, JORDAN BY THAT TIME WILL HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER BY PALESTINIANS BECAUSE OF THEIR NUMBERS AND ABILITIES, AND CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT, PROBABLY A PRESIDENT, WILL BE PALESTINIAN. DAYAN BELIEVES THIS MAY SIMPLIFY FINAL SETTLEMENT.

A. DURING LENGTHLY INTERIM PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT, YAACOBBI STATED DAYAN FEELS ISRAEL SHOULD DO EVERYTHING TO ENCOURAGE WEST BANKERS TO ORIENT THEMSELVES TOWARD AMMAN. DAYAN PREDICTS WEST BANKERS IN DUE COURSE WILL DEMAND EXERCISE OF THEIR POLITICAL RIGHTS AS JORDANIAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE IN JORDANIAN ELECTIONS, AND AMMAN WILL HAVE TO PERMIT THIS.

B. TO FURTHER PROCESS OF ORIENTING WEST BANKERS TOWARD AMMAN, YAACOBBI SAID DAYAN HAS IN MIND EXPANSION OF OPEN BRIDGES POLICY. YAACOBBI SHARED DAYAN'S PREDICTION THAT THIS WOULD WORK, NOTING THAT EVERYONE HAD DOUBTED DAYAN'S PREDICTION IN 1969 OF SUCCESS WHICH POLICY WOULD ACHIEVE IN THREE YEARS, BUT DAYAN HAD BEEN PROVEN RIGHT. ACCORDING TO YAACOBBI, DAYAN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERWHELMING CABINET VOTE MAY 12 IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING ISRAEL'S PRESENT WEST BANK SUMMER VISITOR PROGRAM TO YEAR ROUND BASIS. DAYAN HAD IN MIND OTHER MEASURES WHICH GOI COULD TAKE TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT BACK AND FORTH.

C. NEXT MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE FOR DAYAN RE WEST BANK, YAACOBBI SAID, IS FOR ISRAELIS TO SETTLE EVERYWHERE AND NOT JUST

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 03903 01 OF 03 181229Z

WITHIN LINES OF ALLON PLAN. YAACOBZ SAID ONLY QUALIFICATION

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

26

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

SECRET 313

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

100155

R 181047Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8467
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 TEL AVIV 3903

EXDIS

DAYAN MAKES AS TO LOCATIONS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE WITHIN ARAB METROPOLITAN AREAS, WITH EXCEPTION OF GREATER JERUSALEM AREA, WHICH DAYAN WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND TO INCLUDE BETHLEHEM AND RAMALLAH.

D. YAACOBI SAID THIRD BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR DAYAN IS THAT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SECURITY CONTROL THROUGHOUT WEST BANK. AT SAME TIME DAYAN FAVORS INCREASING AUTONOMY FOR LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING BROADER ROLE FOR LOCAL POLICE. YAACOBI PREDICTED DAYAN WOULD SOON START MOVING TO EXPAND THEIR AUTONOMY.

4. WEST BANK UNDER EVENTUAL FINAL SETTLEMENT. RECALLING DAYAN'S CONVICTION THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT IS SOME TWENTY YEARS AWAY, YAACOB I SAID DAYAN INTENTIONALLY HAS NOT COME TO FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HOW FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD LOOK IN RELATION TO WEST BANK. YAACOB I OUTLINED DAYAN'S TENTATIVE VIEWS AS FOLLOWS.

A. METROPOLITAN COMPLEX OF NABLUS-JENIN SHOULD BECOME TERRITORY UNDER SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB NATION EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. AREA WOULD INCLUDE ROUGHLY ONE-THIRD OF WEST BANK ARAB POPULATION. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE ENCLAVE SMALLER THAN THE ONE ENVISAGED UNDER ALLON PLAN FOR NORTHERN PART OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
25

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

WEST BANK. ALSO UNLIKE THRUST OF ALLON PLAN, DAYAN WOULD EXPECT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES TO CONTINUE TO HAVE INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN ENCLAVE, WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH LOCAL ARAB POLICE.

B. DAYAN WOULD EXPECT ENLARGE JERUSALEM AREA INCLUDING RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM TO BE INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL WITH ITS ARAB INHABITANTS BECOMING ISRAELI CITIZENS.

C. IN DAYAN'S VIEW, REST OF WEST BANK ACCORDING TO YAACOBI SHOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE ANNEXED TO ISRAEL, BUT WITH PROVISIO THAT ARAB INHABITANTS WOULD BE CITIZENS OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN HAS NOT ENTIRELY DECIDED WHETHER HE WOULD FAVOR CREATION OF VERY SMALL ENCLAVE AROUND HEBRON WHICH LIKE ENCLAVE TO NORTH WOULD BE SOVEREIGN TERRITORY OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER. YAACOBI PREDICTED DAYAN WOULD DECIDE AGAINST HEBRON ENCLAVE.

5. GAZA STRIP. YAACOBI NOTED DAYAN HAS ALWAYS TAKEN GREAT CARE TO LIMIT HIS PUBLIC UTTERANCES ABOUT FUTURE OF GAZA TO SAYING THAT EGYPTIANS SHOULD NEVER EXPECT TO RETURN THERE. IN YAACOBI'S OPINION SILENCE OF DAYAN RE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE MEANS HE ALLOWS FOR POSSIBILITY THAT GAZA MIGHT BECOME AUTONOMOUS REGION AND MIGHT BE AFFILIATED IN SOME FASION WITH ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER.

6. SINAI. TURNING TO DAYAN'S VIEWS ON SINAI, YAACOBI SAID THAT VAGUE DISCUSSION IN ISRAELI PRESS THIS WINTER ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF "ELECTRONIC BORDERS" BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS TO ENABLE IDF FROM HIGH GROUND IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO MAINTAIN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES' AIRFIELDS, DREW ULTIMATE INSPIRATION FROM PHASE OF DAYAN'S THINKING AT THAT TIME. YAACOBI CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT DAYAN CURRENTLY IS NOT TURNING OVER IN HIS MIND POSSIBLE WAYS ISRAEL COULD STIMULATE SADAT INTO TAKING SECOND LOOK AT INTERIM SUEZ SETTLEMENT, AND YAACOBI'S READING OF DAYAN ON THIS SUBMECT WAS SOMEWHAT DATED. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN ASSUMES EVERYONE AGRESS NOTHING CONCRETE CAN BE DONE ABOUT NEW ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI ELECTIONS THIS FALL. YAACOBI DESCRIBED DAYAN'S MOST RECENT THINKING RE ACCOMMODATION WITH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE ~~SECRET~~ AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

EGYPT AS FOLLOWS.

A. DEMILITARIZATION. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN WOULD LIKE MILITARY VACUUM IN SINAI WITH NEITHER ISRAELI NOR EGYPTIAN COMBAT FORCES THERE. SOLE MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD BE ISRAELI AND ALSO EGYPTIAN CREWS OF TECHNICIANS LOCATED ON MOUNTAIN TOPS IN MIDDLE OF SINAI TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN POPULATED AREAS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT DAYAN UNDER FINAL SETTLEMENT WOULD GIVE UP IDEA OF ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH, YAACOBI ADMITTED ONE WOULD HAVE TO DESCRIBE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AS PART OF SINAI REGARDLESS OF WHICH SIDE CONTROLLED IT AND SAID THAT DAYAN'S AUTOMATIC REACTION, IF ASKED TODAY, WOULD BE THAT ISRAEL MUST MAINTAIN PERMANENT FORCES AT SHARM. YET IF FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT BECAME REALISTIC PROSPECT, YAACOBI'S OPINION WAS THAT DAYAN MIGHT AGREE TO REMOVAL OF FORCES FROM SHARM PROVIDED EGYPT AGREED TO MILITARY VACUUM CONCEPT FOR ENTIRE SINAI AND ALSO AGREED TO ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION OVER SHARM AND LAND CORRIDOR TO IT.

B. BOUNDARY. YAACOBI SAID THERE IS BROAD CONSENSUS TODAY IN LABOR PARTY THAT FINAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE STRAIGHT LINE FROM SHARM EL-SHEIKH TO A POINT ON MEDITERRANEAN COAST JUST EAST OF EL ARISH. FOR THAT MATTER, YAACOBI ESTIMATED THERE ARE TWENTY MEMBERS OF KNESSET WHO ADAMANTLY CALL FOR ANNEXATION OF ENTIRE SINAI BY ISRAEL, WHEREAS NOT MORE THAN TEN KNESSET MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SINAI TO PRE-1967 LINE. DAYAN'S INCLINATION IS THE SAME AS LABOR PARTY CONSENSUS, YAACOBI SAID, BUT HE EXPRESSED BELIEF DAYAN IS AMONG THE MANY ISRAELI LEADERS WHO WOULD COMPLETELY RETHINK THEIR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TERRITORIAL ISSUE WITH EGYPT IF GENUINE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS EVER BEGAN. TERRITORIAL POINTS ALONG 1967 LINE WITH EGYPT WHICH YAACOBI THOUGHT WERE IMPORTANT TO DAYAN ARE RAFAH JUNCTION PLUS AREA IMMEDIATELY WEST OF EILAT--SETTING ASIDE FOR MOMENT DISPOSITION OF SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND LAND CORRIDOR TO IT. YAACOBI SAID DAYAN FIRMLY HOLDS THAT ISRAEL MUST ANNEX MOST OF COASTAL AREA BETWEEN EL ARISH AND GAZA STRIP. DAYAN ALSO WANTS ISRAELI TERRITORY WIDENED WEST OF EILAT. BOTH OBJECTIVES COULD BE ACHIEVED MOST LOGICALLY, YAACOBI SAID, BY MOVING ENTIRE LENGTH OF 1967 LINE SEVERAL KILOMETERS WEST. ASKED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
25

FORM 10-1074

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 03903 02 OF 03 181241Z

HOW DAYAN MIGHT RACT IF EGYPTIANS WERE WILLING TO REDRAW
1967 LINE AND TO CONCEDE SOME TERRITORY IN RAFAH JUNCTION AREA

NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
20

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 297

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03903 03 OF 03 181248Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SS0-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

100224

R 181047Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8468
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 TEL AVIV 3903

EXDIS

AND WEST OF FILAT, BUT ONLY IN RETURN FOR FACE-SAVING ISRAELI CONFESSION OF SMALL PIECE OF DESERT AROUND EL AUJA, YAACOBZ REMARKED DAYAN WAS JUST DARING ENOUGH THAT IF HE WERE CONVINCED EGYPTIANS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT PFACE, HE MIGHT AGREE.

C. SOVEREIGNTY OVER SHARM EL-SHEIKH. YAACOB I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH DAYAN, AS NOTED, INCLINED TOWARD LABOR PARTY CONSENSUS FAVORING NEW BOUNDARY IN SINAI, HE HAD NEVER SAID SO. YAACOB I FELT DAYAN PROBABLY STILL ADHERES TO LABOR PARTY ORAL TORAH OF 1969 ON ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND LAND CORRIDOR TO IT. ORAL TORAH CALLS FOR THESE AREAS TO BE UNDER ISRAELI "ADMINISTRATION," AND "ADMINISTRATION" DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN SOVEREIGNTY. YAACOB I ADDED THAT "ADMINISTRATION" DOES MEAN MORE THAN "CONTROL," WORD THAT DAYAN CURRENTLY IS USING TO DESCRIBE ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP TO THAT PART OF WEST BANK WHICH DAYAN WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE PLACED UNDER THEORETICAL SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB STATE EAST OF JORDAN RIVER UNDER FINAL SETTLEMENT. YET DAYAN HAD NEVER CALLED FOR SHARM OR ITS CORRIDOR TO BE INCORPORATED INTO ISRAEL AND FLY ISRAELI FLAG, AND YAACOB I DOUBTED THAT ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THIS CASE WERE IMPORTANT TO DAYAN.

7. COMMENT. YAACOBBI'S SPECULATION ABOUT DAYAN'S INNERMOST THOUGHTS ON HOW FAR ISRAEL CAN GO TO REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

BECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03903 03 OF 03 181248Z

EGYPT SUPPORTS OUR BELIEF THAT DAYAN A) STRONGLY DESIRES MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT, AND B) IS THE ONE ISRAELI LEADER WHO LOOKS AT THIS PROBLEM IMAGINATIVELY. IT ALSO SHOWS HOW DAYAN BLOWS HOT AND COLD ON SUBJECT. WHEN IN TCONOCLASTIC MOOD, SEEKING RECONSIDERATION OF OLD ASSUMPTTIONS BY ISRAELIS, HE CAN SHOCK PUBLIC WITH NEW IDEAS; WHEN TROUBLED BY BELLICOSE TALK OUT OF CAIRO (OR BY US PROBES FOR ISRAELI CONCILIATORY GESTURE TOWARD EGYPT), HE CAN TAKE VERY TOUGH LINE RE SINAI. IF NEGOTIATING PROCESS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT SHOULD EVER GET UNDER WAY, DAYAN WOULD PROBABLY NUMBER AMONG ADVOCATES OF HARD OPENING POSITION BUT MIGHT BE PREPARED EVENTUALLY TO MOVE FARTHER THAN SOME ISRAELI LEADERS TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

20

621/20/010

BECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State
MAY 11 PM 8:54

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL 641

2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03712 111543Z

62
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
***** 036784

R 111433Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8391

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 3712

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS
SUBJECT: US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL

1. ACCORDING AFTERNOON PRESS MAY 11, (A) SECRETARY TOLD FBAN MAY 10 THAT US WOULD CONTINUE ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL AS PRESIDENT PROMISED MRS MEIR DURING HER LATEST VISIT TO US, AND (B) ALTHOUGH ISRAEL HAS NOT YET RECEIVED ANSWER TO MRS MEIR'S ARMS REQUESTS, DELAY IS DUE TO PRE-OCCUPATION OF ADMINISTRATION WITH WIDE RANGE OF OTHER PROBLEMS AND IS NOT TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

2. IN VIEW OF ABOVE REPORT, EMB INVITES DEPT'S ATTENTION TO PARA 2 PAGE 12 OF INR RESEARCH STUDY RSGS-4 OR APRIL 16 ON AIRCRAFT SALES THROUGH 1980, WHICH STATES MEIR VISIT RESULTED IN COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH 24 PHANTOMS AND 24 SKYHAWKS.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a star. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

WH

2

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 091514Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8361
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CATRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 3634

EXDIS

F O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ESTIMATE OF SADAT'S INTENTIONS

1. IN CONVERSATION MAY 9 MINISTER OF POLICE (AND CABINET ARAB EXPERT) SHLOMO HILLEL TOLD CHARGÉ HE STRONGLY DOUBTS SADAT HAS ANY INTENTION OF CARRYING OUT THREATS OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. IF ANYTHING, HILLEL SAID, HIS OPINION HAS STRENGTHENED OVER PAST THREE WEEKS THAT SADAT IS ONLY MAKING THREATS FOR PURPOSE OF BUILDING UP TENSION IN ANTICIPATION OF UN DEBATE ON MIDDLE EAST IN EARLY JUNE.

2. HILLEL SAID SADAT HAS THREATENED SO MANY TIMES THAT CREDIBILITY OF HIS THREATS HAS DECLINED. THEREFORE, THIS TIME, IN ORDER TO TRY TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY HE HAS HAD TO MAKE IT LOOK AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AS IF HE REALLY INTENDED TO STRIKE. IF IT IS ACCEPTED, AS HILLEL BELIEVES, THAT SADAT KNOWS HE COULD NOT WIN ANYTHING ON GROUND BY MILITARY ACTION AND THAT HIS PURPOSE IS TO TRY TO GAIN POLITICAL INTERVENTION BY GREAT POWERS BY MAKING IT APPEAR THAT SITUATION IS CRITICAL, THEN SADAT MUST LIMIT HIMSELF TO THREATS AND MUST AVOID IMPLEMENTING THEM AT ALL COSTS. IF HE SHOULD CARRY OUT THREAT AND ATTACK, HIS DEFEAT WOULD BE IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL AND THIS WOULD HAVE OPPOSITE AFFECT IN INTERNATIONAL ARENA FROM WHAT HE IS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH.

01587 273 MAY 9 PM 8:10
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03634 091618Z

MOREOVER, IT COULD HAVE DISASTROUS RESULTS FOR HIM PERSONALLY.
HILLEL THEREFORE, FELT, BARRING THE ALWAYS-PRESENT POSSIBILITY
OF SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR, THAT THERE IS NO REALISTIC REASON TO
FEAR OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE ON EGYPTIAN FRONT.
ZURHELLEN

RECEIVED
2007/11/12

01:08 AM 2 YMM 87

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The entire emblem is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right.

WA

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03616 091339Z

2
3

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

014410

R 091229Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8352
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 3616

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG
SUBJECT: MEIR MESSAGE TO SADAT

REF. A. TEL AVIV 2694; B. 3579 NOTAL

1. AS REPORTED REFTEL B, MRS MEIR IN INTERVIEW TELECAST HERE MAY 6 SOUGHT TO OBSCURE TIMING OF MESSAGE SHE SAID SHE HAD SENT TO SADAT THROUGH THIRD PARTY WHOM SHE DID NOT IDENTIFY, IN WHICH SHE PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, JOURNALISTS BROUGHT HER BACK TO THIS SUBJECT LATER IN INTERVIEW, AND SHE INDICATED MESSAGE HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED WITHIN PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, NOT MONTHS. SHE ALSO SAID SHE HAD CHOSEN THIRD PARTY WITH GOOD CREDENTIALS IN CAIRO AS WELL AS HERE, AND THAT IT WAS PERSONAGE WHO VISITED EGYPT FIRST AND ISRAEL SECOND--PRESUMABLY TRANSMITTING MRS MEIR'S MESSAGE TO SADAT AFTERWARDS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

2. WELL INFORMED ISRAELI JOURNALIST HAS SPECULATED WITH US THAT INTERMEDIARY WAS ITALIAN FONMIN MEDICI. AS NOTED IN REFTEL A, MEDICI DID HAVE PRIVATE TALK WITH MRS MEIR MARCH 27. MFA SOURCE WHO TOLD US ABOUT MEETING, AT WHICH NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT, REMARKED THAT REPORT OF MEETING RECEIVED BY MFA FROM PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE WAS UNUSUALLY BRIEF AND THAT EBAN SEEMED SOMEWHAT TIGHTLIPPED WITH HIS STAFF ABOUT MEIR-MEDICI PRIVATE MEETING. SPECULATION THAT MEDICI WAS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03616 091339Z

INTERMEDIARY THEREFORE SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO US.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET
35

ehi/20/017

REC ASSIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 143 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right.

TELEGRAM

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 APR 26 AM 7:58

029368

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 3239

FROM AMBASSADOR POPPER

REF: NICOLA 970

1. HAD ONLY FEW MINUTES TO RUN THROUGH NICOSIA 970 BEFORE LEAVING TEHRAN. DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER FOLLOWING COMMENTS IN PREPARING RESPONSE.

2. LAST WEEKEND GREEK GOVT. STATEMENT, PUT OUT I BELIEVE BY PRIMIN'S OFFICE, SEEMED TO MARK SOME SORT OF AN ADVANCE IN GOG POSITION. THOUGH STILL EVEN-HANDED, I HAD IMPRESSION IT WAS MORE POINTEDLY ANTI-GRIVAS THAN PREVIOUS GREEK FONOFF COMMENTS, AND I NOTE CYPRUS GOVT. TERMED IT "VERY CONSTRUCTIVE," WHILE GRIVAS FOLLOWERS WERE SAID TO BE DISPLEASED. IF STATEMENT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03239 251558Z

SHOULD HELP TO DEFUSE SITUATION CREATED BY CLENDIES THREAT TO RESIGN AND GRIVAS AND ANTI-GRIVAS VIOLENCE, WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT WANT TO INTERCEDE.

3. IF ON CONTRARY SITUATION REMAINS UNCHANGED, I WONDER WHETHER STAGE HAS YET BEEN REACHED WHERE USG WOULD WANT TO MAKE UNILATERAL APPROACH TO GREEKS. WOULD IT NOT BE WISE TO TALK OVER SITUATION WITH UNDER SYG GUYER, WHO SHOULD BE IN AREA SHORTLY, AND WITH BRITISH, TO SEE WHAT SORT OF PARALLEL ACTION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE? THIS WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS FROM A NUMBER OF POINTS OF VIEW.

4. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY TO BE EXPLORED WOULD BE AN APPROACH, INDIVIDUALLY OR OTHERWISE, TO BOTH GREEKS AND TURKS, URGING THEM TO BREAK THE SLIDE TOWARD CONFLICT BY MEASURES WHICH COULD RESUSCITATE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. ON THE GREEK SIDE THIS WOULD ENTAIL PUTTING THE BRAKES ON GRIVAS; ON THE TURKISH SIDE, RESTRAINING THE DENKTASH BELLCOSITY AND INTRANSIGENCE, WHICH IF NOT OVERSHADOWED BY THE GRIVAS CAPER WOULD BE SEEN TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IMPOSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MIGHT BE WELL TO POINT OUT TO MAKARIOS AND CLERIDES THAT THEY TOO MUST EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND FLEXIBILITY IF MOMENTUM TOWARD SETTLEMENT, OR EVEN DOMESTIC CALM IN CYPRUS, IS TO BE ATTAINED.

5. I WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THESE POINTS FURTHER ON MY RETURN TO NICOSIA APRIL 30.

6. RE NICOSIA 977 JUST RECEIVED IN TEL AVIV, THIS REINFORCES MY FEELING THAT WE SHOULD AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH APPROACHES.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

hhi/ro/0107

REF: ACC: 107

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 APR 17 PM 3:15

090350

O R 171230Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8124
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

FXDIS

REF: STATE 71104

2. EBAN SAID HE HAD TOLD UK AMBASSADOR HERE THAT ISRAELI WOULD BE SHOCKED IF UK SUPPORTED A ONE-SIDED APPROACH TO RESOLUTION, ESPECIALLY ONE SUCH AS EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL TO APPLY SANCTIONS AND WITHHOLD AID. UK AMB REPLIED HE FELT SURE UK WOULD NOT ADOPT ANYTHING THAT SMELLED OF SANCTIONS OR WITHHOLDING AID.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03026 171405Z

LESS BALANCED THAN HIS OWN SUGGESTED DRAFT. OTHERWISE, HE DID NOT SEE HOW HIS MOVE WOULD HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON DRAFT THAT WOULD BE SURFACED. CHARGE NOTED THAT POSSIBILITY OF VETO WAS IMPLICIT IN WHAT US HAD SAID TO OTHERS. EBAN MAINTAINED MEERE POSSIBILITY WAS NOT ENOUGH, IN HIS VIEW, TO HAVE ANY EFFECT: IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL. ACTUALLY, HE DOUBTED ANY RESOLUTION COULD GET NINE VOTES AND STILL NOT BE VETOED BY US. THAT IS, IF IT "GOOD" IT WOULD NOT GET EVEN NINE VOTES AND IF IT "BAD" ENOUGH TO GET NINE VOTES THEN IT WOULD BE BOUND TO BE SO BAD THAT US WOULD DECIDE TO VETO.

4. EBAN SAID MRS. MEIR CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THERE BE NO WEAKENING ON PART OF US. ANY ABSTENTION BY US WOULD BE TAKEN AS A CHANGE IN POLICY, SINCE RESOLUTION AMB BUSH VETOED LAST YEAR WAS NOT AS RAD AS THOSE NOW BEING PRESENTED. IN LONG RUN, GUL THINKS THAT STEADFASTNESS OF US ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN PARLIAMENTARY OUTCOME IN THIS CASE.

5. COMMENT: FRANKLY, WE ARE SURPRISED AT LACK OF HARDER OPPOSITION BY ISRAELIS AGAINST US ILLUSTRATIVE DRAFT (STATE 70320). WHILE DINITZ' ARGUMENTS WERE IN LINE WITH WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT OF ISRAELIS, FACT THAT EBAN DID NOT ADD HIS PROTESTS SUGGESTS THAT THEY SEE LITTLE PROSPECT OF THIS DRAFT EVER COMING UP FOR VOTE AND THEREFORE DO NOT WANT TO ANTAGONIZE US BY ARGUING AGAINST IT. RATHER, THEY EXPECT AND MIGHT EVEN PREFER HARDLINE ARAB DRAFT WHICH WOULD EVOKE US VETO AND PERHAPS SOME OTHER NEGATIVE VOTES.

6. RE WORDING US ILLUSTRATIVE DRAFT, IN ADDITION
TO QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WERE "INNOCENT"
DEATHS AT BEIRUT, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY AT CYPRUS IF REFERENCE
IS TO ATTACK ON AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE AND AIRCRAFT ON APRIL
9. AS FAR AS IS KNOWN HERE, ONLY DEATHS THAT OCCASION IN
CYPRUS WERE FEDAYEEN.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

5/1/20/9/0

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 556

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02982 141102Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO UCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W

071248.

O 141045Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8105
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2982

EXDIS

E U 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, IS EG
SUBJECT: MIRAGES IN EGYPT

REF: CAIRO 1116

1. WHILE WE CAN NEVER RULE OUT ANYTHING IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND WILL KEEP OUR EYES AND EARS OPEN FOR INDICATORS, WE WOULD DOUBT THAT GOI PLANNING STRIKE AT EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS TO KNOCK OUT MIRAGES.

2. WE DO NOT THINK THAT ISRAELIS CARRY OUT MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL PURPOSES AND THEREFORE IDEA THAT THEY WOULD HIT MIRAGES TO SOFTEN SADAT UP FOR NEGOTIATIONS DOES NOTHING TRUE. THEY WOULD CONSIDER THIS KIND OF OPERATION, IN OUR VIEW, ONLY IF THEY FELT THAT PRESENCE OF MIRAGES POSED ACTUAL MILITARY THREAT TO ISRAEL SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME OBVIOUS DISADVANTAGES (INCLUDING POSSIBLE LOSSES DUE TO EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSES) THAT ATTACK WOULD INCUR. WE SEE NO INDICATIONS THAT ISRAELIS CONSIDER AIRCRAFT IN QUESTION THAT KIND OF A THREAT. (PARA 3: USDAO TEL AVIV 0568 DTG 131455Z APR 73).

3. WE THINK ISRAELIS WILL WANT TO USE MIRAGE TRANSFER (IF IT HAS OCCURRED) PRINCIPALLY IN TERMS OF RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, TO SHOW UP WHAT THEY CONSIDER BIASED FRENCH POLICY IN DENYING ARMS TO ISRAEL AS "PARTICIPANT" IN THE FIGHTING WHILE SUPPLYING ARMS TO LIBYA AS "NON-

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

73 APR 14 PM 3:33

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02982 141102Z

PARTICIPANT." THEY WILL MORE TO EMBARRASS FRENCH GOVT, AND
ALSO TO EMBARRASS FRENCH-LIBYAN RELATIONS IF THEY
CAN FORCE FRENCH INTO PUBLIC AVOWAL THAT AIRCRAFT HAVE
IN FACT BEEN TRANSFERRED TO EGYPT.
ZURHELLEN

1000 WASHINGTON

13 DEC 1973 3:33

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

9/1/80/0107

REF: ASSICEN

W H

PAGE 01 TEL AV 2872 01 OF 02 111100Z

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

037-712

73 APR 11 PM 12:13

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2872

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJECT: EBAN REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SITUATION

1. SUMMARY. IN REVIEWING MIDDLE EAST SITUATION APRIL 10 FOR CHARGE, EBAN REITERATED LONGSTANDING ISRAELI INTERPRETATIONS, OFFERED NO NEW IDEAS, AND GAVE EVERY INDICATION HE SEES NO WAY AND NO NEED FOR ISRAEL TO TRY TO MOVE SITUATION OFF DEAD CENTER. HE ACKNOWLEDGED CURRENT HARDNESS OF EGYPTIAN POSITION BUT DISMISSED POSSIBILITY OF DISINTEGRATION OF SADAT REGIME OR EGYPTIAN RESORT TO NEW FIGHTING AND SAID TOUGHNESS MAY WELL BE PRELUDE TO GREATER EGYPTIAN FLEXIBILITY LATER ON. AS FOR KING HUSSEIN, EBAN SAID ISRAELI DOES NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO MOVE TOWARD ACCOMMODATION BEFORE THERE IS PROGRESS WITH EGYPT AND STRESSED HUSSEIN HIMSELF SEES NO URGENCY AND KNOWS THAT TIME IS NOT OPERATING AGAINST HIM. END SUMMARY.

2. EBAN INVITED CHARGE FOR GENERAL REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SITUATION APRIL 10. HE DEVOTED HIS ATTENTION PRIMARILY TO EGYPT, EXPLAINING AT LENGTH WHY HE CONTINUES HO NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02872 01 OF 02 111100Z

BELIEVES ISRAEL AND US SHOULD SEEK TO PUT INITIATIVE ON CAIRO TO ALTER EXISTING MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. HE TOOK UP AND THEN DISMISSED ONE BY ONE THE ARGUMENTS AS HE SEES THEM AGAINST SUCH A STAND-PAT POLICY: A) DANGER OF OVERTHROW OF SADAT REGIME, B) DANGER OF EGYPTIAN RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION, C) APPEAL BY SADAT TO EUROPEANS TO ALTER SITUATION, D) SADAT INDUCED SOVIET PRESSURES IN MIDDLE EAST, AND E) HARM TO KING HUSSEIN OF CONTINUATION OF MIDDLE EAST IMPASSE.

3. SADAT REGIME INSTABILITY AND HARDENING EGYPTIAN LINE. EBAN INSISTED THAT ALTHOUGH SADAT IS PASSING THROUGH DIFFICULT PERIOD, SITUATION IS NOT DANGEROUS, SINCE EGYPTIAN STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS DO NOT HAVE ARMY OR WORKER SUPPORT, AND SADAT HAS EFFECTIVELY ALLIED OFFICER CORPS TO HIS REGIME THROUGH PRIVILEGES. EBAN ACKNOWLEDGED INTERNAL PROBLEMS HAD CAUSED SADAT LATELY TO TALK TOUGH ABOUT US AND TO HARDEN HIS LINE ON SETTLEMENT ISSUES, AS SHOWN INTER ALIA BY NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW, WITH DEMAND FOR ADVANCE COMMITMENT NOT ONLY ON RETURN OF SINAI TO EGYPT BUT ALSO ON TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. EBAN NOTED IN PASSING THAT DISTINCTION BETWEEN FULL EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER SINAI AND FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT LOST ON SADAT, VARIOUS EUROPEANS HAVING PROBED THIS DISTINCTION WITH EGYPTIANS RECENTLY LOOKING FOR AVENUES OF ISRAEL-EGYPT COMPROMISE. THEREFORE, SADAT'S REJECTION OF PRES. NIXON'S CALL FOR RECONCILIATION OF EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY WITH ISRAELI SECURITY AND HIS REMARK THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ISRAELIS LURKING AROUND SINAI AFTER SETTLEMENT WERE SIGNIFICANT. NEVERTHELESS, ALL THIS COULD CHANGE IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE, EBAN SAID, SINCE IN CASE OF EGYPT TOUGH RHETORIC OFTEN DOES NOT ACCORD WITH REAL ATTITUDES. IF SADAT'S MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN REGIME AT HOME, SUCH AS ASSUMING NEW POWERS FOR HIMSELF, ARE ACCOMPANIED NOW BY HARDER POSTURE ON SETTLEMENT ISSUES, THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE GREATER EGYPTIAN FLEXIBILITY LATER ON, EBAN ADDED.

4. EGYPTIAN RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION. EBAN GAVE THREE REASONS WHY EGYPT WOULD NOT TRY ONE-TIME HIT-AND-RUN MILITARY ASSAULT: SADAT'S RATIONALITY, SATISFACTION OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY WITH PRESENT SITUATION, AND ABSENCE OF SOVIET BACKING FOR SUCH SCHEME. EBAN SAID SADAT HAS COME TO RECOGNIZE HE CANNOT EXPECT LIMITED RETALIATION FOR LIMITED ATTACK, AND MOST PROMINENT EGYPTIAN COMMENTATORS HAVE COME OUT AGAINST OLD IDEA (AS MAHMOUD RIAD USED TO ADVOCATE) THAT EGYPTIAN DIPLOMACY MUST

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

REF ASSIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched across the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched across the bottom. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02872 01 OF 02 111100Z

BE BACKED BY SOME SHOOTING. EBAN OPINED THAT EGYPTIANS:
LEARNED SOMETHING FROM WATCHING LATER STAGES OF VIETNAM
CONFLICT. AS FOR OFFICER CORPS, NO WAR NO PEACE IS GOOD DEAL,
SINCE OFFICERS KNOW WAR WOULD MEAN HUMILIATION AND PEACE
WOULD MEAN DIMUNITION OF THEIR ELITE STATURE. AND FOR
REASONS EBAN TOOK UP LATER, HE BELIEVED SOVIETS HAVE MADE CLEAR
THAT THEY WOULD NOT UNDERWRITE EGYPTIAN MILITARY ADVENTURE.

5. EUROPEAN PRESSURES. EBAN SAID SADAT HAD PROVEN TO HIMSELF THIS WINTER THAT WESTERN EUROPE CANNOT SOLVE HIS PROBLEM. EVEN FRENCH HAVE NOW TAKEN POSITION OF REALISTIC FATALISM. EBAN THOUGHT MEDICI HAD SUMMED UP SITUATION IN SAYING EUROPE HAS WEALTH BUT NO STRATEGIC POWER, MEANING EUROPE COULD HELP EGYPT AFTER A SETTLEMENT BUT COULD NOT HELP BRING SETTLEMENT ABOUT. MEDICI COULD ONLY SUGGEST IDEA OF MASSIVE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT IF EGYPTIANS REOPEN CANAL, AN IDEA FOR WHICH MEDICI FELT HE HAD US ENCOURAGEMENT, BUT TO WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED LUKEWARM BRITISH AND FRENCH REACTIONS. EBAN NOTED IN PASSING THAT DISPATCH OF ISMAIL TO WESTERN CAPITALS THIS WINTER EVIDENTLY EARNED SADAT SHARP CRITICISM FROM QADHAFI FOR ATMOSPHERE OF COMPROMISE THIS ACTIVITY ENGENDERED. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO EGYPT'S CURRENT HARD LINE ON SETTLEMENT ISSUES. HOWEVER, ISRAELIS NOW HAVE REPORTS OF SERIOUS LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN STRAIN, AND EBAN FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT UNION SCHEDULED FOR ONLY FIVE MONTHS FROM NOW WOULD COME TO PASS.

6. SOVIET ATTITUDE. EBAN WAS CONVINCED THAT OVERRIDING SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE CONSOLIDATION OF DETENTE WITH US AND EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT LET ARABS GET IN WAY. MOSCOW SEES MIDDLE EAST AS BEARING NOT ONLY ON FIRST OBJECTIVE BUT ALSO ON SECOND, WHERE EUROPEAN INSISTENCE ON GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN EUROPE EXTENDS TO ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION. EBAN WAS CONFIDENT SOVIETS WILL NOT GIVE SADAT GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILES OR HEAVY BOMBERS, WILL NOT USE OWN INTIMIDATION CAPABILITIES TO HEAT UP MIDDLE EAST CRISIS ON ARABS' BEHALF, AND WILL NOT ENCOURAGE CAIRO TO TAKE ANY LIMITED MILITARY ACTION, FOR WHICH EGYPT CAN ONLY EXPECT SOVIET PROPAGANDA SUPPORT. SOVIETS IN EBAN'S VIEW COULD BE INDUCED TO MOVE TO STILL MORE MODERATE ATTITUDE ON MIDDLE EAST BY FURTHER PERIOD OF US STANDING FIRM. AS LONG AS CEASE-FIRE HOLDS AND MIDDLE EAST BALANCE IS MAINTAINED, US DOES NOT NEED TO PURSUE ANYONE RE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 02872 01 OF 02 111100Z
MIDDLE EAST, ACCORDING TO EBAN.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ 837

2

INFO UCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

037677

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2872

7. HUSSEIN. EBAN SAID HUSSEIN HAS BEEN MAINTAINING HIS MODDY POSTURE AND OTHERWISE KEEPING QUIET. EBAN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02872 02 OF 02 111102Z

8. COMMENT. IN PAINTING THIS OPTIMISTIC SCENE FOR PURPOSE OF JUSTIFYING STANDPAT POLICY FOR BOTH ISRAEL AND US RE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, EBAN SEEMED TO HAVE TROUBLE IN FITTING CURRENT TOUGHNESS OF EGYPTIAN POSITION INTO PICTURE. HIS SUGGESTION THAT TOUGHNESS IN CAIRO MAY BE PRELUDE TO MORE FLEXIBILITY LATER ON, ONCE SADAT HAS BETTER SECURED HIS DOMESTIC POSITION, DID NOT CARRY CONVICTION. AT ONE POINT EBAN SAID IT WAS HARD TO BE SURE WHETHER SADAT CONTINUES TO HOPE FOR ACCOMMODATION AND CURRENTLY IS POSTURING TO BRING ABOUT OUTSIDE PRESSURES ON ISRAEL, OR WHETHER HE NOW DESPAIRS OF SOLUTION. EBAN NOTED THAT EGYPTIANS CONTINUE TO LOOK AT SITUATION AS ALL OR NOTHING AT ALL AND HAVE NEVER FACED SQUARELY QUESTION OF HOW THEY MIGHT CUT THEIR LOSSES, IF THEY EVER DO, ISRAEL WILL BE VERY AMENABLE, EBAN SAID.

ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

6/11/2017

DECLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

WK

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02768 061653Z

5

0 R 061413Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8011
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2768

FXDISXU

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, JU, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAELI POLTCIES TOWARD WEST BANK

REF: AMMAN 1793

1. EMBASSY IS REPORTING SEPARATELY BY IMMEDIATE CABLE CONFIRMATION WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM RELIABLE SOURCE THAT CABINET APRIL 8 WILL TAKE UP ISSUE OF PERMITTING ISRAELIS TO BUY LAND IN WEST BANK AND MAY BE ABLE, CONTRARY TO EARLIER INDICATIONS, TO REACH NEW POLICY DECISION AT THE SAME SESSION. ALSO RELEVANT IS FACT THAT DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED APRIL 6 TO HOLD ANOTHER, SUPPOSEDLY FINAL, SESSION IN LABOR PARTY DEBATE ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON APRIL 12, AT WHICH MRS. MEIR, DAYAN, AND GALILI WILL SPEAK. ACCORDING TO THE SAME SOURCE (SPOKESMAN OF LABOR PARTY), MRS. MEIR IS CONVENING HER KITCHEN CABINET APRIL 7 TO GO OVER PLANS FOR BOTH APRIL 8 CABINET DISCUSSION OF LAND PURCHASE ISSUE AND APRIL 12 DEBATE ON POLICY TOWARD TERRITORIES.

2. THERE IS NO WAY TO PREDICT WHETHER SIGNIFICANT, AS OPPOSED TO VERY LIMITED, POLICY SHIFTS WILL RESULT FROM THESE TWO IMPENDING MEETINGS. PRESSURES ON MRS MEIR ARE CONSIDERABLE IN THIS ELECTION YEAR TO OPEN WAY TO LARGE SCALE WEST BANK LAND PURCHASES AND CLOSER INTEGRATION OF WEST BANK WITH ISRAEL IN MANY OTHER WAYS, AS DAYAN WANTS. MRS MEIR BY ALL SIGNS REMAINS OPPOSED TO ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN SITUATION. PRESSURES ARE PRODUCING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 0276R 061653Z

MANY UTTERANCES BY POLITICAL FIGURES AND MUCH COMMENTARY, CREATING IMPRESSION (INCLUDING IN AMMAN--RETEL) THAT MORE IS ALREADY HAPPENING THAN IS THE CASE.

3. NEVERTHELESS, EMBASSY BELIEVES DEPARTMENT SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER TIME HAS COME FOR US TO STRENGTHEN HAND OF THOSE IN GOI WHO OPPOSE CREATION OF NEW FACTS IN WEST BANK BY REMINDER THAT USG HAS IMPORTANT INTERESTS, INTER ALIA IN JORDAN, WHICH WOULD BE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY ANY CHANGE IN EXISTING GOI POLICY TOWARD WEST BANK. ANY SUCH REPRESENTATION IN OUR VIEW SHOULD INDICATE OUR APPRECIATION THAT THIS IS ELECTION YEAR IN ISRAEL, RESULTING IN MUCH THUNDER ON ISSUES LIKE THIS, AND SHOULD STRESS THAT OUR CONCERN IS ONLY ABOUT CONCRETE ACTIONS ON GROUND, NOT WORDS, ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

811/20/0107



Department of State

WH
TELEGRAM

SECRET 726

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02294 01 OF 03 240727Z

2

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

010422

R 231530Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7782
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 2294

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, XF
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM

REF: STATE 51643

1. TO BEGIN WITH, WE FEEL REEXAMINATION IS NEEDED OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE PREMISE THAT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ARE SO EVIL IN THEMSELVES THAT THEY CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY ANY CAUSE IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE EMPLOYED; THAT, MOREOVER, BECAUSE THEY ARE SO, THEY DO NOT FURTHER CAUSE IN WHICH THEY ARE EMPLOYED, BUT ARE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE; AND THAT, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THESE FACTS ARE SELF-EVIDENT TO ANY THINKING PERSON AND THEREFORE OUR CONCLUSIONS MUST

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

SECRET

BE SHARED BY ANY RIGHT-THINKING PERSON, AMONG WHOM WE INCLUDE LEADERS OF ALL COUNTRIES WE DEAL WITH. FROM THE ADMITTEDLY PAROCHIAL AND LIMITED POINT OF VIEW OF ONE EMBASSY, THESE THINGS DO NOT SEEM NECESSARILY TO BE TRUE.

THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE WHO SEE LESS TO CONDEMN IN THE ASSASSINATION OF A FEW PEOPLE FROM TIME TO TIME THAN THEY DO IN WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE MASS MURDER, GENOCIDE AND NATIONAL OPPRESSION. THIS IS NOT TO SAY, BY ANY MEANS, THAT WE CONDONE TERRORISM, BUT THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO FIGHT IT EFFECTIVELY WE MUST UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT.

4. AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE, THEREFORE, MUCH OF THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND CERTAINLY MOST OF THE ARAB NATIONS, DO NOT LOOK UPON THE KHARTOUM TERROR, ANY MORE THAN ON THE LOD OR MUNICH MASSACRES, AS EVENTS SO EVIL THAT THEY MUST BE CONDEMNED AND PREVENTED REGARDLESS OF ONE'S FEELINGS TOWARDS THE CAUSE IN WHICH

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02294 01 OF 03 240727Z

THEY WERE EMPLOYED. SENSITIVE INDIVIDUALS WILL ALWAYS BE SHOCKED AND PERSONALLY ASHAMED AT ACTS OF CRUELTY AND BARBARISM CARRIED OUT BY THEIR FELLOWS, BUT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONCLUDING THAT "THE TERRORISTS MUST BE STOPPED AT ALL COSTS" AND "JUSTICE MUST BE DONE TO THE PALESTINIANS SO THAT THESE THINGS CAN BE STOPPED."

IT SEEMS TO US THAT, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE INITIAL SHOCK WEARS OFF AND THEY FIND THAT THE SAME WORLD WITH THE SAME PROBLEMS IS STILL THERE, THE LATTER IS THE MORE TYPICAL ARAB REACTION. IF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE TO HELP IN FIGHTING ARAB TERROR, THEREFORE, THE CASE MUST BE PRESENTED IN TERMS MEANINGFUL TO THEM, NO ONLY TO US.

5. THE FIRST PROBLEM, WE THINK, IS FACTUAL: ARE THESE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES SUCCESSES OR FAILURES, AND DO THEY SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS? SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN TERMS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PERPETRATORS, WHICH WE SEE AS (A) SO TO ALARM THE WORLD, ESPECIALLY THE LARGE POWERS, THAT IT WILL PRODUCE A SATISFACTORY (TO THE TERRORISTS) SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM WHICH THE ARABS CANNOT GAIN BY THEIR OWN POWER; (B) THE CONCOMITANT OF (A), TO PREVENT ANY OTHER SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM OR ITS INDIFINITE POSTPONEMENT; (C) ESSENTIALLY UNCONNECTED WITH THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM, TO PROMOTE THE RADICALIZATION OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE OVERTHROW OF BACKWARD (READ PRO-WESTERN) RULERS. THESE ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES, AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS THE RELEASE OF FEDAYEEN PRISONERS FROM ISRAELI OR OTHER JAILS ARE SECONDARY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

REF ASSIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

~~SECRET~~ 765

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W

010502

R 231530Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7783
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 TEL AVIV 2294

EXDIS

6. IN THESE TERMS, THE TERRORISTS HAVE GAINED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS FOR OBJECTIVES (A) AND (B), NOT MUCH FOR (C). AS WE SAID IN TEL AVIV 6039 NOTAL ABOUT MUNICH, THAT WAS A SUCCESS FOR FEDAYEEN IN THAT IT INCREASED ISRAELI FEELING THAT ARABS NEITHER WANT PEACE NOR CAN BE TRUSTED TO IMPLEMENT IT AND AT SAME TIME NARROWED OPTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE OPEN TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS FOR COMPROMISE WITH ISRAEL, THUS STRONGLY DAMAGING WHATEVER CHANCES MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE EXISTED FOR AMERICAN MEDIATION IN DIRECTION OF INTERIM AGREEMENT ON SUEZ CANAL. WE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE DILEMMA WE THOUGHT US POLICY WOULD THUS FACE, TAKING ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM WHICH WE HAD TO TAKE BUT REALIZING AT SAME TIME THAT THESE ACTIONS WERE COUNTER TO OR AT LEAST NOT PARALLEL TO OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST. IT SEEMS TO NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02294 02 OF 03 240744Z

US THAT THIS IS STILL THE SITUATION WE ARE IN, AND KHARTOUM MURDERS HAVE MADE IT VERY MUCH WORSE BY HEIGHTENING THE CONCERN WE MUST HAVE AGAINST TERRORISM WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAKING ARAB GOVERNMENTS FEEL MORE RESENTFUL OF US AND PROVIDING ISRAELIS WITH OPPORTUNITY TO SAY WE TOLD YOU SO ALL ALONG.

7. WHAT THEN TO DO? THIS EMBASSY FOUND ITSELF VERY MUCH IN AGREEMENT WITH CAIRO 683 NOTAL, PARTICULARLY ITS POINTS THAT TOO MUCH RHETORIC MIGHT CAUSE MORE RATHER THAN LESS TERRORISM AND THAT USG EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS LIMITING THE DAMAGE OF TERRORIST SPOILING OPERATIONS BY KEEPING OUR LINES OPEN FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE ARABS. WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING IDEAS BE KEPT IN MIND IN PLANNING ANTI-TERRORIST POLICY:

- A. WE SHOULD LOCALIZE AND MAKE SPECIFIC THE PROBLEM, RATHER THAN GENERALIZE IT AND SO MAKE IT VAGUE. THAT IS, THE PROBLEM IS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE US BY BSO, FATAH AND, AT THE WIDEST, PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS. WE MUST FIGHT THAT SPECIFIC TERRORISM AND TRY TO GET THE HELP OF OTHERS WHO CAN FIGHT IT. NO PURPOSE IS SERVED, QUITE THE CONTRARY, BY TRYING TO GET UNIVERSAL DECLARATIONS AGAINST TERRORISM AS A CONCEPT OR BY LINKING THE SPECIFIC DANGER WE ARE FACED WITH HERE WITH THE PROBLEMS OF AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, THE IRISH, US DOMESTIC PLANE HIJACKINGS OR OTHER EXTRANEIOUS CONSIDERATIONS.
- B. WE MUST MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY. WE FEAR THAT USG WARNINGS TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHO DO NOT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE TERRORISTS OR WHO EVEN SUPPORT THEM WILL HAVE LITTLE EFFECT BUT TO REDUCE OUR CREDIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ARAFAT IS SAID TO BE GOING TO SEE FEISAL IN SAUDI ARABIA; SURELY FEISAL WILL GIVE HIM HELL FOR USING THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM FOR THE MURDER OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND A BELGIAN, AND HE MAY THREATEN TO CUT OFF THE MONEY. HOPEFULLY HE MIGHT BE EVEN TOUGHER. BUT WHEN IT IS ALL OVER THERE WILL BE RECONCILIATION, ARAFAT WILL PROMISE NOT TO DO IT AGAIN (I.E. NOT TO INVOLVE SAUDI ARABIA) AND SAUDI SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN WILL GO ON. CAN USG THEN MOVE STRONGLY AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA (PARA 3 STATE 42486) WITHOUT CUTTING OFF OUR NOSES TO SPITE OUR FACES?
- C. SIMILAR ARGUMENT APPLIES TO LEBANON. WE FOUND AMMAN 1339 NOTAL A MASTERFUL PRESENTATION OF A COURSE OF ACTION THAT, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD STRIKE A MAJOR BLOW AT ABILITY OF TERRORISTS TO CARRY OUT THEIR CRIMES. MOREOVER, IT IS A COURSE OF ACTION THAT WOULD BE FEASIBLE FROM USG POINT OF VIEW IF WE DECIDED TO CARRY IT OUT. WHETHER LEBANON WOULD REACT AS AMMAN HOPES, HOWEVER, IS ANOTHER MATTER.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02294 02 OF 03 240744Z

SEEN FROM HERE, LEBANON IS NOT THE WEAK SISTER IT IS SO OFTEN PORTRAYED AS AND WHICH IT APPARENTLY WANTS TO BE CONSIDERED. ON CONTRARY, IT IS ONLY NEIGHBOR OF ISRAEL THAT HAS NEVER FOUGHT A WAR AGAINST ISRAEL, NEVER LOST A WAR TO ISRAEL, AND DOES NOT HAVE PART OF ITS TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. THESE ARE NO MEAN ACHIEVEMENTS, AND THEY HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED BY CAREFUL BALANCING ACT. AS LONG AS RELATIVE FORCES THAT ENTER INTO THAT BALANCING ACT (THREAT OF SYRIA, THREAT OF ISRAEL, INTERNAL THREAT OF PALESTINIANS, ATTITUDE OF OUTSIDE POWERS) REMAIN CAPABLE OF BEING BALANCED WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL ACTION ON PART OF GOL, IT WILL CONTINUE TO BALANCE THEM, WHICH IS CLEARLY A SENSIBLE COURSE FROM ITS POINT OF VIEW. THIS IS QUITE SIMILAR TO PRE-1970 SITUATION IN JORDAN; HUSSEIN MOVED NOT WHEN HE THOUGHT THAT OUTSIDE PRESSURE MADE IT ADVISABLE BUT WHEN HIS OWN THRONE AND LIFE WERE DIRECTLY AND CREDIBLY THREATENED. SIMILARLY, IF LEBANESE ESTABLISHMENT THOUGHT THAT ITS FUNDAMENTAL EXISTENCE WAS AT STAKE, IT WOULD AND COULD RISE UP AND CRUSH FEDAYEEN. AFTER ALL, SMALL AND MEDIOCRE (BEIRUT'S TERM) ARMY IS NOT REASON WHY GOL CANNOT ACT AGAINST FEDAYEEN. IT IS INTENT OF GOL NOT TO ACT AND TO AVOID GETTING INTO SITUATIONS THAT CAN BE RESOLVED ONLY BY MILITARY FORCE THAT HAS DICTATED THAT ARMY BE KEPT SMALL AND MEDIOCRE. BUT EVEN IF WE THOUGHT GOL HAD CAPABILITY OF SUPPRESSING FEDAYEEN, WOULD USG PRESSURE AMERICAN BUSINESSES AND BUSINESSMEN TO GET OUT OF LEBANON, IMPOSE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND TAKE OTHER "DEAD SERIOUS" ACTIONS RECOMMENDED BY AMMAN? REALISTICALLY, WE THINK NOT. IT JUST WOULDN'T WORK. AND IF IT WOULDN'T WORK AGAINST LEBANON, THE "TERRORIST CENTER" AS AMMAN CALLS IT, THEN IT WOULDN'T WORK AGAINST MORE DISTANT AND LESS INVOLVED ARAB STATES.

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 771

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02294 03 OF 03 240753Z

11

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

010587

R 231530Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7784
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

SECRET SECTION 3 OF 3 TEL AVIV 2294

EXDIS

D. WE BELIEVE USG PRESENTATIONS TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE IN TERMS OF US INTERESTS, AND NOT IN TERMS OF WHERE THESE OTHER GOVERNMENTS' INTEREST OR DAMAGE LIE. IF SUDANESE AND SAUDIS, FOR INSTANCE, TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST TERRORISTS IT WILL BE BECAUSE THEY KNOW THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND UNDERSTAND THE THREAT TO THEM, NOT BECAUSE WE HAVE CONVINCED THEM. ON CONTRARY, FOR US TO TRY TO TELL THEM WHAT THEIR INTERESTS OR INTEREST OF PALESTINIANS ARE, AND HOW THEY ARE DAMAGED BY TERRORIST ACTIONS, WILL ONLY CAUSE THEM TO REACT AGAINST US AND SEARCH FOR REASONS TO USE IN REBUTAL. MOREOVER, AS WE HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE, WE THINK USG IS ON DANGEROUS GROUND IN MANY INSTANCES IN ASSUMING THAT ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHARE OUR STANDARDS IN JUDGING RIGHTFULNESS AND EFFICACY OF TERROR. WHEN WE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02204 03 OF 03 240753Z

TALK ABOUT US INTERESTS AND SAY WHAT WE INTEND TO DO TO DEFEND THEM, HOWEVER, THEN WE THINK USG IS ON SOLID GROUND AND OTHERS WILL UNDERSTAND US, EVEN IF THEY DO NOT AGREE WITH US IN EVERY CASE.

E. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON INTELLIGENCE-POLICE OPERATIONS OF LOW-KEY NON-POLITICAL NATURE THAT HAVE ALREADY PROVED SO EFFICACIOUS IN CAUSING NUMBER OF PLANNED TERRORIST OPERATIONS TO FAIL. THIS IS ONE AREA IN WHICH PROFESSIONALS IN POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES OF COUNTRIES CAN COOPERATE EVEN WHEN OFFICIALLY AT POLITICAL ODDS. ALSO, IT IS THE SPECIAL FIELD IN WHICH COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE AREA AND NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM CAN PROVIDE THE MOST HELP IN MAKING IT COSTLY IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE FEDAYEEN TO MAINTAIN THEIR CELLS, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING AND OPERATIONS BASES.

F. INTERNAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD DEFINITELY BE TIGHTENED AT ALL FOREIGN SERVICE AND OTHER AMERICAN POSTS ABROAD. EXCEPT FOR THOSE PLACES WHERE TERRORIST OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE, WE ALL RETAIN TOO MUCH OF A "IT CAN'T HAPPEN HERE" ATTITUDE, AND THAT IS EXACTLY WHERE IT MAY HAPPEN THE NEXT TIME.

8. ALL THIS HAVING BEEN SAID, WE FALL BACK AGAIN ON WHAT WE SAID AFTER MUNICH: "IT IS THIS THAT SEEMS TO US MAJOR SUCCESS THAT BLACK SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED, SIDETRACKING OF AMERICAN EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACE BY SETTING BRUSH FIRES WHICH MUST BE PUT OUT FIRST BUT WHICH ARE NOT FUNDAMENTAL TO PROBLEM. IN LONG RUN, ANSWER TO PALESTINIAN TERRORISM CONTINUES TO LIE ONLY IN A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB NATIONS THAT IS SUFFICIENTLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALLOW THEM TO TURN TO PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND TO DISOWN, IN ACTUALITY AND NOT MERELY IN STATEMENTS MADE PRIVATELY TO AMERICAN EARS, VIOLENCE OF RADICAL FEDAYEEN GROUPS." THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN TO US THAT PROBLEM OF FIGHTING TERRORISM OVERRIDES ALL OTHER AMERICAN INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST, BUT ONLY THAT WE WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH MORE OR LESS TERRORISM UNTIL SETTLEMENT IS MADE. THERE ARE GRAVE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN MIDDLE EAST, AND GRAVE DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER ANYTHING WE COULD DO WOULD IN ITSELF LEAD TO OR EVEN PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT. IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR US TO CONSIDER MURDER OF TWO AMERICANS, DASTARDLY AS IT WAS, AS CONSTITUTING PRIMARY MOTIVATION FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN THIS AREA. IF WE COULD PULL RABBIT OUT OF THE HAT AND PRODUCE A PEACE SETTLEMENT, THERE ARE MANY OTHER OBJECTIVES IN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02294 03 OF 03 240753Z

ADDITION TO SAFETY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS THAT WOULD BE SERVED. WE CANNOT EXPECT THIS FACTOR TO WEIGH VERY HEAVILY WITH PARTIES ON EITHER SIDE WHO HAVE ENDURED TERRIBLE LEVELS OF TERROR, DEATH AND DESTRUCTION OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS RATHER THAN COMPROMISE WHAT THEY THINK ARE THEIR RIGHTS AND INTERESTS. WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO FIGHT TERRORISM, BUT THE LATTER MUST BE SEEN IN PERSPECTIVE, AS A PART AND NOT THE MAJOR PART OF THE WHOLE, AND MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN US POLICY FORMATION.
ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 150 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 151 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 252

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01750 070524Z

2

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO UCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

115917

R 061457Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7526
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

73 MAR 5 AM 8:21

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1750

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PDOR, IS, SU

SUBJECT: ISRAELI VIEWS RE KHARTOUM AND AMMAN GUERRILLAS:

1. MAJOR GENERAL (RET) AHARON YARIV, FORMER CHIEF IDF INTELLIGENCE AND NOW PRIMIN'S ADVISOR ON COUNTER-TERROR AFFAIRS, CALLED CHARGE MARCH 6 TO EXPRESS PERSONAL CONDOLENCES ON DEATHS AMBASSADOR NOEL AND DCM MOORE. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION, CHARGE ELICITED YARIV'S VIEWS ON LIKELY FATE OF GUERRILLAS IN KHARTOUM AS WELL AS IN AMMAN.

2. YARIV VOLUNTEERED THAT NIMAIRI WOULD HAVE MOST DIFFICULT TIME

CARRYING OUT ANY DEATH SENTENCES ON KILLERS OF NOEL MOORE AND BELGIAN CHARGE. HE WILL OBVIOUSLY BE UNDER STRONG ARAB PRESSURE NOT TO TAKE ANY SUCH ACTION. YARIV NOTED ISRAEL ITSELF DID NOT HAVE DEATH PENALTY. IN HIS VIEW, IF SUDAN EVEN SENTENCES KILLERS TO LONG PRISON TERMS, THAT WILL BE EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERABLE COURAGE ON NIMAIRI'S PART.

3. RE ABU DAUD AND HIS GROUP IN JORDAN, YARIV SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHETHER DEATH SENTENCES CONFIRMED BY KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT. PRIOR TO KHARTOUM INCIDENT, IT HAD BEEN HIS GUESS THAT ABU DAUD'S SENTENCE WOULD BE COMMUTED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WHILE OTHERS WOULD BE EXECUTED. HE THOUGHT THIS

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECI ASSOCIATES

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01750 070524Z

MIGHT BE HUSSEIN'S "GIFT" TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. SINCE KHARTOUM, HOWEVER, HE IS NOT SO SURE. ON ONE HAND, HUSSEIN WILL WANT TO DEMONSTRATE TO SUDAN THAT FEDAYEEN CAN BE EXECUTED IN HOPE THIS WILL BUCK UP NIMAIRI. AFTER ALL, SAID YARIV, HUSSEIN IS ALREADY ON FEDAYEEN LIST FOR LIQUIDATION AND HAS LITTLE MORE TO RISK. AT SAME TIME, YARIV CONCLUDED, IT WILL BE MAJOR DECISION FOR HUSSEIN TO EXECUTE FEDAYEEN LEADER LIKE ABU DAUD AND WE WILL JUST HAVE TO SEE WHAT HE DOES.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

es/129/017

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 555

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01697 051536Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

100524

R 051440Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7500
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO

SECRET TEL AVIV 1697

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, IS
SUBJECT: MRS MEIR'S POLITICAL FUTURE

1. AT PRIVATE LUNCH MAR 1, ACTING PRIMIN ALLON TOLD CHARGE HE FELT CERTAIN MRS. MEIR WOULD HEAD LABOR PARTY LIST IN 1973 ELECTIONS AND SERVE, BARRING HEALTH PROBLEMS, FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS. ALLON SAID THAT MRS. MEIR HERSELF WOULD CONSIDER HEADING THE LIST AS A COMMITMENT TO ISRAELI VOTERS TO GO ON FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME, AND HER POLITICAL CONSCIENCE WOULD NOT ALLOW HER VOLUNTARILY TO STEP DOWN SHORTLY THEREAFTER. ALLON THOUGHT MRS. MEIR OUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR ANNOUNCEMENT OF HER INTENT TO RUN FAIRLY SOON, IN ANY EVENT BY INDEPENDENCE DAY (MAY 7) IN ORDER TO DAMPEN SPECULATION AND POSSIBLE BREAKS IN RANKS OF LABOR UNITY.

2. ALLON SAID THERE WAS ONE POLITICAL POSSIBILITY WHICH HAD TO BE CONSIDERED BUT WHICH HE THOUGHT STILL REMAINED UNLIKELY. THAT IS THAT DAYAN SUPPORTERS ACROSS PARTY LINES WOULD FORM SEPARATE NEW PARTY AIMED AT CAPTURING ENOUGH SEATS IN KNESSET TO GIVE THEM DECISIVE ROLE AS POLITICAL COALITION PARTNER FOR LABOR PARTY. THIS NEW GROUP WOULD ANNOUNCE CLEARLY ITS PURPOSE AS TO GET DAYAN MADE PRIMIN AND WOULD APPEAL FOR SUPPORT FROM ALL SIDES FOR THAT OBJECTIVE. ALLON THOUGHT SMALL (4 SEATS) STATE LIST (FORMER RAFI) COULD FORM NUCLEUS OF NEW GROUP. LIBERAL PARTY MIGHT SPLIT FROM GAHAL AND JOIN IT. EZER WAIZMAN MIGHT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01697 051586Z

DESERT HERUT WITH HIS SUPPORTERS AND COME ALONG; FREE CENTER PARTY (SHMUEL TAMIR) (2 SEATS) WOULD ALSO TRY TO JOIN, BUT WOULD BE A HINDRANCE RATHER THAN A HELP; SOME FROM LABOR PARTY MIGHT ALSO PITCH IN, BUT ALLON STRONGLY DOUBTED THAT DAYAN HIMSELF WOULD LEAVE LABOR PARTY. AFTER ELECTIONS, IF RESULT OF NEW GROUPING WAS SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SEATS IN KNESSET AND INABILITY OF LABOR PARTY TO RULE WITHOUT THEM, THEN NEW GROUP WOULD OFFER COALITION ON SOLE CONDITION THAT DAYAN BE MADE PRIME MINISTER.

3. ALLON REITERATED THAT HE STRONGLY DOUBTED THAT ALL OF THIS WOULD HAPPEN, BUT INDICATED THAT SOME PEOPLE HAD IT IN MIND. BARRING SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, HE SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT LABOR PARTY WOULD INCREASE ITS REPRESENTATION AND PRESENT CABINET, WITH MINOR CHANGES, WOULD CONTINUE IN OFFICE.

4. COMMENT: EMBASSY DISCOUNTS ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR THIS KIND OF DAYANIST COALITION. ALLON MAY HAVE MENTIONED IDEA AT THIS TIME MAINLY BECAUSE STATE LIST PARTY HAPPENS TO BE DRAWING UP PLANS CURRENTLY ALONG THESE VERY LINES. (PARTY HAS GROWN SO WEAK THAT IT FACES VIRTUAL EXTINCTION IN NEXT ELECTIONS AND THEREFORE IS CASTING ABOUT FOR A CAUSE.) IN EMBASSY VIEW, HOWEVER EVEN IF STATELIST SOMEHOW SUCCEEDED IN GETTING TOGETHER A DAYANIST COALITION TO PRESENT TO VOTERS THIS AUTUMN, IT WOULD HAVE NO SUCCESS AT POLLS UNLESS DAYAN AGREED TO QUIT LABOR PARTY AND JOIN THIS NEW BLOCK, WHICH WE AGREE WITH ALLON IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY.
ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

251100/0107

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

Wt

TELEGRAM

SECRET 263

2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01678 051344Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

099583.

R 050958Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7494

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1678

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CDES, CPAS, PINR, IS (BORYSOGLEBSKI, WLADISLAW)
SUBJECT: BORYSOGLEBSKI PASSPORT

REF: STATE 33409

WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER FROM GOI RE PASSPORT AND ASSUME THAT IDEA HE MIGHT BE AGENT WAS FIGMENT OF IMAGINATION OF ISRAELI WHO WAS TRYING TO FIND SOME EXCUSE FOR KEEPING DOCUMENT. PASS-PORT CANCELLED AND WILL BE RETURNED WITH EFFECTS.

ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DO 1070

REF ASSIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

WA

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01630 011559Z

73 MAR 2 AM 7:55

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

063852

R 011354Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7473

S E C R E T TFL AVIV 1630

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS
SUBJ: LIBYAN PLANE

REF: TEL AVIV 1416

1. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY MINISTER BAR LEV, PREVIOUS CHIEF OF STAFF, FEB 28 GAVE CHARGE FURTHER RUNDOWN ON CABINET INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYAN PLANE INCIDENT.

2. BAR LEV INDICATED PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IN MATTER LIES WITH AIR FORCE CHIEF MAJ GEN HOD. AT TIME OF INCIDENT, ABOUT 2:00P.M. LOCAL TIME, CHIEF OF STAFF ELAZAR WAS AT HIS HOME RESTING, SINCE HE HAD BEEN UP ALL THE NIGHT BEFORE FOLLOWING EVENTS IN ISRAELI STRIKE INTO NORTH LEBANON. WHEN RADAR INDICATED LIBYAN PLANE INTRUSION IN SINAI, HOD TOOK DECISION TO SCRAMBLE FIGHTERS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND THEN TO ORDER PLANE TO LAND. SINCE, IN ALL PREVIOUS SIMILAR CASES, PLANES HAD LANDED WHEN ORDERED, HOD FELT NO NECESSITY TO DISTURB ELAZAR'S REST. ON CONTRARY, SAID BAR LEV, HOD THOUGHT HE WOULD BE ABLE LATER IN AFTERNOON TO REPORT TO CHIEF OF STAFF THAT A LIBYAN AIRCRAFT WAS SAFELY ON GROUND IN SINAI HAVING LANDED UNDER ISRAELI ORDERS. WHEN REPORTS FROM F-4 PILOTS INDICATED BOEING PILOT HAD UNDERSTOOD SIGNALS AND HAD LOWERED LANDING GEAR, HOD CONTINUED TO BELIEVE ALL WAS IN ORDER. IT WAS ONLY WHEN HE RECEIVED REPORT THAT, CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS INDICATIONS, BOEING APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO ESCAPE, THAT HOD HAD TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO FORCE IT DOWN. HIS DECISION WAS AFFIRMATIVE BUT HE CALLED ELAZAR TO GIVE LATTER OPPORTUNITY TO COUNTERMAND ORDER IF HE CHOSE. ELAZAR WAS THUS FACED WITH REPORT FROM HIS AIR FORCE COMMANDER:

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01630 011559Z

OF FACTS AS THEN UNDERSTOOD BY LATTER AND LATTER'S INTENT TO FORCE PLANE DOWN UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE. ELAZAR HAD NO TIME TO CONSIDER IN DEPTH OR TO CONTACT HIS SUPERIOR, DEFMIN DAYAN, SINCE PLANE WOULD EXIT SINAI WITHIN COUPLE OF MINUTES AND MATTER WOULD THEN BECOME MOOT. MOREOVER, AS LIBYAN PLANE AND F-4S MOVED IN DIRECTION OF CANAL, EGYPTIAN MISSILE RADARS WERE COMING UP! ALLI ALONG FRONT. THIS MEANT PHANTOMS WOULD BE ENDANGERED IF THEY CONTINUED PURSUIT OR ESCORT OF BOEING ANY FARTHER TOWARDS CANAL. IN THIS SITUATION, ELAZAR DID NOT EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO OVERRIDE HOD AND LATTER GAVE ORDERS TO FORCE PLANE DOWN.

3. BAR LEV SAID THAT MAPAM MINISTER SHEMTOV HAD RAISED QUESTION OF COMPENSATION (BAR LEV'S WORK) IN FIRST CABINET MEETING HELD NIGHT OF INCIDENT. ALL OF THE MINISTERS EXCEPT BAR LEV HIMSELF WERE OPPOSED. DAYAN SAID THAT COMPENSATION MIGHT EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE OFFERED BUT THIS SHOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE AS GESTURE TO BE GIVEN PILOTS' ASSOCIATION, RED CROSS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODY WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY BE RAISING MATTER WITH ISRAEL. BAR LEV SAID THAT HE HIMSELF STRONGLY FAVORED UNILATERAL ISRAELI OFFER OF COMPENSATION AND BY SUNDAY MORNING CABINET MEETING HAD TURNED AROUND ENTIRE REST OF CABINET WITH RESULT THAT "EX GRATIA" OFFER WAS MADE. BAR LEV SAID HE DWELT PARTICULARLY ON OBVIOUS EXCELLENT IMPRESSION THAT HAD BEEN MADE ON ISRAELI PUBLIC BY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT EX GRATIA PAYMENT AT TIME OF LOD MASSACRE, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY ON PART OF JAPAN. HE HAD FELT OFFER BY ISRAEL IN THIS CONTEXT WOULD HAVE GOOD RESULTS VIS-A-VIS REST OF WORLD. HE AGREED WITH CHARGE'S REMARK THAT EFFECT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER HAD OFFER BEEN MADE DAY OF INCIDENT RATHER THAN SEVERAL DAYS LATER.

4. BAR LEV GAVE OPINION INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT AFFECT ON ELECTIONS THIS YEAR IN ISRAEL, SINCE IT HAD BEEN MADE PLAIN THAT DECISION WAS PURELY MILITARY ONE WITH NO POLITICAL FIGURE INVOLVED. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT SOME CRITICISM HAS ALREADY ARISEN OF DAYAN AS HAVING RUSHED TO DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM DECISION AND THAT SOME WERE CHARGING THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE HE FEARED POLITICAL DAMAGE TO HIMSELF RATHER THAN BECAUSE HE WANTED TO SUPPORT RIGHT OF MILITARY TO MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS WITHOUT HAVING TO GO TO POLITICAL LEVEL.

5. BAR LEV EXPRESSED HIMSELF VERY STRONGLY ABOUT OBVIOUS GAFFES WHICH HAD BEEN MADE BY IDF IN PUTTING OUT SELF-SERVING ANNOUNCE-

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

REF: ACCIDENT

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 01630 011559Z

MENTS WHICH LATER PROVED UNTRUE, PARTICULARLY THAT CONCERNING FRENCH PILOT'S LICENSE. WHEN, DURING DISCUSSION, IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT BAR LEV STILL CONSIDERED THAT F-4 HAD FIRED ONLY INTO WING OF BOEING (DAO TEL AVI 0275, PARA 5) AND DID NOT KNOW THAT IDF LATER SAID THAT FINAL SHOTS WERE INTO TAIL SECTION, PROBABLY ENGINE (DAO TEL AVIV 0287, PARA 6). CHARGE TOLD HIM OF LATTER FACT. BAR LEV EVINCED CONSIDERABLE SURPRISE AND SAID HE INTENDED TO LOOK FURTHER INTO THIS, ALTHOUGH HE ASSURED CHARGE LATTER WOULD NOT BE QUOTED.

6. BAR LEV WAS EXCEEDINGLY FRANK IN THIS CONVERSATION AND SHOULD BE TIGHTLY PROTECTED.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 671

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01617 011202Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

061896

R 011022Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7466
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO

SECRET TFL AVIV 1617

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, IS
SUBJECT: MRS. MEIR'S POLITICAL FUTURE

REF: TEL AVIV 1555

1. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY MINISTER BAR LEV TOLD CHARGE FEB 28 AT PRIVATE LUNCH THAT HE BELIEVES LABOR PARTY MUST TRY TO FORCE MRS. MEIR TO A DECISION IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE AS TO WHETHER SHE WILL RUN AGAIN. BAR LEV SAID ALL FACTIONS STRONGLY HOPE THAT SHE WILL DO SO, AND WILL URGE HER TO MAKE PLAIN THAT SHE WILL HEAD THE LABOR PARTY LIST IN THIS YEAR'S ELECTIONS AND CONTINUE AS PRIM. IMPLICIT IN THIS, SAID BAR LEV, IS LABOR PARTY REQUEST THAT SHE ALSO MAKE IT UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR IF SHE HAS DEFINITELY DECIDED NOT TO RUN AGAIN, SO THAT THE PARTY CAN HAVE ADEQUATE TIME TO ARRANGE NEW LEADERSHIP. THIS WOULD NOT BE AN ULTIMATUM TO HER, BUT SHE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT PARTY COULD NOT AFFORD TO LEARN ONLY IN JULY OR AUGUST OF HER FINAL DECISION TO QUIT.

2. BAR LEV SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED HER PLANS PRIVATELY WITH MRS. MEIR BUT BELIEVED SHE HERSELF HAD NOT YET FINALLY MADE UP HER MIND. TO SOME EXTENT, HE FELT, POST-WASHINGTON VISIT SITUATION WILL HAVE STRONG INFLUENCE ON HER. IF ALL IS GOING WELL AND SHE ENVISAGES ANOTHER YEAR OR TWO OF HARMONY WITH US, HER INCLINATION WILL BE TO STAY IN OFFICE. IF THE GOING LOOKS TOUGH,

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01617 0112027

THEN SHE IS MORE LIKELY TO BOW OUT.

3. IF MRS. MEIR STAYS, THAN BAR LEV FEELS CERTAIN SAPIR WILL STAY TOO. IN FACT, HE THOUGHT MRS. MEIR WOULD LIKELY MAKE THIS A CONDITION OF HER OWN ACCEPTANCE, WHICH WOULD LEAVE SAPIR NO ALTERNATIVE. IF MRS. MEIR SHOULD STEP DOWN, CONTINUED BAR LEV, MOST LIKELY SUCCESSOR IS SAPIR. HE RECOGNIZES THAT SAPIR HAS SAID MANY TIMES THAT HE DOES NOT WANT THE JOB, BUT ATTRIBUTES THIS MORE TO THE ISRAELI CUSTOM OF MODESTY REGARDING THE TOP OFFICE THAN TO AN ABSOLUTE INTENTION NOT TO ACCEPT IT.
ZURHELLEN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

201/00/010

TEL AVIV



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 086

PAGE 01 STATE 212648

64
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 R

66613
DRAFTED BY: NEA TASK FORCE: GNANDERSON:BN
APPROVED BY: NEA TASK FORCE: GNANDERSON
S/S-O: RWRIGHT
DOD/METG: MR. BLITGEN

O 290359Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO SECDEF
JCS WASH DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASH DC IMMEDIATE
CNO WASH DC IMMEDIATE
CSA WASH DC IMMEDIATE
CSAF WASH DC IMMEDIATE
CMC WASH DC IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 212648

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP IS
SUBJECT: US MILITARY EQUIPMENT VALIDATION TEAM VISIT TO
ISRAEL
MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
REF: TEL AVIV 8720

TEAM IS THE ONE HEADED BY GENERAL CASEY. ENGINE TROUBLE
HAS DELAYED TEAM'S DEPARTURE. TEAM NOW EXPECTING TO DEPART
U.S. ABOUT 0430 GMT, OCTOBER 29, ARRIVE LAJES 0930 GMT,
DEPART LAJES 1245 GMT, AND ARRIVE LOD 1945 GMT OCTOBER
29.

KISSINGER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

73 OCT 26 AM 8:21

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

102224

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 212642

WITH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ESTIMATES OF ARAB LOSSES.

2. (S) THE USMEVTI, TO BE HEADED BY A GENERAL OFFICER FROM THE JOINT STAFF, WILL BE COMPOSED OF 18 TO 25 REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SERVICES, THE JOINT STAFF, AND DIA. NAMES, SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE PASSED BY THE JCS TO THE USDAO TEL AVIV BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

3. (C) PENDING COUNTRY CLEARANCE IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE TEAM WILL ARRIVE IN TEL AVIV SOMETIME BETWEEN 29 - 30 OCTOBER AND REMAIN FROM 10 TO 14 DAYS OR AS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THEIR TASK.

4. (S) REQUEST THAT YOU APPROACH GOI FOR APPROVAL USMEVTI VISIT, STRESSING IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPEDITIOUS CARRYING OUT OF US RESUPPLY EFFORT. FURTHER REQUEST YOU IMPRESS UPON GOI NECESSITY FOR TEAM TO MAKE ON-SITE ASSESSMENT OF LOSSES RATHER THAN TO RELY ON BRIEFINGS AND REPORTS. KISSINGER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

251/20/0107

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 611

PAGE 01 STATE 211293

62

ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY PM/MC:JWSIPES:MEP

APPROVED BY PM:LSLOSS

PM: MR. SLOSS

DOD/ISA: COL. PEINKA

MID-EAST TASK FORCE: MR. STACKHOUSE

PM/SAS:RGREY

S/S-O: K, KURZE

080701

P 260023Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 211293

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: MILI, PFOR, MASS, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PERSONNEL

REF: STATE 208333; TEL AVIV 8374

GOI/MOD MISSION HAS WITHDRAWN REQUEST FOR MCDQUG TECH-
NICIANS REPAIR WAR-DAMAGED F-4'S. ISRAELIS DO NOT BELIEVE
PROGRAM FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME. MAY REOPEN AT LATER DATE.
KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 847

2

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY PM/MC:WCMITHOFFER:JSG
APPROVED BY PM - MR. SLOSS
DOD/ISA - COL. PEINKA
MID-EAST TASK FORCE - MR. STACKHOUS
PM/SAS - MR. GREY
L/PM - MR. FIELDS
PM/MC - MR. SIPES

031050

P 200000Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 208333

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MILI, PFOR, MASS, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PERSONNEL

REF: TEL AVIV 8319

SUMMARY: MCDoug REQUESTED FURNISH 23 TECHNICIANS REPAIR F-41S.

1. ACTION REQUESTED: EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION ON DESIRABILITY HAVING ADDITIONAL AMERICAN CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AND PREFERENCE FOR AUSPICES.
2. WASHINGTON MCDoug REP APPROACHED PM/MC OCTOBER 18 ABOUT HONORING GOI/MOD MISSION TO US REQUEST FOR 23 TECHNICIANS TO REPAIR WAR-DAMAGED F-4'S. COMPANY HAS EXISTING CONTRACT WITH GOI FOR SERVICES WHICH COULD BE USED AS BASIS FOR SENDING PERSONNEL IN ADDITION TO THOSE MENTIONED PARA 7 REF TEL. HOWEVER, CONTRACT MAY REQUIRE AMENDING TO ASSURE THAT MCDoug PERSONNEL ARE NOT INVOLVED IN COMBAT SITUATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 208333

3. MCDoug ALSO EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF SENDING TEAM UNDER FMS AUSPICES.

4. ON BALANCE WE ARE INCLINED TO APPROVE THIS REQUEST SINCE TEAM MAY BE ABLE TO REPAIR DAMAGED GOI AIRCRAFT AND THUS

LESSEN GOI DEMANDS FOR ADDITIONAL PLANES FROM US SOURCE.

5. IN EITHER EVENT, USG PERMISSION FOR TEAM TO PROCEED TO ISRAEL IS REQUIRED. EMBASSY COMMENT INVITED ON DESIRABILITY ADDITIONAL US CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AND RECOMMENDATION WITH RESPECT TO APPROPRIATE AUSPICES. FOR INSURANCE AND POSSIBLE REASONS, MCDoug APPEARS PREFER FMS. KISSINGER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 197251

02

60
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:ESWALKER:SKG
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
NEA:ALATHERTONJR

006992

P 032322Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 197251

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, IS
SUBJECT: DINITZ PRESENTS GOI ASSESSMENT MILITARY SITUATION

1. SUMMARY: IN COURSE OF OCT 1 MEETING WITH ASST SEC SISCO, ISRAELI AMB DINITZ PRESENTED CURRENT GOI ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION IN ADDITION TO POLITICAL TOUR D'HORIZON (STATE 196714). DINITZ SAID THAT WHILE IN ISRAEL ON CONSULTATIONS HE FOUND GROWING CONCERN WITH NEW EQUIPMENT ENTERING ARAB INVENTORIES FROM SOVIET UNION AND WEST. DINITZ STRESSED THAT ARABS HAVE THEORETICAL CAPABILITY TO ATTACK ALL ISRAELI POPULATION CENTERS EITHER WITH AIRCRAFT OR WITH MISSILES, INCLUDING SOVIET SUPPLIED SCUD. DINITZ ARGUED THAT US AND ISRAEL SHOULD EXAMINE MOTIVATION FOR SOVIET UPGRADING OF ARAB CAPABILITIES AND SEE WHAT THIS MEANS FOR SPIRIT OF DETENTE. HE ADDED THAT ISRAEL MUST ALSO CONSIDER HOW ESCALATION AFFECTS ISRAELI ARMS REQUIREMENTS AND RECALLED THAT ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR US "SMART" BOMBS AND NUMBER OF OTHER ITEMS WERE STILL OUTSTANDING. SISCO THANKED DINITZ FOR PRESENTATION AND WITHHELD COMMENT PENDING STUDY OF POINTS RAISED.

THAT WHILE HE WAS IN ISRAEL HE HAD FOUND GREATER CONCERN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 197251

ABOUT MILITARY SITUATION THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED. ISRAEL SEES ESCALATION IN BOTH NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS ARAB STATES NOW RECEIVING. SOVIET UNION NO LONGER HAS MONOPOLY SINCE WESTERN ARMS NOW FLOWING IN. DINITZ FELT THIS MAKES

WEIRD COMBINATION; SOVIETS FINDING IT NECESSARY TO ESCALATE THEIR ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MAINTAIN COMMITMENT OF THEIR ARAB CLIENTS IN FACE UNLIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF SOME ARAB COUNTRIES AND UNLIMITED WILLINGNESS OF WESTERN COUNTRY LIKE FRANCE TO SELL ARMS. THUS, ARAB INVENTORIES CONTAIN SUKOIS, TUPULOVS, MIGS AND MIRAGES AND BOAST SAM TWOS, SIXES AND IN SYRIA AND EGYPT, FROG MISSILES. FROG IS MORE DANGEROUS IN SYRIA THAN IN EGYPT, SINCE RANGE DOES NOT CARRY EGYPTIAN FROGS OUT OF SINAI, BUT SYRIAN FROGS CAN REACH SUBURBS OF HAIFA. DINITZ SAID ISRAEL BELIEVES EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS MAY NOW HAVE MORE SOPHISTICATED MISSILE IN SOVIET SCUD.

3. DINITZ SAID NEW ARAB EQUIPMENT TRANSFORMED MILITARY PICTURE BY GIVING ARABS STRATEGIC ATTACK CAPABILITY. ARABS NOW HAVE AT LEAST THEORETICAL CAPABILITY FOR LOW-LEVEL PENETRATION RAIDS. WITH SUKOI 20 AND NEW CONFIGURATION OF MIRAGE 5, ARABS CAN FLY UNDER ISRAELI RADAR NET AND REACH POPULATION CENTERS. WITH THESE PLANES PLUS MISSILES LIKE FROG 7 AND SCUD, ARABS HAVE CAPABILITY TO HIT PRACTICALLY EVERY POPULATION CENTER IN ISRAEL.

4. DINITZ SAID ISRAEL HAD TO REGARD THIS AS VERY GRAVE DEVELOPMENT WHICH RAISED TWO PROBLEMS. FIRST IS HOW SOVIET SUPPLIES FIT INTO ENTIRE PICTURE OF DETENTE AND WHAT SOVIET INTEREST IS IN UPGRADING CAPABILITIES OF EQUIPMENT BEING PROVIDED TO ARABS. QUESTION IS WHETHER SOVIETS ARE SIMPLY REACTING TO ESCALATION OF WEAPONS BEING PROVIDED TO ARABS BY WEST OR IF IT REPRESENTS POLICY OF DEEPER SOVIET PENETRATION IN PERSIAN GULF. ISRAEL WONDERS HOW THIS FITS IN WITH SPIRIT OF DETENTE IN WORLD AND FEELS THIS POSSIBLY AREA FOR JOINT US-ISRAELI EVALUATION.

5. DINITZ SAID SECOND PROBLEM WAS HOW ISRAEL SHOULD REARM ITSELF TO MEET THIS CHANGE IN BALANCE. NEW EQUIP-

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 197251

MENT DOES NOT REPRESENT UPSET IN BALANCE BUT DOES REPRESENT CHANGE, AND THIS IS TREND WHICH MUST BE WATCHED CLOSELY. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF SCUD MISSILE WHICH IS INTRODUCTION OF COMPARATIVELY NEW ELEMENT IN BALANCE.

6. DINITZ SAID HE DID NOT WANT GO INTO FORMAL PRESENTATION OF WHAT THIS ALL MEANS IN TERMS ISRAELI EQUIPMENT NEEDS. FORTUNATELY, DIFFICULT HURDLE OF AGREEMENT ON PLANES IS NOW BEHIND US AND ISRAEL. BUT THERE ARE STILL MANY REQUESTS PENDING. DINITZ DID NOT WANT GO INTO DETAILS EQUIPMENT OUTSTANDING BUT NOTED IT INCLUDED NUMBER TYPES OF BOMBS WHICH HAD HIGH DEGREE OF ACCURACY

IN HITTING TARGET. HE ADDED SOME REQUESTS HAVE BEEN PENDING FOR OVER YEAR. DINITZ REITERATED HIS STATEMENT THIS WAS NOT FORMAL PRESENTATION ON THESE OUTSTANDING ITEMS BUT HAD TO BE MENTIONED SINCE ANALYSIS WOULD NOT BE COMPLETE WITHOUT THIS INFORMATION.

7. DINITZ ADDED ISRAELI ANALYSTS NOW CONVINCED SAUDI ARABIA HAS SEALED AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE FOR MIRAGE AIRCRAFT. SISCO SAID US HAD HEARD DEAL WAS FOR 38 OR 39 AIRCRAFT BUT US CANNOT SAY DEAL IS FIRM. US ASKED SAUDIS FOR EXPLANATION AND DID NOT RECEIVE SATISFACTORY REPLY. SISCO ADDED THAT IF ISRAEL HAS FIRM INFORMATION ON THIS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO PASS IT ON TO US. THOUGH US MAY HAVE NO DOUBTS AS TO ACCURACY OF RUMORS, THERE IS NO WAY TO PROVE ALLEGATION. DINITZ PROMISED TO PASS ON ANY INFO HE COULD GET AND SAID THIS CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION.

8. SISCO THANKED DINITZ FOR PRESENTATION AND SAID US WOULD STUDY POINTS DINITZ RAISED BEFORE ATTEMPTING COMMENT.
RUSH

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET 727 '73 OCT 1 AM 8:08~~

PAGE 01 STATE 194592

50
ORIGIN SS-25

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:ALATHERTONJR:SKG
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTONJR
INR:MR. STODDARD (SUBSTANCE)
NEA/IAI:MR. STACKHOUSE
S/S -0: R. WRIGHT

106494

Q 30 832Z SEP 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 194592

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MCPS, IS, SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY

REF: AMMAN 5237

1. FOR TEL AVIV: WE NEED URGENTLY ANY COMMENT AND EVALUATION ISRAELIS HAVE OF REPORT REFTEL AS WELL AS RESPONSE TO QUERIES RE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY CONTAINED STATE 194280, BEING REPEATED POSTS NIACT IMMEDIATE.
2. FOR JERUSALEM: WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY INFO YOU CAN ELICIT FROM UNTSO. KISSINGER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DC-1 (5-62)

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 950

PAGE 01 STATE 194509

72
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:WTCUVERIUS:DF
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA - ALATHERTON, JR.
NEA/IAI - MHSTACKHOUSE
EUR/DOV - JMATLOCK (DRAFT)
PM/ISP - JCARTER (PHONE)
S/S - TRPICKERING

097917

R 290244Z SEP 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 194509

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, UR, US, IS
SUBJECT: TERRORIST POSSESSION OF SOVIET GROUND-TO-AIR
MISSILE:

REF: TEL AVIV 7501

YOU MAY INFORM GOI AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL THAT WE HAVE
EXPRESSED TO SOVIETS OUR CONCERN THAT SOVIET GROUND-TO-AIR
MISSILES HAVE BEEN FOUND IN POSSESSION ARAB TERRORISTS.
DRAWING ON STATE 189495 YOU MAY DESCRIBE DEMARCHE MADE BY
UNDER SECRETARY PORTER TO SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TONE
OF LATTER'S REPLIES, AND NOTE THAT TO DATE WE HAVE NOT
RECEIVED RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE. WE JUDGE, HOWEVER,
THAT SOVIETS DISPLEASED BY APPEARANCE OF STRELA MISSILES
IN SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE HANDS. KISSINGER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



'73 OCT 1 AM 8

TELEGRAM

SECRET 733

~~WHITE HOUSE~~
~~SITUATION ROOM~~

PAGE 01 STATE 194280

50
ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 SSD=00 /011 R

66602
DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:RWRIGHT
APPROVED BY: S/S-O:RWRIGHT

106551

0 301903Z SEP 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 194280

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION TEL AVIV, SEPT 28, FROM SECSTATE RPTD
 TO YOU:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 194280

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: IS, EG, SY, MORS
SUBJECT: RUMORED EGYPTIAN MILITARY ALERT

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

1. WE HAVE A REPORT THAT EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE WAS TO HAVE GONE ON ALERT EARLY SEPTEMBER 28. REQUEST EMBASSY OBTAIN ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF THIS REPORT. DO THEY HAVE SIMILAR INFORMATION? IF SO, DO THEY ASCRIBE IT TO MILITARY EXERCISE, PRECAUTIONARY REACTION TO REPORTS OF SYRIAN TROOP MASSING OPPOSITE GOLAN, OR SOME MILITARY INITIATIVE?

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 194280

2. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF SYRIAN
MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AND INTENTIONS.

3. MAY WE PLEASE HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT TO ARRIVE IN THE
DEPARTMENT AT THE LATEST BY COB MONDAY, OCTOBER 1. KISSINGER
UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

hml/EO/010

REF ASSIEN

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top left corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars are positioned on either side of the eagle's body.

CONFIDENTIAL 008

PAGE 01 STATE 181236

55

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00, INRE-00, INRE-00,

CIAE-00, DODE-00, (BOOK-537,) R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE:KHA

9/11/73:EXT 20840

APPROVED BY D

KENNETH RUSH

NEA -MR. ATHERTON

S/S - MR. GAMMON

085820

0 R 121949Z SEP 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 181236

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR--ACTING SECRETARY, SEPT. 10

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR ROUNTREE

SUMMARY. IN SEPT 10 MEETING WITH ACTG SEC AMB DINITZ
RAISED FIRST ISRAELI CONCERNS RE TERRORISM. SAID RECENT
ACTIONS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD ENCOURAGED TERRORIST

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

45

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 181236

ACTIONS IN ATHENS, PARIS AND ROME. DISCOVERY STRELA MISSILE IN ROME PARTICULARLY GRAVE; SOVIETS AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS BOTH RESPONSIBLE. DINITZ ASKED U.S. APPROACH TO USSR STRESSING GRAVITY MATTER AND U.S. EXERCISE DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE AT ROME TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE ICAO ACTION AGAINST SUCH INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION. ACTG SEC SAID, STRESSING CONFIDENTIALITY, WE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN STRONGLY TO SOVIETS ABOUT DANGER STRELA GETTING TO TERRORISTS. WE HAD UNDER REVIEW WHAT FURTHER WE MIGHT DO AND WOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO BOTH AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTIONS. DINITZ THEN RAISED GENERAL SUBJECT U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS. SAID THAT WHILE OFFICIAL U.S. STATEMENTS RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST POLICY REASSURING THERE MUCH PRESS COMMENT CALLING FOR CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TO MORE EVENHANDED APPROACH. DINITZ SAID MISINTERPRETATION OF U.S.-ISRAEL TIES IN SENSE THEY GETTING WEAKER WOULD GIVE ADVANTAGE TO HOSTILE FORCES; INDEED THERE EVIDENCE ALREADY OF INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURES IN AREA. IT WAS

IMPORTANT OTHER SIDE NOT MISREAD TRUE SITUATION. IN HIS RESPONSE ACTG SEC STRESSED: IT WOULD BE HARMFUL IF THERE GENERAL BELIEF WE CHANGING OUR POLICY; U.S. POLICY RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST REMAINED UNCHANGED; WE SUPPORTED STRONG ISRAEL AND NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS; ON OTHER HAND, IT IN ISRAEL'S AND OUR INTERESTS TO GET MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, OTHERWISE SITUATION WOULD FESTER; ISRAEL SHOULD COME UP WITH NEW IDEAS AND INITIATIVE; IT IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST AND OUR OWN WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARABS. IN RESPONSE DINITZ SAID ARABS DID NOT WANT PEACE. ANY UNILATERAL MOVEMENT BY ISRAEL WOULD PRODUCE NOTHING, AND ISRAEL WOULD ONLY JEOPARDIZE ITS POSITION. ISRAEL COULD NOT MOVE BECAUSE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT GIVE IT ROOM IN WHICH TO MOVE. IN CLOSING COMMENT ACTG SEC SAID WE AGREED WITH ISRAEL'S POSTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS, BUT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT FALL INTO TRAP OF CREATING PRE-CONDITIONS FOR ITSELF. END SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADOR DINITZ CALLED AT HIS REQUEST FOR HOUR
ON ACTING SECRETARY SEPT 10. AMONG OTHERS PRESENT WERE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 181236

ISRAELI MINISTER SHALEV AND ASST SECRETARY SISCO. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD BE DEPARTING SEPT 11 FOR 8-10 DAYS IN ISRAEL.

2. DINITZ SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL ACTG SEC ABLE FIND TIME RECEIVE HIM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR ISRAEL. IT WAS GOOD TO HAVE GENERAL DISCUSSION FROM TIME TO TIME AND HE EXPECTED TO BE ASKED MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS ON HIS RETURN. HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO RAISE TWO OR THREE POINTS. FIRST POINT RELATED TO TERRORISM AND PALESTINIANS. DINITZ RECALLED ISRAEL'S FREQUENT EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN AT CONSEQUENCES MISINTERPRETATION BY PALESTINIANS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS OF GESTURES MADE BY OTHERS IN THEIR DIRECTION. GOI HAD OPPOSED INSERTION IN US-USSR COMMUNIQUE OF LANGUAGE CONCERNING "PALESTINIAN INTERESTS". SUCH LANGUAGE WAS OPEN TO SERIOUS MIS-INTERPRETATION, AS WERE SUCCESSIVE CONDEMNATIONS OF ISRAEL ON IRAQI AIRLINER INCIDENT. ISRAEL WAS GRATEFUL FOR U.S. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS, BUT FACT WAS LANGUAGE OF CONDEMNATION BECAME STRONGER EACH TIME. THERE HAD BEEN NO REFERENCE TO BACKGROUND; IT WAS AS IF MRS- MEIR HAD AWAKENED ONE MORNING AND DECIDED OUT OF THE BLUE TO HIJACK A PLANE. WITHOUT DOUBT THESE INSTANCES OF INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO TERRORISM HAD ENCOURAGED TERRORISTS TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTIONS. IN ATHENS, PARIS AND ROME. ISRAEL REGARDED WITH PARTICULAR GRAVITY ROME EVENTS. RUSSIANS WERE VERY CAREFUL IN THEIR SUPPLY OF STRELA MISSILES; THEY KNEW

WHERE EACH AND EVERY ONE WAS. THEY SUPPLIED THEM ABROAD ONLY TO SYRIA, IRAQ AND EGYPT AND THEY COULD REACH OTHER SOURCES ONLY VIA THESE CHANNELS. OBJECTIVE OF ROME TERRORISTS WAS EL AL AIRCRAFT, BUT EVENTUAL TARGET COULD JUST AS WELL BE ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT.

3. ISRAEL FELT, DINITZ CONTINUED, RUSSIANS WERE NOT PRACTICING WHAT THEY PREACHED. THEY TALKED AGAINST TERRORISM, BUT THEY ALLOWED TERRORISTS TO HOLD SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. THIS EVENT REVEALED RESPONSIBILITY OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS FOR TERRORISM. IN SPITE OF THEIR DISCLAIMERS, THEY WERE PROVIDING FIRST RATE MILITARY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with thirteen stars. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a sunburst and a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 04 STATE 181236

4. WHAT ISRAEL WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST OF U.S., DINITZ SAID, WAS FOLLOWING: ISRAEL WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF U.S. WOULD APPROACH SOVIET UNION, CALLING ATTENTION TO GRAVITY OF USE OF THIS WEAPON BY TERRORISTS. SOVIETS COULD, IF THEY WANTED, FIND OUT HOW WEAPONS HAD REACHED TERRORISTS. SECONDLY, ISRAEL WOULD LIKE U.S. TO USE ITS DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE IN ICAO MEETINGS WHERE THESE MATTERS WERE BEING DISCUSSED. ISRAEL HOPED U.S. WOULD PUT ITS ENERGY INTO GETTING TEETH IN ICAO AUTHORITY THAT WOULD PREVENT ACTIONS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION OF THIS NATURE. ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO FEEL THAT IT WAS ONLY ONE WHO CARED ABOUT THESE ISSUES.

6. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE ON TO HIS SECOND TOPIC, MORE GENERAL ONE OF US-ISRAEL RELATIONS. HE RECALLED HE HAD MENTIONED IN HIS PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH ACTG SEC HE HAD SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS MATTER MORE AT LENGTH WITH HIM. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT,

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

REF ID: A66587

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 181236

THOUGH U.S. AND ISRAEL DID NOT ALWAYS SEE EYE TO EYE ON ALL ISSUES, OUR RELATIONS HAD BEEN MARKED BY SPIRIT OF INTIMACY AND FRIENDSHIP. ISRAEL SENSED THIS WAS U.S. FEELING AS WELL AS ITS OWN. IN SPITE OF THIS THERE WERE OCCASIONALLY IMPRESSIONS ON OUTSIDE THERE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. U.S. WAS NOW FACING OIL QUESTION (DINITZ WOULD NOT SAY "CRISIS" BECAUSE EVEN THIS APPELLATION WAS CONTROVERSIAL). IN PRESENT SITUATION WE MAY DISTINGUISH TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EXPRESSION OF ISRAEL-U.S. RELATIONS. ON ONE HAND THERE WAS BARRAGE OF PRESS REPORTS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES AND FROM SOME U.S. NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES TO EFFECT THERE WAS LINK BETWEEN OIL SHORTAGE AND ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, AND BLAMING ISRAEL FOR SHORTAGES. "SLOGANS" WERE APPEARING IN EDITORIAL COLUMNS DEMANDING CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TO MORE EVENHANDED APPROACH. THIS WAS ONE LEVEL. ON OTHER HAND THERE WERE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS SAYING U.S. POLICY UNCHANGED AND U.S. WOULD NOT YIELD TO BLACKMAIL. AMONG THEM WERE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE'S REMARKS BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE, ACTING SECRETARY'S REMARKS AT TEHRAN AND SECRETARY ROGERS' LAST PRESS CONFERENCE. THESE WERE NOT STATEMENTS THAT ALWAYS SAID EXPLICITLY U.S. WAS FOR ISRAEL; THIS WAS WELL-KNOWN AND DID NOT REQUIRE REPETITION. PRESIDENT HAD EXPRESSED MAIN IDEA WELL WHEN HE SAID U.S. WAS PRO-PEACE. BUT SET AGAINST THESE STATEMENTS THERE WAS WHOLE ARRAY OF INTERPRETATION IN PRESS WHICH DID NOT SEEM TO HEAR WHAT PRESIDENT HAD SAID, NAMELY THAT U.S. WAS NOT SUBJECT TO WILL OF OIL SUPPLIERS. THERE WAS NEED TO DISASSOCIATE ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE FROM OIL QUESTION; WE NEEDED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE TWO ISSUES.

7. IN PAST, DINITZ CONTINUED, THERE HAD NOT BEEN SINGLE INSTANCE WHEN THERE INTERPRETATION OF WEAKENING ISRAEL-U.S. TIES THAT HAD NOT GIVEN ADVANTAGE TO FORCES HOSTILE TO BOTH OF US. NOW THERE WAS MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE. AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS OF INTERPRETATION THAT U.S. POLICY WOULD CHANGE, WE SEE EVIDENCE EVERYWHERE SOVIETS WERE INTENDING TO EXERT MORE PRESSURE IN MIDDLE EAST.

SOVIETS WERE SHIPPING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO EGYPT, IRAQ, AND SYRIA. ISRAEL HAD REASON BELIEVE SOVIETS WERE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 181236

BEHIND PRESENCE IN EGYPT OF 20-30 NORTH KOREAN PILOTS. IT WAS IMPORTANT ISRAEL AND U.S. DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT MISINTERPRETATION GETTING OUT OF CONTROL; THIS WOULD NOT BE GOOD FOR ISRAEL OR U.S. IT WAS IMPORTANT OTHERS NOT LOSE SIGHT OF U.S. POLICY ADVOCATING PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND STRESSING U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO SELL OUT ISRAEL'S INTEREST FOR OIL. OTHER SIDE WOULD TRY TO READ EVERY NUANCE. IF THEY THOUGHT THERE WAS NEW ERA OPENING IN WHICH U.S. WOULD FORCE SOME INITIATIVE NOT FOUNDED ON NEGOTIATIONS OR WHATEVER, THIS WOULD BE AGAINST INTEREST ISRAEL AND U.S. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS SPEAKING IN SPIRIT OF COMPLETE CANDOR.

8. ACTG SEC SAID HE APPRECIATED VERY MUCH HAVING DINITZ' SOUND STATEMENT IN APPROACHING THIS SUBJECT. ONE HAD TO LOOK AT BACKGROUND. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON WHAT WAS BEST FOR ISRAEL AND BEST FOR U.S. IT WAS AS MUCH TO ISRAEL'S ADVANTAGE AS TO OUR OWN THAT WE MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARABS. IF WE FAILED TO DO SO, IT COULD GIVE RISE TO FEELING IN THIS COUNTRY WE WERE SELLING U.S. INTERESTS DOWN RIVER FOR ISRAEL. OUR INTERESTS WERE NOT IDENTICAL WITH EITHER ARABS OR ISRAELIS THOUGH, OF COURSE, WE HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. WE COULD NOT GET AWAY FROM FACT THAT WE COULD NOT ISOLATE SECURITY FROM ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS. IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT, WE SAW EVEN FEAR IN SOME QUARTERS U.S. MIGHT USE ITS MILITARY STRENGTH IN EUROPE AS WEAPON IN BARGAINING ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. ARABS INDEED MAY TRY TO USE OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US; WE WOULD NOT BE BLACKMAILED. WE WOULD NOT CHANGE OUR POLICY WITH REGARD TO ISRAEL OR MIDDLE EAST. BUT WE DID HAVE INTEREST THAT SITUATION NOT BECOME STAGNANT. AGAINST BACKGROUND, U.S. EFFORTS IN BERLIN AND VIS-A-VIS RUSSIANS AND CHINESE, PRESIDENT HAS TRIED TO GET MOVEMENT. ISRAEL AND U.S. COULD NOT ALLOW SITUATION TO CONTINUE UNTIL IT FESTERED. THIS WAS THOUGHT THAT UNDERLAY RECENT REMARKS BY PRESIDENT AND SISCO. WE THOUGHT IT WAS TO ADVANTAGE EVERYONE TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WERE SOME MARVELOUS BRAINS IN ISRAEL; WE THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE IF ISRAEL COULD COME UP WITH NEW INITIATIVE. WE COULD NOT SAY WHAT IT OUGHT TO BE, BUT WE DID KNOW THAT IF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 181236

SITUATION CONTINUED, IT WOULD FESTER. LET'S TRY MOVEMENT; WORLD EXPECTS THIS, ARABS AND ISRAELIS DID NOT AGREE ON HOW TO REACH PEACE, BUT THEY BOTH WANTED PEACE.

9. DINITZ LAUGHED AND SAID HE AGREED WITH EVERYTHING ACTG SEC SAID EXCEPT VERY LAST THING; HE COULD NOT AGREE ARABS WANTED PEACE. THOSE WHO THOUGHT ISRAEL'S DESIRE WAS TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO WERE MISTAKEN. IN ISRAEL ITSELF SUCH PEOPLE WERE NOT ONLY NOT A MAJORITY, BUT NOT A MAJORITY AMONG THE OPPOSITION. WHEN U.S. SPOKE OF DESIRABILITY MOVING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, DINITZ MUST RECALL THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN INITIATIVE IN LAST TWO YEARS AIMING AT NEGOTIATIONS ISRAEL HAD NOT GONE ALONG WITH. IT WAS TRUE ISRAEL DID NOT RUSH IN ITS RESPONSE TO SUCH INITIATIVES; THESE WERE HIGHLY IMPORTANT MATTERS TO IT. BUT WHEN FORMULA WAS WORKED OUT AND ISRAEL AGREED TO IT, THAT WAS ALL THAT WAS NEEDED FOR ARABS TO REJECT IT. WHAT BLOCKED PROGRESS WAS ARAB DEMAND TIEING BOTH INTERIM AGREEMENT AND OVERALL AGREEMENT TO PRE-CONDITION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. NO ONE IN ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THIS. ISRAEL HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH NEGOTIATIONS; IT DID HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH IDEA IT SHOULD COME FORWARD WITH UNILATERAL PROPOSALS. THIS WOULD NOT START THINGS MOVING. ANY BRAIN WAVE FROM ISRAEL WOULD PRODUCE SOME LAUDATORY PRESS EDITORIALS BUT WOULD ONLY LEAD TO ANOTHER STALEMATE AND IN UPSHOT, ISRAEL WOULD ONLY HAVE COMPROMISED ITS POSITION. ANY ISRAELI ACCESSION TO A GESTURE OR FORMULA WOULD ONLY JEOPARDIZE ITS POSITION, NOT DISSIPATE DEADLOCK.

10. ISRAEL, DINITZ CONTINUED, WAS NOT SAYING THAT IT WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING. IT WAS SAYING THAT MOVEMENT MUST COME FROM OTHER SIDE. RECENT STATEMENT OF SADAT WAS RELEVANT. SADAT HAD SAID, AMERICA DOESN'T UNDERSTAND ME/ I AM INTERESTED IN TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND RESTORATION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. WHAT ISRAEL WANTED, DINITZ SAID, WAS THAT OTHER SIDE ALLOW GIVE AND TAKE NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO COMMENCE, WITH EACH SIDE STATING POSITIONS. BUT ANY ISRAELI ATTEMPT IN FACT OF THIS PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC ARAB POSTURE COULD NOT SUCCEED. PEOPLE WOULD SAY ISRAEL WAS OBSTINATE BUT FACT WAS ISRAEL COULD NOT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 181236

MOVE BECAUSE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT GIVE IT ROOM IN WHICH TO MOVE.

11. ACTG SEC SAID EXAMPLE OUR BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS WAS INSTRUCTIVE. EACH SIDE HAD SAID IT WANTED TO APPROACH PROBLEM IN ITS OWN TERMS. IN MIDDLE EAST, TOO, EACH SIDE WANTED PEACE ON ITS TERMS. DINITZ INTERJECTED TO SAY ARABS WANTED SOLUTION ON THEIR OWN TERMS, NOT PEACE, BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN SEMANTIC DISCUSSION. ACTG SEC CONTINUED THAT WE AGREE ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT AS PRICE NEGOTIATIONS AN AGREEMENT TO PRECONDITIONS THAT WOULD GIVE ARABS EVERYTHING THEY WANTED. THAT WAS OUT OF QUESTION. SIMILARLY, ARABS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ENTER

NEGOTIATIONS ONLY AFTER ACCEPTING ISRAELI SIDE AS IT WAS. ISRAEL'S POSITION WAS GOOD ONE IN REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE WITH PRECONDITIONS; ONE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH PRECONDITIONS. WE HAVE TOLD OUR ARAB FRIENDS, AND THOSE WHO ARE NOT OUR FRIENDS, THAT NEGOTIATION CANNOT BE SETTLED BEFOREHAND; THEY SHOULD GO INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO TRY AND SEE WHAT KIND OF SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND. BIG THING WAS TO START MOVING. IT DID SEEM THAT PRELIMINARY STEPS COULD BE CONSIDERED, MUCH AS BERLIN HAD BEEN A PRELIMINARY STEP FOR DETENTE WITH USSR. DINITZ INTERJECTED THAT ISRAEL AGREED; THIS WAS WHY GOI HAD LIKED INTERIM AGREEMENT IDEA. ACTG SEC SAID WE WERE NOT CRITICIZING WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN PAST AND WE DID NOT EXPECT ISRAEL TO BE PIECE OF SALAMI TO BE SLICED AWAY, BUT WE DID THINK ISRAEL WAS IN POSITION WHERE MOVEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. ONE COULD NEVER PREDICT HOW THINGS WOULD COME OUT. OUR SITUATION VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS NOW LOOKED DIFFERENT IN LIGHT DEVELOPMENTS WITH MFN AND DISSIDENTS IN SOVIET UNION. THERE WOULD BE MANY PROBLEMS AND IT WOULD NOT BE HEAVEN, BUT MOVEMENT ITSELF WOULD HELP.

12. DINITZ SAID THAT IF ARABS COULD BE BROUGHT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS OR ON BASIS SC RES 242, ISRAELI REPS WOULD BE ANYWHERE IN 24 HOURS. ACTG SEC AGAIN EXPRESSED HOPE ISRAELIS WOULD EXPLORE IN THEIR MINDS WHAT THEY COULD DO TO GENERATE MOVEMENT. DINITZ SAID HE WAS SURE HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DOING THIS. HE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 181236

WOULD CERTAINLY PASS TO JERUSALEM ACTG SEC'S COMMENTS. ACTG SEC AGAIN ADVERTED TO OUR OWN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS OVER RECENT YEARS IN VIETNAM AND BERLIN. LONG AND DIFFICULT AS THEY WERE, THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BROUGHT RESULTS. DINITZ REJOINED THAT U.S. COULD DO THIS BECAUSE IT HAD NOT ACCEPTED ANY PRECONDITIONS. ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD BE ONE OF WEAKNESS IF IT DID. ACTG SEC SAID DINITZ WAS RIGHT. WE WERE NOT ADVISING ISRAEL DO ANYTHING WE WOULD NOT DO.

13. DINITZ SAID THAT BASICALLY WE SAW EYE TO EYE. HE HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE. ACTG SEC AGREED SUCH DISCUSSION WAS HELPFUL IN MAINTAININ OUR CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP. DINITZ RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER THEME AND AGAIN EXPRESSED HOPE WE COULD GET AWAY FROM IMPRESSION OF CLEAVAGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ACTG SEC AGREED IT WOULD BE HARMFUL IF THERE WERE GENERAL BELIEF WE WERE CHANGING OUR POLICY. BUT MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SHOWN; THIS WAS IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST AND OUR OWN. ACTG SEC AGAIN REMINDED DINITZ THERE WAS NEED FOR GOOD U.S. RELATIONS WITH ARAB

COUNTRIES. THERE WAS GRAVE DANGER U.S. OIL COMPANIES IN ARAB WORLD MIGHT BE REPLACED BY EUROPEANS; THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, WEAKEN OUR LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS ARAB STATES. QADHAFI'S MOVES WERE OF CONCERN TO US. DINITZ ASKED WHETHER ACTG SEC THOUGHT QADHAFI WOULD BE REPLACING AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES WITH EUROPEAN. ACTG SEC RESPONDED THIS WAS POSSIBLE. HE WAS SPEAKING HERE NOT JUST ABOUT QADHAFI, BUT ABOUT MIDDLE EAST AS WHOLE OVER LONG SWEEP OF TIME. IN FACT, OF COURSE, SUCH ARAB MEASURES WOULD HAVE MORE EFFECT IN EUROPE THAN IN U.S., WHICH WOULD BE LAUNCHING DRIVE FOR ENERGY SELF-SUFFICIENCY. PRICES OF OIL WERE ALREADY SO HIGH THAT SWITCHOVERS TO ALTERNATIVE SOURCES WERE BECOMING MORE ECONOMICAL.

14. DINITZ OBSERVED SALUTARY EFFECT ON ARABS WOULD BE EVIDENT AS SOON AS U.S. LAUNCHED SUCH PROGRAM. ACTG SEC SAID, OF COURSE, IF WITHIN DECADE OR SO WE WERE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THIS MIGHT RAISE QUESTION OF HOW MUCH LEVERAGE IN MIDDLE EAST WE WOULD HAVE AT THAT TIME. IT

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 181236

WOULD BE SERIOUS MATTER FOR ISRAEL IF U.S. COMPANIES WERE REPLACED BY EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE. DINITZ SAID HE DID NOT SEE THIS HAPPENING. ACTG SEC AGREED THIS UNLIKELY BUT SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT IT. WE WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, SACRIFICE OUR POLICY WITH ISRAEL; WE INTENDED THAT OUR RELATIONS REMAIN STRONG. DINITZ SAID THIS WAS ISRAEL'S AXIOM ALSO; THIS WAS POLICY WHICH WOULD CONDUCE TO PEACE AND STABILITY. IF IT WERE WEAKENED, IT WOULD OPEN WAY FOR RUSSIANS TO COME IN.

15. ACTG SEC SUMMED UP THAT PRESIDENT'S POLICY WAS ONE OF SUPPORT FOR STRONG ISRAEL AND FOR POLICY OF PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. BUT IT WAS ALSO ONE OF SEEKING TO USE IMAGINATION TO DEVISE SOUND INITIATIVES SO AS TO MOVE AWAY FROM PRESENT STATUS QUO. ISRAEL MUST REMAIN STRONG BUT IT SHOULD NOT FALL INTO TRAP OF CREATING PRE-CONDITIONS FOR ITSELF. DINITZ ASSURED ACTG SEC ISRAEL WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING ALIEN TO ITS PRESENT POSTURE.

RUSH

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

901/20/019

FORM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem with a sunburst and stars. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SEP 13 AM 10:27

61
ORIGIN SS-25

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE:KHA
9/11/73:EXT 20840
APPROVED BY D KENNETH RUSH
NEA -MR. ATHERTON
S/S - MR. GAMMON

074820

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 181236

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, ETRN
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR--ACTING SECRETARY, SEPT. 10

SUMMARY. IN SEPT 10 MEETING WITH ACTG SEC AMB DINITZ
RAISED FIRST ISRAELI CONCERNS RE TERRORISM. SAID RECENT
ACTIONS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD ENCOURAGED TERRORIST
ACTIONS IN ATHENS, PARIS AND ROME. DISCOVERY STRELA
MISSILE IN ROME PARTICULARLY GRAVE. SOVIETS AND ARAB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 181236

GOVERNMENTS BOTH RESPONSIBLE. DINITZ ASKED U.S. APPROACH TO USSR STRESSING GRAVITY MATTER AND U.S. EXERCISE DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE AT ROME TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE ICAO ACTION AGAINST SUCH INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION. ACTG SEC SAID, STRESSING CONFIDENTIALITY, WE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN STRONGLY TO SOVIETS ABOUT DANGER STRELA GETTING TO TERRORISTS. WE HAD UNDER REVIEW WHAT FURTHER WE MIGHT DO AND WOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO BOTH AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTIONS. DINITZ THEN RAISED GENERAL SUBJECT U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS. SAID THAT WHILE OFFICIAL U.S. STATEMENTS RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST POLICY REASSURING THERE MUCH PRESS COMMENT CALLING FOR CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TO MORE EVENHANDED APPROACH. DINITZ SAID MISINTERPRETATION OF U.S.-ISRAEL TIES IN SENSE THEY GETTING WEAKER WOULD GIVE ADVANTAGE TO HOSTILE FORCES; INDEED THERE EVIDENCE ALREADY OF INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURES IN AREA. IT WAS

IMPORTANT OTHER SIDE NOT MISREAD TRUE SITUATION. IN HIS RESPONSE ACTG SEC STRESSED: IT WOULD BE HARMFUL IF THERE GENERAL BELIEF WE CHANGING OUR POLICY; U.S. POLICY RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST REMAINED UNCHANGED; WE SUPPORTED STRONG ISRAEL AND NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS; ON OTHER HAND, IT IN ISRAEL'S AND OUR INTERESTS TO GET MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, OTHERWISE SITUATION WOULD FESTER; ISRAEL SHOULD COME UP WITH NEW IDEAS AND INITIATIVE; IT IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST AND OUR OWN WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARABS. IN RESPONSE DINITZ SAID ARABS DID NOT WANT PEACE. ANY UNILATERAL MOVEMENT BY ISRAEL WOULD PRODUCE NOTHING, AND ISRAEL WOULD ONLY JEOPARDIZE ITS POSITION. ISRAEL COULD NOT MOVE BECAUSE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT GIVE IT ROOM IN WHICH TO MOVE. IN CLOSING COMMENT ACTG SEC SAID WE AGREED WITH ISRAEL'S POSTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS, BUT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT FALL INTO TRAP OF CREATING PRE-CONDITIONS FOR ITSELF. END SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADOR DINITZ CALLED AT HIS REQUEST FOR HOUR ON ACTING SECRETARY SEPT 10. AMONG OTHERS PRESENT WERE ISRAELI MINISTER SHALEV AND ASST SECRETARY SISCO. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD BE DEPARTING SEPT 11 FOR 8-10 DAYS IN ISRAEL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 181236

2. DINITZ SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL ACTG SEC ABLE FIND TIME RECEIVE HIM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR ISRAEL. IT WAS GOOD TO HAVE GENERAL DISCUSSION FROM TIME TO TIME AND HE EXPECTED TO BE ASKED MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS ON HIS RETURN. HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO RAISE TWO OR THREE POINTS. FIRST POINT RELATED TO TERRORISM AND PALESTINIANS. DINITZ RECALLED ISRAEL'S FREQUENT EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN AT CONSEQUENCES MISINTERPRETATION BY PALESTINIANS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS OF GESTURES MADE BY OTHERS IN THEIR DIRECTION. GOI HAD OPPOSED INSERTION IN US-USSR COMMUNIQUE OF LANGUAGE CONCERNING "PALESTINIAN INTERESTS". SUCH LANGUAGE WAS OPEN TO SERIOUS MIS-INTERPRETATION, AS WERE SUCCESSIVE CONDEMNATIONS OF ISRAEL ON IRAQI AIRLINER INCIDENT. ISRAEL WAS GRATEFUL FOR U.S. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS, BUT FACT WAS LANGUAGE OF CONDEMNATION BECAME STRONGER EACH TIME. THERE HAD BEEN NO REFERENCE TO BACKGROUND; IT WAS AS IF MRS. MEIR HAD AWAKENED ONE MORNING AND DECIDED OUT OF THE BLUE TO HIJACK A PLANE. WITHOUT DOUBT THESE INSTANCES OF INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO TERRORISM HAD ENCOURAGED TERRORISTS TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTIONS IN ATHENS, PARIS AND ROME. ISRAEL REGARDED WITH PARTICULAR GRAVITY ROME EVENTS. RUSSIANS WERE VERY CAREFUL IN THEIR SUPPLY OF STRELA MISSILES; THEY KNEW

WHERE EACH AND EVERY ONE WAS. THEY SUPPLIED THEM ABOARD ONLY TO SYRIA, IRAQ AND EGYPT AND THEY COULD REACH OTHER SOURCES ONLY VIA THESE CHANNELS. OBJECTIVE OF ROME TERRORISTS WAS EL AL AIRCRAFT, BUT EVENTUAL TARGET COULD JUST AS WELL BE ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT.

3. ISRAEL FELT, DINITZ CONTINUED, RUSSIANS WERE NOT PRACTICING WHAT THEY PREACHED. THEY TALKED AGAINST TERRORISM, BUT THEY ALLOWED TERRORISTS TO HOLD SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. THIS EVENT REVEALED RESPONSIBILITY OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS FOR TERRORISM. IN SPITE OF THEIR DISCLAIMERS, THEY WERE PROVIDING FIRST RATE MILITARY WEAPONS TO TERRORISTS. ISRAEL BELIEVED ALSO THAT DESPITE DISCLAIMERS OF RESPONSIBILITY BY ARAFAT AND HABASH, THEIR ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUED TO BE RESPONSIBLE. TROUBLE WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 181236

THAT GULLIBLE PRESS WAS GIVING CREDENCE TO ORGANIZED
TERRORISM'S DISCLAIMERS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

4. WHAT ISRAEL WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST OF U.S., DINITZ
SAID, WAS FOLLOWING: ISRAEL WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF U.S.
WOULD APPROACH SOVIET UNION, CALLING ATTENTION TO GRAVITY
OF USE OF THIS WEAPON BY TERRORISTS. SOVIETS COULD, IF
THEY WANTED, FIND OUT HOW WEAPONS HAD REACHED TERRORISTS.
SECONDLY, ISRAEL WOULD LIKE U.S. TO USE ITS DIPLOMATIC
INFLUENCE IN SOME ICAO MEETINGS WHERE THESE MATTERS WERE
BEING DISCUSSED. ISRAEL HOPED U.S. WOULD PUT ITS ENERGY
INTO GETTING TEETH IN ICAO AUTHORITY THAT WOULD PREVENT
ACTIONS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION OF THIS NATURE. ISRAEL
DID NOT WANT TO FEEL THAT IT WAS ONLY ONE WHO CARED ABOUT
THESE ISSUES.

5. ACTG SEC RESPONDED THAT AS AMBASSADOR WELL KNEW
WE ARE STRONG IN OUR OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM. WE THOUGHT
IT VERY SERIOUS MATTER THAT STRELA WAS GETTING AROUND
INTO IRRESPONSIBLE HANDS. IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE WE
COULD INFORM AMBASSADOR THAT WE HAD APPROACHED SOVIETS
SEVERAL TIMES REGARDING DANGERS OF STRELA GETTING INTO
HANDS OF TERRORISTS. WE HAD GIVEN THEM OUR VERY STRONG
VIEWS ON THIS AND WERE HOPEFUL THEY WOULD CONSIDER
MEASURES TO CONTROL WEAPONS ADEQUATELY. WE HAD STRESSED
OUR INTEREST IN WEAPONS NOT GETTING INTO WRONG HANDS AND
HAD ASSURED SOVIETS WE WOULD EXERCISE SIMILAR RESTRAINT.
THIS MATTER WAS UNDER REVIEW IN USG AT PRESENT AND WE
WOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO BOTH OF AMBASSADOR'S
SUGGESTIONS. ACTG SEC STRESSED FACT OUR DEMARCHE TO
SOVIETS SHOULD BE HELD CLOSELY.

6. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE ON TO HIS
SECOND TOPIC, MORE GENERAL ONE OF US-ISRAEL RELATIONS.

HE RECALLED HE HAD MENTIONED IN HIS PREVIOUS CONVERSATION
WITH ACTG SEC HE HAD SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS
MATTER MORE AT LENGTH WITH HIM. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT,
THOUGH U.S. AND ISRAEL DID NOT ALWAYS SEE EYE TO EYE ON
ALL ISSUES, OUR RELATIONS HAD BEEN MARKED BY SPIRIT
OF INTIMACY AND FRIENDSHIP. ISRAEL SENSED THIS WAS U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 181236

FEELING AS WELL AS ITS OWN. IN SPITE OF THIS THERE WERE OCCASIONALLY IMPRESSIONS ON OUTSIDE THERE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. U.S. WAS NOW FACING OIL QUESTION (DINITZ WOULD NOT SAY "CRISIS" BECAUSE EVEN THIS APPELLATION WAS CONTROVERSIAL). IN PRESENT SITUATION WE MAY DISTINGUISH TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EXPRESSION OF ISRAEL-U.S. RELATIONS. ON ONE HAND THERE WAS BARRAGE OF PRESS REPORTS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES AND FROM SOME U.S. NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES TO EFFECT THERE WAS LINK BETWEEN OIL SHORTAGE AND ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, AND BLAMING ISRAEL FOR SHORTAGES. "SLOGANS" WERE APPEARING IN EDITORIAL COLUMNS DEMANDING CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TO MORE EVENHANDED APPROACH. THIS WAS ONE LEVEL. ON OTHER HAND THERE WERE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS SAYING U.S. POLICY UNCHANGED AND U.S. WOULD NOT YIELD TO BLACKMAIL. AMONG THEM WERE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE'S REMARKS BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE, ACTING SECRETARY'S REMARKS AT TEHRAN AND SECRETARY ROGERS' LAST PRESS CONFERENCE. THESE WERE NOT STATEMENTS THAT ALWAYS SAID EXPLICITLY U.S. WAS FOR ISRAEL; THIS WAS WELL-KNOWN AND DID NOT REQUIRE REPETITION. PRESIDENT HAD EXPRESSED MAIN IDEA WELL WHEN HE SAID U.S. WAS PRO-PEACE. BUT SET AGAINST THESE STATEMENTS THERE WAS WHOLE ARRAY OF INTERPRETATION IN PRESS WHICH DID NOT SEEM TO HEAR WHAT PRESIDENT HAD SAID, NAMELY THAT U.S. WAS NOT SUBJECT TO WILL OF OIL SUPPLIERS. THERE WAS NEED TO DISASSOCIATE ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE FROM OIL QUESTION; WE NEEDED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE TWO ISSUES.

7. IN PAST, DINITZ CONTINUED, THERE HAD NOT BEEN SINGLE INSTANCE WHEN THERE INTERPRETATION OF WEAKENING ISRAEL-U.S. TIES THAT HAD NOT GIVEN ADVANTAGE TO FORCES HOSTILE TO BOTH OF US. NOW THERE WAS MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE. AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS OF INTERPRETATION THAT U.S. POLICY WOULD CHANGE, WE SEE EVIDENCE EVERYWHERE SOVIETS WERE INTENDING TO EXERT MORE PRESSURE IN MIDDLE EAST.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

REF ASSIGNED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 181236

SOVIETS WERE SHIPPING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO EGYPT, IRAQ, AND SYRIA. ISRAEL HAD REASON BELIEVE SOVIETS WERE BEHIND PRESENCE IN EGYPT OF 20-30 NORTH KOREAN PILOTS. IT WAS IMPORTANT ISRAEL AND U.S. DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT MISINTERPRETATION GETTING OUT OF CONTROL; THIS WOULD NOT BE GOOD FOR ISRAEL OR U.S. IT WAS IMPORTANT OTHERS NOT LOSE SIGHT OF U.S. POLICY ADVOCATING PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND STRESSING U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO SELL OUT ISRAEL'S INTEREST FOR OIL. OTHER SIDE WOULD TRY TO READ EVERY NUANCE. IF THEY THOUGHT THERE WAS NEW ERA OPENING IN WHICH U.S. WOULD FORCE SOME INITIATIVE NOT FOUNDED ON NEGOTIATIONS OR WHATEVER, THIS WOULD BE AGAINST INTEREST ISRAEL AND U.S. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS SPEAKING IN SPIRIT OF COMPLETE CANDOR.

8. ACTG SEC SAID HE APPRECIATED VERY MUCH HAVING DINITZ' SOUND STATEMENT IN APPROACHING THIS SUBJECT. ONE HAD TO LOOK AT BACKGROUND. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON WHAT WAS BEST FOR ISRAEL AND BEST FOR U.S. IT WAS AS MUCH TO ISRAEL'S ADVANTAGE AS TO OUR OWN THAT WE MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARABS. IF WE FAILED TO DO SO, IT COULD GIVE RISE TO FEELING IN THIS COUNTRY WE WERE SELLING U.S. INTERESTS DOWN RIVER FOR ISRAEL. OUR INTERESTS WERE NOT IDENTICAL WITH EITHER ARABS OR ISRAELIS THOUGH, OF COURSE; WE HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. WE COULD NOT GET AWAY FROM FACT THAT WE COULD NOT ISOLATE SECURITY FROM ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS. IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT, WE SAW EVEN FEAR IN SOME QUARTERS U.S. MIGHT USE ITS MILITARY STRENGTH IN EUROPE AS WEAPON IN BARGAINING ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. ARABS INDEED MAY TRY TO USE OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US; WE WOULD NOT BE BLACKMAILED. WE WOULD NOT CHANGE OUR POLICY WITH REGARD TO ISRAEL OR MIDDLE EAST, BUT WE DID HAVE INTEREST THAT SITUATION NOT BECOME STAGNANT. AGAINST BACKGROUND, U.S. EFFORTS IN BERLIN AND VIS-A-VIS RUSSIANS AND CHINESE, PRESIDENT HAS TRIED TO GET MOVEMENT. ISRAEL AND U.S. COULD NOT ALLOW SITUATION TO CONTINUE UNTIL IT FESTERED. THIS WAS THOUGHT THAT UNDERLAY RECENT REMARKS

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 07 STATE 181236

9. DINITZ LAUGHED AND SAID HE AGREED WITH EVERYTHING ACTG SEC SAID EXCEPT VERY LAST THING; HE COULD NOT AGREE ARABS WANTED PEACE. THOSE WHO THOUGHT ISRAEL'S DESIRE WAS TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO WERE MISTAKEN. IN ISRAEL ITSELF SUCH PEOPLE WERE NOT ONLY NOT A MAJORITY, BUT NOT A MAJORITY AMONG THE OPPOSITION. WHEN U.S. SPOKE OF DESIRABILITY MOVING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, DINITZ MUST RECALL THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN INITIATIVE IN LAST TWO YEARS AIMING AT NEGOTIATIONS ISRAEL HAD NOT GONE ALONG WITH. IT WAS TRUE ISRAEL DID NOT RUSH IN ITS RESPONSE TO SUCH INITIATIVES; THESE WERE HIGHLY IMPORTANT MATTERS TO IT. BUT WHEN FORMULA WAS WORKED OUT AND ISRAEL AGREED TO IT, THAT WAS ALL THAT WAS NEEDED FOR ARABS TO REJECT IT. WHAT BLOCKED PROGRESS WAS ARAB DEMAND TIEING BOTH INTERIM AGREEMENT AND OVERALL AGREEMENT TO PRE-CONDITION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. NO ONE IN ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THIS. ISRAEL HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH NEGOTIATIONS; IT DID HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH IDEA IT SHOULD COME FORWARD WITH UNILATERAL PROPOSALS. THIS WOULD NOT START THINGS MOVING. ANY BRAIN WAVE FROM ISRAEL WOULD PRODUCE SOME LAUDATORY PRESS EDITORIALS BUT WOULD ONLY LEAD TO ANOTHER STALEMATE AND IN UPSHOT, ISRAEL WOULD ONLY HAVE COMPROMISED ITS POSITION. ANY ISRAELI ACCESSION TO A GESTURE OR FORMULA WOULD ONLY JEOPARDIZE ITS POSITION, NOT DISSIPATE DEADLOCK.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 181236

I AM INTERESTED IN TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND RESTORATION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. WHAT ISRAEL WANTED, DINITZ SAID, WAS THAT OTHER SIDE ALLOW GIVE AND TAKE NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO COMMENCE, WITH EACH SIDE STATING POSITIONS. BUT ANY ISRAELI ATTEMPT IN FACT OF THIS PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC ARAB POSTURE COULD NOT SUCCEED. PEOPLE WOULD SAY ISRAEL WAS OBSTINATE BUT FACT WAS ISRAEL COULD NOT MOVE BECAUSE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT GIVE IT ROOM IN WHICH TO MOVE.

11. ACTG SEC SAID EXAMPLE OUR BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS WAS INSTRUCTIVE. EACH SIDE HAD SAID IT WANTED TO APPROACH PROBLEM IN ITS OWN TERMS. IN MIDDLE EAST, TOO, EACH SIDE WANTED PEACE ON ITS TERMS. DINITZ INTERJECTED TO SAY ARABS WANTED SOLUTION ON THEIR OWN TERMS, NOT PEACE, BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN SEMANTIC DISCUSSION. ACTG SEC CONTINUED THAT WE AGREE ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT AS PRICE NEGOTIATIONS AN AGREEMENT TO PRECONDITIONS THAT WOULD GIVE ARABS EVERYTHING THEY WANTED. THAT WAS OUT OF QUESTION. SIMILARLY, ARABS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ENTER

NEGOTIATIONS ONLY AFTER ACCEPTING ISRAELI SIDE AS IT WAS. ISRAEL'S POSITION WAS GOOD ONE IN REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE WITH PRECONDITIONS; ONE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH PRECONDITIONS. WE HAVE TOLD OUR ARAB FRIENDS, AND THOSE WHO ARE NOT OUR FRIENDS, THAT NEGOTIATION CANNOT BE SETTLED BEFOREHAND; THEY SHOULD GO INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO TRY AND SEE WHAT KIND OF SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND. BIG THING WAS TO START MOVING. IT DID SEEM THAT PRELIMINARY STEPS COULD BE CONSIDERED, MUCH AS BERLIN HAD BEEN A PRELIMINARY STEP FOR DETENTE WITH USSR. DINITZ INTERJECTED THAT ISRAEL AGREED; THIS WAS WHY GOI HAD LIKED INTERIM AGREEMENT IDEA. ACTG SEC SAID WE WERE NOT CRITICIZING WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN PAST AND WE DID NOT EXPECT ISRAEL TO BE PIECE OF SALAMI TO BE SLICED AWAY, BUT WE DID THINK ISRAEL WAS IN POSITION WHERE MOVEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. ONE COULD NEVER PREDICT HOW THINGS WOULD COME OUT. OUR SITUATION VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS NOW LOOKED DIFFERENT IN LIGHT DEVELOPMENTS WITH MPN AND DISSIDENTS IN SOVIET UNION. THERE WOULD BE MANY PROBLEMS AND IT WOULD NOT BE HEAVEN, BUT MOVEMENT ITSELF WOULD HELP.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are written in a semi-circle above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is written in a semi-circle below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 181236

12. DINITZ SAID THAT IF ARABS COULD BE BROUGHT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS OR ON BASIS SC RES 242, ISRAELI REPS WOULD BE ANYWHERE IN 24 HOURS. ACTG SEC AGAIN EXPRESSED HOPE ISRAELIS WOULD EXPLORE IN THEIR MINDS WHAT THEY COULD DO TO GENERATE MOVEMENT. DINITZ SAID HE WAS SURE HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DOING THIS. HE WOULD CERTAINLY PASS TO JERUSALEM ACTG SEC'S COMMENTS. ACTG SEC AGAIN ADVERTED TO OUR OWN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS OVER RECENT YEARS IN VIETNAM AND BERLIN. LONG AND DIFFICULT AS THEY WERE, THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BROUGHT RESULTS. DINITZ REJOINED THAT U.S. COULD DO THIS BECAUSE IT HAD NOT ACCEPTED ANY PRECONDITIONS. ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD BE ONE OF WEAKNESS IF IT DID. ACTG SEC SAID DINITZ WAS RIGHT. WE WERE NOT ADVISING ISRAEL DO ANYTHING WE WOULD NOT DO.

13. DINITZ SAID THAT BASICALLY WE SAW EYE TO EYE. HE HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE. ACTG SEC AGREED SUCH DISCUSSION WAS HELPFUL IN MAINTAININ OUR CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP. DINITZ RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER THEME AND AGAIN EXPRESSED HOPE WE COULD GET AWAY FROM IMPRESSION OF CLEAVAGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ACTG SEC AGREED IT WOULD BE HARMFUL IF THERE WERE GENERAL BELIEF WE WERE CHANGING OUR POLICY. BUT MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SHOWN. THIS WAS IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST AND OUR OWN. ACTG SEC AGAIN REMINDED DINITZ THERE WAS NEED FOR GOOD U.S. RELATIONS WITH ARAB

COUNTRIES. THERE WAS GRAVE DANGER U.S. OIL COMPANIES IN ARAB WORLD MIGHT BE REPLACED BY EUROPEANS; THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, WEAKEN OUR LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS ARAB STATES. QADHAFI'S MOVES WERE OF CONCERN TO US. DINITZ ASKED WHETHER ACTG SEC THOUGHT QADHAFI WOULD BE REPLACING AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES WITH EUROPEAN. ACTG SEC RESPONDED THIS WAS POSSIBLE. HE WAS SPEAKING HERE NOT JUST ABOUT QADHAFI, BUT ABOUT MIDDLE EAST AS WHOLE OVER LONG SWEEP OF TIME. IN FACT, OF COURSE, SUCH ARAB MEASURES WOULD HAVE MORE EFFECT IN EUROPE THAN IN U.S., WHICH WOULD BE LAUNCHING DRIVE FOR ENERGY SELF-SUFFICIENCY. PRICES OF OIL WERE ALREADY SO HIGH THAT SWITCHOVERS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 181236

ALTERNATIVE SOURCES WERE BECOMING MORE ECONOMICAL.

14. DINITZ OBSERVED SALUTARY EFFECT ON ARABS WOULD BE EVIDENT AS SOON AS U.S. LAUNCHED SUCH PROGRAM. ACTG SEC SAID, OF COURSE, IF WITHIN DECADE OR SO WE WERE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THIS MIGHT RAISE QUESTION OF HOW MUCH LEVERAGE IN MIDDLE EAST WE WOULD HAVE AT THAT TIME. IT WOULD BE SERIOUS MATTER FOR ISRAEL IF U.S. COMPANIES WERE REPLACED BY EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE. DINITZ SAID HE DID NOT SEE THIS HAPPENING. ACTG SEC AGREED THIS UNLIKELY BUT SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT IT. WE WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, SACRIFICE OUR POLICY WITH ISRAEL; WE INTENDED THAT OUR RELATIONS REMAIN STRONG. DINITZ SAID THIS WAS ISRAEL'S AXIOM ALSO; THIS WAS POLICY WHICH WOULD CONDUCE TO PEACE AND STABILITY. IF IT WERE WEAKENED, TIS WOULD OPEN WAY FOR RUSSIANS TO COME IN.

15. ACTG SEC SUMMED UP THAT PRESIDENT'S POLICY WAS ONE OF SUPPORT FOR STRONG ISRAEL AND FOR POLICY OF PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. BUT IT WAS ALSO ONE OF SEEKING TO USE IMAGINATION TO DEVISE SOUND INITIATIVES SO AS TO MOVE AWAY FROM PRESENT STATUS QUO. ISRAEL MUST REMAIN STRONG BUT IT SHOULD NOT FALL INTO TRAP OF CREATING PRE-CONDITIONS FOR ITSELF. DINITZ ASSURED ACTG SEC ISRAEL WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING ALIEN TO ITS PRESENT POSTURE.

RUSH

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

L91/eo/017

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

INH

PAGE 01 STATE 162263

63
ORIGIN SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:ESWALKER:KHA
8/15/73:EXT 22030
APPROVED BY NEA - ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
NEA/IAI - MR. STACKHOUSE
S/S-O: K. KURZE
IO (INFO)

097092

Q 152338Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 162263

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI CONCERN OVER US POSITION IN UN

REF: USUN 2875

1. ISRAELI AMB DINITZ CALLED DEPASSTSEC ATHERTON ABOUT 10:15 A.M. AUG 15 TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN THAT LEBANESE RESOLUTION MIGHT BE TABLED AND VOTED ON IN UNSC BEFORE HE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS QUESTION WITH ASSTSEC SISCO. DINITZ INDICATED HE HAD HEARD FROM NEW YORK AND WANTED TO BE SURE HIS MEETING WITH SISCO WOULD NOT BE TOO LATE. AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION, AT PRESENT TIME LEBANESE AMB GHORRA IS MEETING WITH NONALIGNED NATIONS TO GET THEIR SPONSORSHIP OF DRAFT RES WHICH IS A BIT WORSE THAN AMENDED VERSION WHICH US HAD BEEN WORKING ON YESTERDAY. GHORRA IS LIKELY TO GET NONALIGNED SPONSORSHIP. FRENCH AND BRITISH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RM DE 1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 162263

ARE WAITING TO RECEIVE AN AGREED DRAFT AND GIVE THEIR CO-SPONSORSHIP. NONALIGNED COUNTRIES, BRITISH AND FRENCH ARE LIKELY TO PRESENT DRAFT AT 11 O'CLOCK MEETING AND PRESS FOR VOTE WHICH WOULD COME BEFORE WE HAVE HAD ANY CHANCE DISCUSS QUESTION. ATHERTON SAID TO BE PERFECTLY CANDID WITH DINITZ, 12:30 MEETING WITH SISCO MIGHT BE TOO LATE; HOWEVER, WE HAVE STAYED IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS AT UN AND HERE. ATHERTON SAID HE WOULD LIKE EXPLAIN WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED IN COURSE OF MORNING FOLLOWING DINITZ-SISCO TELECON DURING

WHICH THEY HAD AGREED MEET AT 12:30.

2. ATHERTON EXPLAINED WE HAVE NOW SEEN TEXTS OF TWO DIFFERENT RESOLUTIONS. ONE HAS BEEN PROPOSED BY KENYA WHICH IS ACTING AS SELF-APPOINTED SPONSOR OF NONALIGNED NATIONS. KENYA TOOK BASIC LEBANESE DRAFT BUT CARRIED IT FURTHER ADDING AN OPERATIVE PARA CALLING FOR SUSPENSION OF AID TO ISRAEL. SECOND VERSION IS LEBANESE AND HAS BEEN REVISED ACCORDING TO TWO POINTS WHICH WE STRONGLY PUT TO THEM. IN FIRST OPERATIVE PARA, LEBANESE HAD "STRONGLY CONDEMNS" GOVT. OF ISRAEL. WE HAVE MANAGED TO GET THEM TO DROP "STRONGLY" SO THAT DRAFT NOW SAYS ONLY "CONDEMNS" GOVT. OF ISRAEL FOR SPECIFIC ISRAELI ACTIONS. IN FOURTH OPERATIVE PARA, WHICH SAID THAT COUNCIL WOULD "TAKE" ADEQUATE STEPS, WE STRONGLY INSISTED WORD "CONSIDER" BE INSERTED SO DRAFT NOW READS "WILL CONSIDER TAKING," WHICH MOVES QUESTION OF SANCTIONS ONE STEP FURTHER AWAY. WE DON'T KNOW IF AMB TEKOAHA HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH AMB SCALI ALREADY THIS MORN. HE MAY ALREADY KNOW ABOUT THIS DRAFT. BUT I MUST TELL YOU, ATHERTON SAID, THAT WE HAVE AUTHORIZED SCALI TO INDICATE TO LEBANESE IF THIS DRAFT STANDS, WE CAN SUPPORT IT. RAVIV INTERJECTED "MOST DISAPPOINTING".

3. DINITZ ASKED TO CLARIFY WHAT ATHERTON WAS SAYING; U.S. WILL SUPPORT RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL AND INCLUDING PARA CALLING ON ICAO TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL. ATHERTON SAID "AGAINST ISRAEL" IS NOT IN THERE, SO THAT THIS AT LEAST IN OUR VIEW IS SLIGHTLY IMPROVED VERSION OF WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. DINITZ SAID APPARENTLY DRAFT ATHERTON WAS TALKING ABOUT IS NOT WHAT HE HAD FROM YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. ATHERTON THEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a circular emblem with a sunburst. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 162263

READ ELEMENTS OF CURRENT DRAFT (USUN 2875) SO THAT DINITZ WOULD HAVE THE FULL VERSION BEFORE HIM.

4. HAVING READ OVER THE REVISED DRAFT, DINITZ SAID THAT SINCE HE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO SEE SISCO IN TIME HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY IN ALL SINCERITY AND HONESTY THAT TO VERY BEST OF HIS RECOLLECTION THE U.S. HAS NEVER SUPPORTED SUCH A RESOLUTION. IT IS A RESOLUTION WHICH HAS THREE UNPRECEDENTED ELEMENTS. FIRST, RESOLUTION DOES NOT BRING IN ANY OF BACKGROUND TO TERRORISM PROBLEM. IN THE PAST THE U-S. HAS VETOED RESOLUTIONS WHICH DID NOT REFER TO TERRORISTS ACTIONS. HERE IT IS AS IF ONE DAY OUT OF THE BLUE ISRAEL WENT OUT AND ACTED AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION WHILE IN REALITY ISRAEL WAS ACTING AGAINST SAME TERRORISTS WHO HAVE HI-JACKED AMERICAN PLANES AND HAVE MURDERED AMERICAN DIPLOMATS. SECOND, THERE IS ABSOLUTE TOTAL CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND OF GOVT. OF ISRAEL. IT IS NOT CONDEMNATION OF ACT ITSELF BUT OF GOVT OF ISRAEL AND ONE PRESUMES ITS

PEOPLE. THIRD POINT, AND ONE WE CONSIDER MOST SERIOUS, IS THAT THERE ARE TWO REFERENCES TO SANCTIONS WHICH THOUGH NOT DIRECT CALLS ARE REFERENCES. ONE REFERENCE INVITES ICAO TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SUCH ACTS. THERE ARE NO ACTIONS BEING TALKED ABOUT HERE EXCEPT ISRAEL'S, SO THAT IT IS TALKING ABOUT MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL. SECOND REFERENCE WARNS THAT SC WILL CONSIDER TAKING MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL. TO BEST OF HIS RECOLLECTION, U.S. HAS NEVER SUPPORTED SUCH A RESOLUTION. IF U.S. DOES SO, DINITZ SAID, I WILL HAVE TO TAKE IT, AND MY GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO TAKE IT, VERY SERIOUSLY. ATHERTON THANKED DINITZ FOR HIS PRESENTATION AND NOTED THAT THIS HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT FOR US. DINITZ SAID HE JUST CANNOT IMAGINE THAT U.S. GOVT. WILL DO THIS. WE DO NOT EXPECT U.S. TO SEND US A BOUQUET OF FLOWERS FOR WHAT WE DID, BUT DISTANCE BETWEEN DISAPPROVING AND THE LEBANESE DRAFT IS VAST. DINITZ ASKED IF A WAY COULD NOT BE FOUND TO PUT SOME OBJECTIVITY INTO THIS RESOLUTION AND CUT OUT REFERENCES TO SANCTIONS. THEN DRAFT WOULD NOT BE SO ONE-SIDED. ATHERTON SAID THAT TO BE PERFECTLY CANDID PRESSURE WILL BE ON GHORRA TO MAKE DRAFT STRONGER. WE WERE SURPRISED THAT WE EVEN GOT HIM TO CONSENT TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched across the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched across the bottom, separated by two small stars.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 162263

INSERTING THE WORD "CONSIDER" IN FOURTH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. DINITZ SAID U.S. DOES NOT WANT SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND HE CANNOT SEE HOW THIS DRAFT IN ANY SENSE CAN HELP U.S. OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING TERRORISM IN WORLD. IN FACT, HE COULD SEE THIS DRAFT AS NOTHING MORE THAN ENCOURAGING ARABS TOWARD TERRORISM. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO TALK TO SISCO AT 12:30 IF THE VOTE HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN. ATHERTON SAID WE WANT TO TALK TO HIM IN ANY CASE. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

8/1/20/01

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched across the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched across the bottom. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 JUN 23 PM 3:44

~~SECRET~~ 794

PAGE 01 STATE SITUATION ROOM

74
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:GRCELLA:SKG
6/22/73 FXT 22030
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON,JP
NEA/TAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
S/S :KKURZE

033700

R 222332Z JUN 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TFL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY RETRIIT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 123097

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: MASS, SA, IS, US
SUBJECT: SALE OF F-4S TO SAUDI ARABIA: GOI NOTE OF JUNE 22

1. FOLLOWING IS TELEGRAPHIC TEXT SUBSTANTIVE PARAGRAPHS OF
DIPLOMATIC NOTE DELIVERED JUNE 22 TO DEF SECRETARY BY ISRAELI
AMBASSADOR DINITZ (SUBSTANCE MEETING BEING REPORTED
SEPTFL):

QUOTE U.S. INTEREST IN STABILITY OF PERSIAN GULF REGION AND ITS DESIRE TO ENABLE ITS FRIENDS IN AREA TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND TO PROTECT CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF THEIR OIL RESOURCES ARE UNDERSTOOD.

QUOTE NEVERTHELESS, IT IS SUBMITTED THAT DANGERS INVOLVED

~~SECRET~~
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 123097

IN PLACING PHANTOM AIRCRAFT AT DISPOSAL OF ARAB STATES OUTWEIGH OSTENSIBLE ADVANTAGES. MAIN DANGER LIES IN TEMPTATION USE THESE AIRCRAFT IN CONTEXT ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT RATHER THAN AS ELEMENT IN PERSIAN GULF STABILITY. IF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT HAVE SO FAR BEEN ONLY marginally INVOLVED IN MILITARY ASPECTS OF CONFLICT THAT PARTLY BECAUSE THEY LACK TECHNICAL POSSIBILITY OF REACHING THIS AREA AND CAN CONVINCINGLY PLEAD THIS INCAPACITY WHEN PRESSED BY MORE RADICAL ARAB GOVERNMENTS. WITH PHANTOMS THEY WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF EASY POSSIBILITY OF EVASION. THEY ALREADY UNDER PRESSURE FROM RADICAL QUARTERS. IF THEY HAVE PHANTOMS THEY WILL BE PRESSED TO TRANSFER THEM TO COUNTRIES ACTIVELY

ENGAGED IN CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL. ASST SEC SISCO HAS ADMITTED, IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL QUERIES, THAT THIS CONTINGENCY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. ALTERNATIVELY SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT MAY BE URGED JOIN THOSE COUNTRIES IN CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL SINCE PHANTOM AIRCRAFT EASILY CAPABLE OF REACHING ISRAELI TARGETS FROM SAUDI ARABIAN BASES. PROPOSED NUMBER AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD DOUBLE THAT COUNTRY'S AIR FORCE. MOREOVER, DELIVERY OF PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ARAB COUNTRIES LIKELY BE INTERPRETED IN ARAB WORLD AS SYMBOLIZING BEGINNING OF NEW AMERICAN POLICY AND WOULD THUS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INHIBIT PROGRESS TOWARDS NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

QUOTE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ISRAEL'S CONCERN ARE INTERTWINED. ONCE U.S. TAKES FAR-REACHING STEPS NOW CONTEMPLATED, OTHER SUPPLIERS OF ARMS, SUCH AS FRANCE AND SOVIET UNION, LIKELY TO INCREASE OWN ARMS SHIPMENTS TO OTHER ARAB STATES, AND TO ESCALATE THEM IN TERMS OF QUALITY AND SOPHISTICATION.

QUOTE IN LAST THREE YEARS, DESPITE ISRAEL DISAPPOINTMENT AT REFUSAL OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO NEGOTIATE, SOME PROMISING TRENDS HAVE BEEN SEEN AT WORK. AS RESULT IMAGINATIVE U.S. INITIATIVES, CEASE-FIRE WAS ESTABLISHED AND, THANKS TO U.S. GOVERNMENT'S ACTION TO MAINTAIN MILITARY BALANCE, THIS OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN SECURED. SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM EGYPT. JORDAN HAS OVERCOME GRAVE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES. LEBANON HAS ACTED WITH SOME MEASURE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 123097

OF SUCCESS TO CURB ATTACKS ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY. TO DEGREE
THAT WAR OPTION CLEARLY BLOCKED PACIFIC SETTLEMENT IS
BROUGHT NEARER. APPEARANCE PHANTOM AIRCRAFT IN ARAB
ARSENALS, WITH ALL THEIR SYMBOLIC AND MILITARY POTENCY,
WILL WORK AGAINST THIS PROCESS.

QUOTE IN LIGHT APPREHENSIONS BEARING ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY,
AND IN TRADITIONAL SPIRIT FRIENDLY COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S.
AND ISRAEL, GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WISHES EXPRESS HOPE THAT
INTENTION SELL PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT
MAY YET BE RECONSIDERED. ENDQUOTE
RUSH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 JUN 23 AM 8:37

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 123062

THIS WOULD PSYCHOLOGICALLY INHIBIT PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT; WOULD SERVE TO STIMULATE FRENCH AND SOVIETS TO ESCALATE ARMS RACE; WOULD WORK AGAINST PROMISING TRENDS IN ARAB WORLD BLOCKING WAR OPTION. IN HIS REMARKS DINITZ ELABORATED ON THESE POINTS, BUT STRESSING THROUGHOUT GOI OPPOSITION WAS DIRECTED TO ITEM OF F-4S, NOT TO IDEA OF U.S. SUPPORT SAUDIS AND OTHER FRIENDS IN PENINSULA AREA. ISRAEL WANTED U.S. TO KNOW ITS OBJECTIONS WERE NOT AUTOMATIC OR PRO FORMA; THEY WERE SERIOUS LONG AND SHORT RANGE OBJECTIONS. DINITZ EMPHASIZED HIS CONCERN SALE OF F-4S MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST AND DESIRE AVOID APPEARANCE OF U.S.-ISRAEL RIFT OVER THIS ISSUE. DEPSEC AGREED WITH DINITZ IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE AND HARMFUL IF IMPRESSION GIVEN THERE ISRAEL-U.S.

CONFRONTATION ON THIS. OUR POLICY RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST UNCHANGED. WE GAVE ISRAELI VIEWS FULL CONSIDERATION BUT BELIEVED WE WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION IN AREA AND CAUSE OF PEACE BY SALE. WE DID NOT BELIEVE SALE WOULD CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER. SALE WOULD GIVE US PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN AREA THAT WERE IN BOTH ISRAEL'S AND OUR INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, IT BETTER FOR SAUDIS TO HAVE PHANTOMS, OVER WHOSE USE WE COULD EXERCISE SOME CONTROL, THAN TO BUY MIRAGES FROM FRANCE WHICH WOULD CARRY HIGHER RISK OF DIVERSION IN ARAB-ISRAEL CONTEXT. DEPSEC SAID IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW REVERSAL OF U.S. DECISION WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE U.S. INFLUENCE IN AREA. END SUMMARY

1. DEPSEC RUSH RECEIVED AMB DINITZ A.M. JUNE 22 FOR ABOUT 40 MINUTES. ALSO PRESENT WERE MIN IDAN, POL CONS RAVIV, DEPASSTSEC ATHERTON, COUNTRY DIR STACKHOUSE AND VELIOTES OF DEPSEC'S STAFF.

2. DINITZ SAID PRIMARY REASON HE HAD SOUGHT APPOINTMENT IN DEPARTMENT DURING THIS BUSY WEEK WAS TO DELIVER NOTE FOREIGN MINISTER WANTED PRESENTED TO SECRETARY ON QUESTION OF ANNOUNCED U.S. PLAN TO SELL F-4S TO SAUDI ARABIA AND POSSIBLY KUWAIT. AMB SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD FEW WORDS TO THOSE NOT IN NOTE (TEXT NOTE BY SEPTTEL). THEY WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE HE HAD RAISED IN HIS EARLIER MEETINGS ON SUBJECT WITH SISCO AND KISSINGER. GOI HAD NOW DECIDED

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 123062

TO TAKE THIS ADDITIONAL STEP TO EXPRESS ITS CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF PARTICULAR ITEM OF F-4S.

3. DINITZ CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT OBJECT TO U.S. STRATEGY IN PROVIDING ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA. ITS THINKING WAS IN MANY RESPECTS PARALLEL TO THAT OF U.S. NOR DID ISRAEL OBJECT, GENERALLY SPEAKING, TO U.S. SUPPLYING ARMS TO COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA; IT APPRECIATED U.S. CONCERNS FOR OIL INTERESTS IN AREA, ESPECIALLY AFTER BRITISH DEPARTURE HAD LEFT POWER VACUUM THERE. DINITZ RECALLED THAT ISRAEL IN PAST HAD URGED U.S. TO TAKE POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON THESE MATTERS. SO ISRAEL DID NOT OBJECT STRATEGICALLY. ITS OBJECTIONS WERE TO SPECIFIC TACTICAL MANIFESTATION OF THAT STRATEGY - I.E., PROVISION OF F-4S. REASONS FOR ISRAEL'S OBJECTIONS WERE SET FORTH IN NOTE. ISRAEL FELT THAT, INSTEAD OF CONTRIBUTING TO SEPARATING ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUES FROM ARABIAN PENINSULA MATTERS, PROVISION OF F-4S TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD CREATE LINK BETWEEN THEM. THIS WOULD NOT SERVE EITHER ISRAELI OR AMERICAN OVERALL INTERESTS IN AREA.

4. DINITZ SAID HE ALSO WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN U.S. SALE OF F-4S TO SAUDI ARABIA MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS SHIFT

IN U.S. POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST. CLOSE ISRAELI-U.S. FRIENDSHIP HAD BROUGHT TREMENDOUS BENEFITS TO BOTH COUNTRIES: IT HAD STRENGTHENED CEASE-FIRE IN AREA BROUGHT ABOUT AT U.S. INITIATIVE; IT HAD WEAKENED RUSSIAN HOLD IN AREA AND HELPED STRENGTHEN U.S. TIES WITH SOME ARAB COUNTRIES; IT HAD CREATED SITUATION IN WHICH EGYPT WAS COMING TO U.S. TO SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE IN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE IN BEST INTERESTS BOTH ISRAEL AND U.S. DINITZ WAS CONCERNED, HE SAID, THAT DISAGREEMENT U.S. AND ISRAEL WERE HAVING OVER THIS ITEM WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS RIFT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND U.S., WHICH WAS NOT ISRAEL'S DESIRE. ISRAEL THUS FOUND ITSELF IN DELICATE SITUATION.

5. DINITZ SAID FOREIGN MINISTER WANTED TO ASK THAT THIS MATTER BE REVIEWED AT HIGHEST LEVEL IN DEPARTMENT. ISRAEL WANTED TO ASSURE POSITION IT WAS TAKING WAS NOT REGARD AS SOMETHING AUTO-

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 123062

MATIC; IT HAD SERIOUS LONG- AND SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIONS. ON PUBLIC ASPECT OF MATTER, ISRAEL HAD OF COURSE BEEN OBLIGED TO STATE ITS POSITION ONCE U.S. DECISION SURFACED; BUT IT HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN ITS AGREEMENT WITH OVERALL THRUST OF AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS OBJECTIONS TO SALE OF F-4S. ISRAEL WAS REQUESTING THAT ITS CONCERNS BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND THAT MATTER BE REVIEWED AND RECONSIDERED BY USG.

6. DEPSEC REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE AND HARMFUL TO BOTH U.S. AND ISRAEL IF FALSE IMPRESSION WERE GIVEN TO PUBLIC THERE WAS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN US OVER F-4 SALES. WE HAD NO DESIGN TO CHANGE OUR POLICY RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST; RATHER, OUR DESIGN WAS TO STRENGTHEN THAT POLICY. NOTING THIS MORNING'S WASHINGTON POST HAD CARRIED REPORT OF INDIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ, DEPSEC RECALLED HIS CONVERSATION WITH SHAH OF IRAN WHO HAD EXPRESSED FEAR OF IRAQI DESIGNS IN PERSIAN GULF AREA AND INDIAN DESIGNS ON PAKISTAN, BOTH WITH SOVIET HELP. SHAH FELT SAUDI ARABIA MUST BE STRONG; HE WOULD EVEN LIKE ALLIANCE WITH IT. -IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF SAUDI ARABIA WERE TO FALL UNDER FRENCH INFLUENCE WITH OURSELVES DISPLACED AND U.S. OIL COMPANIES ELIMINATED IN MIDDLE EAST AND LIBYA, AND OTHERS TAKING OUR PLACE. IF WE WERE TO SELL F-4S TO SAUDI ARABIA, WE WOULD BE REASONABLY SURE THAT THEY WOULD BE KEPT IN SAUDI ARABIA. IF FRENCH WERE TO SELL MIRAGES TO SAUDI ARABIA, WE WOULD LOSE STRONG CARD FOR MAINTAINING OUR POSITION AND OUR OIL INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST; AND IF WE WERE WEAKENED IN AREA OR DRIVEN OUT, CAUSE OF PEACE THERE WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED. WE BELIEVED THAT WE WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION IN AREA

AND CAUSE OF PEACE THERE BY SELLING F-4S TO SAUDI ARABIA. WE FELT ISRAEL ITSELF WOULD BE BETTER OFF. THIS WAS OF COURSE MATTER OF JUDGMENT AND ISRAEL WAS RIGHT TO MAKE ITS CONCERNS KNOWN TO US. WE THOUGHT OUR DECISION WAS CORRECT ONE, HOWEVER, AND WE WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN IT OTHERWISE. IN OUR VIEW, MAJOR THING WAS THAT THIS DECISION NOT BE TAKEN AS INDICATION OF CHANGE IN OUR POLICY OR AS BRINGING ABOUT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN US. THERE WERE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

REF ASSIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 123062

BASICALLY NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND IT WOULD BE UN-
FORTUNATE IF THIS WERE TO BECOME CAUSE CELEBRE. IN HIS
PERSONAL OPINION, DEPSEC SAID, IF WE WERE TO REVERSE DE-
CISION, DANGER WOULD INCREASE AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL BE
ADVERSELY AFFECTED. MORE WE HURT IN AREA, MORE ISRAEL IS
HURT.

7. DINITZ REITERATED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT DISAGREE WITH
OVERALL U.S. POLICY. IT WAS NOT SAYING THAT U.S. SHOULD
NOT SUPPLY ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. ISRAEL WAS
INTERESTED IN IRAN AND HAD BEEN DOING SOMETHING ITSELF IN
VARIOUS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FIELDS TO HELP IRAN. ISRAEL
WAS INTERESTED AS WELL IN ETHIOPIA. ISRAEL SHARED
ETHIOPIA'S CONCERNS RE SOMALIA AND THOUGHT IT WOULD
BE WISE IF U.S. VIEWED ETHIOPIA ALSO AS PIVOT IN THAT
AREA, AS PARTNER IN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM. WHAT WAS DIS-
TURBING TO ISRAEL WAS MATTER F-4S. ISRAEL SAW NO COM-
PARABLE DANGER IN SALE OF MIRAGES. ITS INTELLIGENCE ES-
TIMATES WERE THAT SALE OF F-4S WOULD NOT STOP SAUDIS FROM
ACQUIRING MIRAGES; THERE WAS IN FACT HIGH PROBABILITY
THEY WOULD DO SO. F-4S WERE MOST ADVANCED TYPE OF AIR-
CRAFT AND MAINSTAY OF ISRAELI DETERRENT POSTURE. ISRAEL
DID NOT WANT TO SEE ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL POSTURE WEAKENED.
IT NEVER DOUBTED U.S. INTENTIONS THAT F-4S WOULD NOT BE
TRANSFERRED TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. BUT IT DID NOT THINK
THIS COULD BE GUARANTEE. HE NOTED SISCO HAD SAID IN
TESTIMONY ON HILL THAT IF U.S. WERE TO SELL F-4S TO SAUDIS,
IT INTENDED RECEIVE GUARANTEE THEY WOULD NOT BE TRANS-
FERRED, BUT NO ONE COULD GUARANTEE SUCH TRANSFER WOULD
NEVER TAKE PLACE. WHAT WE SEE TODAY IN MIDDLE EAST IS
COMMON MARKET IN ARMS. EGYPT, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS MIRAGES
FROM LIBYA, HAWKER HUNTERS FROM IRAQ AND IS IN PROCESS
OF GETTING LIGHTINGS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. ISRAEL SIMPLY
COULD NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY F-4S WOULD GO TO EGYPT
OR EGYPTIAN PILOTS WOULD GO TO SAUDI ARABIA TO FLY THEM.

8. CONTINUING, DINITZ SAID THERE WAS INTELLIGENCE ASPECT
NOT TOUCHED ON IN ISRAELI NOTE. IT MADE DIFFERENCE TO
ISRAEL IF ARABS WERE TO HAVE F-4S ON HAND THEY COULD STUDY.
ISRAEL WANTED U.S. TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS GENUINELY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The entire emblem is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars.

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 123062

CONCERNED. THIS WAS NOT PROFORMA THING. IT SAW WHOLE
ARRAY OF STRATEGIC, INTELLIGENCE, POLITICAL AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL EFFECTS. IT WANTED U.S. TO TAKE ITS CONCERNS
INTO CONSIDERATION.

9. DEPSEC ASSURED DINITZ WE DID GIVE ISRAELI VIEWS FULL CONSIDERATION. ISRAEL ATTACHED GREAT VALUE TO F-4S AS POLITICAL AND MILITARY WEAPON. SAUDIS SAW PLANES AS HAVING SIMILAR VALUE TO THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO KEEP PEACE. IN ARABIAN PENINSULA AREA, WE SAW OUR PROVIDING F-4S AS MAJOR FACTOR IN MAINTAINING OUR POSITION IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OUR INFLUENCE THERE. BEST GUARANTEE THAT PLANES WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO EGYPT WAS FOR U.S. TO HAVE STRONG PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA AND BE CONSIDERED BY SAUDIS AS GOOD FRIEND. THIS WAS IN OUR SELF-INTEREST AND ULTIMATELY IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST AS WELL. IF WE THOUGHT IT WOULD CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER WE WOULD NOT DO IT. OUR PROVISION OF F-4S WOULD IN ITSELF GIVE US PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE THAT WOULD BE IN BOTH ISRAEL'S INTEREST AND OUR OWN. AHTERTON ADDED THAT OUR F-4S DECISION WOULD HELP US HELP FAISAL WITHSTAND PRESSURES TO POLITICIZE OIL QUESTION. DEPSEC SAID FAISAL WAS INDEED UNDER GREAT PRESSURE AND HAD TO RESIST. RUSH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

04/00/010

REF ASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. A small star is positioned to the left of the eagle's head.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 095329

51
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-71 ADP-00 1026 R

DRAFTED BY NFA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE;MTB
5/11/73 EXT 20840
APPROVED BY S/S - MR. BARNES
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S - MR. BREMER

102249

P R 181400Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 095329

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY-EBAN MAY 10: UNSC MIDDLE EAST DEBATE
AND CURRENT ME SITUATION.

SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S AND SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION MAY 10 FOCUSED MOSTLY ON UPCOMING SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF UN MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AND OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY IN AREA. EBAN AND SECRETARY AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE IN BALANCE OF RESOLUTION 242 AS AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE FOR COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH NEW MACHINERY FOR DEALING WITH DISPUTE. EBAN WILL BE DISCUSSING UN TACTICAL MATTERS WITH AMBASSADOR SCALI NEXT WEEK. EBAN AND SECRETARY WERE ALSO IN AGREEMENT THAT STEP-BY-STEP

SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 095309

APPROACH TO PEACE IN AREA BEGINNING WITH AN INTERIM CANAL AGREEMENT WAS BEST WAY TO PROCEED. AS FOR AREA STABILITY, EBAN SAID ISRAELI ESTIMATED CHANCE EGYPT WOULD INITIATE HOSTILITIES AS VERY LOW, "THREE OR FOUR PERCENT". IN HIS VIEW SADAT'S RHETORIC IS DESIGNED TO CREATE WAR ATMOSPHERE WITHOUT THAT BEING TRANSFORMED INTO ACTUAL WAR SITUATION. RE LEBANON, EBAN SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT AS CLEAR-CUT SOLUTION OF PLO/PALESTINE PROBLEM AS THERE HAD BEEN IN JORDAN BUT HE FELT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACTION DEFINITELY MADE FOR BETTER SITUATION. HE CONFIRMED ISRAELI VIGILANCE WITH RESPECT TO ANY SYRIAN INTERVENTION, BUT INDICATED SOME OPTIMISM THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN. END SUMMARY.

1. SECRETARY AND ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN MET MAY 10 FOR ABOUT HOUR. ALSO PRESENT WERE AMB DYNITZ, MINISTER IDAN, POL COUNS RAVIV, MFA DEP DIRGEN EVRON, EBAN'S POL SEC RENTSUR, ASSTSECY SISCO, DEPASSTSEC ATHERTON AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR STACKHOUSE. MOST OF CONVERSATION CONCERNED WITH UPCOMING UNSC DEBATE AND OUTLOOK FOR MIDDLE EAST STABILITY. OTHER SUBJECTS REPORTED SEPTELS.

2. SECRETARY OPENED BY ASKING HOW EBAN SAW UPCOMING UNSC MEETING. EBAN RESPONDED IT HARD TO ASCERTAIN WHAT EGYPT WANTED. ISRAELI ASSESSMENT OF EGYPT'S MOOD NOW WAS THAT LIKELIHOOD IT WOULD INITIATE HOSTILITIES LOW INDEED. IF EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO IRRATIONALITY, ISRAEL WOULD SAY PROBABILITY NEAR ZERO. AS IT IS, IT WOULD ESTIMATE CHANCE AT THREE OR FOUR PERCENT. SADAT'S INTERNAL SITUATION BAD AND HE FOCUSING ON IT. ONE FACTOR IN HIS FAVOR WAS NO ONE ELSE SEEMED TO WANT JOB. HIS POSITION FRAGILE, BUT ONE THING ABOUT MIDDLE EAST WAS THAT FRAGILITY AND LONG LIFE NOT INCOMPATIBLE. LOOK AT HUSSEIN. ARMY DID NOT WANT WAR. OFFICERS KNEW IT MEANT DEFEAT. AND IN PRESENT SITUATION OFFICER CLASS CONTINUED ENJOY SUPERIOR SOCIAL STATUS. SADAT HAD MADE COMMITMENTS, TO BE SURE, BUT HE HAD MADE BIGGER COMMITMENTS IN PAST AND GOTTEN OUT OF THEM. UPCOMING US-USSR SUMMIT MIGHT BE POINT OF REFERENCE BUT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE SADAT MIGHT NOT WANT MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSED AT SUMMIT. EGYPTIAN PAPERS WERE ALREADY TALKING IN THIS VEIN. EGYPTIANS SEEMED NO LONGER BELIEVE THEY COULD BRING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right sides.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 005329

ABOUT GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. THUS, ISRAEL HAD TO CONCLUDE SADAT'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO CREATE VIRTUAL WAR ATMOSPHERE WITHOUT SEEING THIS ACTUALLY TRANSFORMED INTO WAR SITUATION. ISRAEL RELIEVED SADAT'S ORIENTATION, AS FAR AS PEACE CONCERNED, WAS STILL ON. U.S. SECRETARY INTERJECTED THIS WAS OUR CLEAR IMPRESSION WHEN HAFEZ ISMAIL CAME IN FEBRUARY.

3. TURNING TO UNSC DEBATE, EBAN SAID FIRST THING TO PREVENT WOULD BE CHANGE IN BALANCE OF RES 242. THERE WAS NEED FOR DOCUMENTARY BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL WAS COMMITTED TO 242 AS IT STANDS, NOT TO SOMETHING ELSE. EBAN RECALLED CONVERSATION WITH FORMER UK FONSEC BROWN IN WHICH BROWN CONFIRMED WORDS "ALL" AND "THE" BEFORE "TERRITORIES" IN WITHDRAWAL PARAGRAPH OF RES 242 HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY OMITTED BY SC. (SECRETARY INTERJECTED WE KNEW THIS TO BE CASE.) THIS WAS ONLY THING THAT HAD MADE ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO 242 POSSIBLE. THERE WERE SOME

PEOPLE IN ISRAEL NOT HAPPY WITH RES AS IT STANDS; IF IT
CHANGED, "YOU WOULD LOSE US," AT THIS POINT EBAN WAS
CRITICAL PARTICULARLY OF UK POSITION, SAYING IT SEEMED
TO BE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ALIGN ITSELF WITH FRANCE ON
ISSUES ON WHICH IT HAD NO DIRECT CONCRETE INTERESTS OF
ITS OWN. WHEN IT DID HAVE REAL INTERESTS OF ITS OWN,
HOWEVER, IT WAS TENACIOUS AND UNCOMPROMISING IN THEIR
PURSUIT.


4. CONTINUING, EBAN SAID UNSC DEBATE SHOULD NOT PRODUCE NEW MACHINERY FOR DEALING WITH PEACE PROCESS. SECRETARY AGREED. THERE WAS MUCH TALK, EBAN SAID, OF SETTING UP OF NEW COMMITTEES, INCLUDING AN SC COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE. WITH SC INCLUDING SEVEN MEMBERS WITHOUT RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SUCH TALK UNREALISTIC. LONG AGO UN HAD MADE PEACEMAKING EFFORTS ON MULTILATERAL BASIS BUT THIS HAD BEEN DISCREDITED FOR MANY YEARS. KEY TO ANY EFFECTIVE APPROACH WAS FORMULA TO EFFECT SYG OR HIS AGENT "SHOULD BE AVAILABLE."

5. SECRETARY SAID WE SAW EYE-TO-EYE ON THIS. OUR FEELING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 005329

WAS SADAT WOULD LIKE TO NEGOTIATE INTERIM AGREEMENT BUT DID NOT KNOW HOW TO GET STARTED. IF WE COULD GET LANGUAGE ACCEPTING PRINCIPLE OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL, EVEN 10-15 YEARS HENCE, WOULD PROBABLY NOT POSE PROBLEM TO SADAT. BUT WE KNEW SUCH COMMITMENT WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO ISRAEL. STILL, IT SEEMED WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO FIND SOME FORMULA THAT WOULD APPEAL TO SADAT AND NOT UNDERCUT ISRAELI POSITION. WE DID NOT SAY NOW WAS TIME, SECRETARY SAID, BUT WITH SC OVER WE SHOULD LOOK AT POSSIBILITY OF DEVISING FACESAVER FOR SADAT ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE LONG TIME, BUT THIS WOULD BE START.

6. ERAN COMMENTED THAT EGYPTIAN AIM CONTINUED TO BE TO TRY AND IMPOSE ITS CONDITIONS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS, INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING IN NORMAL WAY. ISRAEL WAS NOT ASKING SADAT TO GIVE UP HIS POSITION. SECRETARY SAID WE UNDERSTOOD. IT STILL SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, TO DEVISE STATEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW SADAT CLAIM HE HAD OBTAINED WHAT HE WANTED, AND YET PERMIT EACH SIDE TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION. EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF COURSE WOULD DEPEND ON ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE. E.G. IF ISRAEL SATISFIED EGYPT WANTED KEEP AGREEMENT, IF FEDAYEEN WERE OUT OF FIGHT, ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCERNS WOULD BE DIMINISHED.

7. ERAN REMARKED HE HAD COME AROUND TO BELIEF THAT PERHAPS AFTER ALL IT WAS NOT DOCUMENT THAT MATTERS, SO MUCH IN MAKING PEACE AS HUMAN RELATIONS BETWEEN FORMER ADVERSARIES. TRADE, TRAVEL, AND LIKE. EGYPTIAN DEFINITION OF PEACE WAS STILL LESS THAN 100 PERCENT; THEY ENVISAGED NO COMMERCIAL, NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

8. SECRETARY SAID IT WAS FOR THESE REASONS WE FAVORED GRADUALISM. THIS HAD BEEN OUR APPROACH WITH CHINA. THIS WAS WHY INTERIM AGREEMENT APPEALED TO US. IN CONTEXT INTERIM AGREEMENT ISRAEL COULD GRADUALLY IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. ERAN RECALLED MRS. MEIR HAD SAID

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 095329

THAT IN CONTEXT REAL PEACE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM WOULD NOT BE SO FORMIDABLE. ISRAEL FELT BEST APPROACH WAS INTERIM AGREEMENT, BETTER THAN ANY UN DISCUSSION OR EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. ISRAEL HAD IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, OTHER COUNTRIES HAD GIVEN UP ON U.S. AS PROPONENT INTERIM AGREEMENT. SECRETARY ASKED IF ERAN THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO BE MORE VISIBLE. ERAN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW. ISRAEL THOUGHT IDEA OF INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS GOOD ONE AND IT IMPORTANT U.S. DEDICATION TO THAT VIEW BE KNOWN. SECRETARY SAID IT MIGHT BE GOOD IDEA AFTER SC DEBATE MAKE CLEAR AGAIN WE ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN THIS ENDEAVOR. EUROPE, OF COURSE, ARGUED THERE WAS A VOID. BETTER A VOID, ERAN REJOINED, THAN WHAT THEY WOULD FILL IT WITH. SECRETARY SAID WE AGREED THERE NO ALTERNATIVE TO INTERIM AGREEMENT WE COULD SEE. DINITZ SUGGESTED THAT ANY U.S. CLARIFICATION RE ITS ROLE MIGHT BETTER COME BEFORE SC DEBATE SO AS TO REDUCE ZEAL OF THOSE WHO WOULD CHANGE FRAME OF REFERENCE. SECRETARY SAID SUCH RESTATEMENT COULD STRESS ADVANTAGES OF INTERIM AGREEMENT TOUCHED ON IN THIS CONVERSATION, HOW AGREEMENT WOULD BUY TIME, ENCOURAGE PARTIES TO LIVE TOGETHER. ERAN AGREED THAT SUCH U.S. STATEMENT BEFORE SC DEBATE COULD INFLUENCE DISCUSSION IN FAVORABLE WAY.

9. ERAN SAID, BEFORE GOING ON TO OTHER SUBJECTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY WORD OR TWO ABOUT LEBANON. BEST SOLUTION WAS OF COURSE ONE PRESERVING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. IN MEETING ISRAELI AND LEBANESE MILITARY AT ROSH HANIKRA LEBANESE HAD GIVEN EXAGGERATED ACCOUNT SYRIAN FORCES ENTERING LEBANON. IN FACT VERY FEW SYRIANS HAD CROSSED AND THEIR INHIBITIONS ABOUT DOING MORE HELP FEDAYEEN WERE POSITIVE FACTOR. ANOTHER WAS FAILURE OF FATAH TO DIVIDE CHRISTIANS AND MUSLEMS. ERAN SAID WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES SOLUTION WOULD BE AS CLEAN CUT AS IN JORDAN, BUT SITUATION WAS BETTER THAN IF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT TAKEN ACTION; TERRORISTS WOULD NOT HAVE

FRRE RUN THEY HAD BEFORE. ERAN DID NOT SEE WHAT ELSE COULD BE DONE AT PRESENT. ISRAEL WAS VIGILANT RE SYRIAN INTERVENTION BUT ERAN INDICATED SOME OPTIMISM SYRIANS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 095329

WOULD CONTINUE BE RESTRAINED. RUSH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FLI/20/0107

REF ASSIGNED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by small stars.

CONFIDENTIAL 612

PAGE 01 STATE 095328

42
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP=00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE:SKG
5/11/73 EXT 20840
APPROVED BY S/S - MR. BARN S
NEA:ALATHERTON, JR
S - MR. BREMER
NEA:JJJSISCO

R 181359Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 095328

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SREF, IS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY-EBAN MAY 10: SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION
TO ISRAEL

1. NEAR END HOUR'S CONVERSATION EBAN EXPRESSED TO SECRETARY ISRAEL'S GRATITUDE FOR WHAT USG HAD DONE TO FACILITATE SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION. USG HAD HAD GREAT SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET LAW. THIS PROVED US AND WORLD OPINION WAS IMPORTANT TO USSR, FACT THAT HAD IMPLICATION IN OTHER AREAS.
2. UNFORTUNATELY, EBAN SAID, HARASSMENT CONTINUES OF JEWS DESIRING TO EMIGRATE. THERE WERE "DRACONIAN TRIALS" PLANNED, E.G., IN MINSK, WHICH WOULD EXCITE ISRAELI OPINION AND THAT OF DIASPORA. WHY USSR PURSUING THESE PETTY ACTIONS, ISRAEL DID NOT KNOW.
3. SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED OUR EFFORTS, TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF CONGRESS' INTEREST IN MATTER, HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by a small star on the right.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 095328

WE HOPED THIS PROBLEM WOULD NOT BE BARRIER TO APPROVAL OF TRADE BILL. SOVIETS KNOW IF THEY WERE TO RENEGE ON THEIR UNDERTAKINGS TO US THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. SECRETARY STRESSED THAT MFN WAS KEY TO IMPROVING TRADE, LEND-LEASE SETTLEMENT, AND GENERALLY, IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS WITH USSR. WE HOPED MFN'S APPROVAL WOULD NOT BE LINKED TO FURTHER SOV CONCESSIONS ON SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION. THIS WAS DELICATE

MATTER AND WE WOULD WELCOME ISRAEL'S SUPPORT. EBAN SEEMED UNDERSTAND U.S. PROBLEM, BUT WAS NON-COMMITTAL. HE SAID HE HOPED U.S. CONSENSUS ON MATTER COULD BE WORKED OUT. ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN "TECHNICALITIES AND METHODS."

RUSH

RUSH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

010/00/1121

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 094078

CAUTIOUS REASON TO HOPE FOR RELEASE OF POW. HE SAID GOI WOULD CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE MATTER CLOSELY, HOPED THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BE ACHIEVED ON BEHALF POW AND EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR US DESIRE BE HELPFUL. RUSH

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

173/20/010

FORM DC 1650

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL 846

PAGE 01 STATE 092804

12
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:GRCELLA:INR:JTM:ANDREW:DF
5/14/73:21714
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
INR/RSG/PMA:DPALMER (SUUS)
INR/RNA:CFJONES
S/S=O:M. EALUM
NEA - MR. ATHERTON

072394

R 152324Z MAY 73.
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 092804

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS
SUBJECT: U.S. ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL

REF: TEL AVIV 3712

1. INR STUDY CITED REFTEL RECEIVED LIMITED DISTRIBUTION PRIOR RPT PRIOR TO BEING FULLY CLEARED. INR HAS NOW REVISED PARA 2 PAGE 12 AS FOLLOWS:

"THE RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER GOLDA MEIR PROVIDED FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE U.S. THROUGH THE 1970'S FOR ASSISTANCE IN MEETING ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH-PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT. AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO STRIVE TO DEVELOP ITS CAPACITY TO PRODUCE MIRAGE-TYPE JET FIGHTERS INCORPORATING THE U.S. J-79 ENGINE. ISRAEL, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING ITS ULTIMATE GOAL OF TOTAL PRODUCTION SELF-SUFFICIENCY DURING THIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 092804

PERIOD TO THE EXTENT THAT IT WILL HAVE TO LOOK TO AMERICAN OR OTHER OUTSIDE SOURCES FOR CERTAIN CRITICAL COMPONENTS. BASED ON EXISTING CONTRACTS AND PENDING NEW REQUESTS FOR A-4 AND F-4 AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS ON WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT CURRENT ASSEMBLY AND PRODUCTION GOALS, IT APPEARS THAT ISRAELI FORCE PLANNERS CONTEMPLATE AN AIR ORDER OF BATTLE BY THE LATTER PART OF THIS DECADE FEATURING AN INVENTORY WELL ABOVE THE PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED 350 HIGH PERFORMANCE

JET FIGHTERS. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE SIGNS OF POSSIBLE ISRAELI INTEREST IN ADDING EVENTUALLY A MORE ADVANCED PLANE, SUCH AS THE F-14, TO THE IDF INVENTORY." RUSH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

hLI/EO/aim

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 921

PAGE 01 STATE 071104

72
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 /027

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:JEMCATEER:NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.:LAB
4/16/73 EXT. 20666 OR 29464
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
TO/UNP:LSULL
S/S WNEWLIN

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 APR 17 AM 8:37

27

085444

O 170114Z APR 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 071104

EXDIS
TODEP 48
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RE LEBANESE
COMPLAINT IN SECURITY COUNCIL

REF.: (A) STATE 70319; (B) STATE 70320

BEGIN SUMMARY: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON TOOK
THE INITIATIVE APRIL 16 TO BILL IN ISRAELI AMBASSADOR
DINITZ ON OUR CURRENT THINKING AND TACTICS RE SC MEETING
ON LEBANESE COMPLAINT AGAINST ISRAEL. NOTING USG FACES
DIFFICULT SITUATION IN VIEW OF PRESENT EMOTIONAL
ATMOSPHERE IN AREA AND LEBANON IN PARTICULAR, ATHERTON
SAID OUR AIM IS TO FIND COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WILL COOL
TEMPERS WHILE SEEKING TRULY BALANCED SC RESOLUTION. HE
BRIEFED DINITZ IN DETAIL ON SECRETARY'S LETTER TO SELECTED
FOREIGN MINISTERS AND DESCRIBED ILLUSTRATIVE RESOLUTION
LANGUAGE WE HAD SUGGESTED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE TO BRITISH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

49

DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 071104

AND FRENCH. DINITZ EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT WITH POINTS MADE IN SECRETARY'S LETTER WHILE MAKING CLEAR ISRAELI HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT "BALANCED" RESOLUTION WHICH TENDED TO EQUATE TERRORIST ACTS AND ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS TO CURB THEM. DINITZ IMPLIED ISRAEL WOULD EXPECT USG TO VETO ANY RESOLUTION LESS BALANCED THAN THE ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE ATHERTON HAD DESCRIBED. ATHERTON SAID OUR VOTING POSITION OBVIOUSLY COULD ONLY BE DETERMINED IN LIGHT OF RESOLUTION WHICH FINALLY EMERGED IN NEW YORK. WE UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL COULD

NOT BE EXPECTED TO WELCOME ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CONDEMNED ITS MILITARY ACTION EVEN THOUGH IT CONDEMNED TERRORISM EQUALLY AND AS SPECIFICALLY. WHAT WE WERE ASKING, ATHERTON SAID, WAS ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE ARE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH FOR SAKE OF LONG RUN IN PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

1. DEP. ASST. SEC. ATHERTON ASKED AMBASSADOR DINITZ TO COME IN APRIL 16 TO COMPARE NOTES ON SECURITY COUNCIL SITUATION AND TO BRIEF HIM ON WHAT US HAS BEEN DOING WITH REGARD TO LEBANESE COMPLAINT AGAINST APRIL 9-10 ISRAELI RAID. STULL (IO/UNB) AND ISRAELI EMBOFF BEN AHARON ALSO PRESENT. ATHERTON SAID THAT LEBANON HAD INFORMED US: IT WOULD FAVOR RESOLUTION WITH SOME ELEMENT OF BALANCE AND IS SEEKING GET FRENCH TO TAKE LEAD IN ORDER PREEMPT MORE EXTREME ARABS. IT WAS CLEAR TO US, HOWEVER, THAT LEBANON WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM ARAB COUNTRIES, INCLUDING EGYPT, TO COME UP WITH ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION CONDEMNATORY OF ISRAEL, AND PERHAPS INCLUDING SANCTIONS LANGUAGE. ATHERTON SAID OUR READING OF SITUATION IS THAT EGYPTIANS WILL PRESS FOR A HARD RESOLUTION AND MAY WISH TO FORCE US VETO. USG FACES UNIQUELY DIFFICULT SITUATION, GIVEN HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE IN ARAB WORLD. HOW WE HANDLE SITUATION COULD HAVE BEARING ON SECURITY OF US PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS IN BEYRUT AND REST OF AREA. OBVIOUSLY, US WANTS TO COOL TEMPERs IN AREA WHILE MAKING ALL-OUT EFFORT TO GET RESOLUTION THAT HAS BALANCE, SAID ATHERTON. WE THINK OUR VETO IN SEPTEMBER ESTABLISHED CREDIBILITY RE HOW SERIOUS WE ARE ABOUT NEED FOR BALANCE.

2. IN ORDER TO STEER THINKING ALONG CONSTRUCTIVE LINES, SECRETARY SENT LETTER OVER WEEKEND TO FOREIGN MINISTERS:

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 071104

OF UK, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, AND INDONESIA. USG FEELS THESE COUNTRIES MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO OUR MESSAGE, AND WE ARE NOW FOLLOWING THIS ACTION WITH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN CAPITALS OF MOST OTHER SC MEMBERS TO BUILD SUPPORT. ASKING THAT INFORMATION BE CLOSELY HELD, ATHERTON SAID HE WISHED TO GIVE SUBSTANCE OF SECRETARY'S LETTER TO DINITZ, AND REVIEWED REF (A) IN SOME DETAIL.

3. ATHERTON THEN SAID USG HAS MADE ONE ADDITIONAL MOVE AND AGAIN ASKED DINITZ TO HOLD THIS INFORMATION PARTICULARLY CLOSELY. WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO UK AND FRANCE ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE WE THINK A BALANCED RESOLUTION SHOULD INCLUDE, IN ORDER THAT THESE COUNTRIES WILL BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT US COULD SUPPORT. USG FEELS THAT ANY SUCH RESOLUTION PUT FORTH SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS US RESOLUTION IF IT TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, AND WE ARE NOT SHARING THIS INFO WITH ANY OTHER GOVT AT THIS TIME. ATHERTON THEN REVIEWED REF (B) WITH DINITZ, WITHOUT, HOWEVER, PROVIDING WRITTEN TEXT. RE LANGUAGE DEPLORING LOSS OF "INNOCENT" LIVES IN BEIRUT RAID, DINITZ INTERJECTED HE NOT AWARE ANY INNOCENT LIVES HAD BEEN LOST IN BEIRUT, TO WHICH ATHERTON RESPONDED HE KNEW OF AT LEAST ONE CASE, THAT OF AN ITALIAN WOMAN. ATHERTON SAID US JUDGMENT IS THAT CHANCE OF GETTING SUCH A BALANCED RESOLUTION VERY SLIM BUT EFFORT IS IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO INDICATE WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED FROM US IN EVENT OF UNBALANCED RESOLUTION. HE SAID THAT USG HOPES FOR UNDERSTANDING OF GOI RE WHAT WE SEEK TO ACCOMPLISH AND WILL KEEP GOI INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY PROCEED.

4. DINITZ THANKED ATHERTON AND SAID HE DOES NOT YET HAVE COMPLETE PICTURE OF WHAT LEBANESE INTEND TO DO AT UN. CONCERNING SUBSTANCE OF WHAT ATHERTON HAD SAID, DINITZ SAID HE FOUND SELF MORE IN AGREEMENT WITH ARGUMENTS THAN WITH CONCLUSION. HE NOTED SECRETARY'S LETTER IS "VERY BALANCED AND GOOD", SAID US AND ISRAEL SEE EYE TO EYE ON PROBLEM BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, AS WAS SOMETIMES TRUE IN PAST, US AND ISRAEL HAVE TENDENCY ARRIVE DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS FROM SAME ARGUMENTS. WHILE RESERVING RIGHT TO COMMENT FURTHER LATER ON, DINITZ SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE THREE POINTS RE: (A) ISRAEL'S POSITION, (B) AN EVALUATION OF WHAT PROPOSED US ACTION WOULD PRODUCE, AND (C) HIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

READING OF HOW US INTEREST MIGHT BE AFFECTED IN MIDDLE EAST.

6. RE (B), ON SUBJECT OF LIKELY OUTCOME AT UN, DINITZ SAID THAT ZAYYAT WHILE EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK STOPPED IN FRANCE AND UK. THERE HE "RATTLED SWORD" FOR BENEFIT OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, SAID EGYPT WOULD DEMAND SANCTIONS AND SEEK EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM UN. THEN, SAID DINITZ, ZAYYAT WILL NOT DEMAND EXPULSION OR SANCTIONS AT UN, AND THIS WILL BE SEEN AS "FANTASTIC CONCESSION." THEN, SAID DINITZ, EGYPTIANS WILL BE VIEWED AS MODERATE, SO OTHERS WILL ASK WHAT IS ISRAEL DOING IN RETURN? SINCE BRITAIN AND FRANCE ALREADY NOT OPERATING ON "STRICT SCALE OF JUSTICE", THEY WILL BEGIN TO BARGAIN AND WILL SEEK TO CHANGE ONE OR TWO WORDS IN CAREFULLY BALANCED RESOLUTION. THIS WILL BE IN BEST OF CASES, SAID DINITZ; IN WORST CASE THEY WILL SIMPLY BACK ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION AGAINST ISRAEL. DINITZ THEN SAID HE CONCERNED US MIGHT DECIDE IT HAD "TO GO ALONG WITH" OR "AT LEAST NOT VETO" A ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION BECAUSE OF THREATS TO US PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS.

7. RE (C), DINITZ SAID LESSON OF PAST IS THAT ONE CANNOT
APPEASE BLACKMAILERS. HE SAID THAT FATAH IS SPREADING
PROPAGANDA ABOUT US AND LEBANON, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO
SO, REGARDLESS WHETHER US ABSTAINS IN UN OR VETOS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 071104

MAJOR QUESTION, SAID DINITZ, IS US CREDIBILITY. HE WOULD HUMBLY SUGGEST THAT IF US DID NOT VETO ANY RESOLUTION LESS BALANCED THAN LANGUAGE AHERTON HAD DESCRIBED, ITS CREDIBILITY WOULD GO DOWN GREATLY IN MIDDLE EAST. FAILURE TO VETO WOULD BE GREATLY ENCOURAGING TO TERRORISTS.

8. AHERTON SAID US UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT APPEASING TERRORISTS. WHEN HE SPOKE OF EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE IN AREA, HE NOT REFERRING TO FEDAYEEN, BUT TO BROADER SPECTRUM OF OPINION IN LEBANON AND ARAB WORLD. AHERTON ALSO NOTED ISRAEL AND USG HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED UN HAS HISTORY OF DOUBLE STANDARD ON THIS ISSUE; US IS TRYING TO MAKE IT "LESS DOUBLE". AHERTON AGREED THAT IN BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS, BEST RESOLUTION WOULD BE ONE RECOGNIZING CAUSE AND EFFECT RE TERRORISM, BUT US MUST WORK WITHIN NARROW REALITIES OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN UN. IN ANY EVENT, SAID AHERTON, OUR EFFORTS OVER WEEKEND WERE LARGELY A TACTICAL MOVE. CHANCES OF GETTING SPONSORSHIP FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION ARE VERY DIM, BUT US FEELS IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE POSITION CLEAR WITH VARIOUS FOREIGN MINISTRIES. DINITZ RESPONDED THAT IF US INTENDED TO INDICATE THAT ANY RESOLUTION LESS BALANCED THAN WHAT US PROPOSED WOULD BE UNACERTAINABLE AND BE VETOED, THAT IS ONE THING; BUT IF THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION IS MERELY A BARGAINING POSITION, WHICH MAY BE SHIFTED, THAT IS SOMETHING ELSE. AHERTON SAID US HAS LEFT NO DOUBT THAT US VETO IS POSSIBILITY. DINITZ RESPONDED THAT GOI WOULD EXPECT THAT ANY ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OR EVEN HINT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD BE VETOED. AHERTON SAID HE OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT SAY AT THIS STAGE HOW US WOULD VOTE, WHEN NO RESOLUTION HAD YET SURFACED IN N.Y. PROBLEM IS TO WEIGH NEED FOR EQUITY IN NEW YORK AGAINST NEED TO CALM ATMOSPHERE IN MIDDLE EAST.

9. DINITZ THEN SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE ONE ADDITIONAL POINT. FOR MONTHS, ISRAELIS HAD HEARD THAT SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE EMBARRASSED BY TERRORIST ACTIVITY. HE ASKED, WOULD THESE GOVERNMENTS NOT BE STRENGTHENED IF US WOULD BLOCK ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTION? DINITZ SAID US SHOULD LOOK AT STRATEGIC VIEW AS WELL TACTICAL ONE. HE SAID CERTAINLY JORDAN, PERHAPS LEBANON AND EVEN POSSIBLY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 071104

EGYPT MIGHT TAKE STRONGER ACTION AGAINST TERRORISTS IF US
TOOK FIRM STAND. ATHERTON ANSWERED THAT USG IS
THINKING PRIMARILY ABOUT LEBANON AND BELIEVES A RESOLUTION
CONDEMNING TERRORISM WOULD STRENGTHEN GOL HAND. HE ADDED
USG HAS NO ILLUSIONS THAT A RESOLUTION SUCH AS HE HAD
DESCRIBED WOULD BE WELCOMED BY ISRAEL; HE COULD APPRECIATE
AND HAD EXPECTED POINTS DINITZ MADE. BUT USG IS ASKING
FOR UNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT IT IS WORKING TOWARD OVER
LONG RUN. ATHERTON ADDED THAT LEVEL OF EMOTION AND
VOLATILITY AS HIGH AS WE HAVE EVER SEEN IT IN LEBANON,
AND WE WANT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO CALM IT WHILE PRESSING
OUR VIEW THAT ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION CANNOT BE DEALT
WITH OUT OF CONTEXT OF TERRORIST ACTS. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

211/20/019

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the eagle.

WK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 072

PAGE 01 STATE 067073

43
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:HH5STACKHOUSE:KHA
4/10/73:EXT 20840
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
L/NEA - MR. BROWN
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S-O:K KURZE

0360471

R 110246Z APR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 067073

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IS, JO
SUBJECT: JEWISH PURCHASE OF WEST BANK LAND

REF: STATE 064462.

1. APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S TIMELY WARNING GOI MIGHT TAKE UP LAND ACQUISITION REGULATIONS REVISION. BOTH EMBASSY AND CONGEN PROVIDED USEFUL BACKGROUND FOR OUR APRIL 6 DEMARCHE. WE DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE FURTHER INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING MATTER WITH GOI NOR COMMENT TO PRESS. BELIEVE HOWEVER, IN EVENT PROBLEM COMES UP AGAIN, IT WOULD BE USEFUL HAVE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND DATA. TERRY SMITH IN NEW YORK TIMES APRIL 9 REPORTS GOI HAS SEIZED 250,000 ACRES OF WEST BANK LAND. IN ADDITION, ACCORDING TO SMITH, THERE HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES 8,000 ACRES ON WEST BANK, 4,500 ACRES IN EAST JERUSALEM AND 6,000 ACRES IN GAZA STRIP. MOREOVER, JEWISH NATIONAL FUND HAS PURCHASED 2,500 ACRES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND JERUSALEM.

2. I WOULD APPRECIATE POSTS' COMMENTS ON FOREGOING AS WELL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 1-67

RECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 067073

AS YOUR MAKING EFFORT THROUGH DISCREET INQUIRY, TO EXTENT
YOU CAN DO THIS IN COURSE NORMAL CONTACTS WITHOUT APPEARING
AGITATE ISSUE, TO ASCERTAIN FOLLOWING:

A. GREATER DETAIL CONCERNING FORM OF ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS INCLUDING IDENTIFICATIONS AS TO KINDS OF PEOPLE

SERVING AS INTERMEDIARIES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS AND LEGAL
FORM OF TRANSACTIONS:

B. IDENTITY OF ULTIMATE PURCHASERS INCLUDING NATIONALITY AND PLACE AND NATURE BUSINESS.

C. KINDS OF PROPERTY INVOLVED, I.E. WHETHER COMMERCIAL, RESIDENTIAL OR OPEN LAND.

D. LOCATION OF PROPERTY AND WHETHER THERE IS ANY APPARENT EFFORT TO PUT TOGETHER LARGE PIECES OF LAND.

E. EXTENT OF SPECULATION, I.E. DEGREE TO WHICH PURCHASE PRICES ARE INFLATED OVER PREVIOUSLY EXISTING MARKET PRICES.

F. ANY JUDGMENTS EMB CAN REACH CONCERNING RATE OF GROWTH OF THIS LAND SPECULATION AND WILLINGNESS OF PRESENT LAND OWNERS GENERALLY IN WEST BANK TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH TRANSACTIONS; ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

എല്ലാവരും

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 794

PAGE 01 STATE 064462

62
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE:KHA
4/6/73 EXT 20840
APPROVED BY NEA - ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
S/S - MR. BARNES

73 APR 7 AM 8:08
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

002686

O R 062326Z APR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECRET STATE 064462

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORY LAND PURCHASE POLICY
REF: TEL AVIV 2768

1. SISCO CALLED AMBASSADOR DINITZ AFTERNOON APRIL 6 RE
SUBJECT. HE SAID WE HAD BEEN FOLLOWING DEBATE IN ISRAEL RE
WHETHER RULES GOVERNING PURCHASE LAND IN OCCUPIED TERRI-
TORIES SHOULD BE LIBERALIZED. DINITZ COULD UNDERSTAND OUR
INTEREST THIS MATTER. WE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FOREIGN
MINISTRY IN ORDER TO GET ADDITIONAL INFO.

2. NOW HOWEVER, SISCO SAID, WE HAD RECEIVED REPORT INDI-
CATING CABINET MAY TAKE UP MATTER THIS SUNDAY AND COULD
MAKE POLICY DECISION THEN. WE KNEW THIS WAS ELECTION YEAR
IN ISRAEL AND WE KNEW THIS SUBJECT WAS PART OF ISRAELI
INTERNAL DEBATE. BUT IF THIS DEBATE WAS TO RESULT IN CON-
CRETE ACTION LIBERALIZING PURCHASE RULES, THEN WE OWED IT TO
ISRAEL TO MAKE CLEAR WE CONSIDERED OUR INTERESTS TO BE IN-
VOLVED AND TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN AT ANY SUCH DECISION.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

RM DS-1652

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 064462

3. OUR CONCERN, SISCO CONTINUED, WAS SIMPLY THAT LIBERALIZATION OF LAND ACQUISITION BY OUTSIDERS WOULD BE SEEN AS CREATING NEW FACTS MAKING PERMANENT OCCUPATION. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY STRENGTHEN ARAB ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL WAS AFTER TERRITORY, NOT PEACE. WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT

EFFECT SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE IN PRESENT EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE IN AREA. IT WOULD COMPLICATE OUR RELATIONS WITH HUSSEIN. AND ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE IN MIND POSTURE WE HAVE BEEN TAKING TO TRY AND HELP PARTIES GET OUT OF PRESENT IMPASSE AND GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. SISCO SAID HE WANTED TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN PRIVATELY. HE DID NOT EXPECT DINITZ TO COMMENT NOW. HE ASKED THAT OUR VIEWS BE REPORTED SO THAT THEY COULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CABINET MEETING.

4. DINITZ SAID HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF CURRENT STATUS DEBATE THIS SUBJECT. HE WOULD REPORT SISCO'S COMMENTS AND SEEK FURTHER INFO BOTH FOR SISCO AND HIMSELF. ROGERS:

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

DS-1652

LL1/00/0107

DECLASSIFIED

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

~~SECRET~~ 159

72
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO UCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.:HLK
3/26/73 EXT 29464
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/IAI - MR. STACKHOUSE
NEA/EGY - MR. STERNER
S/S - MR. BARNES

037922

R 272300Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO *EMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T STATE 056445

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, EG, IS 4
SUBJECT: ISRAELI QUERY RE U.S.-EGYPTIAN CONTACTS

1. DURING CONVERSATION MARCH 26, ISRAELI CHARGE IDAN ASKED DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY U.S.-EGYPTIAN CONTACTS SINCE ISMAIL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. ATHERTON SAID MINISTER GREENE HAD RECENTLY SEEN ISMAIL TO FOLLOW UP HIS EARLIER APPROACH TO FOREIGN MINISTRY AS PART OF OUR DEMARCHES IN ARAB CAPITALS RE ARAB GOVERNMENTS' SUPPORT FOR OR TOLERATION OF BSO/FATAH ACTIVITIES. ATHERTON SAID ISMAIL HAD NOT RESPONDED DIRECTLY ON TERRORISM QUESTION BUT HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE TO RAISE REPORTS, BASED ON MARCH 14 BEECHER STORY IN NEW YORK TIMES, RE ALLEGED NEW U.S. DECISIONS ON MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. ISMAIL'S ATTITUDE IN THIS CONVERSATION HAD BEEN QUITE RESERVED; HE HAD MADE POINT THAT THIS "ANNOUNCEMENT" OF NEW U.S. MILITARY SUPPLY TO ISRAEL DID SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ATMOSPHERE FOR FUTURE PEACE EFFORTS. NOTING THAT BEECHER STORY HAD ELICITED ADVERSE PRESS AS WELL AS PRIVATE COMMENT IN CAIRO, ATHERTON SAID THERE WAS FOR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 056445

PRESENT A NEW CLOUD OVER U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS.

2. IN RESPONSE TO IDAN'S QUERY RE WHAT WE WERE SAYING TO EGYPTIANS ABOUT BEECHER STORY, ATHERTON REPLIED THAT WE DECLINE TO DISCUSS U.S.-ISRAELI ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHERS. WE HAVE SIMPLY TOLD EGYPTIANS, AS WHITE HOUSE

SPOKESMAN SAID FOLLOWING MRS. MEIR'S VISIT, THAT WE CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR MILITARY BALANCE AND FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY; EGYPTIANS SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT THIS WILL CHANGE. WE ALSO HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS IS A BILATERAL U.S.-ISRAELI MATTER AND DOES NOT ALTER IN ANY WAY OUR DESIRE TO WORK FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. FINALLY, ATHERTON TOLD IDAN ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT EGYPTIANS CONTINUE TO DESIRE MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH USG. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

821/20/019

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Z 301410Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SCSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0340
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8775

8 7 9 3 Q
30 OCT 73 Z15 57

NODIS

E O 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH EBAN: VISIT OF MRS MEIR

1. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET WITH FONMIN EBAN AT 12 NOON
TODAY IN TEL AVIV. ALSO PRESENT WERE EBAN'S AIDE, BEN ZUR,
AND DCM.

2. EBAN INITIATED CONVERSATION BY NOTING HE HAD JUST RECEIVED
CONFIRMATION FROM AMB DINITZ IN WASHINGTON THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAD AGREED TO MEET WITH MRS MEIR (AT MRS MEIR'S
REQUEST) ON THURSDAY, NOV 1. EBAN NOTED THAT MRS MEIR WOULD
LEAVE FOR THE U.S. TOMORROW, OCT 31 AND HER WORKING
SCHEDULE IN THE U.S. WAS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. THURSDAY, NOV 1 - MEETING WITH SECRETARY FOLLOWED BY MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT.
- B. FRIDAY, NOV 2 - MEETINGS WITH "OTHER FRIENDS."
- C. SATURDAY, NOV 3 - RETURN TO ISRAEL AND MEET WITH CABINET ON
SUNDAY, NOV 4.

3. EBAN STATED THAT MRS MEIR PLANNED TO DISCUSS TWO BASIC
ISSUES WITH THE SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT: (A) THE IMMEDIATE
PROBLEM OF STABILIZING THE CEASEFIRE AND RELATED ISSUES AND, (B)
US VIEWS AS CONCERNS A POSSIBLE PEACE SETTLEMENT, BOTH PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE.

4. AS CONCERNS THE CEASEFIRE, EBAN STATED IT WAS NECESSARY TO
FIND A MEANS TO "RATIONALIZE" THE CEASEFIRE LINES IN ORDER FOR
CEASEFIRE TO BECOME "STABILIZED." IN THIS RESPECT, HE CONFIRMED
WHAT WE HAD HEARD FROM ISRAELI PRESS SOURCES (TEL AVIV 8744)
THAT GENERAL YARIV HAD OFFERED TO HIS EGYPTIAN COUNTERPART DURING
COURSE OF THEIR TWO MEETINGS A SWAP OF TERRITORY: AN INITIAL WITH-
DRAWAL OF IDF TO THE EAST OF THE CANAL AND EGYPTIAN FORCES TO
THE WEST OF THE CANAL, THIS TO BE FOLLOWED BY A FURTHER WITHDRAWAL
OF BOTH FORCES FROM THE CANAL ITSELF WITH THE UNEF TAKING UP
POSITIONS IN THE "DEMILITARIZED" ZONES. EBAN ADDED THAT, OF -

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 8775, SECTION 1 OF 2, OCT 30, NODIS

COURSE, THE CABINET HAD APPROVED ALL OF THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY YARIV IN THESE MEETINGS, A POINT HE EMPHASIZED FOR REASONS THAT WILL BECOME CLEARER LATER IN THIS MESSAGE.

5. EBAN THEN EMPHASIZED THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF THE POW ISSUE AS CONCERNS THE CREATION OF A STABLE CEASEFIRE. IN THIS RESPECT HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE GOI'S HUMANITARIAN INTEREST IN THE THIRD ARMY WAS TOTALLY RELATED TO EGYPTIAN PERFORMANCE ON THE POWS. HE EXPRESSED A REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THAT EGYPT WOULD BE PREPARED TO COMPLY WITH ARTICLE 70 AND 122 OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED INITIAL STEPS AND THAT ISRAEL EXPECTED QUICK MOVEMENT TO THE ACTUAL EXCHANGE OF ALL EGYPTAIN AND ISRAELI POWS WITHIN NEXT 7 - 10 DAYS. (IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, EBAN SAID ISRAEL BELIEVED IT "PREMATURE" TO CONSIDER OFFERING EGYPTIANS ASSURANCES THAT RETURNED PILOTS WOULD NOT BE UTILIZED IN ANY FUTURE COMBAT MISSIONS. HE NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN PILOTS AMONG THE THOUSANDS OF POWS HELD BY ISRAEL.)

6. IN DEVELOPING THE THEME OF THE IMPORTANCE OF POWS, EBAN REFERRED TO THE "TURBULENT ATMOSPHERE" DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE KNESSET LAST NIGHT. THIS COMMITTEE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT ANY FUTURE HELP TO THE THIRD ARMY HAD BETTER PRODUCE ADDITIONAL QUICK AND TANGIBLE RESULTS ON THE POWS ISSUE OR THE GOVT WAS GOING TO BE IN REAL TROUBLE.

7. CONTINUING ON POWS, EBAN EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISSUE HAD A DOUBLE ASPECT: TREATMENT OF POWS BEFORE RELEASE AND ACTUAL RELEASE. THIS LED HIM TO THE SUBJECT OF SYRIA. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD "TERRIBLE APPREHENSION" ABOUT TREATMENT OF ISRAELI POWS BY THE SYRIANS. I NOTED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IDF RECITATION OF HORROWS WHICH DATT WAS SENDING TO WASHINGTON. EBAN CONFIRMED THIS BRIEFING WAS GIVEN AT REQUEST OF PRIMIN SO WE COULD UNDERSTAND WHY ISRAEL WAS SO CONCERNED. THE GOI FEARED, HE SAID, THAT SYRIA WAS NOT MAKING AVAILABLE ANY NAMES UNTIL THE SYRIANS CAN SEE HOW MANY POWS SURVIVED THE TORTURES BEING APPLIED DURING SYRIAN INTERROGATIONS. HE REMARKED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT ONLY QUICK ACCESS TO THESE MEN BY THE ICRC COULD ENSURE THEIR SURVIVAL.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

BECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- TEL AVIV 8775, SECTION 1 OF 2, OCT 30, NODIS

8. EBAN STATED FRANKLY THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE SITUATION AS CONCERNS EGYPT, THE ISRAELIS REALLY HAD NO SANCTIONS THEY COULD THREATEN THE SYRIANS WITH AND THE GOI JUST DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO ABOUT SYRIA. HE WONDERED ALOUD IF IT WOULD DO ANY GOOD TO ASK THE BRITISH, FRENCH, OR ITALIANS TO HELP IN DAMASCUS. (I ALLOWED THAT IT WOULDN'T DO ANY HARM TO ASK.) HE STATED THAT GENERAL YARIV SAID IT WAS CLEAR, BASED ON HIS MEETING WITH EGYPTIANS, THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET SYRIANS TO FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTION. AT END OF THIS RECITATION OF GOI FRUSTRATION RE SYRIAN POWS SITUATION, EBAN THREW OUT COMMENT THAT "THERE WOULD BE A BAD OUTLOOK FOR THE CEASEFIRE IN THE NORTH." IF THE SYRIANS DON'T RESPOND TO THE ICRC RE ISRAELI POWS."

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

Z 301410Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0341
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8775

8 7 9 7 Q
Oct 30, 1973
15:17 Z

NODIS

9. THROUGHOUT HIS PRESENTATION ON POWS, EBAN EMPHASIZED THE ASSURANCES GIVEN TO THE GOI AS CONCERNS SOVIET-US AGREEMENT TO OBTAIN EARLY EXCHANGE OF POWS AND HE NOTED THIS ISSUE WAS "AN IMPORTANT TEST CASE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS."

10. EBAN REMARKED IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR MRS MEIR TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY IN WASHINGTON TO REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF US THINKING ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE TALKS. IN THIS RESPECT HE NOTED THE "WORLD PRESS" AND EGYPTIANS WERE SUGGESTING THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE ON THE VERGE OF REACHING AGREEMENTS ON SUBJECTS OF GREAT IMPORT TO ISRAEL. FOR EXAMPLE, HE NOTED "REPORTS" THAT US AND SOVIETS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON FORCING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO JUNE 5, 1967 LINES. IN ADDITION, HE CITED THE REPORTS THAT WE AND THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO GENEVA AS THE SITE FOR FUTURE PEACE TALKS. EBAN NOTED THAT ISRAEL PROBABLY HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO GENEVA BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL EXPECTED TO BE CONSULTED ON "EVEN THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS" OF THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT. IN THIS PRESENTATION (AND OUR SUMMARY TELEGRAM DOES NOT DO JUSTICE TO HIS VOLUBILITY DURING HIS PRESENTATION OF THIS SUBJECT). EBAN EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOI HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM THE SECRETARY THAT AGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW HAD NOT GONE BEYOND WHAT WAS INCORPORATED IN RES 338. TO THE BEST OF THE GOI'S KNOWLEDGE, THIS WAS STILL THE CASE (HE SAID THIS WITH CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THE GOI HOPED THIS WAS STILL THE CASE), AND, OF COURSE, THE GOI CABINET HAD NOT APPROVED ANYTHING ELSE.

11. EBAN THEN RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE MEETINGS WITH THE GENERALS IN THE SOUTH. HE NOTED THAT GOI WAS WELL AWARE PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS YARIV MADE INVOLVING MAJOR TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS, POWS, MARITIME BLOCKADE, ETC. WERE FAR BEYOND THE COMPETENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN GENERAL AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REFER THESE MATTERS TO SADAT IN CAIRO. TODAY, YARIV WILL HOLD THE THIRD MEETING AND WILL DEDICATE IT TO SUBJECT OF POWS IN ORDER THAT EGYPTIANS THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND WHERE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES ARE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-2- Tel Aviv 8775, Oct 30

EBAN GAVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR US TO BE GIVEN AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TODAY SUMMARIES OF YARIV'S FIRST TWO MEETINGS (WE WILL SEND THEM AS SOON AS WE GET THEM). EBAN NOTED THAT YARIV WOULD BE AVAILABLE WITH MRS MEIR FOR DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON.

12. EBEFORE BREAKING UP, I ASKED EBAN TO CLARIFY WHAT, IF ANY, RELATIONSHIP GOI SEES BETWEEN THE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIAN RESPONSES ON POWS AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF MOVING TOWARDS BROADER TALKS IN NEAR FUTURE. EBAN STATED THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO SEPARATE THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN SITUATIONS. IF POWS ISSUE COULD BE PROMPTLY RESOLVED WITH EGYPTIANS THE GOI WAS PREPARED TO GO FROM THERE WITH CAIRO. THE ISRAELIS, THEREFORE, NOW CONSIDER SYRIA TO BE A DISCRETE PROBLEM AND WOULD NOT INSIST ON SYRIAN SATISFACTION RE POWS PRIOR TO MOVING WITH EGYPTIANS.

13. COMMENT: CUTTING THROUGH EBAN'S ELEGANT TURNS OF PHRASES ("BASIC PROBLEMS UNSOLVED," "POTENTIAL US-ISRAELI FRICTION," "DELETERIOUS EFFECTS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS") IS THE OBVIOUS MESSAGE THAT PRIMIN MEIR AND HER SENIOR GOI COLLEAGUES ARE VERY NERVOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILIY WE EITHER HAVE DECIDED OR ARE IN THE PROCESS OF SO DECIDING TO MOVE AHEAD IN CONCERT WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO IMPOSE (TO USE A FAVORITE ISRAELI DIRTY WORD) A SOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HENCE, THE URGENT CALL FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET
Department of State TELEGRAM

WH

P 291000Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0318
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8730

CONTROL: 8 3 9 4 Q
OCTOBER 29, 1973
7:48 AM

HAIR
SCOWCROFT

NODIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH MRS MEIR ON OCT 24

REF: TEL AVIV 8575

1. IN REFTTEL, I REPORTED MRS MEIR'S CONVERSATION WITH ME ON OCTOBER 24. THE CENTRAL THEM OF HER REMARKS WAS THAT SHE AND GOI HAD GIVEN THEIR WORD THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 338 AND CEASEFIRE, AND WOULD NOT VIOLATE THIS PLEDGE BY TAKING INITIATIVE TO BREAK CEASEFIRE ON SOUTHERN SUEZ FRONT. (SHE SEEMED GREATLY DISTURBED THAT PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY MIGHT DOUBT HER BONA FIDES. THAT SEEMED TO BE HER MAIN PURPOSE IN SENDING FOR ME. ALTHOUGH I PERSONALLY BELIEVED HER, I REALIZE MY SIGHTS ARE LIMITED AND VALID INFORMATION MAY BE AVAILABLE TO WASHINGTON OF WHICH I AM UNAWARE. I TOLD HER I WOULD REPORT HER CONCERNS AT ONCE.

2. I RECOMMENDED THAT MRS MEIR BE REASSURED THAT US "DOES NOT QUESTION HER VARACITY MR FRIENDSHIP FOR U.S.." THAT OR THE OPPOSITE MAY HAVE BEEN DONE DIRECTLY, BUT I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY DECISION, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, AS CONCERNS THIS RECOMMENDATION. INDEED YOU MAY VERY WELL DISAGREE WITH IT FRANKLY, I HAVE MORE DOUBT REGARDING ITS VALIDITY THAN WHEN I MADE IT.

3. I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT I BE INFORMED AS TO THE DEPT'S REACTION TO MRS MEIR'S STATEMENTS AND TO MY RECOMMENDATION AS WELL AS DECISION AS TO ACTION TAKEN OR NOT TAKEN. WITHOUT THIS INFORMATION, IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO JUDGE WITH CONFIDENCE THE CREDIBILITY OF SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS IN MY FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THEM ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. ALSO, UNLESS SHE HAS HEARD DIRECTLY, I FEAR PRIME MINISTER MAY SUMMON ME AGAIN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



SECRET
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-2-TEL AVIV 8730, OCTOBER 29, 1973 (NODIS)

TO PROBE AS TO MY READING OF ATTITUDES IN WASHINGTON.
IN THIS RESPECT THE LAST FORTY-EIGHT HOURS HAVE WITNESSED
A MARKED INCREASE AMONG GENERAL PUBLIC AND PRESS IN
NERVOUSNESS OVER TREND IN ISRAELI-U.S. RELATIONSHIPS,
PARTICULARLY AS CONERNS DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN SUEZ
FRONT (WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THIS SUBJECT).

KEATING

D
I
S
N
O
D
I
S
N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

COPY 9 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 8697Q
RECD: 30 OCT 73 3:30AM

O 300726Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0329
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8754

NODIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: CPUS
SUBJECT: VISA FOR GENERAL YARIV

REF: A-4245 MAY 15, 1973

1 IDF LIAISON OFFICE HAS ASKED US ISSUE NON-IMMIGRANT (B-2) VISITORS'S VISA FOR GEN YARIV IN NAME OF ABRAHAM YARON. ISRAELI REGULAR PASSPORT 591825 ISSUED TEL AVIV JUNE 15, 1971, VALID TO JUNE 15, 1976.

2. GIVEN URGENCY YARIV'S ARRIVAL IN U.S. (HE'S PROBABLY LEAVING LATER TODAY), THERE WAS NOT TIME TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN REF AIRGRAM. WE HAVE, THEREFORE, ISSUED VISA AND LEAVE IT TO YOUR JUDGMENT WHETHER OR NOT INS SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO THE ACT.

KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 182 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

HAK
Secured
LL
WH 7

SITUATION ROOM
PM 3:24
646 15Q
23 OCT 73 Z15 09

Z 231403Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0243
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8513

NODIS

E O 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR

1. AT HER REQUEST, I CALLED ON PRIMIN MEIR AT 12:30 TODAY. ALSO PRESENT WERE MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN IN PRIMIN'S OFFICE AND DCM.

2. THE PRIMIN INITIATED CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING HER GREAT CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBILITY FOR QUICK EXCHANGE OF POWS, NOTING THIS COULD BE MAJOR ITEM IN OPPOSITION (LIKUD ATTACK) AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN KNESSET MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 6:00 PM TODAY. I FORTUNATELY WAS ABLE TO HAND HER COPY OF MCCLOSKEY'S STATEMENT (STATE 208876) WHICH SHE READ WITH GREAT RELIEF AND APPRECIATION NOTING "OH, GOOD: I'VE BEEN WORRIED ABOUT THIS ALL MORNING." SHE GAVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STATEMENT BE FEATURED ON ISRAEL RADIO THROUGH THE DAY.

3. SHE CONTINUED FOR AWHILE ON THE SUBJECT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION NOTING THAT THE OPPOSITION WILL NOT ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE AND INDEED MAY MAKE THE ISSUE A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE THIS AFTERNOON. SHE WAS SURE OF WINNING A MAJORITY VOTE ENDORSING THE GOVT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE BUT THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES WOULD SHOW THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO THE GOVT'S ACTION.

4. MRS MEIR THEN EXPRESSED HER GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT YESTERDAY. SHE NOTED THAT HER CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY HELPED TO CLEAR UP SOME THINGS THAT WERE OBSCURED BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH EVENTS PROCEEDED. SHE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES HER SATISFACTION WITH THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT.

5. I NOTED THAT THE BRITISH AMB HAD JUST CALLED ON ME AND, INTER ALIA, WAS PROBING FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS "IMPRESSION" THAT THE GOI AND US MIGHT HAVE SOME MAJOR DIFFERENCES OVER THE UN RESOLUTION. I ASSURED HER THAT I HAD DIASEBUSED HIM OF ANY SUCH NOTION AT WHICH POINT MRS MEIR REMARKED "IT'S TOO BAD YOU COULDN'T HAVE MADE HIM HAPPIER."

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 8513, SECTION 1 OF 2, OCT 23, NODIS

SHE THEN RELATED A SERIES OF RECENT HISTORICAL ANECDOTES ILLUSTRATING WHY ISRAEL HAS SUCH A LOW OPINION OF "ALBION PEFFIDE."

6. WE THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE CEASEFIRE. MRS MEIR QUICKLY RAN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL QUICKLY AGREE TO THE CEASEFIRE. SHE NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN MOST UNHELPFUL TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD BY THEIR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES. SHE STATED SHE WAS FRANKLY PUZZLED AS TO WHAT THE JORDANIANS WERE UP TO BY OFFICIALLY AGREEING TO THE CEASEFIRE AND THEN "LEAVING THEIR TANKS IN SYRIA." SHE SAID THAT THE KING "HAD GOOD REASON" TO PULL HIS TANKS BACK SINCE, AFTER ALL, EGYPT WAS THE FIRST ARAB COUNTRY TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE. POLITICALLY, THEREFORE, HUSSEIN IS COVERED. AS SHE HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY, SHE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR HUSSEIN'S POSITION AND THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION IN HER REMARKS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CONTEMPLATING ANY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN.

7. AS WE TURNED TO THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH, I NOTED TO MRS MEIR THAT WE WERE PLEASED WITH TIMELINESS OF OUR IDF BRIEFINGS ON THE CEASEFIRE SITUATION ON THE SUEZ FRONT. IT APPEARED FROM THESE REPORTS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE ENGAGED IN WHOLESALE VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE, AT LEAST IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, AND ISRAEL WAS RESPONDING TO THESE ATTACKS. I NOTED THE "DELICACY" OF THE MATTER I WAS ABOUT TO RAISE, BUT I ASSUMED SHE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME WHO MIGHT VIEW WITH SOME SCEPTICISM INFO FROM GOI SOURCES AND WHO WOULD WONDER WHETHER OR NOT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT NOT BE TAKING INITIATIVES IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

8. MRS MEIR REPLIED SHE COULD UNDERSTAND THE POINT I RAISED. SHE THEN WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT WHEN THE GOI WAS FORMULATING ITS POSITION ON THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION, THE ISRAELI MILITARY COMMANDERS "PLEADED" FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS MORE TIME IN THE SOUTH IN ORDER TO FINISH OFF THE EGYPTIANS IN THAT SECTOR. THE CABINE SAID A FLAT NO AND THE ORDERS WENT OUT THAT THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE RESPECTED SCRUPULOUSLY. ISRAEL HAS, HOWEVER, ORDERED ITS TROOPS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING UNTIL AND UNLESS THE EGYPTIANS STOP. IN THIS RESPECT SHE DESCRIBED HER MEETING EARLY LAST NIGHT WITH IDF LEADERS TO CONSIDER REPORTS THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE CONTINUING TO SHOOT. SHE CONCLUDED AT THAT TIME THAT THIS WAS NOT ABNORMAL SINCE SOME VIOLATIONS COULD BE EXPECTED FOR A

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT **SECRET** AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- TEL AVIV 8513, SECTION 1 OF 2, OCT 23, NODIS

VARIETY OF REASONS IN THE FIRST FEW HOURS AFTER A CEASEFIRE. (THE MFA TOOK THE SAME POSITION WHEN WE QUERIED THEM ON THIS SUBJECT LAST NIGHT AT 10:00 P.M.). LATER IN THE EVENING, HOWEVER, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, WAS NOT ISOLATED VIOLATIONS BUT THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD LAUNCHED MAJOR MILITARY ATTACKS. SHE SAID THAT THE FIGHTING LAST NIGHT AND TODAY WAS EXTREMELY HEAVY. ALTHOUGH SHE WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVES CAME FROM LOCAL COMMANDERS WHO WERE TRYING TO COVER UP THEIR PREVIOUS LIES TO HEADQUARTERS AS CONCERNS THEIR VICTORIES, SHE WAS AFRAID THE MAGNITUDE OF THE FIGHTING SUGGESTED "ORDERS FROM THE TOP."

S
N
O
D
I
S
N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

Z 231403Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0244
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8513

6 4 6 9 Q
23 OCT 73 Z15 18

NODIS

9. MRS. MEIR WONDERED ALOUD "WHAT DO THE RUSSIANS DO WITH THE EGYPTIANS NOW?" I ASKED IF SHE THOUGHT THE RENEWED GROUND HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUGH REPRESENTED A DANGER OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT RENIGGING ON ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE. SHE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, AND REPEATED THE PROBLEM WITH EGYPTIAN COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD NOT TELLING THE TRUTH TO CAIRO, WITH THE RESULT THAT SADAT APPARENTLY DID NOT HAVE ANY ACCURATE MILITARY DATA BASE ON WHICH TO BASE POLITICAL DECISIONS.

10. MRS. MEIT THEN NOTED THAT, IN HER CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH THE SECRETARY AND ASST SECRETARY SISCO, SHE HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF A MECHANISM TO ASSURE A CEASEFIRE. SHE SAW MERIT IN THEIR SUGGESTION THAT ISRAELI MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SUEZ FRONT, PARTICULARLY WHERE SHOOTING IS GOING ON, MIGHT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO CONTACT THEIR EGYPTIAN COUNTERPARTS TO ARRANGE LOCAL TRUCES. SHE GAVE THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT SHE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH HER MILITARY COMMANDERS WHO WERE NOT TOO ENTHUSIASTIC WITH THE IDEA SINCE SUCH HEAVY FIGHTING WAS GOING ON. I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTH A TRY EVEN IF THE GYPTIANS DID NOT RESPOND SINCE THE EFFORT ITSELF WOULD HELP CERTIFY THE GOI'S BONAFIDES IN WISHING TO HAVE A REAL CEASEFIRE. MRS. MEIR SAID SHE THOUGHT THIS WAS WORTH RAISING AGAIN WITH THE MILITARY AND WOULD DO SO. #3 ,953\$,HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH HER SPEECH TODAY IN THE KNESSET SHOULD MAKE CLEAR ISRAEL'S SINCERE DESIRE FOR THE CEASEFIRE ALONG THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, SHE HAS TO ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ZSADAT CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS" - HE CANNOT OFFICIALLY AND PUBLICLY ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE AND THEN CLANDESTINELY GIVE ORDERS TO HIS SOLDIERS TO CONTINUE SHOOTING.

11. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD THE DILEMMA OF TRYING TO FIND A MEANS OF SETTING UP A MECHANISM TO POLICE A CEASEFIRE AND THE DESIRE TO AVOID INVOLVING THE UN. SHE NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THAT SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM WOULD ONLY BE TOO ANXIOUS TO GET HIMSELF AND THE ENTIRE UN INVOLVED. IN THE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 8513, SECTION 2 OF 2, OCT 23, NODIS

INTEREST OF ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING CEASEFIRE, HOWEVER, SHE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE UNTSO SINCE, AS AN ORGANIZATION IN PLACE, IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE ON THE CHORE WITHOUT HAVING TO GO BACK TO THE UN FOR A NEW "MANDATE" AND THUS GIVE WALDHEIM AN OPENING THROUGH WHICH TO RUN INTO THE ACTION. SHE ASKED IF WE COULD TELL HER WHERE THE UNTSO OBSERVERS ARE WHO USED TO BE ALONG THE SUEZ. I TOLD HER WE WOULD CHECK OUR FILES AND BE IN TOUCH WITH HER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY. (ACCORDING TO OUR FILES THE UNTSO OBSERVERS WHO WERE ALONG THE WEST BANK OF THE CANAL ARE IN CAIRO WHILE THOSE WHO WERE ALONG THE EAST BANK HAVE BEEN MOVED TO JERUSALEM. WE HAVE SO INFORMED THE PRIMIN'S OFFICE.)

12. COMMENT. MCCLOSKEY'S STATEMENT RE POW'S WILL GO LONG WAY TOWARDS HELPING MRS. MEIR WITH PARLIAMENTARY DIFFICULTIES LATER TODAY. I CANNOT EVALUATE MRS. MEIR'S CLAIM THAT LACK OF SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY SITUATION ON GROUND IN CAIRO IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN WHATEVER MISTAKES SADAT MAY BE MAKING NOW AS CONCERNS MILITARY SITUATION. I NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT EBAN MAKE SAME COMMENTS TO ME IN MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON SUNDAY EVENING. AND, IF TRUE, I HAVE NO SOLUTIONS TO OFFER. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO SHOOT BACK AND IF EGYPTIAN ATTACKS CONTINUE I WOULD NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK DESIGNED TO WIPE OUT THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY ON THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL. IF THINGS REACH THIS POINT, I'M NOT SURE WHAT KIND OF A CEASEFIRE WILL BE LEFT TO BUILD UPON. I ASSUME WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS SUBJECT AND CAN ONLY HOPE THEY SHARE OUR CONCERNS.

13. I HAVE JUST SEEN USUN 4139. MRS. MEIR DENIES ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE CEASEFIRE, BLAMES THE EGYPTIANS AND NOTES IDF GIVEN ORDERS TO SHOOT BACK.

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

10/22/73

NOTE: Received in Department at 7:59 a.m.
garbled. The Operations Center
called Tel Aviv to bring to the
Secretary's attention.

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

Z 221016Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0227
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8458

6 2 6 4 Q
22 OCT 73 ZZ11 59

NODIS

E O 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, US, IS, UR, XF
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FONMIN EBAN

DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S AIRCRAFT

1. ATTACHED TELEGRAM WAS PREPARED LAST NIGHT AND DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION DUE TO OUR DESIRE ADD FEW REFINEMENTS. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE IT IS OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL BACKGROUND FOR THE SECRETARY FOR HIS VISIT.

1A. AT HIS REQUEST, I CALLED ON FONMIN ABBA EBAN IN TEL AVIV THIS AFTERNOON. ALSO PRESENT WERE EPHRAIM EVRON, DEPDIRGEN, MFA, AND EBAN'S PERSONAL AIDE BEN TSUR AND DCM (SEE SEPTELS RE LEBANON AND DAYAN).

2. EBAN INITIATED THE CONVERSATION BY EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD ATTENDED CABINET MEETINGS LAST NIGHT AND TODAY. HE GAVE PERSONAL BRIEFING OF EVENTS OF PAST FEW WEEKS ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT AND CABINET HAD OPPORTUNITY FOR THOROUGH DISCUSSION ALL ASPECTS SITUATION. UPSHOT OF THESE SESSIONS WAS CABINET'S UNANIMOUS DESIRE FOR HIM TO PASS ON TO ME FACT THAT ISRAEL IS COMPLETELY UNITED IN ITS GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATE FOR ALL ASPECTS OF US SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE FROM OCT 6 TO PRESENT. EBAN MADE SPECIAL POINT OF EXPRESSING GOI APPRECIATION BOTH FOR "SUBSTANCE AND RATIONALE OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON GRANT AID TO ISRAEL. I ASKED WHETHER CABINET TOOK ANY DEFINITE ACTION ON A CEASEFIRE OR ANY OTHER MATTER THAN THIS AND HE SAID CABINET DID NOT.

3. AS CONCERNS SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, EBAN SAID GOI "WELCOMED" SECRETARY'S STATEMENT - REPEATED SUBSEQUENTLY BY MCCLOSKEY - THAT THE US WOULD NOT RPT NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS CONCERNING ISRAEL'S INTERESTS WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH GOI. EBAN EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ARABS AND SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THIS BY NOW.

4. EBAN SAID GOI HAD "IMPRESSION" KOSYGIN WAS UNABLE OBTAIN ANY AGREEMENT FROM SADAT RE MOVING TOWARDS END OF HOSTILITIES. HE WONDERED, THEREFORE, IF URGENT REQUEST FROM SOVIETS FROM KISSINGER VISIT TO MOSCOW MIGHT NOT BE DESIGNED TO GET US-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 8458, OCT 22, NODIS

SOVIET AGREEMENT ON PLAN WHICH SOVIETS COULD THEN USE WITH SADAT. EBAN SPECULATED THAT KOSYGIN MIGHT HAVE REALIZED IN CAIRO HOW FAR REMOVED FROM REALITY SADAT HAD BECOME - PERHAPS SOVS EVEN RECOGNIZED THAT THEY HAD MORE ACCURATE VIEW OF MILITARY SITUATION ON SUEZ FRONT THAN EGYPTIAN LEADERS. CONTINUING THIS LINE, EBAN SAID SOVIETS KNOW THAT NEITHER THE US NOR GOI WOULD AGREE TO AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-JUNE 10, 1967 FRONTIERS - STANDARD ARAB/SOVIET FARE TO DATE: THE SOVIETS, THEREFORE, HAD TO HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND.

5. EBAN NOTED THAT ANY DIPLOMATIC ACTION ON THE UN FRONT WAS ALSO DELAYED PENDING THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETING IN MOSCOW. HE PAID PARTICULAR TRIBUTE TO AUSTRALIAN AND MCINTYRE WHO AS CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE SC INSISTED THAT THERE WAS NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY CONVENING THE SC JUST TO HAVE MEMBERS LISTEN TO THEMSELVES PRATTLE ON IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE HOSTILITIES WITHOUT BEING ABLE OR WILLING TO ADDRESS REALISTIC WAYS THE SHOOTING MIGHT BE ENDED.

6. ON GENERAL SUBJECT OF ENDING FIGHTING, EBAN STATED THAT GOI TRIED TO STAY AWAY FROM ADDRESSING SUBJECT OF CEASEFIRE IN PUBLIC REMARKS. HE NOTED THAT CEASEFIRE MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE AT DIFFERENT TIMES. FOR EXAMPLE, ARABS RIDICULED IDEA OF CEASEFIRE AND RETURN TO STARTING POINTS IN NORTH AND SOUTH ON OCT 9. SUCH AN IDEA MIGHT LOOK PRETTY GOOD TO ARABS NOW. AT ANY RATE, HE SAID, ONE SURE WAY TO NOT RPT NOT GET A CEASEFIRE IS FOR ISRAEL TO ASK FOR IT SINCE ARABS WOULD REJECT IT. HE ADDED "IT'S UP TO THE ARABS, THEY STARTED THE WAR."

7. EBAN THEN DEVELOPED THEME THAT "DO NOT LEAD TO CEASEFIRES BUT RATHER, CEASEFIRES HAPPEN WHEN REALITIES OF MILITARY SITUATION MAKE THIS DESIRABLE. DRAWING ON CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE OF ISRAEL IN SUBJECT SINCE 1948, EBAN ADDED THAT ONLY REALISTIC APPROACH IN MID EAST IS TO GO FOR SIMPLEST CEASEFIRE POSSIBLE. HE LINKED POW RETURN TO END OF SHOOTING: ASIDE FROM THAT, HE STRESSED NECESSITY OF NOT CREATING SITUATION WHERE SHOOTING STILL GOING ON WHILE "WE TALK OF PEACE." IN THIS RESPECT BY PERIODIC REFERENCE TO SUBJECT, HE GAVE CLEAR IMPRESSION HE NOT INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITY OF PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO CEASEFIRE ALONG LINES OF VIET NAM EXPERIENCE. HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT PEACE SETTLEMENT SHOULD NOT BE LINKED UP WITH CEASEFIRE BUT THAT THE TWO SHOULD BE SEPARATED AS WAS DONE IN '67.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

REF ASSIEN

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- TEL AVIV 8458, OCT 22, NODIS

8. I TOOK OCCASION TO INTRODUCE INTO CONVESATION AT THIS POINT ARTICLE IN HISTADRUT PAPER TODAY BY LEADING COLUMNIST WHICH CALLS FOR SWITCH IN ISRAELI STRATEGIC THINKING FROM EMPHASIS ON TERRITORY TO OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LIMIT ARMS TO ARABS (TEL AVIV 8443). I NOTED AUTHOR ONLY SPEAKING FOR HOIMSELF, BUT I WONDERED IF FONMIN HAD SEEN THIS PIECE.

9. WHEN I FIRST MENTIONED NAME OF JOURNALIST (ESHED), EBAN HAD NEGATIVE REACTION, MAKING CLEAR HE NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH USUAL ESHED LINE (HAWKISH). WHEN I HANDED HIM THE ARTICLE, HOWEVER, HE READ IT WITH SOME INTEREST, COMMENTING THAT SUBSTANCE "FAR ABOVE" ESHED'S USUAL INTELLECTURAL LEVEL, ALTHOUGH IDEAS WERE "PREMATURE." HE NOTED MAJOR PROBLEM OF GETTING SOVS TO AGREE TO LIMIT ARMS TO ARABS AND THEN TRUSTING THEM TO KEEP THEIR WORD.

10. COMMENT: SINCE EBAN HAD SPENT MOST OF HIS WAKING MOMENTS SINCE RETURNING LAST NICTH WITH MRS MEIR AND THE CASINET PRIOR TO OUR MEETING, I ASSUME THAT HIS COMMENTS REFLECT TO CONSIDERABLE DEGREE THESE DELIBERATIONS. EBAN IS SCHEDULED TO MEET THIS EVENING WITH THE IMPORTANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE KNESSET.

11. AS I LEFT, EBAN EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON AT THE SECRETARY'S CONVENIENCE AFTER HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION AND EXPECTED TO BE CALLED BACK THERE. DESPITE ASSURANCES FROM US CITED BY EBAN, I SUSPECT ISRAELIS ARE A BIT NERVOUS ABOUT CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW. AS FOR TIMING OF A VISIT TO WASHINGTON (CN ASSUMPTION SECRETARY DOESN'T COME HERE FIRST), I WOULD READ EBAN'S COMMENTS AS MEANING THE SOONER THE BETTER.

12. DEPDIRGEN, MFA, EVRON WHO WAS PRESENT AT THIS CONVERSATION CALLED THIS MORNING TO ASSURE ME THAT EBAN KNEW NOTHING ABOUT WHAT WAS COOKING AND WAS NOT TRYING TO PLAY GAMES WITH ME. HE SAID EBAN WAS MOST EMBARRASSED BECAUSE HE APPEARED BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE KNESSET LAST NIGHT AND TOLD THEM NOTHING MORE THAN HE HAD TOLD ME. I TOLD EVRON TO ASSURE EBAN THAT I WAS EQUALLY IN THE DARK, WAS NOT CONCEALING ANYTHING FROM EBAN AND WAS EQUALLY EMBARRASSED.

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT **SECRET** AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



SECRET

Department of State

COPY 7 OF 8 COPIES

SCOWCROFT
HOWE
TELEGRAM
McFarlane

O 200859Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0191
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8373

NODIS CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

E O 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: MARR, OTRA, IS
SUBJECT: TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT TEAM

REF: STATE 208414 (NODIS/CHEROKEE)

DELIGHTED TO LEARN OF PENDING ARRIVAL OF TECHNICAL
ASSESSMENT TEAM. AS DATT HAS REPORTED, OUR ISRAELI FRIENDS
WILL ENSURE TEAM WILL BE BUSY.

KEATING

BT
#8373

NOTE: NOT passed SECDEF by OC/T

CONTROL 5875Q
RECVD: 20 OCT 73
25:11AM
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
PM 1:50

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5510Q
RECD: OCT 19, 1973
1154Z

HAK
Scowcroft
LL

P 191019Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0176
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8337

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E O 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, I, USXA
SUBJECT: RESUPPLY AIRLIFT

REF: STATE 206834

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I WELL UNDERSTAND TIME
PRESSURES IN FAST-MOVING COMPLEX AND HIGHLY VOLATILE
SITUATION. KEEP UP THE FINE WORK!

KEATING

BT
#8337

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

WH (9)
TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

CONTROL: 5022Q

RECD: OCT 18, 1973
0958Z

O 180943Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0161
BT
TOP SECRET TEL AVIV 8291

HAK
Scowcroft
LL

NODIS

E O 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: MASS, IS, US
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL VIA SIXTH FLEET

IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT PLAN EXISTS TO STAGE TEN
SKYHAWK A-4S DAILY TO ISRAEL OCTOBER 21 THROUGH 23 WITH
USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AS LAST SURFACE REFUELLING
STOP OF AIRCRAFT BEFORE THEY LAND IN ISRAEL. AS CINCNVAIRLANT
MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 18 ADVISING OF PLAN DOES NOT SHOW STATE AS
ADDRESSEE, I AM HEREBY NOTING PLAN TO BE CERTAIN YOU ARE AWARE
OF IT.

KEATING

BT
#3291

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 18 PM 12:46

TOP SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

SECRET



Department of State

COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4 7 6 8Q
RECD: 17 OCT, 2:15PM

O 171405Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0155
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 826

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1.
TAGS: PFOR US IS
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR

on his talk with Mrs. Meir
HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

3 OCT 17 PM 11:06

1. AT THE OUTSET OF OUR CONVERSATION, MRS. MEIR EXPRESSED ISRAEL'S DEEP GRATITUDE FOR OUR SUPPORT. SHE NOTED SHE HAD TRIED TO EXPRESS THIS SENTIMENT IN ISRAEL IN HER KNESSET SPEECH YESTERDAY, BUT REALIZED NOT EVEN THAT EFFORT SAID IT ALL ADEQUATELY.

2. SHE STATED THAT ISRAEL WELL RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE DECIDED TO COME TO ISRAEL'S RESCUE WITH LARGE SCALE MILITARY RESUPPLY. (SHE ADDED THAT THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD SHOULD REALIZE THAT AN IMPORTANT BIPRODUCT OF US ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL WILL BE TO PRECLUDE SOVIET DOMINATION OF THE MID EAST). SHE HOPES, HOWEVER, TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY PERSONALLY TO TRY TO EXPRESS TO THE PRESIDENT WHAT AMERICAN AID MEANS IN HUMAN TERMS HERE, SINCE EVERY FAMILY THROUGHOUT THE LAND IS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT TRAGEDY. SHE ADDED WITH RESTRAINED EMOTION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO AID ISRAEL AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT WILL BE EMBLAZONED IN THE HISTORY BOOKS READ BY ALL FUTURE GENERATIONS OF JEWS.

3. I THEN EXPLAINED TO MRS. MEIR THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROACHING HOST COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO EXPLAIN AND SUPPORT OUR DECISION TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT. DRAWING ON THE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE, I PASSED TO HER OUR LINE. SHE WAS QUITE INTERESTED AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR BEING SO INFORMED.

4. TURNING TO ANOTHER SUBJECT, I NOTED PRESIDENT SADAT'S SPEECH AND MRS. MEIR'S ADDRESS TO THE KNESSET. ALTHOUGH WE WELL APPRECIATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD FIND SADAT'S "OFFER" UNACCEPTABLE, I NOTED THAT SHE HAD, UNDOUBTEDLY BY DESIGN, NOT ADDRESSED SADAT'S SUGGESTION OF A PEACE CONFERENCE. I WONDERED, THEREFORE, IF THE GOI WAS PLANNING SOME SORT OF RESPONSE. I SAID, EMPHASIZING THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT COULD BE A MISTAKE TO LEAVE THE "PEACE INITIATIVE" IN SADAT'S HANDS, SINCE THE GREAT MASSES OF

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS NODIS NODIS

SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

7 2 - TEL AVIV 826, 17 OCT '73

PEOPLE IN THE WEST TO WHOM HIS COMMENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO UNDERSTAND THE SUBTILITIES OF THE SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, I THOUGHT SHE MIGHT CONSIDER STATING PUBLICLY AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE TO ATTEND A PEACE CONFERENCE OF ALL THE BELLIGERENTS, SINCE IT IS NORMAL INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE FOR THOSE COUNTRIES ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES TO ATTEND PEACE CONFERENCES. IF SADAT THEN REFUSED, THE PUBLIC ONUS WOULD BE DIRECTLY ON EGYPT.

5. MRS. MEIR REPLIED THAT SHE APPRECIATED MY VIEWS AND THE IDEA WAS WORTH CONSIDERING. SHE THEN POINTED OUT HOW A CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION SINCE IT IS A STACKED DECK. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT OBVIOUSLY ISRAEL WANTS PEACE MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE - NOTING THAT THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZED THIS IN MAKING HIS DECISION ON MILITARY RESUPPLY. THE WORLD CAN BE ASSURED, SHE SAID, THAT ISRAEL "WILL RUN" TO ANY PEACE CONFERENCE THAT REALLY PROMISED A SETTLEMENT AND TRUE PEACE. I NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN OUR MINDS, OF COURSE, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ISRAEL TAKE EVERY APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SURE THAT THE WORLD AT LARGE ALSO GETS THIS MESSAGE.

6. MRS. MEIR, IN DISCUSSING ATTITUDES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, MENTIONED WITH OBVIOUS DISGUST THE CYNICAL ATTITUDES OF THE UK AND FRANCE. AS CONCERNS THE UK, SHE WONDERED WHY SOMEONE DIDN'T ASK SIR ALEC HOME WHERE BRITAIN WOULD BE TODAY IF THE US HAD DECIDED TO EMBARGO ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE BELLIGERENTS BEFORE DECEMBER 7, 1941. AS FOR THE FRENCH, SHE WONDERED WHO THEY WERE KIDDING BY GIVING THE IMPRESSION THEY WERE AGONIZING OVER THE DELIVERY OF THE LAST THREE MIRAGES TO LIBYA, SINCE THEY HAD ALREADY DELIVERED NINETY. SHE SAVED MOST OF HER IRE, HOWEVER, FOR THE "NON-ALIGNED" YUGOSLAVS. IN ADDITION TO FREELY LENDING THEIR AIR SPACE TO THE SOVIET AIR LIFT, THE YUGOSLAVS, SHE CLAIMED, ARE NOW ALLOWING SOVIET EQUIPMENT TO ENTER THE COUNTRY ON THE RAILROADS AND TO BE LOADED AT YUGOSLAV PORTS FOR DELIVERY TO THE ARABS IN THIS RESPECT, SHE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD LEARNED THIS MORNING THAT ALL CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ON THE YUGOSLAV RAILROADS HAD BEEN STOPPED IN ORDER TO SERVICE THE HEAVY DEMANDS FOR TRANSPORT OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT THE GOI WAS OF COURSE WORRIED ABOUT REPORTS OF SCUD MISSILES IN EGYPT AND PERHAPS IN SYRIA. SHE DESCRIBED EARLIER REPORTS OF THE SOVIETS HAVING EVACUATED ALL OR MOST OF THEIR ADVISERS FROM EGYPT AND SYRIA AUI "BLUFF." SHE SAID THAT MANY ARE LEFT, PRIMARILY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

- 3 - TEL AVIV 826, 17 OCT '73

TECHNICANS WHO ARE THERE TO HELP THE ARABS LEARN TO OPERATE THE NEW SOPHISTICATED ARMS WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE BRINGING IN.

8. CONCERNING THE CURRENT MILITARY OUTLOOK, MRS. MEIR SAID THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME BECAUSE "WE DON'T DARE LOSE THE WAR." SHE ADDED THAT THERE WAS, OF COURSE, NO COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SITUATION EIGHT DAYS AGO AND TODAY (OBVIOUSLY MEANING THINGS WERE MUCH BETTER FOR ISRAEL). WHILE NOT HAZARDING A GUESS AS TO HOW LONG THE WAR WOULD LAST, SHE DID NOTE THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING FURTHER BLOODSHED, IT'S TOO BAD IT COULDN'T BE ENDED TOMORROW, BUT THIS, OF COURSE, WAS NOT IN THE CARDS.

9. WITH REGARD TO THE NORTH, SHE NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CHEWING UP THE SYRIANS, IRAQIS AND, UNFORTUNATELY, THE JORDANIANS AS THEY STAGE THEIR PERIODIC ATTACKS. REFERRING TO THE JORDANIANS, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT SHE WAS SORRY THAT JORDANIANS WERE GETTING HURT IN THIS WAR AND SHE RECOGNIZED THAT ISRAEL AND THE US DID ALL WE COULD TO KEEP THEM OUT OF IT. SHE SAID "I FEEL SORRY FOR HUSSEIN" WHO FOUND HIMSELF UNDER SUCH HEAVY PRESSURE TO JOIN IN. MRS. MEIR REFERRED TO A RECENT REPORT SHE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IDF THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BOLTED THE FIELD DURING A RECENT ATTACK AND LEFT THE JORDANIANS ALL ALONE.

10. IN THE SOUTH, SHE SAID THAT IDF FORCES WERE ON THE WEST BANK AND THAT SHE ASSUMED THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO KNOCK OUT ENOUGH SAMs TO ALLOW THE AIR FORCE TO WORK ON THE EGYPTIAN FORCES AND PERHAPS "HELP KNOCK SOME RESPONSIBILITY INTO SADAT'S HEAD." SHE WONDERED ALOUD IF SADAT REALLY MEANS TO LOSE ONE MILLION MEN A YEAR. CONTINUING, SHE NOTED THE REPORTS THAT SADAT HAD ORDERED THE PREPARATION OF UP TO 60 THOUSAND GRAVES. AT ANY RATE, SHE SAID, THE EGYPTIANS SEEMED TO HOPE FOR A WAR OF ATTRITION ON THE PATTERN OF 1963-1970 "BUT SO FAR THEY'RE NOT DOING SO WELL."

11. COMMENT: THE MEETING LASTED FOR CLOSE TO AN HOUR. SEVERAL TIMES I SUGGESTED THAT I WAS OVERSTAYING MY WELCOME AND MRS. MEIR KEPT ME ON NOTING THAT SHE APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. MRS. MEIR'S COMMENTS ON JORDAN AND HUSSEIN WERE ENCOURAGING TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, INTEND TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXTEND THE WAR TO JORDANIAN TERRITORY BECAUSE OF THE ENGAGEMENTS WITH JORDANIAN TROOPS. THIS SEEMED SO OBVIOUS THAT I DID NOT THINK IT WAS NECESSARY TO COMMENT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

- 4 - TEL AVIV 826, 17 OCT '73

ON THIS ASPECT OF OUR CONVERSATION. IF IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PI WILL PICK UP THE CALL FOR A PEACE CONFERENCE IN SADAT'S SPEECH AND USE IT FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES INTERNATIONALLY.

12. FINALLY, I FOUND MRS. MEIR TO BE IN VERY GOOD PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION. SHE TOLD ME SHE HAD BEEN GETTING SLEEP RECENTLY AND IT WAS CLEAR FROM HER COMMENTS THAT SHE WAS VERY HEARTENED BY THE SOLIDARITY WITH WHICH THE KNESSET GREETED HER REMARKS YESTERDAY. THERE IS ANGUISH, OF COURSE, IN HER GENERAL Demeanor BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR SHE CONSIDERES EVERY ISRAELI CASUALTY AS A PERSONAL LOSS. THE DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS I NOTED, HOWEVER, WERE A GRIM DETERMINATION AND MATTER-OF-FACT CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE COUPLED WITH GRATITUDE TO THE UNITED STATES.

KEATING.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 189 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

COPY 8 OF 15 COPIES.



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

'73 OCT 16 AM 8:45

CONTROL ROOM 199Q
RECD 16 OCT 6AM
SITUATION ROOM

HAK
Seawest
LL

Z 160941Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0129
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8182

NODIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR IS US
SUBJ: APPOINTMENT WITH MRS MEIR

REF: STATE 203889, 203698, 203685 AND 203684

1. GIVEN UNIQUENESS OF SITUATION HERE, I NATURALLY ASSUME THAT REFTELS CONCERNING PROPOSED DEMARCHES TO HOST GOVERNMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO US IN OUR RELATICS WITH THE GOI.

2. MRS. MEIR IS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS PARLIAMENT THIS AFTERNOON. TIMING IS OBVIOUSLY RELATED TO OFFICIAL U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT OF MILITARY RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL WHICH SHOULD STRENGTHEN HER CONSIDERABLY RE UNDERCURRENTS OF DISCONTENT WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED WITH GOI FAILURE TO LAUNCH PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST EGYPT AND SYRIA.

3. GIVEN NEW TURN OF EVENTS, I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT FOR ME TO MEET WITH MRS. MEIR AND OBTAIN FROM HER FIRST HAND HER VIEWS OF CURRENT SITUATION AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS. I SHOULD NOTE THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AROUND TOWN ABOUT HOW SHE IS HOLDING UP. MY MEETING SHOULD HEPL IN ASSESSING THIS SITUATION AS WELL.

4. I HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT FOR TOMORROW.

KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

SECRET

COPY 14 OF 15 COPIES

273 OCT 16 AM 8:45

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 4164Q
RECD: 16 OCT 73 2AM

O 151814Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 121
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8146

HAIR
Scowcroft
LL

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MILI, IS, US, UR
SUBJECT: T-62 TANK DELIVERY

MY DATT HAS ADVISED ME THAT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE WILL, THIS EVENING, TURN OVER TO US ONE SOVIET T-62 TANK. IT WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE U.S. IN THE FIRST AVAILABLE TRANSPORT. DATT IS REPORTING THROUGH HIS SPECIAL CHANNEL. THIS IS JUST TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE WILL BE GETTING THIS TANK, WHICH ENJOYS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY ON U.S. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION LISTS.
KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



SECRET

Department of State

TELEGRAM

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES

O 132010Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0099
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8040

CONTROL: 3 6 7 2Q
RECD: 13 OCT'73 5:05PM

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US IS MASS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI REQUEST FOR RESUPPLY

*Ambassador Keating would
favor an urgent response to
Israel's request for resupply if they
are likely to be in serious
military trouble.*

*HAK
SCOWCEN-7*

1. MY DATT HAD EXTENSIVE BRIEFING TODAY FROM IDF RE ISRAELI
NEED FOR QUICK LARGE-SCALE RESUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT AND ARMOR. HE
IS REPORTING DETAILS. ATMOSPHERE OF BRIEFINGS WAS VERY
SERIOUS AND ISRAELIS CONVEYED IMPRESSION THEIR NEED IS URGENT.
I KNOW WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO RESPOND TO GOI REQUESTS FOR
RESUPPLY OF SOME CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMO AND SOME
PLANES BUT DO NOT HAVE ANY FEEL FOR CURRENT VIEWS OF USG RE
SUCH LARGE-SCALE RESUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT OR TANKS.
2. IN ARRIVING AT A DECISION, WE WILL BE INFLUENCED, OF COURSE, BY
OUR ESTIMATE OF IMPACT OUR AGREEING TO THIS ISRAELI REQUEST WOULD
HAVE ON ARAB WORLD AND OUR INTERESTS THERE. SINCE MOST ARABS
ARE THINKING THE WORST OF US IN THIS RESPECT, WE ARE ALREADY
DAMNED TO SOME EXTENT EVEN IF WE DON'T DO ANYTHING.
3. GIVEN LIMITED INFO HERE CONCERNING OUR EXCHANGES WAY ISRAELIS
ON SUBJECT OF RESUPPLY, I WON'T PRESUME TO MAKE RECOM-
MENDATIONS CONCERNING HOW MUCH OF LATEST ISRAELI REQUEST
WE SHOULD COMPLY WITH OR HOW FAST, WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEP-
TION: IF, BASED ON ALL INFO AVAILABLE TO WASHINGTON USG
BELIEVES GOI IS LIKELY TO BE IN SERIOUS MILITARY TROUBLE, I
RECOMMEND WITHOUT QUALIFICATION THAT WE BE RESPONSIVE ON
URGENT BASIS TO LATEST GOI REQUEST.

KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



~~SECRET~~

COPY 11 OF 15 COPIES

WH

Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12058, Sect. 3.6

TELEGRAM

NLNS 02-07/15 D05 Ltr 2-15-02

NARA, Date

P 141819Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 110
BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 8076

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: UK INTEREST IN CEASEFIRE AND MILITARY RESUPPLY

REF: TEL AVIV 7918

1. AT HIS REQUEST, I CALLED ON UK AMBASSADOR LEDWIDGE TODAY, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM. UK DCM GIFFARD ALSO PRESENT.

2. FOR MOST OF THE APPROXIMATELY 45-MINUTE MEETING, LEDWIDGE ASKED MY VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS, SUCH AS THE SITUATION IN THE SINAI, IN THE GOLAN, PROBLEMS WITH LEBANON, JORDAN (SEE SEPTTEL), POSSIBLE DISSENSION IN THE GOI CABINET, DIFFERING VIEWS ON MRS. MEIR'S TEMPERAMENT, ETC. HE WAS CLEARLY TIPPY-TOEING AROUND THE SUBJECT THAT REALLY INTERESTED HIM UNTIL, I SUPPOSE AS A RESULT OF MY UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE HIM A HANDLE BY ENGAGING IN ANY REAL EXCHANGES ON THE SUBJECTS HE RAISED, HE GOT TO THE POINT.

3. IN BRIEF, HE AGAIN ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STATE OF THE IDF AND US RESUPPLY INTENTIONS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE SO BADLY HURT THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE.

4. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO INDICATION THAT THE ISRAELI WILL TO FIGHT HAD LESSENED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAD SUFFERED LOSSES. AS FOR HIS INTEREST IN MY GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS RE MILITARY RESUPPLY, I COULD ONLY REPLY "NO COMMENT" AND REFER HIM TO THE LATEST AUTHORITATIVE USG STATEMENTS OUT OF WASHINGTON. LEDWIDGE HEMMED A BIT AND NOTED HE ASSUMED MY REPLY WAS RELATED TO "THE REPORTS IN THE MORNING PAPER." I JUST LET THIS PASS.

5. LEDWIDGE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT HE THOUGHT "WE AGREED" THAT ALTHOUGH ISRAEL APPEARED MORE "FLEXIBLE" THAN THE ARABS AT THIS TIME, THE ISRAELIS WERE PROBABLY NOT YET READY TO ACCEPT A STAND-STILL CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENT AND THAT MORE TIME HAD TO PASS BEFORE WE REACHED THIS POINT. I REPLIED THAT I WASN'T SURE WHAT TIME FRAME HE HAD IN MIND, AND REPEATED MY PREVIOUS COMMENT CONCERNING THE ISRAELI WILL TO FIGHT.

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONTROL 3 7 5 7Q
RECD: 14 OCT '73 3:42PM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

15 AM 8:42

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- TEL AVIV 8076, 14 OCT'73

6. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SOME VARIATIONS,
THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN THE UK REFRAIN HERE.
SINCE MY LAST CONVERSATION WITH LEDWIDGE ON OCTOBER 9.

KEATING

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
S
NODIS
S
NODIS
S



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

WHT (7)
TELEGRAM

Z 121512Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0090
BT

SCOWCROFT
L.L.

CONTROL: 3259Q
RECD: OCT 12, 1973
1542Z

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 8011

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS

E.O. 12053, Sect. 3.6

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: MOPS JO

SUBJ: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

By AN/5 NARA, Date 3-19-02

REF: STATE 202433 AND 202437

1. I ASSUEM THAT, SINCE YOU REPEATED AMMAN TELS YOU WISHED
MY VIEWS, ALTHOUGH NO ACTION INDICATED.

2. I BELIEVE KING HAS EVERY REASON TO BE CONCERNED AS TO POSSIBLE
ISRAELI REACTION. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, PLOY KING IS COMTEMPLATING
MAY PROVE TO BE TOO SUEILE FOR REAL WORLD SHOOTING WAR SITUATION
IN WHICH ISRAELIS CURRENTLY ENGAGED. IF KING INTENDS TO CARRY
OUT HIS PLAN, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT HE FIND WAY TO TELL GCI
DIRECTLY EXACTLY WHAT TROOPS ARE GOING TO BE WHERE, UNDER WHAT
CIRCUMSTANCES AND FOR WHAT PURPOSES, AND ASK ISRAELIS TO BE UNDER-
STANDING. FOR ANY REAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS, HOWEVER, WE WOULD
PROBABLY HAVE TO TAKE SUPPORTING APPROACH DIRECTLY TO PRIMIN
OR DEPPRIMIN.

3. AS FAR AS SAUDIS ARE CONCERNED, MY BEST GUESS IS THAT ISRAELI
GSACTION WILL DEPEND UPON DEGREE OF SUCCESS ISRAELIS HAVING
OR HAS HAD IN ACHIEVING ITS AIMS IN SYRIA AT TIME SAUDI CON-
TINGENT REACHES JORDANIAN BORDER. IF SYRIAN ARMED FORCZX ARE
FINISHED AS EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE, IT IS POSSIELE, BUT BY
NO MEANS GUARANTEED, THAT ISRAELIS WOULD NOT MILITARILY OPPOSE SAUDI
CONTINGENT IN TRANSIT PARTICULARLY IF IT WERE RELATIVELY SMALL AND
COULD BE EXPECTED TO STAY AWAY FROM ANY SENSITIVE MILITARY TARGETS IS-
RAEL
STILL HITTING AFTER ARRIVALIN SYRIA.

4. OPTIMUM SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR KING AND SAUDIS TOJUST STAY
OUT. IF THIS IS IMPOSSIELE, THEN WE WILL HAVE TO DO WHAT WE CAN
WITHIN CONTEXT OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAELIS AND OUR DESIRE TO
SAFEGUARD WIDER INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST.

5. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD ENCCOURAGE BRITS TO STOP POKING
AROUND IN VILATILE JORDANIAN SITUATION. BASED ON MY CONTACTS
WITH MY UK COLLEAGUE HERE, I HAVE NO CONFIDENCE THAT WE AND
BRITS ARE NECESSARILY MARCHING TO THE SAME DRUMMER.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

BECLASSIFIED

COPY 7A OF 15A COPIES



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

CORRECTED COPY

CONTROL: 3041Q

RECD: 11 OCT '73 18:07P

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73
OCT
12 AM 10:29

Z 112340Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 078
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7982

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, XF
SUBJECT: GOI WAR AIMS IN THE NORTH

1. MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN OF PRIMIN'S OFFICE, CALLED ME AT 2300 LOCAL TONIGHT FROM MRS MEIR'S OFFICE AND INFORMED ME DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALLON WISHED TO SPEAK TO ME. ALLON INITIATED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WANTED TO SHARE WITH ME HIS "ELATION" OVER DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SYRIAN FRONT. HE STATED THAT AT PRESENT ISRAELIS HAD BROKEN THROUGH IN TWO AREAS, WERE CONSOLIDATING AND RESTING DURING THE NIGHT AND WOULD PRESS ON EARLY TOMORROW. HE EMPHASIZED FACT THAT GOI HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING DAMASCUS, STATING "WE WOULD NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH IT IF WE TOOK IT." HE ADDED, HOWEVER,

THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO HIT MILITARY TARGETS IN SYRIA WITH PRIMARY AIM OF KNOCKING OUT WHAT REMAINED OF SYRIAN AIR FORCE AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AFTER SYRIAN MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS DESTROYED, ALLON STATED THAT ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE SENT TO SINAI.

2. AS CONCERNS SINAI, HE CONFIRMED SUBSTANCE OF REPORTS THAT EGYPTIANS HAD MOVED EAST FROM CANAL--AT LEAST IN SOME PLACES--TO DEPTH OF 8 KMS. HE STATED THIS WAS 8 KMS. "TOO MUCH." ISRAEL WAS PLEASED WITH MANNER THINGS BEING HANDLED IN WASHINGTON AND NOTED ISRAEL DID NOT WANT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL EGYPTIANS THROWN BACK OVER CANAL.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-2- TELAVIV 7082 11 OCT '73

3. ALLON ALSO MADE POINT THAT ISRAELI SUCCESS IN NORTH WOULD
SERVE TO DETER HUSSEIN FROM JOINING ON SYRIAN SIDE. YOU WILL HAVE
NOTED THAT I DID NOT PASS ON INFO RE ISRAELI INTENTIONS AS DES-
CRIBED BY ALLON TO AMMAN IN REPLY TO AMMAN'S 5447 (TEL AVIV
7978).

4. I ASSUME AMB BROWN WOULD BE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO SHARE SUCH
INFO WITH KING AS PART OF HIS MAGNIFICENT HOLDING ACTION. MY
CONCERN IS IF KING MIGHT NOT PASS INFO ON TO SYRIANS WHO MAY BE
HOUNDING HIM TO JOIN IN FRAY IN ORDER "SAVE DAMASCUS." I ASSUME
DEPT SHARES MY CONCERN THAT WE NOT INADVERTENTLY PROVIDE INFO

OF THIS NATURE TO SYRIANS GIVEN US IN CONFIDENCE BY ISRAELIS.
KEATING
BT
#7982

CORRECTED COPY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 2282Q

RECD: 09 OCT '73 9:20PM

*HNK
Sowcroft
Have
McFarland*

P 091940Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0051
BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 7919

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US, XF, UK
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR

REF: A. TEL AVIV 7918 AND B. TEL AVIV 7811

AS REPORTED IN REF A, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND I HAD CONVERSATION
AT HIS INITIATIVE MORNING OCT 9. HE DID HIS BEST TO ESTABLISH

DURING CONVERSATION FACT THAT SINCE USNAND UK HAD SO MUCH IN
COMMON RE MID-EAST CRISIS HE AND I SHOULD STAY IN "CLOSE TOUCH."
GIVEN FACT HE AWARE OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN SECRETARY AND
LORD CROMER, I WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT NOT TO MEET WITH HIM ONCE
IN A WHILE SHOULD HE INSIST. THERE IS NO QUESTION, OF COURSE,
ABOUT MY MAINTAINING LINE BETWEEN DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS
IN THESE MEETINGS, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY (REF B). IT
WOULD BE HELPFUL, HOWEVER, IF I COULD BE KEPT INFORMED OF OUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON IN ORDER TO
HAVE BETTER BACKGROUND FOR INEVITABLE SESSIONS HERE.

BT
#7919

KEATING

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 10 AM 10:01

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLNS 02-07/17 DOS 2-15-02

By *RMB* NARA, Date *3-19-02*

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



73 Department of State

PM 11:28
SECRET

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES

W4
TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 2561Q

RECD: 10 OCT '73 3:29P

*****CORRECTED COPIES TO FOLLOW*****

O 101326Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 071
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 7955

HAK
Scowcroft
LL

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS, US, SII
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ALLON

1. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH MORNING WITH DEPRIMIN ALLON, HE GAVE ME HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION (SEE SEPTELS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS). ALLON NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE NOT THE AUTHORITATIVE GOI POINT OF VIEW AND HE WAS NOT TRYING TO PROJECT HIMSELF INTO THE ROLE OF GENERAL ZEIRA, WHO HE KNOWS IS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH SITUATION. I ASSURED HIM THAT I WELCOMED HIS VIEWS AND UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION.

2. ALLON INITIATED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT, STRATEGICALLY SPEAKING, THE GREATEST DANGER TO COME FROM SYRIAN ATTACK IN THE NORTH. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE SYRIAN TWO-PRONG ATTACK BE BLUNTED SINCE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SHE RAN A GRAVE RISK OF ALSO LOSING NORTH ISRAEL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE ATTACK BY THE SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS ON YOM KIPPUR HAD, IN RETROSPECT, PROBABLY HELPED RATHER THAN HINDERED THE ISRAELI MOBILIZATION SINCE THE RESERVISTS WERE EITHER AT HOME OR CONCENTRATED AT SYNAGOGUES. HE NOTED THAT THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTIES GAVE THE JOYNT CARTE BLANCHE WITHOUT HESITATION TO DO WHATEVER NECESSARY FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEFENSE ON THIS MOST HOLY DAY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**
SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 7955 10 OCT '73

3. ALLON CREDITS THE SUCCESSFUL CONTAINMENT OF THE SYRIAN SURPRISE ATTACK TO THE FEROCIOUS DEFENSE BY THE REGULAR ARMY BRIGADE ON THE GOLAN. HE STATED THAT THE MEN OF THIS UNIT FOUGHT STRAIGHT THROUGH VIRTUALLY WITHOUT CEASE FROM SATURDAY AT 2:05 P.M. UNTIL LAST NIGHT (TUESDAY). HE ALSO REMARKED THAT THE RESERVISTS NEAR THE FRONT LINE AREAS WERE FIGHTING VIRTUALLY AS THEY WERE BEING MOBILIZED.

4. FOR ALLON THE TURNING POINT IN THE WAR IN THE NORTH CAME YESTERDAY. HE NOTED THAT THE ARABS FOUGHT BETTER THAN THEY FOUGHT BEFORE AND CREDITS THIS TO MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPLIES OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION - VIRTUALLY AN OVER-SUPPLY, THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WITH OVERWHELMING FORCES, AND THE BLANKET OF SAMS, INCLUDING SAM 68, WHICH PROVED AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST CLOSE GROUND SUPPORT BY THE IAF. HE NOTED THAT BY LAST NIGHT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN THE ENTIRE GOLAN HEIGHTS BACK EXCEPT FOR SOME UNITS ON MT. HERMON. HE RECOGNIZED THAT MT. HERMON, IF IT WERE TO STAY IN ENEMY HANDS COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS BUT HE SAID THAT THE GOI INTENDS TO COME BACK AND MOP UP THAT AREA LATER.

5. AT PRESENT, HE SAID, THE PROBLEM IS TO MAKE THE SYRIANS NERVOUS AND THINK THE ISRAELIS ARE "GOING TO TRY TO TAKE DAMASCUS." THEN THE IDF WILL SWING INTO ACTION PAST THE CEASEFIRE LINE WITH AIM OF SMASHING THE 600-800 SYRIAN TANKS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN THE AREA. HE NOTED THAT THE SAMS APPEAR TO BE A SWORD WHICH CUTS BOTH WAYS: IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE SAMS ARE TROUBLE FOR GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT, THE FORCE SO PROTECTED FINDS ITSELF VIRTUALLY HUED TO THIS COVER.

6. IN DEVELOPING HIS THEME, ALLON REFERRED TO THE BOMBING OF DAMASCUS AS AN ACTION TAKEN "NOT WITHOUT HESITATION" BY THE CABINET, BUT HE DEFENDED THE BOMBING OF THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AS STRATEGICALLY NECESSARY. ONCE SYRIA WAS KNOCKED OUT, THUS ELIMINATING THE THREAT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL, ISRAEL COULD TURN ITS ATTENTION TO THE SINAI. (HE NOTED A QUICK KNOCK OUT OF SYRIA WOULD SOLVE HUSSEIN'S PROBLEM AS WELL SINCE HE WOULD NO LONGER BE UNDER PRESSURE TO JOIN IN: SEE SEPTTEL ON JORDAN.)

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- TEL AVIV 7955 10 OCT ;73

7. ALLON SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD "EXPLOIT HER SUCCESS" ON THE GOLAN TODAY AND CRUSH THE SYRIANS. HE THEN FUZZED THE TIMETABLE A BIT SINCE, AS HE POINTED OUT, HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR A WHILE CORRECTED VERSION WAS THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT, ALLON STATED THAT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS WERE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE UNTIL THE SYRIAN PROBLEM WAS SETTLED. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, HE CONFESSED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TASK IN DISLOGGING THE EGYPTIANS, (AGAIN PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SAM COVER. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE EGYPTIAN FORCES WERE LOATH TO RISK LEAVING THIS COVER BEHIND AND HE SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO SEE THE EGYPTIANS STRIKE EAST FROM THE CANAL.

9. COMMENT: ALLON IS NOT ONLY A SENIOR GOI FIGURE BUT SURAIPEOZED FORMER GENERAL. I WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT. MY DATT HAS JUST RETURNED FROM IDF BRIEFING DURING WHICH IDF REITERATED ALLON'S CLAIM ISRAEL IN CONTROL OF ALL GOLAN (MINUS PARTS OF MT. HERMON). AS OF THIS EVENING, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO INFO RE POSSIBLE ISRAELI THRUST ACROSS CEASEFIRE LINE AS PROPOSED BY ALLON. AS DATT IS REPORTING, AMMO SHORTAGES MAY BE HOLDING UP ISRAELI MOVES.

10. AS CONCERNS SUBJECT OF RESUPPLY, I DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO REPORT OF THIS EVENING BY DATT THAT IDF CLAIMS AT LEAST 16 SOVIET CARGO PLANES ARE FLYING TO SYRIA AND SUPPOSITION IS THAT CARGO IS MISSILES. I ALSO HAVE NOTED REPORT FROM OUR CAIRO MISSION (CAIRO 3031) THAT SOVIETS ARE REPORTEDLY PROMISING TO SUPPLY AMMUNITION FOR EGYPTIANS.

KEATING

BT
#7955

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

SECRET

COPY 4 OF 15 COPIES

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 2561Q

RECD: 10 OCT '73 3:29P

CORRECTED COPY

O 101326Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 071
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 7955

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS, US, SII
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ALLON

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

OCT 11 AM 9:13

1. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH MORNING WITH DEPRIMIN ALLON, HE GAVE ME HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION (SEE SEPTELS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS). ALLON NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE NOT THE AUTHORITATIVE GOI POINT OF VIEW AND HE WAS NOT TRYING TO PROJECT HIMSELF INTO THE ROLE OF GENERAL ZEIRA, WHO HE KNOWS IS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH SITUATION. I ASSURED HIM THAT I WELCOMED HIS VIEWS AND UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION.

2. ALLON INITIATED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT, STRATEGICALLY SPEAKING, THE GREATEST DANGER TO COME FROM SYRIAN ATTACK IN THE NORTH. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE SYRIAN TWO-PRONG ATTACK BE PLUNTED SINCE IF ISRAEL LOST THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SHE RAN THE GRAVE RISK OF ALSO LOSING A GOOD PART OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE ATTACK BY THE SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS ON YOM KIPPUR HAD, IN RETROSPECT, PROBABLY HELPED RATHER THAN HINDERED THE ISRAELI MOBILIZATION SINCE THE RESERVISTS WERE EITHER AT HOME OR CONCENTRATED AT SYNAGOGUES. HE NOTED THAT THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTIES GAVE THE GOVERNMENT CARTE BLANCHE WITHOUT HESITATION TO DO WHATEVER NECESSARY FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEFENSE ON THIS MOST HOLY DAY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 7955 10 OCT '73

3. ALLON CREDITS THE SUCCESSFUL CONTAINMENT OF THE SYRIAN SURPRISE ATTACK TO THE FEROCIOUS DEFENSE BY THE REGULAR ARMY BRIGADE ON THE GOLAN. HE STATED THAT THE MEN OF THIS UNIT FOUGHT STRAIGHT THROUGH VIRTUALLY WITHOUT CEASE FROM SATURDAY AT 2:05 P.M. UNTIL LAST NIGHT (TUESDAY). HE ALSO REMARKED THAT THE RESERVISTS NEAR THE FRONT LINE AREAS WERE FIGHTING VIRTUALLY AS THEY WERE BEING MOBILIZED.

4. FOR ALLON THE TURNING POINT IN THE WAR IN THE NORTH CAME YESTERDAY. HE NOTED THAT THE ARABS FOUGHT BETTER THAN THEY FOUGHT BEFORE AND CREDITS THIS TO MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPLIES OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION - VIRTUALLY AN OVER-SUPPLY, THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WITH OVERWHELMING FORCES, AND THE BLANKET OF SAMS, INCLUDING SAM 6S, WHICH PROVED AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST CLOSE GROUND SUPPORT BY THE IAF. HE NOTED THAT BY LAST NIGHT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN THE ENTIRE GOLAN HEIGHTS BACK EXCEPT FOR SOME UNITS ON MT. HERMON. HE RECOGNIZED THAT MT. HERMON, IF IT WERE TO STAY IN ENEMY HANDS COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS BUT HE SAID THAT THE GOI INTENDS TO COME BACK AND MOP UP THAT AREA LATER.

5. AT PRESENT, HE SAID, THE PROBLEM IS TO MAKE THE SYRIANS NERVOUS AND THINK THE ISRAELIS ARE "GOING TO TRY TO TAKE DAMASCUS." THEN THE IDF WILL SWING INTO ACTION PAST THE CEASEFIRE LINE WITH AIM OF SMASHING THE 600-800 SYRIAN TANKS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN THE AREA. HE NOTED THAT THE SAMS APPEAR TO BE A SWORD WHICH CUTS BOTH WAYS: IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE SAMS ARE TROUBLE FOR GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT, THE FORCE SO PROTECTED FINDS ITSELF VIRTUALLY HUED TO THIS COVER.

6. IN DEVELOPING HIS THEME, ALLON REFERRED TO THE BOMBING OF DAMASCUS AS AN ACTION TAKEN "NOT WITHOUT HESITATION" BY THE CABINET, BUT HE DEFENDED THE BOMBING OF THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AS STRATEGICALLY NECESSARY. ONCE SYRIA WAS KNOCKED OUT, THUS ELIMINATING THE THREAT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL, ISRAEL COULD TURN ITS ATTENTION TO THE SINAI. (HE NOTED A QUICK KNOCK OUT OF SYRIA WOULD SOLVE HUSSEIN'S PROBLEM AS WELL SINCE HE WOULD NO LONGER BE UNDER PRESSURE TO JOIN IN: SEE SEPTEL ON JORDAN.)

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- TEL AVIV 7955 10 OCT ;73

7. ALLON SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD "EXPLOIT HER SUCCESS" ON THE GOLAN TODAY AND CRUSH THE SYRIANS. HE THEN FUZZED THE TIMETABLE A BIT SINCE, AS HE POINTED OUT, HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR A WHILE HIS CORRECTED VERSION WAS THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE ASS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT, ALLON STATED THAT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS WERE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE UNTIL THE SYRIAN PROBLEM WAS SETTLED. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, HE CONFESSED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TASK IN DISLOGGING THE EGYPTIANS, (AGAIN PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SAM COVER. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE EGYPTIAN FORCES WERE LOATH TO RISK LEAVING THIS COVER BEHIND AND HE SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO SEE THE EGYPTIANS STRIKE EAST FROM THE CANAL.

9. COMMENT: ALLON IS NOT ONLY A SENIOR GOI FIGURE BUT SURVIVED FORMER GENERAL. I WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT. MY DATT HAS JUST RETURNED FROM IDF BRIEFING DURING WHICH IDF REITERATED ALLON'S CLAIM ISRAEL IN CONTROL OF ALL GOLAN (MINUS PARTS OF MT. HERMON). AS OF THIS EVENING, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO INFO RE POSSIBLE ISRAELI THRUST ACROSS CEASEFIRE LINE AS PROPOSED BY ALLON. AS DATT IS REPORTING, AMMO SHORTAGES MAY BE HOLDING UP ISRAELI MOVES.

10. AS CONCERNS SUBJECT OF RESUPPLY, I DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO REPORT OF THIS EVENING BY DATT THAT IDF CLAIMS AT LEAST 16 SOVIET CARGO PLANES ARE FLYING TO SYRIA AND SUPPOSITION IS THAT CARGO IS MISSILES. I ALSO HAVE NOTED REPORT FROM OUR CAIRO MISSION (CAIRO 3031) THAT SOVIETS ARE REPORTEDLY PROMISING TO SUPPLY AMMUNITION FOR EGYPTIANS.

KEATING

BT
#7955

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

NLNS 02-07/18 *DOS ltr 2-15-02*
By *SLG* NARA, Date *3-19-02*

C ONTROL: 2281

RECD: 9 OCT '73 0920PM

P 091918Z OCT 73 ZHFA
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0050
BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 7918

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US, XF, UK
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

HAK
SCOWCROFT
McFARLANE
Howe
OCT 10 AM 10:00

1. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET TODAY WITH UK AMBASSADOR LEDWIDGE, WHO RETURNED LATE LAST NIGHT FROM LONDON. LEDWIDGE INITIATED THE CONVERSATION BY STATING HIS GOVERNMENT HOPED FIGHTING WOULD STOP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER THAT SITUATION WOULD NOT "POISON" RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARABS. HE NOTED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE FIGHTING FROM SPREADING AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT JORDAN AND/OR LEBANON WOULD BE DRAWN INTO THE FIGHTING.
2. AS CONCERNS LEBANON, HE NOTED THAT BOTH US AND UK HAD ALREADY URGED RESTRAINT ON ISRAELIS AND THAT THE FRENCH HAD ALSO INDICATED THEY WOULD DO LIKEWISE. AS CONCERNS UK DEMARCHE, LEDWIDGE STATED ISRAELI RESPONSE WAS FAIRLY POSITIVE WHILE NOTING GOL HAD RESPONSIBILITIES RE RESTRAINING FEDAYEEN.
3. LEDWIDGE THEN ASKED MY VIEW ON POSSIBLE SOVIET INTENTIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE NOTED UK BELIEVES SOVS TRIED TO DISCOURAGE THE EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS AND WHEN THEY COULDN'T, THEY LEFT. I TOLD HIM THIS PRETTY MUCH AGREES WITH OUR ESTIMATE OF SITUATION. HE THEN SWITCHED THE CONVERSATION TO EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS AND RATHER CURIOUSLY ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THAT SADAT MEANT IT WHEN HE TOLD THE UK AMBASSADOR RECENTLY THAT EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO FIGHT FOR "TEN YEARS." (LEDWIDGE CLAIMS HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO TELL US THIS SO PLEASE PROTECT. I NOTICE, HOWEVER, THE SAME INFORMATION IS IN CAIRO'S 2987.) HE LUMPED THIS TOGETHER WITH QUESTIONS ON OUR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND WONDERED IF WE THOUGHT SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE IF AS A QUID PRO QUO THE ISRAELIS WOULD AGREE NOT TO STRIKE ACROSS THE CANAL. I REPLIED THAT I DON'T THINK SADAT'S STATEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN LITERALLY, THAT

~~SECRET~~
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

-2- TEL AVIV 7918 9 OCT '73

WE WOULD PREFER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD BE HAPPY IF THE PARTIES ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND ALTHOUGH I HOPED SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL I HAD NO INFORMATION TO EITHER CONFIRM OR DENY THAT SADAT WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE SHOULD THE ISRAELIS EITHER TAKE OR NOT TAKE CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIONS IN CURRENT WAR. IN THIS RESPECT, I SAID IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT A GOOD WAY FOR ISRAEL TO BRING EGYPT TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WOULD BE NOT TO STOP AT THE CANAL BUT TO APPLY INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE. I NOTED I WASN'T ADVOCATING SUCH A COURSE, BUT MENTIONED IT IN CONTEXT OF HIS QUESTIONS. LEDWIDGE NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE IN A RECENT CONVERSATION IN WASHINGTON WITH LORD CROMER.

4. LEDWIDGE THEN ASKED ME IF WE HAD HEARD THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD LOST CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TANKS AND AIRCRAFT. I REPLIED MERELY THAT WE KNEW THAT THE WAR HAD RESULTED IN EQUIPMENT LOSSES AS WELL AS THE LOSS OF CONSIDERABLE ISRAELI BLOOD. LEDWIDGE CONTINUED ON THE SUBJECT OF ISRAELI EQUIPMENT LOSSES NOTING THAT THE UK HAD INSTITUTED AN EMBARGO ON SUPPLY OF MILITARY ITEMS TO THE BELLIGERENTS FOR THE DURATION OF THE HOSTILITIES AND WONDERED WHETHER WE HAD ALSO TAKEN SUCH A STEP. I TOLD HIM I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY SUCH DECISION ON OUR PART.

5. JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTING, LEDWIDGE SAID HE HOPED WE COULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

6. COMMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR THIS CALL WAS TO TRY TO GET INFORMATION RE ISRAEL'S EQUIPMENT LOSSES AND AMERICAN RE-SUPPLY INTENTIONS, PROBABLY IN ORDER TO EVALUATE WHAT LEVERAGE THE US MIGHT HAVE OVER THE GOI SHOULD WE DECIDE TO APPLY IT. PRESUMABLY THE BRITS ARE TRYING TO GET THE SAME INFO OUT OF WASHINGTON.

KEATING

BT
#7918

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



SECRET
Department of State

COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES

TELEGRAM

O 091915Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0049
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7917

CONTROL: 2 2 6 8Q
RECD: 09 OCT'73 8:11PM

NODIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MASS, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMMUNITION NEEDS

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 10 AM 10:08

AS DEPARTMENT WILL SEE IN DATT REPORT OF IDF BRIEFING
HE RECEIVED 1300Z TODAY, IDF HAS INDICATED THAT ITS STOCKS
IN CERTAIN AMMUNITION CATEGORIES ARE RUNNING LOW AND GENERAL
TONE OF BRIEFING SOMEWHAT RESTRAINED. IN ORDER
BETTER TO EVALUATE TONE AND SUBSTANCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
MILITARY INFORMATION WE ARE RECEIVING FROM ISRAELIS, WE WOULD
APPRECIATE KNOWING OF ANY AMMUNITION OR EQUIPMENT REQUESTS GOI MAY
HAVE MADE OR MAY MAKE IN WASHINGTON DURING CURRENT HOSTILITIES.
KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

73 OCT 9 PM

(13)

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2110Q
OCT 9, 1973
1324Z

WAK
SCAUCHA

O 091252Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0039
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 7898

NODIS

E O 11652: XGDS-3
TAGSC MASS, US, IS
SUBJECT: F-4 DELIVERIES

FOR YOUR INFO, THIS MONTH'S DELIVERY TO ISRAEL OF F-4S IS
SCHEDULED OCTOBER 11. I JUST WANT TO BE SURE DEPT IS AWARE OF
THIS.

KEATING

BT
#7898

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Copy 10 of 12 copies

Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

O 190748Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9829
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 7346

CN: 4333Q
REC'D: SEPTEMBER 19, 1973
4:06 A.M.

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF, US
SUBJECT: US POSTURE ON ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: TEL AVIV 7343

LAST LINE PARA 2 REFTTEL SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO READ "....AS
DEPT SPOKESMAN INDICATED AUG 23 (STATE 167892) UNLESS THAT
POLICY HAS NOW BEEN CHANGED." VICE"....DEPT SPOKESMAN
INDICATED AUG 23 (STATE 167892) UNLESS THAT POLICY HAS
NOT BEEN CHANGED."

KEATING

BT
#7346

SEP 19 AM 8:17
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 SEP 18 PM 11:01

R 181503Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9827
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 7343

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 4 0 9 9Q
RECD: 18 SEP'73 11:55PM

Handwritten initials
LL

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF, US
SUBJECT: US POSTURE ON ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: TEL AVIV 6846 & 6927

1. AS WE ARE REPORTING SEPTTEL, GOI YESTERDAY APPARENTLY BACKGROUNDED ISRAELI PRESS ON US POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. ACCORDING TO TWO PAPERS, GOI OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT US (A) HAS NO OBJECTION TO NEW LABOR PARTY PLATFORM ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND (B) SEES NO DEPARTURE IN THIS PLATFORM FROM EXISTING GOI POLICY.

2. SO FAR AS OUR TRAFFIC REVEALS, WE BELIEVE GOI MAY HAVE PERCEIVED USG VIEW INCORRECTLY ON BOTH COUNTS. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, IMPLEMENTATION OF ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM OUTLINED IN PLATFORM IN OUR ESTIMATION WOULD HARM PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, AND CERTAINLY PROGRAM IN LARGE PART IS AT VARIANCE WITH LONGSTANDING US POLICY, AS DEPT SPOKESMAN INDICATED AUGUST 23 (STATE 167892) UNLESS THAT POLICY HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED.

3. AUGUST 23 STATEMENT OF SPOKESMAN CAUSED BARELY A RIPPLE IN ISRAEL, AS WE NOTED AT THE TIME. SINCE ISRAELIS ARE NOW PUTTING OUT ABOVE LINE AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH DINITZ, IT WILL HAVE AMOEBS RING IF THERE IS US SILENCE. I THEREFORE FIND MYSELF IN POSITION OF AGAIN RECOMMENDING THAT US MAKE KNOWN ITS SERIOUS VIEW OF THIS MATTER IN NEAR FUTURE, WHETHER THROUGH REPLY BY SPOKESMAN TO NEWS QUERY OR THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS DIRECTLY TO GOI, OR BOTH, UNLESS THERE ARE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH I WOULD THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND WHICH MAKE A POLICY OF SILENCE PREFERABLE AT THIS TIME.

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



HAIC
SCOWCROFT
L.L.

WH

Department of State

SECRET

R 041319Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9652
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 6927

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

0 11552: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, XF/ IS
SUBJECT: GOI POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

AMB KEATING FEELS
THAT WE SHOULD RAISE
MATTER OF LABOR PARTY
POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES IN ORDER TO
POSSIBLY RESTRAIN
CAMPAIGN RHETORIC AND
CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW GOI
MORE FLEXIBILITY RE
IMPLEMENTATION.

REF: A) TEL AVIV 6846, B) TEL AVIV 6913, C) TEL AVIV 6905

1. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THE LABOR PARTY HAS NOW OFFICIALLY APPROVED ITS PROGRAM FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (REF B). WE EXPECT THAT, DESPITE MIGIVINGS WHICH MAPAM WILL VOICE, THIS PROGRAM WILL EMERGE VIRTUALLY INTACT AS THE LABOR ALIGNMENT'S PLATFORM FOR POLICY TOWARD THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES DURING THE ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY IT WILL BE THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE GOI.

2. IT IS, OF COURSE, TOO LATE TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE SHAPE OF THIS PROGRAM AS THE LABOR ALIGNMENT WILL PRESENT IT TO THE PEOPLE DURING THE CAMPAIGN. IN RESPONSE TO CRITICS, LABOR PARTY SPOKESMEN HAVE EMPHASIZED PUBLICLY THAT PROPOSED POLICIES ARE MERELY CONTINUATION OF ONGOING PROGRAMS AND NOT INTENDED AS ANY DRAMATIC NEW DEPARTURES IN THIS FIELD. AS NOTED IN REF C, FONMIN EBAN MADE SAME POINTED TO WALDHEIM WHEN SYG RAISED THIS SUBJECT TO HIM.

3. WE COULD, OF COURSE, DECIDE NOT TO RAISE THE MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE GOI UNTIL THE PARTY PLATFORM BECOMES OFFICIAL GOI POLICY AFTER THE ELECTIONS. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PREFERABLE COURSE WOULD BE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE GOI IN THE NEAR FUTURE, EMPHASIZING THOSE ASPECTS OF THE POLICY WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE THE MOST TROUBLESOME. THE ISRAELIS PROBABLY WILL SIMPLY TAKE THE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN TO US, ALONG THE LINES OF THE PUBLIC COMMENTS OF THE SPOKESMEN AND EBAN'S REMARKS TO WALDHEIM, THAT THIS IS JUST A LITTLE MORE OF THE SAME AND HENCE NOTHING TO GET EXCITED ABOUT. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE WHAT THEIR OFFICIAL REACTION TO US MAY BE, OUR DEMARCHE(S) COULD TO SOME EXTENT RESTRAIN THE CAMPAIGN RHETORIC ON THIS SUBJECT AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE GOI TO HAVE MORE FLEXIBILITY RE IMPLEMENTATION THAN OTHERWISE MIGHT BE THE CASE.

SECRET

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State

'73 AUG 32 PM 2:40

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Kennedy
McFarlane

SENT TO S.C.

R 311900Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9639
BT

CONTROL: 42Q
RECVD: 1 SEP 73
2:53AM

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 6899

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFCR, IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON PRIME MINISTER MEIR

1. I PAID MY FIRST CALL ON GOLDA MEIR THIS MORNING. SHE RECEIVED ME VERY WARMLY WITH THE COMMENT THAT YOUR SENDING ME AS AMBASSADOR WAS A RECONFIRMATION IN ISRAELI EYES OF US FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

2. WHEN I GAVE HER YOUR LETTER SHE REMARKED "WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DONE FOR US WE WILL NEVER FORGET."

3. THAT BRIEF SENTENCE, SPOKEN WITH SUCH SINCERITY, SAYS IT ALL WITH RESPECT TO THE HIGH REGARD THE ISRAELIS HAVE FOR YOU.

KEATING

BT
#6899

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

CO 6 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State
73 SECRET AM 10:38

W H
TELEGRAM

O 301450Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9818

BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 6846

WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 8464Q

RECD: 31 AUG 73 3AM

NODIS

FOR ACTING SECRETARY, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, ASST. SECRETARY
SISCO

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFCR, PBOR, XF

SUBJECT: GOI POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: TEL AVIV 6819

1. WE HAVE REPORTED AND ANALYZED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS AND REFTEL HIGHLIGHTS THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM WILL POSE FOR ANY US POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE AT LEAST THE INITIATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE ONLY TOO AWARE THAT THE REAL DIFFICULTY IS PROPOSING SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS. WE PROPOSE TO USE THIS CHANNEL FOR A DIALOGUE WITH WASHINGTON ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE USG SHOULD DO ABOUT THE ISRAELI LABOR PARTY PROGRAM, HOW AND WHEN. IN THIS RESPECT, WE HAVE REPORTED THAT THIS PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO BE ADOPTED OFFICIALLY BY THE LABOR PARTY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

2. WE ARE UNABLE TO RECONSTRUCT FROM OUR FILES THE HISTORY OF US REPRESENTATION TO THE GOI HERE ON SUBJECT OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT APPEARS LAST AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT WAS MADE BY AMBASSADOR YOST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969, WHICH OUTLINED OUR CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO "ANY ACTION-- IN JERUSALEM OR ELSEWHERE -- THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS PREJUDICING OR PREJUDGING A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE." FOR THE LAST FEW ~~years~~, WE APPEAR NOT TO HAVE OFFICIALLY PROTESTED TO THE GOI ITS ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; IN THIS RESPECT, WE NOTE THAT ON AUG 23 THE DEPT SPOKESMAN REFERRED TO THE 1969 YOST STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING US ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REPORTED LABOR PARTY PROGRAM. SINCE THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED PUBLICLY ON AUG 23, SEVERAL LEADING US NEWSPAPERS HAVE WRITTEN EDITORIALS WARNING THAT THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS EQUIVALENT TO DE FACTO ISRAELI ANNEXATION, WITH ALL THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS THAT HAS FOR HOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- TEL AVIV 6846, AUG 30

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISRAELIS WERE LISTENING, WE BELIEVE THAT THE AUGUST 23 EXERCISE WAS USEFUL IN THAT AT LEAST IT PUT US ON THE PUBLIC RECORD AS NOT HAVING CHANGED OUR OFFICIAL POLICIES TOWARD THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THIS ACTION IN ITSELF IS GOING TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE LABOR PARTY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM NOR ON SUBSEQUENT LONGER RANGE GOI PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS COMPONENT PARTS.

4. WHAT, AS STATED IN REFTEL, MUCH OF THE PROGRAM IS A CONTINUATION OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF ONGOING GOI PROGRAMS. WE CANNOT EXPECT THE ISRAELIS EITHER TO REPUDIATE PUBLICLY THESE PROGRAMS OR TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY REQUEST FROM US THAT THEY JUST TURN THE WHOLE THING OFF. AND IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT MANY ISRAELIS BELIEVE SINCERELY WITH DAYAN THAT THE ONLY HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA IS TO CONVINCE THE ARABS THAT TIME IS NOT ON THEIR SIDE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS TO US THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF BEING ABLE TO ASSURE THE GOI OF ANY REAL HOPE FOR AT LEAST INITIATING A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, WE SHOULD FOCUS ANY ACTION WE DECIDE TO TAKE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE GOAL OF GETTING THEM TO DELAY IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM WHICH REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT AND HIGHLY VISIBLE NEW DEPARTURES. WE COULD, THEREFORE, EMPHASIZE OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF YAMIT AND ITS ADJACENT NETWORK OF SETTLEMENTS ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, WHILE EXPRESSING GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THRUST OF LABOR PARTY PLATFORM IN CONTEXT OF CONTINUITY OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (SEE REFTEL FOR MORE DETAILS.)

5. HOW AND WHEN. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INITIALLY RAISE SUBJECT WITH GOI IN NEAR FUTURE. FOR OPENERS, WE WOULD SUGGEST AN EARLY CONVERSATION WITH AMB DINITZ IN WASHINGTON. EMBASSY, OF COURSE, IN NO POSITION TO GUARANTEE WHAT SUCCESS WE MIGHT HAVE WITH GOI. DEPENDENT IN PART ON RESULT OF SUCH A MEETING, DEPT CAN DETERMINE WHETHER WE SHOULD MAKE DEMARCHE AT OUR END. ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE COMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN IMMINENCE OF ELECTIONS HERE, ON BALANCE I RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THIS MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE ISRAELIS HERE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HOPEFULLY, EXPRESSION OF OUR CONCERNS WOULD HELP MODERATE AT LEAST SOME CAMPAIGN RHETORIC ON SUBJECT AND SHOULD STRENGTHEN HAND OF THOSE IN GOI WHO ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TREND TOWARD ANNEXATION. ALSO, IT WOULD SERVE AS REMINDER TO GOI DECISION MAKERS THAT IN THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC ISRAELI CONSIDERATIONS THEY SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF FACTOR OF US-GOI RELATIONS.

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTION TO THIS MESSAGE.

KEATING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH 9

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

O 141211Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9409
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 6388

3 5 4 3 Q
14 AUG 73 213 04

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, IS, LE
SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT DIVERSION INCIDENT IN UNSC

REF: STATE 159712

1. FROM EMBASSY'S VANTAGEPOINT INSTRUCTIONS IN REFTEL POINT TO OPTIMUM OUTCOME FROM CURRENT UNSC DELIBERATIONS. HOPEFULLY, EVENTS IN NEW YORK WILL DEVELOP ALONG LINES WE DESIRE THUS ENABLING US TO TAKE STRONG POSITION AGAINST AUGUST 10 AIRCRAFT DIVERSION. ISRAELIS WOULD BE UNHAPPY WITH ADVERSE US POSITION IN SC, BUT WE SUSPECT GOI LEADERSHIP IS BRACED FOR THIS EVENTUALITY.
2. DAYAN'S WEEKEND STATEMENT DEFENDING IDF ACTION AND NOTING THAT GOI WILL FEEL FREE TO TAKE SUCH ACTIONS IN FUTURE IS LATEST STEP IN EVOLUTION OF NEW ISRAELI THEORY OF GOI EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS IN ITS WAR AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THIS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION GIVEN FORMAL SANCTION IN ISRAEL DURING TRIAL BEGINNING LAST MONTH OF FEDAYEEN KIDNAPPED FROM LEBANON (TEL AVIV 5761). TO SOME EXTENT, AND IN MUTED FORM, THE SAME LINE HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY SOME ISRAELI PRESS COMMENTATORS AS DEFENSE OF GOI INVOLVEMENT, IF THERE WAS ANY, IN ASSASSINATION CASE IN NORWAY.
3. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT DEVELOPING GOI CLAIMS OF "UNIVERSAL SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION" AND PERSISTENCE BY ISRAELIS IN PUSHING THIS LINE WILL SERIOUSLY DAMAGE ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND MAKE OUR LOT AS VIRTUALLY ISRAEL'S ONLY SUPPORTER INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.
4. TO JUDGE BY ATMOSPHERE HERE, IT MAY REQUIRE SUCH A PUBLIC SHOCK AS ADVERSE US VOTE ON ISSUE NOW BEFORE SC TRULY TO IMPRESS UPON ISRAELIS THAT THERE ARE REAL LIMITS TO GOI ACTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- TEL AVIV 6388, AUG 14, NODIS

WHICH US, IN ITS OWN INTERESTS, CAN BE EXPECTED EITHER TO SUPPORT OR TO ACCEPT. CURRENT ISSUE SEEMS TO BE VERY APPROPRIATE AS VEHICLE FOR MESSAGE SINCE THERE IS UNDERCURRENT OF SERIOUS DOUBT IN ISRAEL ABOUT WISDOM OF AUGUST 13 IDF ACTION WHICH WE BELIEVE IS NOW STARTING TO REACH INTO SENIOR LEVELS OF GOI. OPPONENTS OF THIS PARTICULAR POLICY COULD PROBABLY USE THE AMMUNITION A PUBLIC DISPLAY OF US DISAPPROVAL WOULD PROVIDE.

5. IN EMBASSY'S OPINION, GOI THEORY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND AUGUST 13 INCIDENT ARE CLEARCUT ISSUES. US CAN, THEREFORE, AFFORD TO SHOW CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE BETWEEN GOI AND USG ON THESE ISSUES, WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE THE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

VELIOTES

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

SECRET

ISRAEL
WA
TELEGRAM

2 3 6 7 Q
Jul 10, 1973
12:14 p.m.

R 101338Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9051
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 5429

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, IS
SUBJECT: DAYAN CONSIDERING AIRCRAFT NEEDS FOR 1980'S

1. DAYAN TOLD CHARGE JULY 9 THAT HE WAS "VERY PLEASED" WITH RECENTLY CONCLUDED AIRCRAFT SUPPLY AGREEMENT AND IN PARTICULAR WITH LONGER, FOUR YEAR TERM. HE SAID THAT COUPLED WITH LOCALLY PRODUCED AIRCRAFT, WHICH SHOULD BE IN SERVICE INSIDE OF TWO YEARS US SUPPLIES WILL MAINTAIN ADEQUATE ISRAELI AIR POWER UNTIL 1980'S. DAYAN POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL NOW HAS STRONGEST AIR FORCE IN AREA WITH MORE PLANES THAN ITALY, TURKEY AND EVEN US SIXTH FLEET.

2. DAYAN SAID THAT PROBLEM NOW, IN ADDITION TO MISSILES, WAS TO THINK OF ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW GENERATION OF AIRCRAFT IN THE 80'S. HE SAID THAT HE WAS QUITE HAPPY TO HEAR THAT US WAS NOW PLANNING TO SELL F-14S FOR SIX AND A HALF MILLION DOLLARS APIECE SINCE THIS WAS CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION FROM FIGURE PREVIOUSLY QUOTED. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN INTERESTED TO HEAR OF PLANS TO DEVELOP LIGHTER, LESS COSTLY PLANES WITH HIGH PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES. IN ANY EVENT, US IS STILL IN DEVELOPMENT STAGE FOR NEXT GENERATION SO IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY EXACTLY WHAT AIRCRAFT WOULD FULFILL ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS. DAYAN ADDED THAT RATHER THAN DIRECT PURCHASE, ISRAEL IS MORE INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS WITH US FOR LOCAL PRODUCTION OF SOME EEOETS OF ANY NEW GENERATION F14S THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE. DAYAN SAID HE EXPECTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE DISCUSSING ALL THESE MATTERS WITH US IN ANOTHER TWO YEARS.

ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



'73 JUL 10 PM 5:30

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

2 3 6 7 Q
Jul 10, 1973
12:14 p.m.

R 101338Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9051
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 5429

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, IS
SUBJECT: DAYAN CONSIDERING AIRCRAFT NEEDS FOR 1980'S

1. DAYAN TOLD CHARGE JULY 9 THAT HE WAS "VERY PLEASED" WITH RECENTLY CONCLUDED AIRCRAFT SUPPLY AGREEMENT AND IN PARTICULAR WITH LONGER, FOUR YEAR TERM. HE SAID THAT COUPLED WITH LOCALLY PRODUCED AIRCRAFT, WHICH SHOULD BE IN SERVICE INSIDE OF TWO YEARS, US SUPPLIES WILL MAINTAIN ADEQUATE ISRAELI AIR POWER UNTIL 1980'S. DAYAN POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL NOW HAS STRONGEST AIR FORCE IN AREA WITH MORE PLANES THAN ITALY, TURKEY AND EVEN US SIXTH FLEET.

2. DAYAN SAID THAT PROBLEM NOW, IN ADDITION TO MISSILES, WAS TO THINK OF ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW GENERATION OF AIRCRAFT IN THE 80'S. HE SAID THAT HE WAS QUITE HAPPY TO HEAR THAT US WAS NOW PLANNING TO SELL F-14S FOR SIX AND A HALF MILLION DOLLARS APiece SINCE THIS WAS CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION FROM FIGURE PREVIOUSLY QUOTED. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN INTERESTED TO HEAR OF PLANS TO DEVELOP LIGHTER, LESS COSTLY PLANES WITH HIGH PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES. IN ANY EVENT, US IS STILL IN DEVELOPMENT STAGE FOR NEXT GENERATION SO IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY EXACTLY WHAT AIRCRAFT WOULD FULFILL ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS. DAYAN ADDED THAT RATHER THAN DIRECT PURCHASE, ISRAEL IS MORE INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS WITH US FOR LOCAL PRODUCTION OF SOME EEOETS OF ANY NEW GENERATION F14S THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE. DAYAN SAID HE EXPECTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE DISCUSSING ALL THESE MATTERS WITH US IN ANOTHER TWO YEARS.

ZURHELLEN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

REF ASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

SECRET

'73 AUG 12

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

O 131108Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9382
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 6337

3187Q
AUG. 13, 1973
7:44 AM

NODIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MCAP, SY, IZ
SUBJECT: ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE ARAB ACTION AGAINST EL AL

1. DAO IS REPORTING TO DOD VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL IDF CONCERN THAT SYRIAN OR IRAQI AIR FORCE MAY ATTEMPT TO SEIZE ISRAELI AIRLINER EN ROUTE BETWEEN TEL AVIV AND TEHRAN IN RETALIATION FOR ISRAELI SEIZURE AUGUST 10 OF MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES CARAVELLE.

2. EL AL OPERATES FLIGHT TO TEHRAN (ROUTING IS OVER SOUTHERN TURKEY) TUESDAYS, THURSDAYS AND SUNDAYS WITH RETURN FLIGHT TO TEL AVIV TUESDAYS, FRIDAYS AND SUNDAYS.

3. DEPT SHOULD OBTAIN COPY OF DAO REPORT EXPEDITIOUSLY FOR PURPOSES REVIEW IDF REQUEST. UNLESS THERE ARE CONSIDERATIONS OF WHICH EMBASSY UNAWARE, WE HOPE THAT RAPID AND HELPFUL REPLY WILL BE GIVEN.

VELIOTES

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
S
NODIS
S
NODIS
S



Department of State
SECRET

PAGE 8 OF 15

TELEGRAM

O 090840Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7560
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 1821 MAR 9, 1973, 4:40 AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, YE, ET, IS
SUBJECT: ZUQAR ISLAND

REF: STATE 42659

STATE 41702 NODIS WAS ANSWERED BY TEL AVIV 1796 EXDIS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN DEPT BEFORE TRANSMITTAL REFTEL. WE THOUGHT CONTENT REQUIRED TRANSMISSION TO A NUMBER OF LATERAL POSTS BUT DID NOT INCLUDE REFERENCE TO STATE 41702 BECAUSE LATER HAD BEEN NODIS.

ZURHELLEN

BT
#1821

73 MAR 9 AM 10:26
2911Q

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

COPY 8 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 061046Z MAR 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7505
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1711

CONTROL: 1 6 8 3 Q
RECD: 6 MARCH 73
6 MAR AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, YE, ET, IS
SUBJECT: ALLEGED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ZUQAR ISLAND

REF: ADDIS ABABA 2540 AND PREVIOUS

1. ON OUTSIDE CHANCE ISRAELIS DO HAVE SOME PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT ON ZUQAR ISLAND, EMBASSY BELIEVES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO WARNING GOI OF IMPENDING TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLE.
2. IF ISRAELIS HAVE PERSONNEL OR INSTALLATIONS ON ISLAND, DECISION TO PUT THEM THERE MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN BEFORE SERIES OF SETBACKS EARLY THIS WINTER TO ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA -- A DEVELOPMENT WHICH PRESUMABLY HAS HEIGHTENED IMPORTANCE FOR ISRAEL OF ITS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA.
3. ALSO, ISRAELIS MAY NOT APPRECIATE STRENGTH OF YEMENI-ETHIOPIAN DIFFERENCES OVER SOVEREIGNTY OVER THIS RED SEA ISLAND. FROM TRAFFIC IN RECENT DAYS RE ZUQAR, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT TIME MAGAZINE STORY WHEN IT BREAKS WILL LEAD YARG TO SET UP HUE AND CRY WHICH MAY EMBARRASS ETHIOPIA THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD. ISRAELIS THEREFORE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWING (TEMPORARILY) ANY PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT THEY MAY HAVE IN ZUQAR BEFOREHAND AND TELL IEG THEY HAVE DONE SO, TO ENABLE IEG FORCEFULLY TO DENY STORY.

ZURHELLEN

BT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



SECRET

WHL
COPY 8 OF 8 COPIES

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 8 9 2 2Q

O 302104Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 8196
BT
SECRET STATE 213667

*Spencer
Howe
McFarlane
Rodman*

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS
SUBJECT: VISIT OF MRS. MEIR

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

REF: TEL AVIV 8764

APPRECIATE GREATLY YOUR OFFER RETURN FOR MEIR VISIT.
IN VIEW, HOWEVER, DELICACY CEASE-FIRE SITUATION AND UNRE-
SOLVED NATURE NUMBER RELATED ISSUES, MY MIND WOULD BE MORE
AT EASE IF YOU WOULD REMAIN AT POST. WE WILL KEEP YOU
FULLY INFORMED. KISSINGER

NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE:SKG
10/30/73 EXT 20840
THE SECRETARY

NEA:ALATHERTONJR
S/S:

NEA:JJSISCO

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

COPY 7 OF 8 COPIES

'73 OCT 26 AM 11:20

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

HAIR
SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE
HOWE

CONTROL 8 2 3 9 Q
RECD 27 OCT 73
3:58 PM

Z 271919Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8174
BT
SECRET STATE 212590

NODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US
SUBJECT: US-ISRAEL RELATIONS

REF: STATE 212525

FOR AMBASSADOR KEATING FROM THE SECRETARY

1. AS A FOLLOW-UP OF MY MESSAGE TO YOU CONTAINED REFTEL, I WANT YOU TO BE UP TO THE MINUTE ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

2. AS A RESULT OF SOME APPARENT ISRAELI SLIP-UP, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS CONVEYED TO ME IN A PERSONAL PHONE CALL FROM MRS. MEIR, IT HAS PROVEN NECESSARY TO RE-SET THE DATE FOR THE MEETING OF THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AND FOR THE RELIEF EGYPTIAN CONVOY. ALL OF THE ABOVE IS UNDER AUSPICES OF UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

3. ISRAEL PROPOSED 6:00 AM CAIRO TIME; WE WORKED OUT WITH EGYPTIANS 10:00 PM CAIRO TIME AS ALTERNATIVE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY EGYPTIANS HAVE SUGGESTED 12:00 MID-NIGHT CAIRO TIME. ISRAELIS HAVE AGREED. KISSINGER.

BT

#2590

DRAFTED BY NEA JJSOSCO
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCE TRPICKERING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
S
NODIS
S
NODIS
S



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

Z 271327Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8171
BT
SECRET STATE 212525

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US
SUBJ: US - ISRAEL RELATIONS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW BEFORE YOUR 1700 MEETING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI IN WASHINGTON. THESE HAVE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED POSITION OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY ON EAST BANK OF SUEZ.

2. AS A RESULT OF EXCHANGE WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO FACILITATE HERE IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, ABOUT WHICH USSR HAS BEEN KEPT VERY GENERALLY INFORMED, THE FOLLOWING HAS TAKEN PLACE:

3. BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT INDICATE THEY ARE PREPARED TO HAVE A MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL OFFICERS AT 1500 HRS CAIRO/TEL AVIV TIME OCTOBER 27 TO DISCUSS MILITARY ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RES'S 338 AND 339. THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER UN SUPERVISION AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE BY UNTSO AND ACTING UNEF COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL SIILVASUO. IN ADDITION EGYPT HAS PROPOSED AND ISRAEL SEEMS PREPARED TO AGREE TO PERMIT CONVOY CARRYING NON MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR SUEZ AND THIRD ARMY EAST OF CANAL TO PASS TO ITS DESTINATION BY 1500 LOCAL TIME UNDER UN AND RED CROSS SUPERVISION. KISSINGER

S/S:TRPICKERING
10/27/73 10/27/73
S/S:TRPICKERING

NEA - ATHERTON

S - THE SECRETARY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

73 OCT 27 AM 10:11
8192
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

SECRET

OPY 8 OF 15 COPIES

TELEGRAM

Z 220953Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8120
BT
SECRET STATE 208834

NODIS

E.O.
TAGS: CVIP
SUBJECT: SECRETARY VISIT

SECTO 29

1. SECRETARY DESIRES THAT FULL MILITARY BRIEFING FROM ISRAELIS BE INCLUDED IN HIS SCHEDULE.
2. WE ASSUME IN PRESENT DELICATE DOMESTIC SITUATION, PM WILL WANT MEETING WITH HER KEY MINISTERS (ALLON, SAPIR, DAYAN, (IF HE IS NOT AT THE FRONT) AND EBAN). WITHOUT SUGGESTION IT, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT SECRETARY IS PREPARED TO MEET ALONE WITH PM FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. BEFORE OR AFTER SUCH A MEETING IF SHE DESIRES.
3. PLEASE INFORM US ABOARD AIRCRAFT OF SUGGESTED PROGRAM PLANNED BY GOI FOR VISIT.
4. IN ADDITION SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO SPEND ONE-HALF HOUR WITH SENIOR OFFICER AND A FEW KEY AIDES PRINCIPALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATION OF US AIRLIFT IN ISRAEL. WE DO NOT WANT TO HIGHLIGHT PRESENCE OF US PERSONNEL. MEETING THEREFORE SHOULD BE ARRANGED AT APPROPRIATE PLACE WHERE PRESS NOT APT TO PICK IT UP. (EMBASSY, RESIDENCE OR CONSULATE IN JERUSALEM).
5. APPRECIATE YOUR SUGGESTIONS FOR GENERAL PRESS HANDLING OF VISIT. PICKERING

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:K.KURZE

APPROVED BY: S/S-O:K.KURZE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONTROL: 6252Q
RECD: 22 OCT 73 6:30 AM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 22 PM 3:53

DECLASSIFIED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 217 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



SECRET

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5 2 9 8Q

O 182052Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8080
BT
S E C R E T STATE 206834

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, USMAS
SUBJ? RESUPPLY AIRLIFT

REF: TEL AVIV 8061

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR OUR DECISION TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL. I SAID IN MY PRESS CONFERENCE FRIDAY THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT IS RIGHT IN THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION, AND WE ARE DOING IT. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET, AND WE MUST SEE THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE IS MAINTAINED AS WE SEEK AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES AND A WAY TO GET DIPLOMACY WORKING ON A FINAL ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT.

2. I AM SURE I HAVE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS WHY, IN THIS COMPLEX AND FAST-MOVING SITUATION, WE WERE UNABLE TO CONSULT OR INFORM YOU OF OUR POLICY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE WAY WE WOULD NORMALLY WANT TO. KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON:MTB
10/16/72 EXT 19380
THE SECRETARY

NEA:JJSISCO

S/S - MR. PICKERING

73 OCT 19 AM 9:58
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

0071
DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

copy 6 OF 8 COPIES

WH
TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 2644Q
RECD: 10 OCT 73 9PM

HAK
SCOWCROFT
HOWE
MCFARLANE

O 102346Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7988
BT
SECRET STATE 201359

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MASS, IS
SUBJ: ISRAELI AMMUNITION NEEDS
REFS: TEL AVIV 7917 AND 7937

FOR AMBASSADOR KEATING

WE HAVE NOTED VARIOUS OF YOUR TELEGRAMS REGARDING ISRAELI
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS MATTER IS
BEING HANDLED QUIETLY BACK HERE IN WASHINGTON. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: S:LEAGLEBURGER
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCES: S/S:MR.PICKERING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



~~SECRET~~

COPY 11 OF 15 COPIES

W#

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 AUG 17 PM 10:04

R 172128Z AUG 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7474
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 164045

CONTROL: 4 8 9 6Q

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MCAF, SY, IZ
SUBJECT: ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE ARAB ACTION
AGAINST EL AL

REF: TEL AVIV 6337

FYI: DIA AS EXCLUSIVE ACTION AGENCY HAS ALREADY RESPONDED
TO DAO REQUEST REPORTED YOUR REFTEL. ROGERS

NEA/RA: NKPRATT:MH
8/17/73 EXT. 21794
NEA: ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.

NEA/IAI: HHSTACKHOUSE
INR/RNA: PHSTODDARD

S/S - MR. GAMMON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLNS 02-07/19 DOS ltr 2-15-02

By AMP NARA, Date 3-19-02

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

SECRET

COPIES 10 OF 15

W H
TELEGRAM

R 061814Z JUN 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6786
BT
SECRET STATE 108723

NODIS

CONTROL: 1661Q
RECD: 06 JUN 73 5 PM

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-3
TAGS: MASS, IS, SA
SUBJECT: ISRAELI INQUIRY RE PHANTOM SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. AMBASSADOR DINITZ CONVEYED FOLLOWING TWO QUERIES ON
BEHALF OF PRIME MINISTER MEIR TO AHERTON JUNE 5:

A. WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON U.S. PHANTOM SALES TO
SAUDI ARABIA IF KING FAISAL SHOULD ALSO DECIDE TO
PURCHASE MIRAGES?

B. WHEN USG SURVEYS ARMS REQUIREMENTS OF ARAB
COUNTRIES IN REACHING DECISION ON WHAT IT WILL PROVIDE
THEM, DOES USG TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ONLY ITEMS OF U.S.
ORIGIN OR DOES IT ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT THOSE
COUNTRIES ARE RECEIVING FROM OTHERS, E.G., FROM U.K.
AND FRANCE?

DINITZ SAID HE HAD NO EXPLANATION FOR FOREGOING QUESTIONS
BUT ASSUMED GOI HAD INFORMATION THAT SAUDIS ALSO PLANNING
TO BUY EQUIPMENT FROM OTHER SOURCES.

2. AHERTON SAID HE PREFERRED NOT TO ATTEMPT TO ANSWER
THESE QUESTIONS OFF THE TOP OF HIS HEAD BUT WOULD SEEK TO
OBTAIN CONSIDERED REPLIES. ROGERS

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
APPROVED BY: NEA:JOSEPHJ.SISCO

CLEARANCES: NEA/IAI:MR.STACKHOUSE

S/S:MR.BARNES

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

9 OF 15 COPIES

R 042035Z JUN 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6773
BT
SECRET STATE 106798

CONTROL: 0904Q
RECD: 4 JUN 73 7:30PM

Scowcroft
Howe

NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: PHANTOM SALE TO ISRAEL

1. SISCO CONTACTED DINITZ JUNE 1 AND SAID HE PLEADED INFORM HIM PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED FOLLOWING: (A) OFFER TO ISRAEL 48 F-4'S EVENLY SPACED OVER FOUR YEAR PERIOD, AT RATE 12 PER YEAR, BEGINNING AFTER EXPIRATION PRESENT CONTRACTS (B) 42 A-4'S EVENLY SPACED OVER PERIOD JUNE 1974-DEC 1977. SISCO STRESSED STRONGLY THAT THIS INFO MUST REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. WE KNEW ISRAEL NOT RESPONSIBLE BUT EFFECT OF EARLIER BEECHER STORY HAD BEEN DISASTROUS. WE WERE TAKING STEPS ON OUR SIDE AVOID REPETITION SUCH LEAKS AND ASKED THAT DINITZ AND GOI HANDLE THROUGH MOST CONFIDENTIAL CHANNELS. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD GIVE INFO HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION.

2. SISCO SAID HE WISHED ADD COUPLE POINTS. IT OBVIOUS THIS OFFER WAS FOR FOUR-YEAR PERIOD RATHER THAN TWO. WE THOUGHT PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY IN AIRCRAFT SUPPLY WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR BOTH OF US AND WE WANTED TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT IN MOST UNMISTAKEABLE AND PRACTICAL WAY. IN THIS WAY WE HOPED TO AVOID FURTHER PUBLICITY ON AIRCRAFT SUPPLY MATTERS FOR REST OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. WE HOPED ISRAEL WOULD SEE THIS AS POSITIVE RESPONSE.

3. DINITZ ASKED WHETHER 12 PER YEAR RATE MEANT DELIVERIES AT ONE PER MONTH. SISCO SAID THAT AS PRACTICAL MATTER WE HAD NOT DELIVERED F-4'S SINGLY IN PAST; THIS WAS SOMETHING TO BE WORKED OUT ON TECHNICAL LEVEL. DINITZ SAID THAT HE RECALLED PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS HAD HAD PROVISIO FOR EXTRAORDINARY DELIVERIES IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, AND ASKED IF THIS OFFER CONTAINED SIMILAR PROVISIO. SISCO RESPONDED THAT THIS POINT NOT EXPLICITLY COVERED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS, BUT HE COULD SAY OUR POSITION WOULD BE AS IT HAD BEEN, IF THERE EMERGENCY WE ALWAYS READY TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT SUPPLY SCHEDULES. ROGERS

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE APPROVED BY: NEA:JJSISCO
CLEARANCES: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR S/S:MR.BARNES

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
S
NODIS
S
NODIS
S



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

COPY 12 OF 15 COPIES

O R 302230Z MAY 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0000
RUESKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0000
RUESHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0000
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
RUESOR/USINT CAIRO 0000
RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0000
RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
BT
S E C R E T STATE 103841

CONTROL: 8967Q
RECD: 30 MAY 73 7PM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 MAY 31 AM 8:03

NODIS
TOSEC 05

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-3
TAGS: MASS, SA, IS, US
SUBJECT: SALE OF PHANTOMS TO SAUDIS: SISCO-DINITZ MAY 29
CONVERSATION
REF: STATE 100056

SUMMARY: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DINITZ CALLED ON ASST. SEC
SISCO MAY 29 TO PRESENT SPECIFIC GOI OBJECTIONS TO PHANTOM
SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA. SISCO SAID USG WOULD CAREFULLY
EXAMINE ISRAELI CONCERNS BUT COULD NOT ENCOURAGE GOI TO
EXPECT REVERSAL OF USG DECISION. END SUMMARY.

1. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DINITZ CALLED AT HIS REQUEST MAY 29
ON ASSTSEC SISCO TO CONVEY GOI REACTION TO THEIR MAY 23
CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL RE USG AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
TO SELL SAUDI ARABIA F-4'S. MINISTER IDAN AND PGL COUNSELOR
RAVIV ACCOMPANIED DINITZ. ATHERTON AND STACKHOUSE WERE
ALSO PRESENT.

2. DINITZ MADE FOLLOWING INTRODUCTORY POINTS: (A)
OFFICIAL GOI REACTION WAS /STRONG/ AND CONFIRMED ARGUMENTS
AGAINST PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY DINITZ MAY 23; (B) DIARAUSENC
PRECISE DETAILS RE POTENTIAL MAGNITUDE OF SAUDI ARMS
PACKAGE AND BALANCE OF CONSTITUENT WEAPONS SYSTEMS,
SUBSEQUENT REMARKS RESTRICTED TO F-4'S; AND (C) REASONING
APPLIED HERE TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD ALSO APPLY TO KUWAIT.
DINITZ ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT GOI OBJECTIONS WERE WITHIN
CONTEXT OF US-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

2 STATE 103841, MAY 30

PERSIAN GULF AND NEED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY, STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE FROM SOVIET INFLUENCE OF STATES THERE; GOI NOT RPT NOT QUESTIONING USG MOTIVES BUT LOOKING AHEAD TO PRACTICAL RESULTS OF SALE OF PHANTOMS TO SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS.

3. TURNING TO SPECIFICS, DINITZ LISTED GOI "POLITICAL" ARGUMENTS AGAINST SELLING F-4'S TO SAUDIS AS FOLLOWS: (A) PROVISION OF F-4'S TO ANY ARAB STATE WOULD DETRACT FROM SYMBOLIC VALUE OF WEAPON HERETOFORE MADE AVAILABLE ONLY TO ISRAEL AND IRAN IN THE AREA AND COULD SET PRECEDENT FOR EVENTUAL SALES TO JORDAN AND EVEN EGYPT. (B) TO EXTENT SALE ENCOURAGED ARAB HOPES OF BEING ABLE TO PRESSURE ISRAEL, IT WOULD INHIBIT PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATED MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. (C) EGYPTIANS WOULD LIKELY PRESSURE SAUDIS, GIVEN THEIR GREATLY ENHANCED OFFENSIVE PUNCH, TO TAKE MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. (D) FACT OF SALE WOULD REDUCE PSYCHOLOGICAL EDGE CURRENTLY ENJOYED BY ISRAEL OVER ARABS. (E) SALE COULD BE TAKEN BY USSR AS AMERICAN GREEN LIGHT FOR PROVISION TO ARABS OF MORE ADVANCED SOVIET AIRCRAFT. (F) SALE COULD ALSO ENCOURAGE AN EVEN LESS RESTRAINED FRENCH ARMS POLICY VIS-A-VIS ARABS. (G) F-4'S COULD BE SUBJECT TO INTRA-ARAB ARMS TRANSFERS THAT ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE COMMONPLACE. (H) SAUDI ACQUISITION OF F-4'S WOULD OBLIGE GOI TO REVIEW ITS CONCEPT OF SECURE BORDERS. (I) POST-FAISAL ERA IN SAUDI ARABIA IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT, THEREFORE PRESENT GUARANTEES OF AMERICAN CONTROL OVER F-4'S NOT PARTICULARLY REASSURING.

4. AS FOR "MILITARY" CASE AGAINST PROPOSAL, DINITZ MADE FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) SAUDI ARABIA IS AT WAR WITH ISRAEL AND MUST BE PRESUMED PARTICIPANT IN ANY RENEWAL OF GENERAL ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES. (B) 24-30 F-4'S WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE SAUDI MILITARY POTENTIAL QUALITATIVELY AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVELY AND GIVE SAUDIS NIGHT AND ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY AGAINST ANY AND ALL ISRAELI TARGETS FROM TABUK BASE. (C) SAUDI F-4'S WOULD MENACE ISRAEL'S RED SEA LIFE-LINE AND FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

-3- STATE 103841, MAY 30

5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, DINITZ SAID GOI OFFICIALLY URGED USG TO RECONSIDER DECISION TO ALLOW SAUDI ARABIA TO PURCHASE F-4'S AND, BY EXTENSION, ANY SIMILAR DECISION THAT MAY BE TAKEN RE KUWAIT. NOTING DEMARCHE HAD PERSONAL APPROVAL OF PM MEIR AND FONMIN EBAN, DINITZ ASKED THAT IT BE PASSED TO HIGHEST LEVELS OF USG.

6. SISCO RESPONDED THAT DINITZ COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT USG WOULD WEIGH ISRAELI REPRESENTATIONS AT HIGHER LEVEL IN KEEPING WITH THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THEY HAD BEEN MADE AND WITH OUR "CLOSE, SPECIAL" BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, ENCOURAGE GOI TO THINK THAT CONSIDERATION OF ISRAELI OBJECTIONS WOULD LEAD TO REVERSAL OF US DECISION. SISCO REITERATED THAT (1) SAUDIS HAVE YET TO REPLY TO OFFER AND (2) EVEN IF ACCEPTED, TIME FRAME FOR IMPLEMENTATION WAS RELATIVELY LONG ONE.

7. ALTHOUGH HESITANT TO RAISE TOPIC WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, DINITZ EXPRESSED PERSONAL BELIEF THAT IF PRESS REPORTS OF US ASSISTANCE IN STRENGTHENING SAUDI NAVY WERE TRUE, AUGMENTATION OF SAUDI NAVAL STRIKE CAPABILITY WOULD POSE GRAVE PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL AND FORCE IT TO RE-EVALUATE ITS ENTIRE SECURITY POSTURE IN RED SEA. ATHERTON SAID THAT US-SAUDI NAVAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ORIENTED TOWARD COASTAL SECURITY AND ANTI-SMUGGLING AND DID NOT INCLUDE DESTROYER CLASS VESSELS AS ALLEGED IN PRESS. HE ADDED THAT THIS TOO WOULD BE LONG-TERM PROPOSITION REQUIRING UP TO TEN YEARS FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION.

8. DINITZ MADE CLEAR HE NOT QUESTIONING UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF US-SAUDI MILITARY COOPERATION IN CONTEXT OF PERSIAN GULF STABILITY. QUESTION WAS DID THAT CO-OPERATION HAVE TO INCLUDE F-4 SALES. SISCO STATED F-4 DECISION HAD NOT BEEN ARRIVED AT EASILY. HE REPEATED THAT ISRAELI REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION WOULD BE REFERRED TO HIGHER USG AUTHORITIES.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-4- STATE 103841, MAY 30

9. RE PRESS QUERIES ABOUT DINITZ CALL, SISCO AND DINITZ AGREED THAT, IF ASKED, DINITZ WOULD CONFIRM POTENTIAL SAUDI ARMS SALES WAS ONE OF SUBJECTS COVERED IN CONVERSATION WITH SISCO (OTHERS REPORTED SEPTEL). DINITZ WOULD, AGAIN IF ASKED, ADD THAT HE HAD PRESENTED SPECIFIC GOI CONCERNS TO SISCO AND THAT SISCO HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS OF USG TO LOOK AT THEM. RUSH

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:GRCELLA

APPROVED BY: NEA:JOSEPHJ.SISCO

CLEARANCES: NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
S/S:MR.BARNES

NEA:MR.ATHERTON

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

O R 261703Z MAY 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUESHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUESKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0000 79600-79650
RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0000 MAY 26, 1973
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000 1:26 PM
RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0000
RUESOR/USINT CAIRO 0000
RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
BT
S E C R E T STATE 102212

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, KU, SA
SUBJECT: MILITARY SALES: US-KUWAIT ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

REF.: (A) STATE 098884; (B) STATE 100056; (C) TEHRAN 3603

1. AS A FOLLOW UP TO MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR DINITZ AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO ON MAY 23, ARABIAN PENINSULA DIRECTOR DICKMAN BRIEFED ISRAELI EMBASSY COUNSELOR MOSHE RAVIV ON MAY 24 ON BACKGROUND OF US-KUWAIT ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. NOTING WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE OF PREVIOUS DAY WAS GENERALLY ACCURATE AND MORE DETAILED THAN MAY 21 LE MONDE STORY WHICH STIMULATED IT, DICKMAN OPENED BY STRESSING: (A) THAT US DEFENSE SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS WITH KUWAIT SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE VIEWED AS SOMETHING US HAS RUSHED INTO SUDDENLY IN KNEE-JERK REACTION TO CURRENT GULF SITUATION; AND (B) THAT AS YET NO RPT NO FIRM SUPPLY COMMITMENT OF ANY KIND HAD BEEN MADE.

2. DICKMAN OUTLINED FOR RAVIV GENESIS OF CURRENT US/KUWAITI NEGOTIATIONS, BEGINNING WITH GOK'S BECOMING ELIGIBLE FOR FMS SALES IN LATE 1971--A DECISION WHICH STEMMED FROM ITS OVERTURES TO US AND OUR OWN APPRECIATION OF FACT BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM GULF LEFT THIS SMALL, VULNERABLE STATE WITH NO EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DEFENSE AGAINST

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- S E C R E T STATE 102212 NODIS

A RADICAL IRAQ WHICH HAS NEVER RENOUNCED CLAIMS TO VARIOUS PARTS OF KUWAIT. HE ALSO BRIEFLY DESCRIBED FEBRUARY 1972 DOD SURVEY TEAM VISIT TO KUWAIT AND EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN DETAILED REPORT SUBSEQUENTLY DRAWN UP ON OVERALL KUWAIT DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

3. ARP DIRECTOR NOTED THAT AFTER RECEIVING AND STUDYING REPORT, GOK IN FALL OF 1972 BEGAN MOVE FORWARD BY EXAMINING VARIOUS OPTIONS AND AVAILABILITIES. LAST WINTER A KUWAITI TEAM WAS SENT TO EUROPE TO LOOK AT EQUIPMENT IN US INSTALLATIONS THERE. KUWAITI TEAM ALSO LOOKED AT FRENCH AND BRITISH EQUIPMENT. NO KUWAIT MILITARY MISSIONS HAVE VISITED UNITED STATES, BUT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN LOGICAL NEXT STEP IF MARCH 20, 1973 IRAQI ATTACK AND SUBSEQUENT OCCUPATION OF AL-SAMITAH BORDER POST HAD NOT CREATED A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN KUWAIT AND STIMULATED GOK TO REQUEST IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF SECOND DOD TEAM TO CONSIDER HOW SOME KIND OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY--PARTICULARLY IN THE AIR--COULD BE PROVIDED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

4. THIS SECOND TEAM, DICKMAN CONTINUED, WAS IN KUWAIT DURING LATTER PART OF APRIL, AND IN CONNECTION WITH ITS VISIT, WE DEMONSTRATED F-8 AIRCRAFT, TOW ANTI-TANK ROCKETS, AND WORKED OUT A LIST OF APPROPRIATE ITEMS AROUND WHICH KUWAITIS COULD BUILD THEIR DEFENSE. THIS LIST INCLUDED FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT, ASSOCIATED TRAINING, AND FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION: 32 F-8 CRUSADER AIRCRAFT; ONE BATTALION OF HAWK MISSILES; 12 HELICOPTERS; 165 M60A1 TANKS, 50 TOW LAUNCHERS; 1900 ASSORTED TRUCKS, JEEPS, APCS AND MOTORCYCLES; A JOINT OPERATION CENTER; A TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM; AND SEVERAL AIRSTRIPS. ESTIMATED COST OF THESE ITEMS WAS A LITTLE OVER 500 MILLION DOLLARS WITH ABOUT HALF FOR EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING AND OTHER HALF FOR FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION.

5. DICKMAN SAID WE REMAIN IN "TENTATIVE STAGE" AND NO RPT NO SUPPLY AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN SIGNED. HOWEVER, WE WILL BE SENDING ANOTHER GROUP OF DOD EXPERTS TO KUWAIT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-3- S E C R E T STATE 102212 NODIS

NEXT WEEK. IF ANY FORMAL AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED, HARDWARE DELIVERY, TRAINING, AND CONSTRUCTION PHASES WOULD BE SPREAD OVER AT LEAST FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. HE STRESSED OUR REQUIREMENT KUWAIT DEVELOP ADEQUATELY-TRAINED MANPOWER WAS OF VERY HIGH PRIORITY.

6. RAVIV ASKED IF USG HAD COORDINATED THESE ACTIVITIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA. DICKMAN SAID WE HAD NOT ALTHOUGH SAUDIS THROUGH KUWAITIS POSSIBLY AWARE OF GENERAL NATURE OF

OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH KUWAIT. MR. DICKMAN ALSO SAID US UNDER NO ILLUSION KUWAIT COULD DEVELOP FORCE CAPABLE OF DEFEATING AN AGGRESSOR. KUWAITI OBJECTIVE WAS TO PROVIDE CREDIBLE STOP-GAP DEFENSE WHICH COULD HOLD-UP AGGRESSOR FOR FEW DAYS UNTIL OUTSIDE HELP FROM FRIENDLY STATES COULD ARRIVE.

7. IN RESPONSE TO RAVIV'S QUESTIONS ON STATUS USG DELIBERATIONS ON F-4 (PHANTOM) SALES TO KUWAIT, DICKMAN EMPHASIZED PHANTOM WAS NOT RPT NOT INCLUDED IN NEGOTIATIONS JUST DESCRIBED. THESE INVOLVED USED F-8 CRUSADERS ONLY. F-4 WOULD BE FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT. ARP DIRECTOR POINTED OUT KUWAITIS HAVE ALSO BEEN TALKING TO FRENCH RE MIRAGE F-1 AND TO BRITISH RE JAGUAR. HE NOTED GOK WELL DOWN LINE TOWARD AGREEMENT WITH FRENCH ON F-1. WE EXPECT KUWAITIS WILL SIGN CONTRACT FOR MIRAGE F-1 AS FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT IF F-4 NOT AVAILABLE.

8. IN ACKNOWLEDGING ISRAELI COUNSELOR'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN THAT ANY ARM SALES TO AN ARAB STATE RAISES POSSIBILITY WEAPONS BEING USED AGAINST ISRAEL, ARP DIRECTOR STRESSED ALL ARMS WE PROVIDE SUBJECT TO NO TRANSFER CLAUSE. THIS GIVES US ELEMENT OF CONTROL. ALSO POINTED OUT KUWAIT, JUST AS OTHER PENINSULAR STATES, DOES NOT INTERPRET ITS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN ARAB/ISRAEL TERMS, BUT RATHER IN GULF TERMS. KUWAIT'S FOCUS, HE SAID, WAS ON IRAQ--NOT ISRAEL--AND THAT VERY VULNERABLE KUWAIT WAS SEEKING WAYS TO ASSURE ITS CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE AND

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-4- S E C R E T STATE 102212 NODIS

SOVEREIGNTY IN WHAT WAS FOR IT A DIFFICULT SITUATION, BUT ONE UNAFFECTED BY EVENTS IN THE LEVANT. DICKMAN SAID SAUDI ARABIA HAD SIMILAR FEARS ABOUT RADICAL GOVERNMENT IN ADEN AS WELL AS IRAQ. IF WE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO SALE OF F-4S TO KUWAIT, THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT EVEN BEGIN PHASING-IN UNTIL POST-1976. THEIR NUMBERS WOULD BE LIMITED AND DELIVERY TIMED TO KUWAIT AIR FORCE CAPABILITY TO FLY AND MAINTAIN THEM.

9. MR. RAVIV ASKED FOR ESTIMATE OF CAPABILITIES OF PDRY'S ARMED FORCES. DICKMAN DESCRIBED THEIR POTENTIAL AS RELATIVELY QUITE HIGH, GIVEN AREA IN WHICH THEY OPERATE. THEIR MIG-15 AND 17 AIRCRAFT, AMPLE AMOUNTS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE GROUND EQUIPMENT, AND A TRADITION OF BRITISH TRAINING GIVE PDRY A POTENTIAL TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA. ALSO, PDRY COULD BEST NORTH YEMEN SHOULD CONFLICT OCCUR FOLLOWING POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF UNITY TALKS WITH ADEN. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, SAUDIS

WOULD BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE YAR PRESSURE TO PROVIDE YAR MILITARY WITH SUPPORT. SAUDIS WERE ALSO CONCERNED WITH PFLOAG SUPPORT FOR DHOFAR INSURRECTION TO WHICH RAVIV COMMENTED THAT LATTER SITUATION DID NOT APPEAR REQUIRE PHANTOMS.

10. EMBASSY TEHRAN MAY DRAW ON FOREGOING FOR BRIEFING GOI RE POSSIBLE US MILITARY SALES PROGRAM TO KUWAIT. RUSH

DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARP:GQLUMSDEN,JR.:LAB
APPROVED BY:NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
CLEARANCES:NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
PM/MAS:CCHAPMAN
S/S:MR. R. H. MILLER
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
NEA/IRN:JCMIKLOS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



Department of State

SECRET

73 MAY 26 PM 12:31

COPY 11 OF 15 COPIES

TELEGRAM

P 250241Z MAY 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 6704
BT
SECRET STATE 101662

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 7682Q
RECD: 25 MAY 73 8 PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-3
TAGS: MASS, SA, IS, US
SUBJECT: ISRAELI REACTION TO SAUDI AND KUWAITI REQUESTS
TO PURCHASE F-4 PHANTOMS

REF: STATE 100056

1. IN ABSENCE FROM TOWN OF AMBASSADOR DINITZ, IDAN CONTACTED ATHERTON MAY 25 TO RELAY INITIAL ISRAELI REACTION TO POSSIBILITY OF U.S. SALE OF PHANTOMS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. IDAN SAID THIS REACTION CAME FROM FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER. EBAN WANTED USG TO KNOW THAT ISRAEL WAS "ALL OUT" AGAINST SUCH SALES. ISRAELI EMBASSY EXPECTS MORE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS SHORTLY AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH DEPARTMENT TO GIVE US FULL ISRAELI REACTION EARLY NEXT WEEK. RUSH

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR

APPROVED BY: NEA:JOSEPH J. SISCO

CLEARANCES: NEA/IAI:MR. STACKHOUSE NEA/ARP:MR. DICKMAN
S/S:MR. BARNES

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



SECRET
Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH 9

R 101727Z MAR 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0000
BT
SECRET STATE 044798

CONTROL: 3 4 8 7 Q 1/2
3 4 8 8 Q 2/2
MARCH 10, 1973
1:21 PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS
SUBJECT: RABIN FAREWELL CALL AND ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
REQUESTS

1. AMBASSADOR RABIN PAID FAREWELL CALL ON SECRETARY MID
DAY MARCH 9. ALSO PRESENT WERE IDAN, RAVIV, SISCO,
ATHERTON AND STACKHOUSE.

2. RABIN SAID THAT ORIGINALLY HE HAD IN MIND THAT THIS
WOULD ONLY BE COURTESY CALL. HE DID HAVE ONE ITEM OF
BUSINESS, HOWEVER, BUT BEFORE CONVEYING IT HE WISHED
TO THANK THE SECRETARY FOR POSITION HE HAD TAKEN WITH
RESPECT TO ISRAEL AND FOR HIS UNDERSTANDING. WITH FIVE
YEARS AS ISRAEL'S AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON BEHIND HIM,
HE WAS GRATEFUL TO SECRETARY FOR HIS COOPERATION AND
FRIENDSHIP. THERE HAD BEEN OPPOSING VIEWS IN OUR RELATIONS,
BUT WE MUST REGARD THESE IN PERSPECTIVE. HE WANTED TO
EXTEND THROUGH SECRETARY IN NAME OF HIS COUNTRY THANKS
FOR THIS COOPERATION TO ALL MEMBERS OF STATE DEPARTMENT
AND U.S. GOVERNMENT.

3. SECRETARY INDICATED, LAUGHING, THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
DULL IF WE HAD NOT HAD, AT TIMES, OPPOSING VIEWS. WE
WOULD MISS AMBASSADOR. IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT IN SPITE

OF UPS AND DOWNS, WE NEVER LOST SIGHT OF OUR BASIC RE-
LATIONSHIP OF FRIENDSHIP, AND WE CARRIED ON IN THAT
SPIRIT. SECRETARY SAID HE ADMIRER RABIN'S ABILITY TO
REFLECT VIEWS OF USG TO GOI WITHOUT IN ANY WAY
COMPROMISING GOI VIEWS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SAY WHAT
WAS OBVIOUS: OUR RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT; THEY
COULD NOT BE MUCH BETTER. IN PERSONAL VEIN, SECRETARY

73 MAR 9 AM 11:49

STATE ROOM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



~~SECRET~~
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-2 -STATE 44798, MARCH 10, 1973 (NODIS)

SPOKE OF HIS HIGH RESPECT FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. RABIN AND PAID TRIBUTE TO RABIN'S PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION TO U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS.

4. TURNING TO SUBJECT OF AIRCRAFT, SECRETARY SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRIME MINISTER MEIR AND HAD SAID HE WOULD BE CONVEYING DECISION TO AMBASSADOR. DECISION ON PRODUCTION ASSISTANCE WAS CONTAINED IN LETTER HE THEN PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR, WHICH SPOKE FOR ITSELF. (TEXT BELOW. RABIN READ LETTER, MADE NO COMMENT.) AS FOR AIRCRAFT SUPPLY, SECRETARY SAID, THERE WOULD BE CONTINUITY OF SUPPLY PIPELINE. WE WOULD WANT TO TALK ABOUT NUMBERS AND HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE. OBVIOUS PHRASE WHICH CAME TO MIND WAS, WE WOULD STUDY SYMPATHETICALLY ISRAEL'S REQUEST; BUT ESSENTIAL POINT REALLY WAS WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY AIRCRAFT. RABIN ASKED WHEN ISRAEL WOULD KNOW U.S. DECISION ON NUMBERS. SISCO SAID, FAIRLY QUICKLY. THERE WAS SOME SORTING OUT TO BE DONE BETWEEN STATE AND DOD IN TERMS OF NUMBERS AND SCHEDULES.

5. SECRETARY URGED THERE BE NO PUBLICITY. WE WERE CONTINUING TO SUPPLY AIRCRAFT AND WE WANTED TO DO IT QUIETLY. IT WAS EASIER FOR OBVIOUS REASONS IF THIS WAS CASE.

6. RABIN NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER IN ALL HER STATEMENTS AFTER SHE SAW PRESIDENT, WHEN ASKED ABOUT THIS SUBJECT, REFERRED ONLY TO WHAT WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAD SAID. SHE HAD NOT ADDED ONE WORD. THEREFORE SECRETARY COULD BE ASSURED HER POLICY WAS NOT TO GO BEYOND WHAT WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAD SAID. IN FACT, ISRAELIS SAID LESS THAN WHAT WHITE HOUSE HAD SAID.

7. SECRETARY SAID WE WERE NOT IN ANYWAY COMPLAINING; WE KNEW PRIME MINISTER HAD HANDLED THIS WELL. WE MERELY HOPED THAT AS OTHERS BECAME AWARE OF DECISIONS, THEY WOULD BE SIMILARLY DISCREET.

8. RABIN COMMENTED THAT AS LONG AS MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WAS ONGOING, ISRAEL WOULD NOT DISCUSS PUBLICLY THESE

~~SECRET~~
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



SECRET
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-3-STATE 44798, MARCH 10, 1973 (NODIS)

SECRET

MATTERS. RABIN RECALLED ISRAEL HAD ASKED FOR 30 SKYHAWKS AND 36 PHANTOMS. IT BELIEVED THESE WERE REALLY NUMBERS REQUIRED. IT HAD PLACED BEFORE U.S. GOOD DEAL OF DATA; IF U.S. NEEDED MORE, ISRAEL WAS READY TO COOPERATE. IT KNEW THERE WAS PROBLEM RE AVAILABILITY AND IT KNEW USAF WAS NOT HAPPY TO HAVE TO GIVE UP TO ISRAEL SUPPLIES IT WAS EXPECTING. THERE WAS A LEAD TIME PROBLEM AS WELL. GIVEN ALL THESE FACTORS, THE SOONER DECISION COULD BE MADE, THE BETTER. ISRAEL KNEW MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WAS DECIDED. PRESIDENT HAD SAID HE COULD ASSURE ISRAEL HIS ATTITUDE WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC. PRESIDENT, OF COURSE, HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT RE NUMBERS.

9. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER GIVEN RABIN BY SECRETARY.

QUOTE:

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU OFFICIALLY THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ASSIST ISRAEL IN THE PRODUCTION OF ONE HUNDRED SUPER MIRAGE AIRCRAFT FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE NEEDS. THIS DECISION IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AIRCRAFT SURVEY TEAM WHICH VISITED ISRAEL LAST JANUARY. WE PLAN TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN MOST CASES THROUGH THE RELEASE OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND, FOR THE REMAINDER, THROUGH THE SALE OF COMPONENTS.

AS YOU KNOW, UNDER U.S. LAW, SALE TO THIRD COUNTRIES OF AIRCRAFT USING U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND COMPONENTS, WHETHER MANUFACTURED IN THE U.S. OR ELSEWHERE, IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT THE PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS PRINCIPLE IS EXPLICITLY SET OUT IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL OF 1 NOVEMBER, 1971. SHOULD ISRAEL WISH TO EXPORT AIRCRAFT CONTAINING U.S. COMPONENTS OR TECHNOLOGY FULL CONSULTATION AND A SEPARATE DECISION ON THIS MATTER WOULD BE REQUIRED.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



SECRET
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-4-STATE 44798, MARCH 10, 1973 (NODIS)

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH THE APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTING THIS DECISION. SINCERELY, WILLIAM P. ROGERS. UNQUOTE.

10. FOREGOING IS FYI AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE IN GOI. WE WANT TO RESTRICT ALL CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT TO WASHINGTON. ROGERS

NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE:HLK
3/8/73 EXT 20840
NEA - ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.

S - DLISSY

S/S MR. MILLER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

